Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

The ‘Old Man’ and the Sea

The Stark Report

A Maritime Strategy for 2038

Blood on the Decks

Doctors Should Train for the Fight

Design Doldrums: SWATH & Sea Knife

Yankee Sub, Go Home!

So Long, Mr. Nice Guy Calling Cutters to the Gulf ASW: Winning the Race Women at USNA: Miles to Go . . .

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petty officer community, believing

“The ‘Old Man’ and the Sea”

(See W. K. Earle, pp. 49-55, August 1988

Proceedings)

Captain Hugh C. McCaffrey, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)—I never sailed on the Eagle. I did my time in the rigging of the Danmark, the Danish training ship the Coast Guard had in World War II. But the captain’s beautifully written account stirred some nostalgic memories for me. To feel again the salty smell of an open ocean breeze and to sleep again on board ship, lulled by the seductive motion of the ever restless sea—a sensation no landlubber will ever know—was won­derful indeed.

I may never go to sea again. It’s get­ting a little late in the day for me. So, thank you, Bill, for taking me there one more time.

“The Stark Report”

tSee M. Vlahos, pp. 64-67, May 1988; N. L.

Flacco, p. 17, June 1988; H. C. Boshen, p. 16,

July 1988; S. Peek and L. B. Jackson, pp. 19­24, August 1988 Proceedings)

Chief Petty Officer W. G. K. Bowen, U. S. Navy—Mr. Peek’s outspoken com­mentary on the Stark’s (FFG-31) prede­ployment training deficiencies was fasci­nating, if all too familiar. The insane ticket-punching mentality of our manage­ment-oriented Navy implies that the quantity of evaluation bullets is more important than honest quality. After con­secutive tours on board a frigate and two air squadrons, I have seen many fine junior officers leave the Navy because of this play-the-system-or-else attitude. Mr. Peek says that department head tours on board the Stark were about 18 months; on our frigate they lasted less than 11 months. Internal division officer rotation at all three units was more frequent. Leading chief petty officers and leading petty officers became bystanders, wast­ing valuable time in an endless cycle of explaining or defending and then proba­bly needlessly revising division proce­dures. The enlisted community is aware of all this, but accepts it as an “officer thing” generally out of their control.

The quality of training has always been a problem in the Navy, and the loss of key officer and enlisted personnel during critical operational phases is not unusual. Conducting training en route to an opera­tional theater might be more practical* But after a decade of this “management approach to the operating forces, one new thing bothers me a great deal. The chie officer corps has found the key to suc­cess, is adopting a similar attitude: evalu­ating not necessarily how well one p^er forms a task, but how many jobs one holds and how visible those jobs are. A Mr. Peek correctly observes, the Sovie and U. S. systems offer two extremes >ⁿ personnel assignment and training- Ce^f tainly there is a middle ground; it willj^us take a lot of common sense and ha work to get there.

“A Maritime Strategy for 2038’

(See S. A. Hastings, pp. 30-35, July 1988

Proceedings)

Colonel Ky L. Thompson, U. S. Mar>ⁿ^ Corps—Lieutenant Hastings is corre when he says “the United States needs new Maritime Strategy.” However, h¹ argument—ranging from nescient 0 ^e“ “the unprecedented outbreak of dem°^c racy in Latin America”) to notable (*-^e ’ his comments on Antarctica)—ultima^ > flounders because of his failure to g^ra " the fact that the current “strategy” '^{s nel} ther a military strategy for a maritn state, nor a naval strategy in the clas sense.

If the United States is to have a ^trU maritime strategy, it must be an intern² tionally accepted national strategy ^ratn than a service idee fixe. It must be a str egy that determines the mutual ^re*^at'°u_e ship between the land forces and naval forces, a strategy that consio naval forces and land forces as ⁰ weapon. This is something the Navy^ maritime strategy fails to do. The Navy strategy orchestrates a Gotterdamrneru s for the Soviet fleet, while doing lit¹*⁶ ^

provide for the critical reinforcement Europe. It views the land campaign ^aS diva views the chorus.

Regardless of my comments, l-*^eU \-_or ant Hastings deserves an accolade contributing to the discussion of the m^a time strategy. Until we in the naval P^r fession are able to accept what the curr pseudo-maritime strategy is and is however, we will be unable to remedy¹ ^ current problem, let alone produce Maritime Strategy for 2038.”

about

Commander Smith complains

de­

He is correct that SWATHs are

signed to operate at a constant

the

and

thus must include ballast tanks placed

that

ible

Commander Smith is correct

SWATH has significantly less ^arraI1jq_e able, enclosed volume than a comp^ara monohull, and that modern combat® are volume limited. Thus a SWATH displace more than a monohull size ^ perform the same mission. The most ^ cient shape in nature is a sphere. Aⁿ SWATH is very unsphere-like. Hovve*^ the magnitude of this drawback ^ somewhat ameliorated as we gain tf

experience in arranging SWATHs- While “artists” indeed may

ence in the Navy who has seriously ^c^₍ sidered such an application, certainly'  ,

“Blood on the Decks”

(See A. M. Smith, pp. 62-66, July 1988; R. W. Savage, p. 79, September 1988 Proceedings)

“Doctors Should Train for the Fight”

(See M. S. Baker, p. 65. July 1988

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Steven L. Oreck, Medical Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve, practicing civilian orthopaedic surgeon— The purpose of the medical components of the Naval Reserve is to be readily available on extremely short notice to provide care for the wounded, injured, and ill victims of any potential conflict. Many projections indicate that it would take 30-60 days from the initiation of a conflict for even volunteer physicians to be inducted, indoctrinated, and placed in an operational billet (whether at a naval hospital in the United States or some other medical facility). The time needed to draft physicians and other health pro­fessionals would be longer, since most of these individuals are not registered with the Selective Service and would have to be found before they could be potentially available. What this leaves us with is the necessity for those active-duty Navy phy­sicians (and dentists, nurses, and corps- men), plus those in the ready reserve, to take care of the casualties for the first 30­60 days.

Experience in the Arab-Israeli wars and in the Falklands Conflict indicates that the volume of casualties can be high from the beginning, not allowing the lux­ury of being able to build up our medical resources slowly. Furthermore, as both Captain Smith and Commander Baker allude to, the patients will not need rou­tine hernias or medical workups, but sur­gical trauma care and medical care for environmental and tropical diseases not commonly seen in the United States.

As Commander Baker says, we must “train for a fight.” Surgeons should have a chance to spend some time in the facil­ity that they might be assigned to. We should use their expertise and ask them if they have any suggestions about equip­ment or arrangement. There is probably substantially more trauma experience among the Naval Reserve doctors than active-duty physicians.

Furthermore, the suggestion to cut back on reserve center physicals is out­standing. Most physicians I know, espe­cially the surgeons in the critical areas, find having to do these physicals in any volume extremely unattractive. Physi­cians who would crawl on their hands and knees to be involved in more real-time activities become discouraged when they spend their weekends conducting physi­cals. Perhaps, in the best of all possible worlds, we would be so completely manned with physicians in the reserves that the physical load per physician would be very light. Unfortunately, we are unlikely to reach that happy state in the near future.

Instead of doing physicals and having the corpsmen assist reservists in filling out their forms, wouldn’t it be better to have physicians spend a weekend at a trauma center? Even if they only observe, it may be a nice refresher and it may be many nurses’ and corpsmen’s first expo­sure to real-life trauma. Such trips to the trauma center also would expose some medical personnel to the Navy and Naval Reserve, and might enlist some new re­cruits.

Without proper ongoing, hands-on trauma training, these dedicated reserv­ists will be no more capable of perform­ing their tasks than line officers restricted to working a plotting board in a reserve center who never go to sea, or aviators flying simulators who never sit in a real cockpit. Fortunately, most reservists and those in the reserve command hierarchy don't see reserve medical personnel per­forming their mobilization mission in peacetime. When a conflict strikes, how­ever, the need for immediate competency is just as great.

“Design Doldrums: SWATH &

Sea Knife”

(See K. M. Smith, pp. 96-98. July 1988

Proceedings)

Captain B. F. Tibbitts, U. S. Navy, pro­fessor of naval construction and engi­neering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former director of the Naval Sea Systems Command's Ship De­sign Group—Commander Smith at­tempted to educate those who see the small waterplane area twin hull (SWATH) as a panacea, but he presented an unbalanced case.

He charges that SWATH ships are ad­vocated for many high-speed missions. Really? By whom? For which missions? I have been involved in many design stud­ies for high-speed ships and in SWATH design studies as well. The two seldom coincide (FFX is the only major excep­tion that comes to mind) for the simple reason that the SWATH pays a large power penalty because of its wetted sur­face. To push a SWATH more than 30 knots requires excessive horsepower. SWATH does have the advantage of suf­fering much less speed degradation than a monohull as the seas rise. But no one who is familiar with the facts portrays the SWATH as a high-speed ship.

Commander Smith uses the phrase “high-deck area missions.” And at t^|r- glance, a SWATH may appear to have a lot more deck area than a monohull ⁰ similar displacement. But careful '^nsPj^, tion shows that this is not so. A SWAT is typically beamier than a monohull, b also shorter, and thus the net deck area about the same. Perhaps the SWAl appears bigger because its shape is dm ent from those that we are accustomed to- those who have somehow “ensured ^{1 a} SWATH has been considered ⁰ “every” new class of ships. His state ment is wrong. I have been shipm" with every Navy acquisition design o the last decade, and a SWATH alternative has been examined in about 10% °f * cases. Further, when starting a new sign, no alternatives should be ruled ou priori. So even if Commander Sm't ^ assertion were true, the situation wo not be improper.

displa^ce ment (to maintain clearance between seas and the cross-deck structure) the lower hulls. However, to state this adversely affects the ship’s usa volume misses the point. The lower h are sized to provide sufficient buoy at' to float the ship. Because of accessibt ■ problems this volume is not very use!" a legitimate SWATH drawback. But co verting this low-value real estate into

last tanks makes virtue of a necess i

that a

at'

have

‘artists” indeed may _flt drawn SWATH aircraft carriers, I ^arri aware of any one with ship design

, no¹

for the high-performance convention takeoff and landing aircraft in the ^ today. The practical limits of beam . draft rule out SWATH applications rn» beyond 15,000-20,000 tons. And ^ yond this displacement range. SWATH loses its seakeeping advan -

over the monohull. SWATH, however, is seen often as a candidate for operating vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) or vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, and properly so.

Care must indeed be given to arranging the propulsion plant in a SWATH. Plac­ing the prime movers in the lower hull is unattractive because of maintenance, accessibility, and radiated noise consid­erations. Placing the prime movers in the upper hull may lead to a complex drive train as Commander Smith suggests. But an obvious solution is electric drive. T- AGOS-19, the Navy’s first SWATH ship and currently under construction, em­ploys electric drive. Indeed, I know of few SWATH designs in recent years that have not employed electric drive. This is all the more reason for the Navy to con­tinue development of electric propulsion.

Commander Smith notes that SWATHs need more control surfaces than a monohull does. Typically a SWATH needs forward and aft control surfaces to control pitch (like a subma­rine’s sail/bow and stem planes), in addi­tion to rudders for directional control. Obviously, this adds cost, complexity, and concerns about reliability. But let’s examine this a bit further. First, it is per­fectly feasible to combine the SWATH “stem planes” and rudders into a single pair of canted control surfaces. Second, while forward surfaces are believed to be necessary (to damp heave), the degree of controllability of these surfaces varies with the speed-to-length ratio of the ship. At low values, fixed forward surfaces may prove adequate. At high values, you need controllable surfaces. In between, you need surfaces that are adjustable. Thus, the cost, complexity, and reliabil­ity issues, while real, vary from applica­tion to application.

SWATHs at high speeds are indeed less maneuverable than monohulls unless differential thrust is applied to the propul- sors. On the other hand, they possess excellent directional stability. At low speeds, a SWATH’s maneuverability is unsurpassed. The ship designer must be aware of these advantages and disadvan­tages.

Commander Smith’s observations re­garding the SWATH’s sensitivity to changing loads are mostly correct. The SWATH may be poorly suited to handle loads that are rapidly applied or removed, although its ballast system can handle loads that change more slowly.

Commander Smith’s comments re­garding the SWATH seakeeping operat­ing envelope are confusing. Yes, the slamming of the support (cross-deck) structure is frequently the limiting case.

But the fact remains that in a well- designed SWATH, this limit occurs as much as two full sea states higher than the upper seakeeping limits are reached in a comparable monohull. Moreover, not only does a SWATH roll and pitch less than a monohull, the period of the mo­tions is longer, and therefore the acceler­ations are less.

Finally, Commander Smith notes that a SWATH suffers from excessive beam, draft, and height that present harbor facil­ity problems. He notes problems with piers, and one could add drydocking problems as well. These are valid issues, that must be addressed in any SWATH design.

Other SWATH negatives that Com­mander Smith did not address might in­clude concerns about the unusual struc­tural loading of the ship, damaged stability (off-center flooding), and high cost because of size and redundant ma­chinery plants.

On the other hand, the SWATH does have some things going for it in addition to its seakeeping properties. It has the potential to be an excellent antisubmarine warfare vessel. Its radiated noise signa­ture can be lowered because the prime movers are located in the upper hull and the propulsors see a relatively clean, sub­marine-like wake. The lower hulls are well suited for installation of sonar arrays because of their physical configuration, their relatively greater depth below the water surface, and their separation from main machinery spaces. The boxy upper hull can easily accommodate helicopters or VTOL aircraft, and these aircraft can be operated in higher sea states than in a monohull.

Applications where excellent direc­tional stability are important, such as in towing long arrays, can be good missions for SWATHs. SWATH, like all twin-hull ships, easily can accommodate a center well, and this may be a desirable feature in oceanographic survey applications.

There are indeed SWATH advocates- and also advocates for hydrofoils, ait' cushion vehicles, surface-effect ships- planing craft, catamarans, monohulls- etc. Advocates who oversell ultimate y serve their causes poorly because they soon lose credibility. Yet anyone who h3S attempted to introduce new technology into the Navy, whether it be a new hu form or some new subsystem, ^s0°ⁿ comes to understand that enormous p^ef sistence is needed if one is to overcome the Navy’s innate resistance to radica J new ideas. Many of the SWATH disa vantages that Commander Smith cites are real. Some are generic and must be h^ve with; the impact of others may be reduce as our experience with SWATH ^ira proves. We learned a lot designing ¹ AGOS-19. We will learn more when > goes to sea. Let’s try to restrict the hyp^er bole until then.

“Yankee Sub, Go Home!”

(iSee J. D. Harbron, pp. 87-88, August 1988

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Richard P- ^^al' sen, U. S. Naval Reserve—Although 1 not wish to delve into the political asp^ea of the sovereignty of Canada’s A^fC waters, I must point out an error in Co mander Harbron’s piece. As the f°^ral. navigator of the USS Archerfish (SS 678), I can testify that the first submarine surfacing at the North * was conducted in May 1986 by the An erfish, the USS Ray (SSN-653), and tn USS Hawkbill (SSN-666). There are s few “firsts” remaining in the world ¹ it is only human for the particip^an quickly to note any inaccuracy and a- the record to be set straight.

“So Long, Mr. Nice Guy”

(See R. Fraser, pp. 36-44, July 1988; R. E. Korroch, p, 89, August 1988; K. J. Barry, pp. 79-84, September 1988 Proceedings)

Irwin Siegel, U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliarist—I would like to remind Commander Fraser that there is no need to rush to embrace private industry for search and rescue or even aids to naviga­tion when 32,000 Coast Guard Auxilia- rists (all volunteers) are serving side by side with all of the Coast Guard family, trained by Coast Guard standards, and with a 49-year track record of national service.

wishes the Coast Guard to be.

To turn the military against citizens protesting political actions is a dangerous policy, as even dictatorial governments have found out throughout history. In the United States it is a shortcut to disaster, as the confrontations between the military and protesters proved during the Vietnam War.

It is important to remember that the basic function of the military services is to protect all the nation’s citizens—even those who disagree with the military.

Michael Cohn—In Table 2 of his article, Commander Fraser lists “Protesters” among “Threats” to Coast Guard Port Operating Environments in both peace and war.

Protesters should not be seen as threats, unless they engage in terrorist activities (such as the Greenpeace sinking of Icelandic whaling ships). Protesters, at least in the United States, are citizens expressing their opinion in ways guaran­teed by basic U. S. laws. If they violate the law they should be dealt with by civic authorities, such as police, rather than by a military force as Commander Fraser

“Calling Cutters to the Gulf”

(See R. E. Korroch, pp. 58-61, September 1988

Proceedings)

Captain G. Stephen Duca, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)—When Congress re­fused to send Coast Guard units to the Persian Gulf, it injected itself into the process of implementing an executive branch foreign policy initiative, by dic­tating the program priorities of one of the armed forces. This transaction represents a classic confrontation between the exec­utive and legislative branches of govern­ment. That it ended up as a Reagan ad­ministration loss, with Congress dictating foreign, defense, and drug policy in one

fell swoop, is not surprising. Simply P^ut’ the initiative to use the Coast Guard in the Gulf was out of step with the sentiments of the American people. That it was poorly handled politically and containe questionable programmatic content con­tributed to the political defeat, but a chie cause of the misfire was the administra­tion’s continued misreading of the rea importance the American people have p^ul on the country’s drug problem. Further more, this myopia has acted as an incen­tive for Congress to challenge the Reag^an administration by designing its own drug programs—e.g., the present rush to g^e the Department of Defense committed m the “drug war.”                                                    .

Members of Congress were not J^{uS 6}        -esent

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being politically partisan. They reprt the people, and the administration better wake up to the fact that the peoP^e are not of a mind to lose yet anoth “war.” The Persian Gulf misadventure makes one wonder whether anyone in ^[ administration is really listening to ¹ people, who are increasingly irritated an want answers to some fundamental q^ueS tions. For example, how can you nounce one month that “victory [>^sl sight . . . [we’re] turning the corner ⁰ drugs” (based on one data point of dm» use) and, shortly thereafter, attempt cajole Congress into participating crisis management through creat* fc the Special Executive-Legislative l^a

Force? The people are weary of the g

loping ad hoctry that has charactenz most administration drug programs. I*¹ J want to know: Who is in charge ^ the Commander-in-Chief, Congress, ¹ Drug Policy Board, or individual go^ve ment agencies?      ,

Specifically, to the Justice Departure

had

and Drug Policy Board: Are you

listen-

H the

ing? Turn on the television and read papers. The people say they are tired an ad hoc war being “fought” in P grams announced in press releases. ¹ are saying that your priorities are ^wr°₀f and that drugs are a national menace the highest priority. If you needed Coast Guard in the Persian Gulf. ^vV j couldn’t you devise a strategy that ^w°^u provide assets at the expense of ^s° other program(s) not directly tied to ^ declared “war”? By not having a ^ program, you loaded a congressi°ⁿ blunderbuss and two of your best ag ,, cies were shot down. And by the way.^ you are the general running this war. ^ people would like to see the equivalen ,

tin⁵

_co-

a Five-Year Defense Plan against ^ threat to their security. They want a ^t herent plan of action based upon ^r ^ nonpolitical threat assessments, effe^c _{ policies and forces designed to com

the:

' grandparents are mugged, and their

^lstening? Some leadership is needed. Get .¹ 'n front for a change. All the discus- .,°ⁿ about your being the wrong place for j.^e Coast Guard is the voice of dissatis- ^en people—lots of them your own. If bsten, you can hear their message: °u are part of this war. It’s time to get jj^>Ur head out of the Transportation ‘pork ^arrel‘ _an(j h_eip your long-neglected ^gency fight the enemy.”

Wh;

that

f'nd Coast Guard, are you listening?

"tion

you could have made a fine contri-

to enhancing national security in

claimed that your defense role and . ^racter are trivial. Their message is

■ They can do without you in the Gulf

%

Winning the Race”

^each element of the threat, and the con- ^C(,rnitant commitment of resources. They ^are asking, “What specifically are you ^g0lng to do to help us and when will we ^See results? And no slogans, please!” Office of Management and Budget, are y°^u listening to the people? They are ^tlred of your finger-pointing at other na- ^ll°ns and at Congress, and your limp ex­^CUses that fighting the drug war is expen- ^SlVe- They are paying the bills and they ^want results. Their teenagers are the cas­hes who are overdosing and dying,

'■‘tildren are victimized for lunch money y addicts who go untreated year after !^Car- The people are tired of entering the attlefield of this war every day. How "'any more policemen must be murdered 'aside the Capital Beltway for you to stop saying no” to antidrug funding and agree to support these programs with re­Sou_rces And by the way, the people are sking y_{ou t0} proving effective oversight . federal programs. Are you asking the ^ht questions? They weary of program- atic duplication, waste, and ineffi- ency. They wonder why you approved building of two air forces and navies ^r this “war” where logic dictates a ^eed for only one of each? department of Transportation, are you ^at the people have told you is only y^ - your priorities have been rearranged.

but

JjOulf. The people know that, and have ^cha,

thi_s. *1                                                              -

* ⁱⁿat in the business of life saving,

l^anitarian^m, maritime safety, and |L . ^er>forcement, your contributions to ab/^{r                      anc}^ security are indispens

^ar- but not in the Drug War.

^J4SW:

/.“ ' H. Patton, pp. 63-66, June 1988 ^t0"edings)

_ti^'^ain K. H. Smith, U. S. Navy (Re­_a ' This article promises to examine ^mbmed-arms” approach to antisub- ^lne warfare for submarines, but all it

offers is obeisance to this latest "buzz” phrase. It also loosely develops the idea that attacks by maritime patrol aircraft on submarine contacts could be followed by an independent submarine attack on the same contact. In this situation, says Cap­tain Patton, surface forces’ ASW attacks against enemy cruise missile-firing sub­marines could be helped if U. S. nuclear- powered attack submarines (SSNs) poured ordnance simultaneously onto probable launch points. Such assists, the author concludes, “cannot help but in­crease the U. S. submarine advantage.” That’s the extent of his recommended “combined-arms” approach for solving the problem of increasingly quieter enemy submarines. Unfortunately, that won’t hack it.

An indication of a more serious defi­ciency in analysis is the statement that the Soviets have “triggered the most ineffi­cient expenditure of assets in the history of warfare,” wasting vast resources on submarines like the Alfas, “ . . . the Ed- sels of the global submarine commu­nity.” Some Edsels! With a far greater top speed (43 knots) than any of our best SSNs, a maximum depth of 1,000 me­ters, plus increased quietness, the Alfa class deserves respect, not cavalier scorn.

Most dismaying is the author’s pro­found failure to realize that one of the prime virtues of the Soviets’ submarine shipbuilding program is the very diversity of their submarines’ hulls. They fre­quently have created prototype subma­rines but they have built few follow-on models. It also is true that the Alfa is not without shortcomings. The main point, however, is that the Soviets create nu­merous prototypes, and they learn from each one. If the Soviets don’t like what they’ve built, they don’t seem to feel—as the U. S. Navy does—an overwhelming compulsion to create serial reproductions of their mistakes in large numbers. How Captain Patton can smugly take for granted that the U. S. Navy’s approach to submarine design and production is so superior to the Soviets eludes me. The U. S. Navy’s approach is to lobby furi­ously for the approval of a new design and, when that design is still on the draw­ing board, without one hull ever having touched salt water, thence commit itself to producing 60 or more identical ver­sions. This is a serious and systematic form of folly. The reality is that one can­not see that well, nor that far, into the future. No navy can have that confi­dence.

The U. S. Navy desperately needs to test numerous approaches and to learn as it goes along. The Navy admits that the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class was no

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had

But also, the air ASW community

as

until

its aircraft are as absolutely certain

wha¹

Captain Patton’s article continues

rary

ai«

cles concerning ASW. The articles

slim on facts, long on speculation, and

fear, the diminishing grasp throughout the naval establishment- that is a serious matter.

bias at the Naval Academy is deeply d‘^s

_with

itil*

reflects a deep and seemingly unshaka^j

off”¹'

cers that women really don’t bek¹¹¹? _;, the Navy. What is really disturbing i^s ₍

Since leaving active duty in 19^ have worked with men and women ^1,1

had

vestment banker or computer prog¹

ran¹'

eo¹

banking isn’t every bit as stress

fottf

what the Navy threw at me during ^ years at sea, they weren’t around trading floors on 19 October 1987!

m^en

alone is no excuse for the kind of 6l^at®

de-

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great step forward from the Sturgeon (SSN-637) class. Indeed, it had many characteristics inferior to the Sturgeon class. But somehow, we still have turned it into one more marvelous success story. Currently, the Seawolf (SSN-21) is the subject of a massive public relations cam­paign, and although we are without a sin­gle prototypal hull in which to conduct the necessary extensive testing, we are committing ourselves to large numbers. The Seawolf, therefore, is a very risky proposition. It is almost certain to fall short of its publicized expectations. The U. S. Navy once built many classes of subs and many prototypes. It should re­turn to that practice rather than scorning the Soviet design process.

Captain Patton made a few historical errors. Electric Boat, he says, had a six- year hiatus delivering SSNs after com­pleting its last Sturgeon-class submarine. In fact, the last of Electric Boat’s Stur­geon-class boats was delivered in 1973 and Electric Boat’s first Los Angeles- class submarine was delivered in 1977, a hiatus of only four years. Moreover, Electric Boat did not build the first of the 688 class; Newport News did.

Patton states the presumptive succes­sion of submarine attacks against a carrier battle group backwards. He says, first, torpedoes would be fired from SSNs and then missiles would be fired from a long range. Why close first to use short-range weapons and keep the long-range weap­ons, with their advantage of surprise and lessened vulnerability, under wraps? The late Soviet Admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov, in his writings about long- range missile attacks by submarines from hundreds of miles away, envisioned many submarine-launched missiles pro­ducing an almost simultaneous single­strike action against a battle group, in­cluding its ships, thus overwhelming the battle group’s defenses and scoring im­portant hits. Only then, after the massive missile strike, did he foresee a mop-up action by SSNs, which would use torpe­does from close range to ensure a deci­sive victory.

Throughout his article, Captain Pat­ton’s tone is casual, breezy, and uncon­templative. His is the language of color­ful brochures and defense industry advertising. He substitutes speculation for facts, and frequently reveals as shal­low a grasp of the complexities and true difficulties of ASW as such popular nov­els as Tom Clancy’s The Hunt for Red October (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984) dish up. When discussing air ASW, for instance, the author is most anxious lest “ . . . after hours or days on-station, weapons are carefully hus­banded against a real target.” Well. t° begin with, fixing a submarine target position, particularly a fast maneuvering one, to drop a weapon accurately is/ from the facile process that he impli^eS

better husband its torpedo resources

they can be that its targets are “real. False contacts are the rule in curre ASW, not the exception, and classifi^c‘' tion remains a grave and enduring P^r0 lem. Any realistic ASW campaign sc® nario that takes into account tn prodigious false-contact statistics u) continue to bedevil ASW, coupled ^vVlt the vast waste of ASW ordnance exp^erl enced in World War II, will reveal th^a the U. S. Navy is exhausting its precio^u> supply of ASW torpedoes very early- is a disappointing—and, I hope, temp⁰ trend in recent Proceedings ad¹

weak in interpretation. They mirror.

of A^S, And

“Women at USNA: Miles to Go ” (See S. Schollaert, p. 94, August 1988 Proceedings)

Lieutenant William D. Paine, U- , Naval Reserve—Midshipman S^cK ^ laert’s withering attack on instituti°ⁿ turbing. After nearly ten years women in the ranks, the Academy ^s belief among the majority of male underlying this attitude is the idea women in the Navy are there for susp^t'^j reasons, that they are somehow abnon” for wanting to serve their country-^ j

far more equitable society than what 1 been used to. Nobody questions the tives or the competence of a femal^e

mer. And if anyone thinks investm¹

ful

f

years at sea, they weren’t around

The military attracts more young ^ from conservative social backgro^un , than from liberal ones. But backgr°^u

harassment Midshipman Schollaert scribes. If her company commander