CDS: The Combat System Trigger

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fleet needs? The cutting-edge combat di­rection system (CDS) must demonstrate two essential qualities to answer these questions: flexibility and the ability to grow.

The next-generation CDS for the carri­ers is the Block 1 Advanced Combat Di­rection System (ACDS). When the fleet receives this next-generation CDS, will the new system—“mature” technology upon deployment—immediately and rap­idly begin to fall behind the increasingly complex C² problem? Will the C² short­fall then steadily increase for the next eight to ten years while the next C² sys­tem is defined, specified, and developed? Does this signal the start of another labo­rious development cycle? Hopefully, the ACDS Block 1 will mark the start of a new era of CDS processing, because this system will introduce to the CDS world flexibility and the ability to grow.

In terms of C², flexibility may be de­fined as the capacity and capability to operate in a wide range of tactical scenar­ios, including those scenarios that have not yet been experienced. Flexibil'O; therefore, is an essential element of systems. C² system designers must res'^s the alluring temptation to impose the “expertise” (or prejudices) on new sy^s terns. Even if you were there, or ha been there for X- number of years, y° probably won’t “be there” when the sy tem you have helped design will be ployed. Collectively, designers tn^, learn to incorporate that may be tailored officer to meet the tai

CDS: The Combat System Trigger

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systems and provides it in some palatable display

tance to solve the tactical problem. What could the system have done to help formulate a timely resp¹ The Aegis command and decision (C&D) processor used on board USS Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class j guided-missile cruisers points in the right direction- an Aegis C&D had been processing the data that tn Stark’s systems detected, the probable result would

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As unfortunate as the USS Stark (FFG-31) incident was, it prompted the naval community to produce many insightful articles on shipboard systems design, tactical procedures, and Persian Gulf perspectives. Within this wealth of information, one analysis distin­guishes itself with its clarity and objectivity. This is the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) report on the Iraqi Mirage attack.

The report details the Stark’s system capabilities, and the probable status of each system at the time of the Iraqi F-l attack. It then summarizes the probable rea­sons for the failure of the ship’s combat system to re­spond. Following these sections, the report outlines the capabilities, status, and possible employment of each primary system of interest on board the Stark, with one exception: the ship’s combat direction system (CDS).

In the Stark incident, every indication points to a fully operational CDS that was doing the job for which it was designed, that being the processing and display of data received from the frigate’s sensor and weapon systems. It is, however, the combination of the weap­ons, sensors, communication assets, and the CDS that comprise the combat system. Yet, any discussion of the CDS was conspicuously absent from the HASC report. Why?

The Combat System Sight and Trigger: The ability to engage targets, deceive weapons, track contacts, and communicate data resides in operational combat sys­tems (of which the Stark had a full complement). The decision to employ those assets must be made by the tactical action officer (TAO), who will base his deci­sions largely upon the data that is first received and then displayed to him (and to his operators) by the CDS.

If we draw a loose parallel to a rifle, the weapons, sensors, and communications gear provide the ability to deliver the bullet. As the CDS provides processed data displays, it basically is the “sight” that puts the com­bat system “cross hairs” on the target. When the TAO has made the decision to engage, radiate, or communi­cate, (and the cross hairs are on the target), the CDS will provide the means by which the TAO’s decision is implemented, either through a direct digital command to the required system, or through a verbal command to the operator of the on-board system required to do the job, or both. By implementing the TAO’s deci­sions, the CDS becomes the TAO’s “trigger.” No doubt the rifle analogy will seem simplistic to many experienced naval personnel, but if the CDS is in f^aC the combat system “cross hair and trigger,” then d should have been a key item in the HASC report on the Stark incident. Again, why the omission?

Possible Answers: The answer to this question m# reside in a prevailing attitude that the CDS is merely “display system” rather than the combat system ^cr°^s hair and trigger. The “display system” terminology implies a CDS that passively accepts data from other

for the operator. A display system, in this sense, h»^s very little combat potential. The naval tactical data ^s; tem (NTDS), as the incumbent CDS for most surface units (Aegis-class ships being the notable exception^ may be responsible for this attitude, simply because provides 1960s-vintage processing capabilities, whW rely on the TAO/tactical operator to mentally pr°^v‘^c^, much of his own data processing and tactical respoⁿ Facing the reality of what is actually deployed today' naval officers have learned to expect little real-time tactical support from the CDS. The attitude that has been created is that CDS is merely a “display sys­tem,” and not a dynamic tactical asset providing timely operator support.                        . _v

The Aegis Precedent: It is apparent that the comb tion of the Stark’s CDS and whatever hard-copy d^ata._s_ was available did not provide sufficient real-time as

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have been a series of interrogate/engage recommej tions for the inbound Iraqi Mirage. Recomrnendatm would have been system-generated by the C&D’s ^aC tive doctrine statements. Doctrine statements would ^ have reflected the rules of engagement (ROEs) and CO’s direction for that precise tactical area and si^[ll^_ tion. Each recommendation would have required a cisive go/no go selection by the TAO, and one of ¹ decision points may have defended the Stark from incoming attack.

The Aegis C&D has taken the first step to infu^se new technology into CDS processing. The “if ■ ■                                                                  ,,

then” doctrine statement processing that Aegis C& _f. providing to the fleet today performs situation mon¹

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Proceedings / October

the^^{Ue s}'^tuat*^on- For example, until now,

: ^e CE>Ss have offered a man-machine ^efface (MMI) that was rigidly fixed, ^a consideration for change. While the f. °f the world adopted holographs in Spectrum color, the Navy has labored ard with primarily monochrome ^C0^at systems

^ ^why th_e MMI inflexibility? The MMI _0n^{s a}*^ways been a design football. Every- ^ seems to “know” how to build the i^^st MMI. Meanwhile, the fleet supplies °hcn conflicting inputs and waits for one approach or another to garner enough supporters and momentum to hurdle the competing approaches and get deployed. Thus, the MMI that finally arrives in the fleet is the product of the design and ap­proval of a relatively small number of agencies and personnel who never envi­sioned half of the display needs imposed by integrated environmental data, for example. How much better would it be instead to allow a commander to select an MMI scheme with tailorable display for­mats and colors and display filters, cus­tomized to his operations?

The design community must recognize that it cannot define the ultimate capabil­ity for systems that are scheduled to be deployed years from the design’s incep­tion. Older software technology, limited by its rigid software code, may have im­posed such restrictive, early design deci­sions. New software technologies such as object-oriented databases, don’t impose that rigidity. The community cannot build the ultimate system (as defined ten years before it is introduced and deployed