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will reduce the horizon-limited detecl
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ranges of defending airborne early
The naval warfare implications of wing-in-ground (WIG)-effect technology are promising. Yet the United States has never built any WIG vehicles. Small experimental WIG vehicles were built and tested in West Germany during the 1970s, but no Western navy has ever adopted a WIG operational requirement. As the WIG vehicle is neither a ship nor an airplane, the lack of an institutional “home” for the concept is undoubtedly a factor in its neglect.
In contrast, the Soviet Union has vigorously pursued WIG technology for many years. The Soviet term for the WIG vehicle is “ekranoplan.” Soviet design groups have produced thousands of ekranoplan studies. Many prototypes have been built, the largest of which was the “Caspian Sea Monster” or CASP-A. The CASP-A prototype was about 300 feet in length, and first flown in 1965. It was later joined by the smaller 200-foot CASP-B. Extensive flight testing of these machines has given the Soviets a commanding lead in WIG technology.
Recently, the West has learned of Soviet intentions to place derivatives of both the CASP-A and CASP-B into series production. These operational vehicles have respectively been designated the Utka- and Orlan-class ekranoplans.
The Utka is a fast-attack ekranoplan equipped with six SS-N-22 antiship missiles (ASMs) housed dorsally in ship-type canisters. If it matches the estimated performance of the CASP-A, it is capable of flying at 300 knots at sea level. The Orlan is said to be an amphibious assault ekranoplan that can carry 400 to 850 troops or two tanks.
.The duration and scope of the Soviet ekranoplan development and test program, and the forthcoming appearance of the Utka and Orlan indicate that the Soviet Union has well-defined operational goals for these vehicles. Former Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov corroborated this evidence:
“Ekranoplan research and technical problems have been defined. Although the experience in building and operating these ships is still insufficient, their potential is recognized. Compared with surface-effect ships, ram-wing vessels will have greater speed, expend less energy and hence, other things being equal, be capable of greater range of operations.”1
Technical Profile: WIG vehicles are ing in significantly increased payload and range. The closer the vehicle flies to the surface, the greater the ground-effect, and the greater the performance.
As is the case with the flying boat, a WIG vehicle is handicapped by the need to overcome large hydrodynamic forces during takeoff and landing at sea. This results in high structural weight and installed power design requirements. In order to reduce this handicap, the power- augmented-ram/wing-in-ground (PAR- WIG)-effect concept was developed. A PAR-WIG has forward-mounted engines that blow air under the wing on takeoff, thus creating a hovercraft effect that lifts the vehicle from the water at very low speeds.
The PAR-WIG has a payload weight fraction competitive to a ship of similar size, and equivalent endurance at high ship speeds. Fuel consumed per payload per mile is lower for a PAR-WIG than for a ship of similar size at high ship speeds, and equivalent at low ship speeds. While the PAR-WIG can travel ten times as fast as a ship, it can also alight on the sea and loiter, if sea state permits.
WIG vehicles can be designed to fly out of ground-effect for short periods by trading speed for height or by increasing power. This would be desirable for avoiding obstacles or for performing popup over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting.
As with ships, a WIG vehicle’s seakeeping performance is proportional to its structural size. The larger the WIG vehicle, the higher the sea state in which it can operate. However, even a small WIG vehicle has an option not available to any ship: It can increase its cruise altitude,
albeit at the cost of severely reduced range or payload.
the conventional WIG vehicle (or n®' use, further discussion will be limits - PAR-WIG concepts. Potential PAR'"^ mission areas include antisurface, phibious, nuclear, and antisubm3 warfare, and sealift. v
Antisurface Warfare (ASUW): Th herent characteristics of the PAR' ^ vehicle will make it a potent ,j combat system. A PAR-WIG is desifn^ for high-speed, long-distance cruising sea level. Sustained sea-level oper3.
wad1'
ing (AEW) systems, significantly re ing warning time. If the defender .jj AEW assets, mast-height ship radars not see the PAR-WIG until it has ald1^^ reached its target. While convent*0 ASUW aircraft can reduce their alt*1 ^ to avoid detection, they suffer seve reduced range as a consequence. I*1 parison, the longer range of the “ WIG allows for omni-azimuthal atta For the Soviets, a combination of1 s based ASUW aircraft (such as BacR 1 s and Blackjacks) and Utka ekranop could be an extremely potent c°. aft, tion. In one scenario, the ASUW aircruiJ armed with long-range ASMs, w0(t|e head directly toward a U. S. carrier b3 , group (CVBG). To maximize >nte^bc ranges, E-2C Hawkeye aircraft won placed well ahead of the CVBG to n1^, age the outer air battle. Meanwhile ekranoplans, operating from fiordh3pS other covert coastal locations, P ,|,e even lying in wait, would circle CVBG and attack from any aZlirLjs- Prior to launching their SS-N-22 .
siles, the Utkas would zoom climb
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Proceedings
October
The present score on superpower WIG research and development is Soviets: 2—the Orlan-class amphibious assault skimmer (facing page) and the fast-attack Utka antiship missile craft; United States: 0.
%
targeting fix. With their great pay- •he ^P^ility, the offensive punch of Ekranoplans would be substantial. The PAR-WIG would be an ef-
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'ad
fg 1
l^.Ve system for ASW, able to detect, 1Ze> and kill submarines at long eaJ^s from its base. Its great payload ousd '% would allow it to carry numeric p°nobuoys, torpedoes, and mines, drift ^~WIG could operate in a sprint. node, alighting only to dip its sonar. Wlde'area ASW may be difficult, iit6 ,ever> because of the PAR-WIG ceilidh lrn'tat'°n (affecting line-of-sight so- prob°y data links). The PAR-WIG would t(jrivab|y function best when teamed with hu er|d°nal ASW aircraft operating at
altitude.
C^,o,v Warfare: The speed, pay- liCs ’ and low-altitude cruising capabili- die PAR-WIG will enable devas- 0r|a® SUrPrise assaults. For example, the it|fa n could rapidly deploy Soviet naval If;, -jdy to secure key objectives, such as t|)at pddsh straits. It has also been noted Fj||,| AR-WIGs could have reached the versiand Islands from Britain in hours ° " days it took surface forces to
Th,
Sus the
during the conflict.
major difficulty with PAR-WIG itig If 0Us operations is the actual land- sv men and equipment. Since reduced dfioi* ' wc‘8ht is a key factor enabling
PAR-WIG flight, the vehicle tytlj 1 be reinforced to allow beaching
Of
Thi
,°ut its cruise performance suffering.
the
constraint is evident in the design
>d
Orlan, which supposedly can be
V"cu bow-on and has a swing-away
%',Since
the structure of the Orlan Withstand beaching loads, it is nec- y strong enough for higher speed fela s- The PAR requirement is thereby lot k b°r this reason, the Orlan does
V have
the Utka’s eight-forward- engine design. The end result is j Efficient ekranoplan. a‘ft: The PAR-WIG’s high speed,
>ed.
and great payload would also Vy " We'f suited for the sealift role, 'op CVer> in order to reliably brave high
\ijtates-
\s need to be very large, at least 900 "'eight tons. Even so, it is esti
a transoceanic PAR-WIG
mated that one such PAR-WIG could deliver more cargo farther than three 300- ton C-5 aircraft—and do this while using 60% less fuel.
The PAR-WIG would fill a gap between conventional airlifters and slow surface shipping. Unlike aircraft, PAR- WIGs would not be dependent upon overseas bases. Yet unlike ships, PAR- WIG sealifters would be fast, require no escorts, and be invulnerable to torpedoes and mines. They would reduce the requirement for material prepositioning overseas. And while less efficient than large freighters in carrying bulk cargo, the relative survivability of the PAR-WIG would be invaluable in time of war.
An extensive PAR-WIG sealift study was made several years ago by Lockheed for the U. S. Navy. A conceptual PAR- WIG was sized for the transport of four M-60 battle tanks; the result was a vehicle with a gross weight of 650 tons and a length of 238 feet. Nothing ever came of the effort.
Nuclear Warfare: The performance characteristics of the PAR-WIG would make it suitable as a launch platform for tactical and strategic cruise missiles. Its sea-skimming cruise capability would allow it to exploit gaps in low-altitude radar coverage. Furthermore, its sea- loiter capability would give it a flexibility not found in conventional strategic bombers: In a crisis, PAR-WIGs could deploy to mid-ocean and alight on the surface to maximize their survivability.
Maritime Strategy: In order to assess the relative importance of these PAR- WIG mission applications to both the Soviet Union and the United States, it is necessary to consider the maritime priorities of each nation.
Two of the highest Soviet maritime priorities are defense of their nuclear- powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the defense of their homeland against attack from the sea. Since the U. S. Navy attack submarine is the primary threat to the Soviet SSBN, it follows that the ASW mission has a high Soviet priority. Defense against attack from the sea involves ASUW against
U. S. Navy battle groups and ASW against U. S. Navy and allied SSBNs.
Consequently, one might expect that the Soviets would make production of the Utka-class ASUW ekranoplan a high priority. It is also likely that an ASW version of the Utka will be developed, although this mission would be shared with conventional ASW patrol aircraft. In fact, it should be emphasized that the ASW and ASUW ekranoplans would complement, rather than replace, existing systems.
The U. S. maritime strategy is based on sea control, power projection, and strategic sealift. The resupply of Europe by sea in time of war is a major concern, and is made possible by protecting the sea lines of communication. Unfortunately, convoy escort forces available to the United States are insufficient to meet the magnitude of the Soviet submarine threat. In this context, PAR-WIG strategic sealift would have a high-priority mission application to U. S. naval strategy. As PAR-WIG sealifters would not require escorts, more escorts would be available for conventional ship convoys.
Although massive capital investment would be required to establish a U. S. PAR-WIG sealift capability, a greater barrier to attaining this goal is the absolute lack of any U. S. technological base or planned research efforts. There is no easy way to match the decades of Soviet experience in this field, but it is essential that the United States prepares for the introduction of ekranoplans in Soviet forces by examining their likely operational employment.
The lack of a WIG technological base in the United States limits future U. S. developmental and operational options. This situation should be rectified.
'Roy McLeavy, “Forward,” Jane’s Surface Skimmers 1983 (New York: Jane’s Publishing, Inc., 1983), p. 17.
Mr. Sommer, a project manager for Veda Incorporated in Arlington, Virginia, has supported the management of several naval aircraft acquisition programs, including the E-2, C-2, E-6, and the naval airship. He previously worked as an engineer for the Garrett Corporation in Los Angeles. Mr. Sommer has a bachelor’s degree in engineering and applied science and a master’s in national security studies.
ln8s / October 1988
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