Needed: Submarine Design Competition

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th_e. ^Drnarine construction contracts are ier_e

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P ^u W submarine design.

lh_e ^Su^j^ects of severe competition, but Voiy *^{Sn t an}y ^rea* cornp⁶¹'¹'⁰¹¹ 'ⁿ“

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sub° ^dldense contractors, designing a c_st ?^ar*^ne means taking a basic design tb_e ^lshed by the Navy and developing b^it ^eta'ls ^enough ^{so l}^c boat can be in_v j ^hile developing these details H_aj ^{Ves a} lot of work, most of the be_er)^{r des}'gn decisions already have

fense contractors would compete against each other, as well as the Navy, just as in the ship overhaul/ repair arena.

Such a design process would encour­age more creative thinking and innova-

made

'two

c₍i^^r’^ln8 the same submarine, but

P^s designing a submarine that Thp^^{6 same} requirements

Pr_e|j^^re is virtually no conceptual or

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_n^_K^inary submarine design work Hot ^det^ensc contractors. There is

%t ^{Ven a means} t>y which defense lirni_n^{aCtors can cr}*^t'^cl^ue d^lc Navy’s pre- de_sj ^ary designs. A defense industry ^er> for example, cannot recom­mit ^{3 doub}'^e hull to increase surviv- de_Sjp ^when the Navy’s preliminary hull ^dravv'ngs already show a single

Can■

Httyi ^{a a} nte of passage, but any Will . ^llred non-government engineer ^c°nsiH^neVitably ^as'^c> “Have we ever ^es ^{6reb l}Hi^s?” The usual answer is, Na_Vy’ ^^Ut Navy wants this.” The So_ns f^may indeed have very good rea- sy_ste °^r its positions, but the present Nay,¹¹! *^0r design assumes that the Iri_sj| ^ls infallible. Remember that an Phili ^Cl^i'i^an designer named John 'he fy Holland had a tough time selling the f; ^3vy ^on the idea of a submarine in _lh^lrst Place.

process could be compet­es f ^ae ^avy could just state its de- m m°^{r a} submarine’s speed, depth,

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Mission

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requirements, or simply

mission requirements and then

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hosv .,^ne design groups to determine

’they

would each meet them. De-

tion, and offer the Navy a true choice of designs. Previously sacrosanct as­sumptions, givens, and practices would be evaluated more critically to deter­mine their continued validity. Progress would be forced. Alternatives would be demanded.

The Navy already recognizes the need to draw on talent outside the Navy during preliminary design. In­deed, it adds defense contractor person­nel to its staff during such efforts. But this is teamwork, not competition. In true competition, two heads are better than one only if each is left to his own devices to determine who has the right stuff. Compromise and a melding of ideas are not taboo, but they should occur only after a competitive design process.

Companies like the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics and Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry-

dock Company have the talent and the resources to perform a conceptual or preliminary design on their own. In­clude the Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and the Naval Sea Systems Command (Nav- Sea), and the Navy potentially could have five different submarine designs to choose from.

As the cost of ship acquisition con­tinues to rise, Congress and the Ameri­can people will demand to know that all the possibilities have been consid­ered. Congress, in fact, already has asked such questions about the Seawolf (SSN-21). Being able to show that sev­eral designs were developed through a competitive process and then carefully evaluated by the ultimate operator would convince most politicians and taxpayers that the Navy’s design deci­sion was correct. This is not to say that the SSN-21 is not the best design today for our next generation of submarines, but its successor should be designed at the outset in a truly competitive manner.

This approach should be no more expensive than the existing design process. In the recent case of the SSN-21, both Newport News and Elec­tric Boat were involved equally in the preliminary design and contract design that are used later for the contract drawings and shipbuilding specifica­tions on which the eventual detail drawings are based. However, both contractors were fleshing out details for the same submarine, and one whose basic features already had been estab­lished by the Navy.

The proposed competitive design process also should be occurring on a regular basis. Major design efforts are now undertaken only to support new construction, but new construction now is proposed only every 10 to 15 years. There should be preliminary design competitions every few years. And

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