The Fleet Plays a War Game

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The Navy’s enhanced naval warfare gaming system (ENWGS) installations at Tactical Training Groups Pacific and At­lantic provide an accessible, state-of-the- art war-gaming capability for fleet units. The scope of games it can support range from complex global- and theater-level scenarios down’ to a two- or three-ship surface action group scenario. Specifi­cally designed to support man-in-the-loop decision making, the installations provide a sophisticated experimental, educa­tional, and evaluation arena heretofore unavailable to the fleet.

Historians trace the genesis of go and chess, the first war games, back 2,000 to 4,000 years.¹ From an educational view­point, the principal purposes of go and chess were to develop intellectual acuity and war-oriented thinking. Today, the games are recreational but they still carry lessons for the military student. Chess is a confrontational game, involving pieces of varying capabilities aimed at destroy­ing the opponent’s will to fight, which symbolically rests in the king. Winning the game is based on concentrating at­tacking forces against a particular goal. Go, on the other hand, is a game of fi­nesse and encirclement involving pieces of equal value, and oriented toward avoiding direct confrontation in favor of developing a winning position over a pro­tracted period of time. Winning the game is achieved by controlling more unoccu­pied territory than one’s opponent. The similarity of chess to Western war fight­ing is obvious, and the similarity of go to guerrilla warfare is no less obvious. The wars of liberation waged by Mao Tse- tung and Ho Chi Minh reflect the think­ing that makes go so popular in the Far East, and represent a lesson the United States relearned in South Vietnam.

War-gaming at the fleet level has a chess-like orientation. Since the maritime strategy was formulated, the primary emphasis has been on “taking the fight to the enemy.” A chess-like mind-set, how­ever, is not appropriate for all situations. Coexisting with hit-and-run, hostile forces in the Persian Gulf without estab­lishing control requires a different ap­proach.

Chess, go, and their elaborate succes­sors allow all opponents to view the en­tire gaming field. This changed with the refinement of Kriegspiel by the Prussian von Reisswitz, who separated the two sides and introduced an umpire to control and adjudicate game play.² Although much more technologically sophisticated, ENWGS keeps to these basic tenets of imperfect and late information about an opponent’s forces and actions.

Robert McQuie points out that the dumbest captain is more creative than the best computer.³ He can think ahead and scheme, choosing when, where, and if to engage. He can focus on the mission, choosing among several options to ac­complish it. With ENWGS, the Navy has chosen to invest in this creative leader­ship in preparing for war. ENWGS is an excellent vehicle for imparting insights into the dynamics of war to those ex­pected to fight; therefore, a primary pur­pose of ENWGS is to play a part in the education of students studying at the tac­tical training groups.

ENWGS, a distributed, multiuser sys­tem based on a Honeywell mainframe, is the latest in a series of electrical and elec­tronic naval war-gaming systems in­stalled at the Naval War College. Two systems are located at the Naval War Col­lege, one devoted to war-gaming and one used by the software support activity de­voted to software maintenance and con­figuration control . The mainframe at Tac­tical Training Group Atlantic hosts the local installation and two remote sites. The mainframe at Tactical Training Group Pacific hosts the local installation and two remote sites. The war-gaming department at the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies has the largest installation in the Navy, consist­ing of 44 player modules. The three other host sites have ten player modules, and the remote sites four. Currently, most games are played locally, but the system is connected to the Data Network, which will allow all sites, remote and host, to participate in the same game as well as play their own.

ENWGS is economical, accessible, convenient, and analytically abstract. It is not, however, operationally realistic; there is no way to replicate Karl von Clausewitz’s “friction.” While “fight­ing” on the ENWGS game floor will not bring sweat to the brow in the same man­ner as a seagoing exercise, neither will the cost. For example, the Pacific Tacti­cal Training Group has been preplaying the plans and events of a seagoing exer­cise. Falling between table-top review and the first sortie, the ENWGS game floor provides an excellent, low-cost test bed for operational plans.

This game floor has ten player modules

containing 13 player stations; the ® ules that contain more than one pW . station are devoted to workload-^rl1 functions. A typical player station ^c sists of one geotactical display (GeoTac), five automated status b° , (AStaBs), one alphanumeric data er> extraction display unit (AnDU), ^aIltV termodule communications equipme ^

At the Naval War College, ^w*^ier® ^ umpire monitors this ENWGS '^v game, students learn how to '^vir,₍j_0l)s wars before they go to battle sta for real.

ned ^iS

the player stations would be man follows:           _Col„-

Officer in Tactical Command / posite Warfare Commander Strike Warfare Commander Antiair Warfare Commander Antisurface Warfare Comman Antisubsurface Warfare ⁽-'^0lTir?_orjty/ Submarine Operating A^u Submarine Element Coordinate Electronic Warfare Coordinate Air Resources Coordinator . u_ter Airborne Early Warning'**¹ Control

Opposition Air Forces Opposition Surface/Subsurfa^ce

Forces

Game Director             ,jon-

Wolf Pack (game support m¹¹ e.g. neutral air, etc.)

170

Proceedings

I October

t-ndwidually captained platforms, ^{e c}ommander level. The system per-

fan

dj_s"l °n either side of the GeoTac and in ''y 'he type of information available

I>he,„

ter 3.^mhat information or direction cen-

teti

game. Facilitators are normally

‘red

.Although the system can support play-

comes into its own at the war­_s3l^s individual platform functions, as­f ⁿ'ⁿ8 a competent crew and properly V t zoning equipment. For example, the _fJris ^eiri will not turn on sensors or weap- ihe ^aut0matically; the player must order activated. Once activated, however, f^ti °^ns and sensors perform as if cor- „₀J employed, according to specifica- 3 fleet doctrine, and experience. tj₀ ^e GeoTac is a multicolored situa- jjy display, including coastal outlines ^donal boundaries. The system as-' ti_0n^^s all data links and communica­nt) ^Clrcu'^ts are operable, displaying all e_ac.^rrnati°ⁿ available to the force for bo]₀ P*^ayer. GeoTac real-time track sym- ^rePi ieates Navy tactical data sys- ^ ^symbology. Five AStaBs are ar- to keypad and track-ball are provided lw.^eat AStaB, GeoTac manipulation, l_atio^K‘^ng tracks, range and bearing calcu- etc course and speed assignments, G_eo-,. ^ae AnDU is on a table next to the is p_r'^ac and AStaB table, and a keyboard sy_st ^v'dcd for an operator. Most of the bsi_n interface is through the AnDU, (w ^verbs” to extract information and ”_cj_la ^e commands; typical verbs include for, ⁿge course,” “change depth,” “re- ^s°fst ^eafl°ⁿ system status,” “report sen- t|i]_c ^Us>” “activate sensors,” “modify tig^) ^ engagement” (i.e., free versus target’,, ^lay sonobuoys,” and “engage pti_nti' An ink jet printer capable of ii$p|ⁿ8 any GeoTac, AStaB, or AnDU ke_Cp •’ ts provided, making it easy to ^Velo^'^Py ^{records a} game as it fhe c

Play ^system is complex enough that ihg _a^{rs Ca}n’t operate it skillfully. So dur- Antjtf^arne an operator is stationed at the The_Se ^{3nd a} facilitator at the GeoTac. 8am_e ^tvv° individuals ensure that the the pi¹¹¹¹¹⁵ smoothly by making certain tio„ _a^^er receives all available informa- ttlatjj, ^rap,d|y ^as possible and by manip- 9^3 ^the system as desired. With this ^c’^ent f^rtlent’ ^most players become profi- hrigf °Aowing a 45-minute in-module

Pfaej- y the facilitator and a two-hour

“uce ^cXp_£ri_e ^naval officers with 20-30 years fare _Sn^{nce and} are experts in their war- ^c'^alties, keeping current through Se jj^{Cs at} the host site. Most of their '^t'g_j '^dev°ted to designing, construct- ''^Wr-o testing games, and ensuring the h data base and models are up to

Depending on objectives the game’s sponsor specifies, three types of games are usually played: one-sided, two-sided, and three-sided. In a one-sided game, the opposition has knowledge of all forces, including blue. Friendly forces can be U. S. only or can include one or more allies. The one-sided game is usually educational and the omniscient opposi­tion orchestrates the game under control of the sponsor and director. The sponsor, for example, may want the game to pro­ceed to armed conflict regardless of the player’s maneuvering to avoid war.

The traditional two-sided game con­sists of opposing sides that possess in­complete and imperfect knowledge of each other. Although the sponsor and di­rector may be omniscient, they cannot neatly control the game’s path. This type of game allows the man-in-the-loop to scheme, exercise deception, and avoid engagements as best he can.

In a three-sided game, the third side may be neutral, hostile, or a little of both. The third side can be an honest player or act as the sponsor’s agent provocateur.

Because degradation of communica­tions can bring a game to its knees, the amount of degradation is the sponsor’s decision. He must weigh achievement of objectives, realism, the amount and type of training desired, and the player’s skill. Voice communications in the modules consist of speakers and handsets capable of handling eight circuits, all of which can be degraded 100%.

An on-scene sponsor may participate in a game or choose to control it. The game director and his team of facilitators and operators orchestrate the game ac­cording to the sponsor’s wishes. Game- support personnel from the host site pos­sess the expertise to play almost any side.

Depending on the availability of the system, the number of platforms in a game, and the complexity and detail re­quired to meet objectives, a game can be developed in approximately two to four months. The time to develop a new one may be reduced if a sponsor’s objectives can be met by modifying an existing game.

When a sponsor requests a game, a di­rector and designer are assigned to de­velop it, and as it is developed, a continu­ing dialogue exists among the designer, the director, the sponsor, and his agents. The sponsor may wish to appoint a trusted agent to review friendly, opposi­tion, and third-side forces to ensure the game’s construction will meet game ob­jectives. In some cases, the agent may wish to observe a preplay to ensure pre­planned events unfold as required. Pre­paring for a game may require almost as much effort as planning for real opera­tions and, in fact, a fair amount is learned during preparation.

An introductory brief and practice game usually precede game play. Even for the experienced, the practice game establishes the players as a team on the game floor. By far the most successful games are the ones in which the players have invested time and effort to prepare their campaign. A successful game re­quires the player to suspend disbelief—to take the game seriously—and this is eas­ier if he has been involved in the plan­ning. Playing an existing game without trying to achieve the game’s objectives can result in an arcade-type experience for the players, and serves no purpose. The value of insights and lessons learned rests in the mind of the player.

ENWGS can record game play and provide certain post-game reports. But because ENWGS depends on man-in-the- loop interaction, it does not support rig­orous quantitative analysis. ENWGS pro­vides excellent support when the subject of the analysis is the decision-making process, situational development, and the exposure of hidden assumptions. Situa­tions that do not develop according to expectations are particularly interesting. For example, since many of today’s play­ers have little or no wartime experience, they may be unprepared for a “hot war” that does not develop according to their peacetime-based expectations. Also, they must overcome their preconceptions re­garding the opposition’s play; for exam­ple, a player sometimes refuses stub­bornly to accept an opponent’s superior performance.

The war game is most effective when it forces a player to confront unfulfilled expectations and to recognize that his ac­tions may bring about unforeseen, hid­den, and unintended results. As his own analysis of the why and wherefore lends credibility to the play and outcome, the player will gain insight and understand­ing, alter expectations, and, perhaps, even have his absolute confidence shaken. The value of the experience rests as much in what the player brings to the game as the game itself.

Directors receive most complaints when the players do not win. The game director may then be faced with two problems: criticism of the ENWGS sys­tem for its artificiality and limitations, and a political or emotional orientation of the players that precludes them from ac­cepting the game’s results.

Of the two, criticism of the ENWGS system is easier to handle. ENWGS is an impartial umpire; if one does A, the result is B. Games may be played deterministi-

171

^lngs / October 1988

The Game in Action

Tactical Training Group Pacific (TacTraGruPac) con­ducted the war-game portion of BFIT 88-2 from 21 to 24 March 1988. One of the most complicated games ever attempted on the enhanced naval warfare gaming system (ENWGS), BFIT 88-2 was a distributed game among players located at the host site. TacTraGruPac in San Diego, California, and two remote sites. Twenty-four ENWGS player stations were involved at each remote site. For this game, TacTraGruPac was augmented with three additional player stations shipped from East Coast sites. Voices from remote sites were connected through four digital, secure voice channels originating at TacTraGruPac. Data from remote sites were connected through a secure Digital Data Network.

BFIT is sponsored by Commander Third Fleet and 88-2 was last in a series of three war games, spanning the theater level to the tactical level. In the first two games, two battle groups, a Third Fleet force and a Seventh Fleet force, secured the sea lines of communi­cation and conducted follow-on power projection strikes. In this third game, the two battle groups joined forces to complete the power projection strikes and achieve air superiority in support of an amphibious landing conducted on the last day of the game. The game structure consisted of approximately 600 sea and land units, with aircraft contributing to the track count as they were launched.

Major Commanders represented in this game in­cluded Commander Third Fleet (the game’s sponsor), TacTraGruPac (the game’s host), Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Commander Seventh Fleet, Commander Submarine Forces Pacific, Commanding General I Ma­rine Expeditionary Force, Commander Special Warfare Command, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group Five, Commander Carrier Group One, Commander Carrier Group Three, Commander Service Force Group One, Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Forces Third Fleet, Commander Mine Warfare Group One, Commander Amphibious Group Three, Commander Submarine Group Five, Commander Special Warfare Group One. Commander Tactical Air Control Group One, Com­mander Amphibious Squadron Five, Commander Car­rier Air Wing Fifteen, Commander Carrier Air Wing Two, Commander Patrol Wings Pacific, Commander Destroyer Squadron Seven, Commander Destroyer Squadron Seventeen, Commander Special Operations Pacific, Fleet Deception Group Pacific, Commander Mine Division Five, the USS Ranger (CV-61), and the USS Bunker Hill (CG-52). In addition, the Naval War College, Tactical Training Group Atlantic, TacTraGruPac Reserve Unit 119, and CinCPacFlt R^e' serve Unit 119 provided game-support personnel from their commands necessary for the full complement of support required for a game the size of BFIT 88-2.

^(N^evV

Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Go'^[1] _ajid

‘See

Th c

²Porter, p. 29.

cally or randomly. Suppose in a particu­lar situation the computed probability of kill (Pk) is .6. In game processing, this Pk = .6 is compared to a reference: if the Pk is greater, a kill is scored, and if less, a miss is scored. In deterministic play, the reference is fixed before the game begins, so any situation that results in a Pk greater than the reference always re­sults in a kill. In random play, the refer­ence is not fixed, but is a random number selected for each situation, and the Pk might be greater than the random refer­ence and it might not. The concept of an uncertain event permeates ENWGS, ap­plying to all phases of play—sensor de­tections, weapon employment, aircraft launch, and equipment operation.

When ENWGS acts as an impartial umpire, the game control function is smoother because the director, facili­tators, and staff make fewer decisions, and make them by exception, allowing them to devote more time to orchestrating the game. But the automatic processing aspect of ENWGS is sometimes criti­cized, because it eliminates some deci­sions that the player has had to make elsewhere and has come to regard as es­sential. With ENWGS, the approach is to eliminate details in favor of emphasizing the more complex decisions that must be made. Electronic surveillance measures bearing lines, for example, are listed on an AStaB but not displayed on the GeoTac. ENWGS assumes the correla­tion and fixing function, and presents the player with an evaluated track on the GeoTac. The lack of bearing lines on the GeoTac bothers some players but these lines represent a relatively mechanical function compared to the decisions that the player must make once the track is detected and fixed.

The second complaint the game direc­tor faces is more difficult to handle. For one reason or another, a player will bring an antiwar-gaming bias to the game. Whether the negative bias is for the game at hand or war-gaming in general, if the player possesses significant influence, he can undermine the game overtly or co­vertly. The worst occurs when the spon­sor or a valued assistant is openly antago­nistic or cavalier. Directors, however, welcome a healthy, honest, “show-me” attitude because such individuals tend to play earnestly, and the value of the game rests in earnest play.

The largest game played to date at Tac­tical Training Group Pacific has been a two dual-carrier battle force game. The smallest has been a six-submarine, four- ship antisubmarine warfare exercise preplay game that involved P-3C and S-3A shore-based aircraft. In this game.

blue submarines were played qd>^te cessfully as individually captain⁰¹¹ 1 forms.      _kj!is

The ability to test plans and while pushing a scenario to its lim^|ts’_eXj_St weapons-free environment, does in peacetime seagoing exercises- are artificialities both in the EN ^_ut game floor and in seagoing exercis⁰*^, the two complement each other. By ^ ^ sures of time, dollars, and blood °_gntfie decks, it is better to make mistakes game floor first.

York: Oxford University Press, 1969);

Elizabeth Morris, The Game of Go (New pof' American Go Association, 1951); anti Davj Th^c ter, Origins of Military Wargaming, ^Uy₀| !$• Bulletin of Military Operations Research.

No. 3, September 1987).

³Robert McQuie, What Good is a Man in Phalanx, The Bulletin of Military Op^cra[' search, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1987, pag^e

172