Incorporating many of the new technologies identified in a recent report on future defense programs is the Navy’s A-6 Intruder replacement, the Advanced Tactical Aircraft, which will be capable of missions now unavailable to Western forces.
Emerging technologies are causing a revolution in the art of warfare. These technologies include those associated with enhanced conventional explosives, micro-miniaturization, optics/remote sensors, “stealth,” exotic materials, sophisticated data-processing hardware and software, superconductivity, and extremely precise guidance systems. Technology advances are occurring so rapidly that without a sound security strategy and wise procurement procedures to support that strategy newly developed military equipment can be obsolescent or ineffective by the time it reaches the operating forces. In light of the fact that we are facing a prolonged period of flat or declining security expenditures, what combination of which technologies incorporated into what force structure can best provide for the defense of the nation?
The recent report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, entitled Discriminate Deterrence, attempts to answer this question by developing a security strategy that makes best use of Western technological advantages. It should have a significant influence on the design of U. S. armed forces for the next century. Cochaired by then-Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle and strategist Albert Wohlstetter, the Commission included former National Security advisors Henry A. Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and William P. Clark; former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr.; former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral James L. Holloway, III, U. S. Navy (Retired); and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey, U. S. Army (Retired).
One of the basic principles upon which the integrated
long-term strategy was developed is defined by the C°nl mission’s report:
“We must diversify and strengthen our ability bring discriminating, non-nuclear force to bear w*1 needed in time to defeat aggression. To this end. ^ and our allies need to exploit emerging technologic
provide olj,
er
precision, control and intelligence that can ] conventional forces with more selective and more fective capabilities for destroying military targets’
of
The report also points out the growing interests
United States and its allies in the Third World and its de
artat11
riorating ability to gain operational access to imp0'
regions. It recommends that these interests be protects
:dW
“versatile, mobile forces, minimally dependent on seas bases, that can deliver precisely controlled str* against distant military targets.”2 U. S. maritime tor1-
and air power (to the extent that air power’s depends^
on overseas bases can be reduced) are ideally suited to
emerging technologies to accomplish this objective
dr^
Commission also recommends four programs that heavily on these technologies and are urgently neede “strengthen our ability to respond to aggression with c trolled, discriminate use of force. ,,
1) The integration of ‘low observables’ [stealth] s'‘
terns into our force posture; . ,|
2) ‘Smart’ weapons—precision guided munitions combine long range and high accuracy;
3) Ballistic missile defense; and ,«3
4) Space capabilities needed for wartime operations-^
The Commission’s bipartisan composition and the ^
going (and likely to continue) budget-driven restructut1^ of U. S. armed forces guarantee the future relevance
to
re
iff
of
of
f-
1<S
[jt
»y
V
•s
■5
•e
;6
|6
0
I-
it
dls.rePort. It will be a major contributor to force-structure KC,sions regardless of the results of the 1988 election, j m°re specifically, how will emerging technologies llj programs recommended by the Commission affect
tavy?
Observables (Stealth and Counter-stealth)
Cr f^e Commission’s focus in this area was on stealth air- CqThe submarine has long been an example of the ^Plications that low-observable technology brings to a oDte Problem. The Navy’s primary interest is the devel- °f the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA), or A-12, •e rePlacement for the A-6 Intruder. Discriminate Deter- 5e reports that: “Low observable aircraft would also Possible a number of other military missions now mrally considered beyond Alliance capabilities, for % f *6’ search-and-attack forays on enemy missiles or \-I °rces whose location is not precisely known.”4 The ;(r)j 's planned for both Navy and Air Force operation, Hi c°uld complement Air Force stealth bombers for this ,s>on.
b)e °wever, the Navy has other interests in low-observa- ®chnology. The Seawolf (SSN-21) submarine will in- the most advanced signature-reduction tech- available, making it virtually undetectable.
CO]
lrPorate >es
Hid 'attack missions with extremely precise weapons be ’ Perhaps, antiair warfare missions will be possible for Use °f this unique capability. Stealth is also desirable \ UrfaCe ships. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, U. S. pr0 ^ Retired), former Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare, a ‘‘21st-Century Dreadnought” that could carry s °f cruise missiles and possibly rely on remote sys
tems for targeting and weapon control. It could serve as the center of a strike-warfare battle group and would use low-observable technology to improve survivability in forward areas.5
The Soviets will not, however, allow us a monopoly in stealth technology. We must prepare to counter their use of this technology to avoid a significant impact on our forward-deployed maritime forces. They already have demonstrated keen interest in undersea stealth, which has greatly complicated our antisubmarine warfare problem. The current CNO, Admiral Carlisle Trost, ranks ASW as his “central warfighting concern” because of continued advances in the quality of Soviet submarines.6 In his prize-winning Proceedings essay “Melee Warfare,” Lieutenant Daniel Nylen, U. S. Navy, described the deleterious effect that the loss of an acoustic tactical advantage is having on our ASW tactics: “Traditionally, the role of the U. S. SSN [nuclear-powered attack submarine] was similar to that of a skilled hunter with a high-powered rifle. ... In the future, the U. S. SSN, designed for such long-range hunting, will find itself in a melee at close range, much like a knife fight in a dark alley.”7 Improved tactics and technologies will be necessary to maintain our current ASW superiority. Combined-arms operational concepts that integrate and magnify the antisubmarine warfare capabilities of all individual units in an area will be essential.
The loser in the ASW battle of the future will be the submarine that first reveals its presence. Because these glimpses will be rare, ASW forces must be capable of conducting near-instantaneous attacks from the closest unit. “Time-late,” the delay between submarine detection and getting a weapon on target, must be closed. This re-
N,
/ October 1988
127
ing and communications systems that generate tim1 alerts to operational commanders. SDI advances in rern1
eiy
l#
the
si"-
aginable accuracy . . . could enable the United S^1
quires a weapon that has a very high speed and very long range, is very precise, and can be launched from aircraft, ships, and submarines. Infrequent opportunities for detection of stealthy submarines, the requirement for nearinstantaneous attacks, and the possibility of a further decline in U. S. overseas basing rights all emphasize that lengthy on-station time for combat units is a key factor in solving the future ASW problem. We should start by developing an extended-duration aircraft as a follow-on to the P-3 Orion—possibly a design based on the Voyager aircraft, using sophisticated materials technology or a lighter-than-air aircraft. If we must procure a more conventional P-3 follow-on, and if crew fatigue could be reduced by improved habitability and the use of multiple aircrews, an inflight refueling capability could allow mission lengths on the order of days as opposed to hours.
More active sonar operations will also be required as Soviet submarine stealth increases. Lower frequencies will greatly increase sonar range and the number of false targets. Locating undersea targets in a cluttered environment will resemble the problem of picking a reentry vehicle out of a cloud of decoys and space clutter. Data- processing technology advances achieved by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) can help solve the ASW problem. One example is Sandia National Laboratories’ recent development of a “hypercube massively parallel supercomputer” that can process 1,024 parallel operations simultaneously—ten times the number of operations previous^ considered the theoretical limit. By comparison, the top of-the-line Cray supercomputer contains only four para'1 ^ processors.8 Soviet stealth operations will also drive us depend on remote sensors with sophisticated data procesS sensing and battle management will greatly facilitate development of these systems.
Soviet trends in undersea stealth are currently cau: the greatest concerns about the survivability of our m"" time forces, but their aircraft and missiles will also ben" from this technology. Advances in data processing, sel1 sors, communications, and targeting similar to those ^ quired for ASW will be necessary. We must be able defeat the stealthy submarine and aircraft, or our for"'3 maritime posture will be at risk.
Smart Weapons
Discriminate Deterrence reports that “current techfl" ogy makes it possible to attack fixed targets at any with accuracies within one to three meters.”9 Ric"a Perle, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter"
tional Security Policy, recently testified to Congress
“Non-nuclear cruise missiles with previously
i«5$
to replace nuclear with non-nuclear weapons for a c* ., of important targets that can now be destroyed 0 with nuclear weapons. Such deployments would sig", icantly raise the nuclear threshold and place even h" ened targets at risk. This would create a formid3 ■ deterrent to conventional attack and diminish the "e
sSNs
dumps. Almost all future surface combatants and
weaponry.” J The key point here is that the Navy’s structure is clearly linked to a strategic vision that
for£f
c0$
to rely on nuclear strikes to halt a conventional offensive early in a major war.”10
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans ground-based conventional and nuclear missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, will result in a greatly expanded naval and air force role in the delivery of these weapons. These forces previously held a dominant position in the delivery of precision, unmanned ordnance in Third World and Pacific conflicts. That responsibility now will encompass the European theater. The Navy will have to respond by gradually increasing the number, accuracy, and targeting flexibility of its sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).
However, the pace of this improvement has become an issue. The military services have been criticized for responding too slowly in developing these extremely precise weapons.11 They are accused of being too concerned with the retention of manned aircraft and other expensive platforms such as aircraft carriers. Extremely precise weapons provide many attractive options to security planners, particularly in Third World conflicts. Some developing nations have challenging defensive systems, and attrition rates for U. S. aircraft that would be acceptable in a major war are not acceptable in ‘‘violent peace” conflicts. Unmanned weapons also eliminate pilot capture.
The Navy already has made an extensive commitment to distributing offensive striking power throughout the fleet by developing and deploying SLCMs. About 20 surface ships and 31 SSNs now have Tomahawk cruise m1* siles, which are effective against a variety of discrete.r atively fixed targets, including bridges, govern^ centers, military command-and-control centers, pow'e generation facilities, airfields, drydocks, and ammunit"
will be equipped with this weapon. Significant upgrades the Tomahawk’s navigation accuracy, propulsion, and" geting flexibility are already under way, but these 11 provements fall short of the range and precision thatcl rent technology could provide.12 ,,
A new weapon program is needed to fully achieve results desired by the Commission. This will be difficul fund within the constrained defense budget situat*0 ^ which is already complicating Navy efforts to attain ^ maintain an adequate force structure. The Commiss| leaves little doubt about its priorities: “When spend"1- decisions are not clearly linked to a strategic vision.111 j there will be heavy pressures to maintain force size 8 ,■ take the cuts out of modernization. Any steady patter" that sort would be incompatible with the strategy we r i pose, which depends heavily on procurement of advan"
Vivtui; muwu IV ouuiwgiw v I'*-
forms to that of the Commission. In general war, l5 rier battle groups, four battleship battle groups, 100 SS[\ and associated amphibious and support ships are the n" ^ mum necessary to support the Maritime Strategy. In World operations, which the Commission considers likely and therefore more important for the design of 0 forces, the Navy has been and will continue to be the f° • of choice. The same force structure dictated by the N*‘1 time Strategy for general war is the minimum necessary maintain forward-deployed forces in the most likely aIt
conflict—and not wear out people, ships, or aircraft.
tacti
'°ns called for in Discriminate Deterrence.
St‘c-Missile Defense (BMD)
even r. —
The .?:!er ballistic-missile defenses have been deployed.
achi,
In
^°r the foreseeable future, the most successful strike "tlc will be provided by a mix of cruise missiles and anned aircraft. Conventionally armed cruise missiles can ten high-technology defenses and at least temporarily ■teinate high-priority fixed targets. Manned aircraft can c lyer the most ordnance on target in the most flexible economical fashion. The Navy should develop the q reniely precise, long-range munitions called for by the ^mission as rapidly as possible, but not at the expense
lts force structure, which is superbly tailored for the
'hiss'
Mi.
^ he importance of ballistic missiles will decline ulti- because of the steady advance of BMD. Nuclear C-Ms and air-launched cruise missiles will assume the ‘teary deterrent role currently filled by ballistic missiles.
1 Point, NATO solidarity can be maintained only by til b.ress'veiy improving—with conventional arms—the Jteter nuclear correlation of forces after the outbreak of a nu | —Warsaw Pact war. Then a NATO threat to initiate c C ear conflict to halt a conventional attack would be a. ’°le. With this strategy, deterrence can be maintained
NF Treaty gives the Navy a greatly expanded role in ev'ng this objective.
' addition to sinking enemy nuclear-powered ballistic- $0 . e submarines (SSBNs) during a general war with the c0v'et Union, naval forces, with their ability to maintain ha,|ert. forward positions, could assist BMD by attacking Sa| ISi’c missiles in their post-boost phase, before disper- b|eof their reentry vehicles. If submarines are ever capa- Cou,0/ 'he antiair missions described by the CNO, they •*., c°nceivably destroy ballistic missiles in flight.14 tect E program has been a technology driver for di- ten'incrgy weaPons that can provide an effective, f0 '^action, self-defense capability for surface plat- Sof( S' Micro-miniaturization will allow us to put more fe;( 'Vare (e.g., more counter-countermeasure and control ons r®s)> explosives, and endurance in our smart weap- teen ^ata Processing» remote sensor, and battle manage- ste | advances will assist greatly in countering Soviet ’h and thereby solving the ASW and A AW problems.
Capabilities Tli
t%seNavy has become heavily dependent on space sys- 0,ic ,0r communications, navigation, and surveillance. ^Ilrn'fate Deterrence reports that “the United States ti0n s "tilitary satellite systems that will continue to func- Pea 0r Can at least be reconstituted speedily, not only in by ,e’lnie, but also to support our forces in resisting attack 'auncf,Viet *ancU sea and air forces.”16 Our land-based ext|.g iacilities and our satellites in near-earth orbit are .lo-^ly vulnerable to attack. Launch facilities are sta- the ^ ar"l undefended. Our satellites are at risk because syst 0v,e's have the only deployed co-orbital antisatellite 01 ’ and their Galosh antiballistic-missile system is reputed to have antisatellite capabilities.17
The Navy has covert, secure, and mobile seaborne assets (i.e., SSBNs) that could play a significant role in speedily reconstituting some space-based assets. Though not a direct Navy responsibility, the Navy is greatly interested in ensuring that current programs, such as non- jammable communications developments, defensive capabilities against Soviet antisatellite weapons, and capabilities to hold Soviet satellites at risk, come to fruition. The Navy must also participate aggressively in formulating requirements for space-based assets and contribute its share of resources to the development of new systems.
In this period of constrained resources and rapidly advancing technologies, the United States urgently needs a security strategy that effectively employs those technologies and a force structure capable of implementing that strategy. The bipartisan Commission on Integrated LongTerm Strategy strongly endorses forces that exhibit flexibility, mobility, and precision, as well as independent overseas bases—a clear description of the inherent capabilities of maritime forces. The Commission also recommends emerging technologies and programs that will enhance the survivability, striking power, and precision of these forces.
1Discriminate Deterrence, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988, p. 2.
2Ibid., p. 3.
3Ibid., p. 49.
4Ibid., p. 50.
5Scott C. Truver, “The Navy’s ‘Revolution at Sea’: Surface Warfare in the 21st Century,’’ Armed Forces Journal, November 1987, p. 56; VAdm. Joseph Metcalf III, USN (Ret.), “Revolution at Sea,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, pp. 34-39.
6Adm. C.A.H. Trost, U. S. Navy, Statement before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1989 Budget of the United States Navy, 1 March 1988, p. 16.
7Lt. Daniel I. Nylen, U. S. Navy, “Melee Warfare,” Proceedings, October 1987, p. 58.
8Boyce Rensberger, “New Computer Works 1,000 Times Faster,” The Washington Post, 14 March 1988, p. 1.
9Discriminate Deterrence, p. 50.
10Richard Perle, Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 4 February, 1988, p. 7. (Available from American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th St, NW, Washington DC 20036).
"Peter Grier, “Pentagon Drafts Plans for ‘Smarter’ Weapons,” Christian Science Monitor, 29 Feburary 1988, p. 3.
,2Tomahawk improvements described by the Honorable Thomas F. Faught, Jr., Report by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Engineering and Systems) on the Amended FY 1989 Budget for the Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Program, p. 34. Limits on current cruise missile technology is provided by Dr. Kim R. Holmes, More Tasks for U. S. Cruise Missiles, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 11 March 1988, p. 10.
13Discriminate Deterrence, p. 60.
l4Adm. Carlisle A.H. Trost, U. S. Navy, “Sea Power and Undersea Power: The Double-Edged Sword”, Sea Power, April 1988, p. 139.
,5Capt. Alfred Skolnick, U. S. Navy (Ret.), “Too Light on Lasers,” Proceedings, December 1984, p. 30. Capt. Skolnick discusses the feasibility of developing lasers and directed-energy weapons as self-defense systems for surface forces.
16Discriminate Deterrence, p. 52.
llThe Soviet Space Challenge (DoD publication), November 1987, p. 11.
Commander Shields reported to the Office of Legislative Affairs in June, after serving as the Navy Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He has served as executive officer of the USS Sterett (CG-31), in the USS Aylwin (FF-1081), USS Nicholson (DD-982), and USS Richmond K. Turner (CG-20), and as the assistant for surface ASW and mine warfare in the Navy’s Directorate for Research, Development and Acquisition. A 1972 Naval Academy graduate, he attended the Royal Navy Staff College and received a masters’ degree in underwater acoustics from the Naval Postgraduate School.