Interview: Vice Admiral William E. Ramsey, USN

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:^ne Deputy Commander- ⁿ'Chief of the U. S. Space J^mand and Vice Com- atider, North American J^r°space Defense Com- .^d, met with Proceedings •tors Kristine Wilcox and ^ ^argaret Rantz to discuss J^Vv the Navy is using, and ^a,ls to use, space tech- _H^0|°gy-—to monitor the father, find ships, and * to submarines—and

^the

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Vincennes (CG-49) ^ent had nothing to do

l_h. the Strategic Defense ^'tiative (SDI).

i_c^l°t the future is going to be inex- Atirr,- ^ 'inked to space capabilities.”

^eVen JSi H

"'em so far as to say, “Space ^ls sea control. Whoever con-

to_Urs^[1]_e^Pace will control the

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N_av ^e*dings: Since you became the (Qp q^{[2] [3] [4] [5] S} ^'^rst director of space systems ha_Ve in 1980, what major changes ity _to^^ere been in the Navy’s capabil­ity . ^Use space in support of its own 1(^|^ ^ •

itit_e ^e^^: I think space is becoming an ₀f Stated p_{ar( 0}{- _{our 0}p_erations. Chief h | j‘J^Vai Operations Admiral [Thomas iv_e ^aVward made some very support- Nav-f^ches, and his theme was, “The

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*^ra* [James] Watkins, when he ¹ board as CNO, took a vert Posture in favor of space, and

can see their efficiency and effective­ness enhanced by those capabilities.

To do that, we put satellites into space that generally fall into the cate­gories of providing communication, surveillance or information gathering, weather information, and positioning and navigation data. Today, every ship and submarine probably has two satel­lite communication terminals, and many of them have four, five, and six. Every one of them has a satellite navi­gation terminal. Many of them will have, or have today, satellite weather terminals. We are going to be introduc­ing terminals that will allow more di­rect downlinking of information from satellites.

Proceedings: Does the Navy simulate the loss of satellite data during fleet exercises?

Ramsey: Yes. People say we are de­veloping too much dependency on space. Well, I guess 1 put that in the category of: “Do we have too much dependency on aircraft, nuclear subma­rines, or carriers?” Yes, we have be­come very dependent upon space sys­tems. We will become increasingly dependent upon space systems as they become more survivable.

We have first-generation communica­tion satellites that we use today.

They’re called FLTSAT [fleet],

LEAS AT [leased], and GAPF1LLER— technically rather simple communica­tion satellite systems, efficient, effec­tive, but also easily jammed and not very survivable. But the MilStar [mili­tary strategic, tactical, and relay sys­tems] and the DSCS (defense satellite communication system) satellites will provide jam resistance and survivabil­ity, and are hardened against lasers and radiation effects. They are considered to be war-fighting systems. Their utility to the operational commanders in the field—whether land-based forces or naval forces, will be a function of what computer and display terminals are developed and available to exploit those capabilities.

Proceedings: If the Aegis combat in­formation system could not provide sufficiently clear data to allow the crew of the Vincennes to distinguish an Ira­nian passenger Airbus from a fighter plane, how do we know that the SDI system, which is going to be much more complicated, will not tell us that a benign radio signal is a missile launch?

147

^m8s / October 1988

and E-2 airborne early-warning ra¹ for example, and increasing the

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“I prefer to call [SDI] a ballistic- missile defense system. ... 20 or 25 years from now, the world will be a fishbowl. If we have information that essentially gives us a 24-hour video­tape of the world, it’s going to be very difficult for any nation to maneuver forces without other nations knowing what those forces are doing.”

Ramsey: Of course, the Aegis system performed just like it was supposed to perform. It computed a target solution, the missiles were fired, and they worked absolutely perfectly.

I think people are trying to draw too many conclusions from the events that transpired in the Persian Gulf. We don’t put all our eggs into one system. We have systems of systems. The SDI is a system of systems. There are six technologies that are being investigated during SDI’s initial phase, and they are a synergistic blending of land-based capabilities, space-based capabilities, command-and-control, and the connec­tivity to tie those capabilities together. Aegis is a single system. It was never intended for Aegis to be a panacea for naval warfare or for antiair warfare.

We have long-range systems that ex­tend our weapons’ reach beyond the horizon, but we have not yet developed a complementary identification system.

I believe that space will contribute sig­nificantly to that. The technology is here today to engineer satellite systems that will provide wide-area surveil­lance, search, and tracking capabilities. Radar systems and infrared systems, possibly, are two primary candidates.

As a result of recent Defense Resource Board decisions, monies have been pressed into the budget to pursue a wide-area surveillance and tracking system.

I think, 20 or 25 years from now, the world will be a fishbowl. If we have information that essentially gives us a 24-hour videotape of the world, it’s going to be very difficult for any nation to maneuver forces without other nations knowing what those forces are doing.

Proceedings: Would that include sub­marine forces?

Ramsey: Submarines are going to have the advantage of physics. The oceans are not likely to become transparent in the foreseeable future. [In October 1984] Paul Scully-Power, an oceanog­rapher from the Navy Undersea Sys­tems Center, flew in the space shuttle Challenger, and the pictures [see “Swallowing the Transparency Pill?” December 1987 Proceedings, pp. 149— 152J and interpretations of the dynam­ics of the sea he brought back showed the oceans are much more complex than we originally thought. He came back and said, “The oceans are proba­bly more opaque than we ever really imagined.”

Synthetic-aperture radars and other sensors have been used to take pictures of the surface of the sea, which show manifestations of underwater activity, but under very limited constraints. It’s just going to be very difficult for us to penetrate the oceans and make subma­rines more vulnerable. I don’t see it happening. The Soviets are greatly in­terested in observing the ocean also, and they’ve conducted experiments using their space station, multispectral electro-optical devices, infrared detec­tion, and so forth, with, I believe, not very encouraging results.

Proceedings: Is there any indication that SDI would be effective against sea-launched cruise missiles?

Ramsey: The mission of SDI is to de­stroy ballistic missiles. How those bal­listic missiles are launched and what system launches them should not be much of a factor. I prefer to call it a ballistic-missile defense system. That’s the way we address it at the U. S.

DEPARTMENT

Space Command, because most lik^e9 we will have that mission as an °P^etL tional command if and when we dep.' the technologies that are being inve⁵" gated for the SDI role.

SDI is not intended to target crui^se missiles. SDI is intended to destroy objects that fly through space, or r^ee<! try vehicles with warheads. Cruise ^nl siles are a related requirement, beca one could say that if the United St^att is successful in developing a very ^r° bust ballistic-missile defense then th^L Soviets may find it more attractive ¹⁰ concentrate on strike capabilities W¹ cruise missiles.

Proceedings: Does that mean SDI could ultimately make the Navy’s j° harder?

Ramsey: No, I don’t believe so. have what is called the Air Defense Initiative, ADI, which is looking ^at technologies to counter the cruise- j_S missile threat. Over-the-horizon rad^ a promising capability. Increasing sensitivity and range of the AWAC-¹ intercept capability of the fighters ⁰ ^ the future—the follow-ons to the F' F-16, and the F-14. They can all d⁰^ ^ the job now, but they’re very lim*¹®^, their intercept ranges or volume by ¹ ^ fact that cruise missiles are very

148

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Proceedings / Octobe

ity ^ don’t have a very good capabil- ^orth ^^>IC'^{C U}P ^m'^ss'l^es penetrating il,_e _ America. I think it reflects all 'hat h^{Vl£t concern a}b°^ut cruise missiles into 'h ^are attempting to bring them me negotiating process in Geneva.

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t^connaissance and command-and-

_Scrj, ^dlngs: Would you briefly de­in r ^{6 wb}at capability the Soviets have ⁱⁿ tecor •

_Raⁿ'^rol satellites?

During the last ten years, the ^v*ets ■

n_u , gradually have increased the i_{n Q} ,^er satellites that they maintain lit_es^f!!' They operate about 170 satel- 10o • ^ae United States operates about I’m talking on a broad rti^ ^now °h national systems, because in_er . 'he systems we use are com- on _c          ^sy^s'ems—we lease capability

ity ^0rnmercial satellites for connectiv- fo’h^aud and control, and so V'i_et ^C ^^e*‘^eve that some 160 of the nati satellites primarily support their

C _h^security-

rep,_e ■ ^ave a robust capability for Thecg ^IS'^l'ⁿg ^satebites on short notice. th_e si T^{6 Sorne} interesting examples of ^e"ein^L4 booster, for example, experi- Sl_4 o ^a failure. They’ll launch another W_here°°s'^er in 40 days or perhaps less, c°_ns ^We have taken a much more and dQ^Val'^ve approach. We stand down gation ³ borough engineering investi-

It

determine what failed.

hav_e ³ ^'hference in philosophy. They

bili,/^sted heavily in launch capa- ^et« to

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' ⁿey have eight different boost- Sa'e]ii_t.^aunch satellites into orbit. Their

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app_a^are very short-lived, so they

°f a _s ^nt T are willing to accept the loss 'hat diff *^{te 0n} 'aunch, where we find 'cult to accept, because ours

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^s'°n s ^ ^ComPlex, expensive, multimis-

cials discussed with the Soviets the possibility of destroying it in space in­stead?

Ramsey: The Cosmos 1900, one of their nuclear-powered satellites, is mon­itored very closely by the U. S. Space Command’s space surveillance network. We track it and continue to advise U. S. government officials of its status. The predictions are still somewhat hazy, because the satellite is stable, as far as we know, and there’s no evi­dence that it’s going to start to deterio­rate and decay out of orbit within the immediate future. So our estimate es­sentially says that in early fall, unless the Soviets take some action, Cosmos 1900 will start to reenter the atmo­sphere, the drag will increase, and it will go unstable and decay out of orbit.

We don’t have any way of destroy­ing it. The Soviets, however, do have an antisatellite capability, as vested today in two proven systems—an an­tiballistic-missile capability that rings the Moscow complex and could be used against low-flying Earth-orbiting satellites, and the much-debated co­orbital antisatellite, which they last launched successfully in 1982 but have not launched since then. They routinely have launched the SLU booster for that system through this year, and can train with other segments on the ground, so they most likely could kill the Cosmos 1900.

Proceedings: Would that provide us with intelligence if we could see them use one of those two weapons against the satellite?

Ramsey: Obviously we could gain in­formation. I’m not sure whether the Soviets would want to do that. That’s a decision that they’re probably ponder­ing if, indeed, they have lost control of the satellite. We are speculating that they don’t have control of the satellite, because the orbit is slowly decaying. If it does reenter the atmosphere and the nuclear-power package is still intact, then there’s the remote possibility of another incident similar to the one in Canada, where, as you recall, radioac­tive debris was deposited when a So­viet satellite fell to Earth in 1978.

Proceedings: Is it true that the Navy would like to have a radar satellite that could locate ships?

Ramsey: A space-based radar is a ca­pability that would serve all the armed forces. The Navy has perhaps the dom­inant and more visible requirement, in that we operate in the world’s oceans where we don’t have conventional

longer be transmitted to FLTSAT. We still have 13 usable circuits, but the ability to support operations in that area of the world has been severely de­graded. If we had a relatively simple satellite that provided a UHF [ultra­high-frequency] communications capa­bility, we could send that up, have it operate in the same general area as the FLTSAT, and augment the remaining capability—without having to launch an entire new FLTSAT, which might provide us more capability than is nec­essary under the circumstances.

We could draw other analogies to our weather satellites, which have six different sensors. If we lose, let’s say, one or a couple of those sensors and they measure an important environmen­tal parameter, are we going to launch an entirely new weather satellite, or are we going to continue to operate the one that has five good sensors? If that par­ticular capability or parameter is ex­tremely important to us, we probably will launch a new weather satellite. Well, if we had an augment satellite for just that one mission—just to mea­sure the sea-surface temperature, for example—we would most likely launch it and have it augment the remaining capability.

Proceedings: It would appear that the Navy would be in a very difficult posi­tion if the Soviets shot down some of our satellites in wartime, which they are likely to do. Is it true that we don’t have a way of quickly replacing them? Ramsey: That’s right. We have abso­lutely no way of rapidly replacing sat­ellites. The minimum amount of time we’ve experienced on a launch-on- demand is four months. Depending on what capability you’re talking about, the Soviets have been launching new satellites within a matter of hours.

We are initiating a better-defined an­tisatellite approach than we’ve had in the past, and there are some very promising proposals that will, if pur­sued, funded, and introduced, provide us with a capability to place at risk Soviet satellites. Our low Earth-orbiting satellites are at risk today from existing Soviet antisatellite systems. Our satel­lites in higher Earth orbit are not be­cause the Soviets have not yet devel­oped the capability to kill them. But that doesn’t mean they’re not going to. In fact, we’re pretty sure they will.

Proceedings: A Soviet radar reconnais­sance satellite reportedly is “dying,” and scientists predict it will fall to Earth this December. Have U. S. offi­

cllites. We design systems to

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'°^viet ^{t6n years} *ⁿ space, and the soi^tly intend them to live,

S, hi "cean.

^Cases’ 14 days. Even their only f_C)p^lrVe’Uance satellite systems live Perhaps as long as six months.

During wartime, would

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titt_cu ' ^Some kind of an emergency

^^atise°.ⁿ^'demand capability?

"tent f 'hink there is a require-

^cnpabi]°^{r tbc} United States to have the

. .«V to surveil the Earth from in

^sPai

-ec_0ns;:; ^a crisis—not necessarily just a Oient _c." ^utable capability, but an aug- httild _v^apabiHty. * mentioned that we hfes i °^ry complex multimission satel- ’h^ere. tk^{S Say we have a} FLTSAT up h*ne j_s , ^a’ FLTSAT has 23 channels. ^rate _cu_r^a "'ideband channel of ten sepa- Thai Let’s say we lose that.

^ans 'hat ten circuits can no

^,nRs / October 1988

149

means of support: we don’t have fixed radars such as those in a land-based environment; we don’t have fixed com­munication sites; we don’t have obser­vation posts, etc. So a space-based radar would broaden the horizon and extend the area of knowledge for a battle-group commander. If you downlink that directly to the battle- group commander, land-force com­mander, or Air Force commander, then you’ve got instantaneous, tactically use­ful information.

There’s been a constant give-and- take within the Department of Defense and the services as to what approach should be pursued. It now looks like we’re going to get together, and hope­fully have the funds to pursue the wide-area surveillance system.

Proceedings: Can you explain why the defense antisatellite mission has been assigned to the Air Force?

Ramsey: The antisatellite mission is a U. S. Space Command mission. That is one of our missions—space control. That means the ability to place at risk Soviet or adversary satellites and to protect our own satellites. As for the service that may have the responsibility for designing systems to satisfy that mission right now, it appears like the

Army and the Navy are the most prom­inent candidates. But all the services have some promising proposals. They all may be called upon to develop a capability. Directed-energy weapons are obviously under consideration, as well as a kinetic kill capability, also perhaps an electronic combat capability.

From my viewpoint, the easiest way to go after satellite systems is to go after the ground stations, because they’re fixed. You could do that with land forces, with aircraft, and you might even do it with the cruise mis­sile, without having to develop some­thing very sophisticated that goes out into space. The hardest thing to do is to go after a satellite in space.

So how do you address that particu­lar weakness? How do you develop mobile ground stations to make it diffi­cult for them to be targeted? That’s another area that we are embarked on as a nation, and not only in just Navy systems.

Proceedings: What is the status now of the Navy’s revised master space plan? Ramsey: The Naval Space Command is responsible for updating the naval space master plan, which complements the U. S. Space Command master space plan. The general trends of the

naval space master plan are to broad^en our base of personnel who are know!" edgeable about space. If we start dirt¹ downlinking more information from satellite systems to our seabased pl^at' forms, then we need to have peopl^e ®¹¹ board who are knowledgeable about t satellite systems. We need a broaden space specialty. Of course, we do ha' two space subspecialties today, but they are mostly vested in the U. S- Space Command, the Naval Space Command, and organizations in Was ington, D.C. But on operational stat⁵ we don’t have many space-knowledg^ ble officers, and I think we’re going need them.                ,

By the way, one area that we did¹¹ talk about today is a future capabihu that has a great deal of promise—■                                    :

satellite laser communications. Such satellite would permit communicati°^nS to submarines at any speed and any depth, without them having to stick r a mast or trail a wire. It seems to h>^e that that technology could be expand to include the remote control of rni» j and acoustic listening devices, buoy⁵ we might plant around the world. There are many possible application⁵ the satellite laser might be a comma cation capability that could actually penetrate the waters of the world.

T¹ he United States Naval Institute and the Vincent Astor Foundation take pleasure In announcing the Fifteenth Annual Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest for Junior Officers and Officer Trainees of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The contest is designed to promote research, thinking, and writing on topics of leadership in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

FIRST PRIZE: $1,500, a Naval Institute Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute.

FIRST HONORABLE MENTION: $1,000 and a Naval Institute Silver Medal.

SECOND HONORABLE MENTION: (two to be awarded) $500 and a Naval Institute Bronze Medal. The first prize essay will be published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The Institute's Editorial Board may elect to publish any or all of the honorable mention essays In any given year, but is not obligated to do so. The Editorial Board may, from time to time, publish collections of the award winning essays and other essays in book or pam­phlet form.

The contest is open to:

1.     Commissioned officers, regular and reserve, in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in pay grades 0-1,0-2, and 0-3 (ensign/2nd lieutenant; lieutenant (junior grade)/1st lieutenant: and lieutenanUcaptain) at the time the essay is submitted.

2.     U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officer trainees within one year of receiving their commission.

ENTRY RULES

1.     Essays must be original and may not exceed 4,000 words.

2.                                                          All entries should be directed to: Executive Director (VAMLEC), U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.

3.     Essays must be received on or before 1 February 1989 at the U.S. Naval Institute.

4.     The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author's name and (b) by itself on the outside of an accom­panying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank, branch of service, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the motto. The identity of the essayist will not be known of the judging members of the Editorial Board until they have made their selections.

5.     The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors during the graduation awards ceremonies at their respective schools, if appropriate, or at other official ceremonies. Mrs. Astor or her personal representative will be invited to present the first prize each year.

6.     Essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8V4 x 11”. Submit two complete copies.

7.     Essays will be judged by the Naval Institute's Editorial Board for depth of research, ana­lytical and interpretive qualities, and original thinking on the topic of leadership. Essays should not be merely expositions or personal narratives.