C² for the Cutting Edge

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% '^{S VCrSe carr}'^es time-honored truth 5_S ^aPPhes to battle group effectiveness, ^eH as to personal relationships. Put in the shoes of our adversaries: you prefer to approach or engage a _cJv surface combatant or a surface s_0r( ^atar>t that is operating in close con- c_0o ^VVlth other battle group units that are and^Perativeiy employing their sensors is^P^haps, their weapons? The choice b_at ^l0Us- But consider our surface com- H₀ ^ln a dispersed formation. Even Uuj_t . it is operating as a battle group % * k® approachable and engage- ton, ^{as a} single unit without effective

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c_0tt) 8 uew factors into situations that The^l'?^an^^ers thought they had “wired.” Pf₀b| ^st naval officers respond to C² ie_tl) .^erris by anticipating how the prob- th_at ^1S Soing to try to unravel. They know tiv_ei ^ltlle pressure here and there, selec- Ptev ^aPP*‘ed in a timely fashion, can to_a^ent,^many tactical miscues. The talent of,_h ^lc'Pate, to stay ahead of and on top th_e ^tactical problem, is a key element of ^ Quality naval officer’s makeup. To- °^Wever> die C² task is taking on

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will add new dimensions and complexity to the C² equation. C² technology that allows the best use of today’s combat system assets is a priority. The next step is to have C² in place that is ready to deal with the challenge of employing and inte­grating systems infused by new technol­ogy. We need cutting-edge C² to add fo­cused effectiveness to existing and new sensor and weapon procurements.

The Navy’s Challenge: Past track rec­ords show that it now takes eight to ten years to develop, test, and deploy a new fleet system. This excruciating pace has been the rule for C² systems. A delay of this magnitude puts the fleet at the peril of operating with C² that is not by any means “state-of-the-art.” The “water­fall” design approach that begins with requirements debate and proceeds through a maze of software standards is simply too laborious and slow. The wa­terfall approach must be abandoned in favor of a more responsive C² systems development. The deployment of ad­vanced sensors and weapons will at best be partially effective if it does not depend upon the concurrent deployment of ad­vanced (or technologically comparable) C² systems. There is a critical need for system automation to cope with the vast variety and volume of data in required reaction times, for C² support that is tested thoroughly and will perform reli­ably under heavy data loading (despite disruptive enemy measures), and for au­tomated C² response to assist the already overburdened naval officer and decision maker. And when automated weapon re­sponse is involved, that response must be predictable and reliable. As the defi­ciencies of C² become severe (that is, critical), the surface combatant in our example becomes a more isolated asset in the face of a more deadly threat. The cut­ting-edge C² system must feature the near-real-time capability to integrate new and existing combat system assets. Only in this way can new combat system tech­nology be effectively introduced to the fleet.

Flexibility and the Ability to Grow: Knowing that there is a critical need for accurate tactical information and precise C² has been more than disturbing for to­day’s fleet commander and commanding officer. The prospect of deploying with antiquated systems and the knowledge that new C² systems are years away from

deployment, have caused commanders to take the initiative. Fleet officers have developed a panoply of stand-alone, per­sonal-computer-based systems to fill the information gap. These personal comput­ers have been surprisingly effective, but because of limited interface with the bat­tle group sensors and the absence of con­trol over the data links, they provide only limited C². What they do provide is more data. The net result is a proliferation of systems that has brought larger quantities of partially correlated data to the fleet with limited means to pull this data into a single, cohesive tactical picture. In other words, these procurements do not address the problems of deficient C².

The stand-alone procurement syn­drome is not affordable in terms of defi­cient naval C² for our ships, naval offi­cers, and enlisted personnel. And although these systems fill an information gap, they have had the detrimental effect of diluting the U. S. Navy’s focus on the optimum C² architecture. The question that must be answered now is: What can be done to short circuit the development delay of a C² system to be responsive to

When the new Soviet carrier Baku sailed through the Turkish Straits in June with formidable new radar and electronic warfare equipment, she probably was looking for some of the U. S. Navy’s C² computers that “cannot talk to each other.”

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fleet needs? The cutting-edge combat di­rection system (CDS) must demonstrate two essential qualities to answer these questions: flexibility and the ability to grow.

The next-generation CDS for the carri­ers is the Block 1 Advanced Combat Di­rection System (ACDS). When the fleet receives this next-generation CDS, will the new system—“mature” technology upon deployment—immediately and rap­idly begin to fall behind the increasingly complex C² problem? Will the C² short­fall then steadily increase for the next eight to ten years while the next C² sys­tem is defined, specified, and developed? Does this signal the start of another labo­rious development cycle? Hopefully, the ACDS Block 1 will mark the start of a new era of CDS processing, because this system will introduce to the CDS world flexibility and the ability to grow.

In terms of C², flexibility may be de­fined as the capacity and capability to operate in a wide range of tactical scenar­ios, including those scenarios that have not yet been experienced. Flexibil'O; therefore, is an essential element of systems. C² system designers must res'^s the alluring temptation to impose the “expertise” (or prejudices) on new sy^s terns. Even if you were there, or ha been there for X- number of years, y° probably won’t “be there” when the sy tem you have helped design will be ployed. Collectively, designers tn^, learn to incorporate that may be tailored officer to meet the tai

CDS: The Combat System Trigger

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systems and provides it in some palatable display

tance to solve the tactical problem. What could the system have done to help formulate a timely resp¹ The Aegis command and decision (C&D) processor used on board USS Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class j guided-missile cruisers points in the right direction- an Aegis C&D had been processing the data that tn Stark’s systems detected, the probable result would

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As unfortunate as the USS Stark (FFG-31) incident was, it prompted the naval community to produce many insightful articles on shipboard systems design, tactical procedures, and Persian Gulf perspectives. Within this wealth of information, one analysis distin­guishes itself with its clarity and objectivity. This is the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) report on the Iraqi Mirage attack.

The report details the Stark’s system capabilities, and the probable status of each system at the time of the Iraqi F-l attack. It then summarizes the probable rea­sons for the failure of the ship’s combat system to re­spond. Following these sections, the report outlines the capabilities, status, and possible employment of each primary system of interest on board the Stark, with one exception: the ship’s combat direction system (CDS).

In the Stark incident, every indication points to a fully operational CDS that was doing the job for which it was designed, that being the processing and display of data received from the frigate’s sensor and weapon systems. It is, however, the combination of the weap­ons, sensors, communication assets, and the CDS that comprise the combat system. Yet, any discussion of the CDS was conspicuously absent from the HASC report. Why?

The Combat System Sight and Trigger: The ability to engage targets, deceive weapons, track contacts, and communicate data resides in operational combat sys­tems (of which the Stark had a full complement). The decision to employ those assets must be made by the tactical action officer (TAO), who will base his deci­sions largely upon the data that is first received and then displayed to him (and to his operators) by the CDS.

If we draw a loose parallel to a rifle, the weapons, sensors, and communications gear provide the ability to deliver the bullet. As the CDS provides processed data displays, it basically is the “sight” that puts the com­bat system “cross hairs” on the target. When the TAO has made the decision to engage, radiate, or communi­cate, (and the cross hairs are on the target), the CDS will provide the means by which the TAO’s decision is implemented, either through a direct digital command to the required system, or through a verbal command to the operator of the on-board system required to do the job, or both. By implementing the TAO’s deci­sions, the CDS becomes the TAO’s “trigger.” No doubt the rifle analogy will seem simplistic to many experienced naval personnel, but if the CDS is in f^aC the combat system “cross hair and trigger,” then d should have been a key item in the HASC report on the Stark incident. Again, why the omission?

Possible Answers: The answer to this question m# reside in a prevailing attitude that the CDS is merely “display system” rather than the combat system ^cr°^s hair and trigger. The “display system” terminology implies a CDS that passively accepts data from other

for the operator. A display system, in this sense, h»^s very little combat potential. The naval tactical data ^s; tem (NTDS), as the incumbent CDS for most surface units (Aegis-class ships being the notable exception^ may be responsible for this attitude, simply because provides 1960s-vintage processing capabilities, whW rely on the TAO/tactical operator to mentally pr°^v‘^c^, much of his own data processing and tactical respoⁿ Facing the reality of what is actually deployed today' naval officers have learned to expect little real-time tactical support from the CDS. The attitude that has been created is that CDS is merely a “display sys­tem,” and not a dynamic tactical asset providing timely operator support.                        . _v

The Aegis Precedent: It is apparent that the comb tion of the Stark’s CDS and whatever hard-copy d^ata._s_ was available did not provide sufficient real-time as

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have been a series of interrogate/engage recommej tions for the inbound Iraqi Mirage. Recomrnendatm would have been system-generated by the C&D’s ^aC tive doctrine statements. Doctrine statements would ^ have reflected the rules of engagement (ROEs) and CO’s direction for that precise tactical area and si^[ll^_ tion. Each recommendation would have required a cisive go/no go selection by the TAO, and one of ¹ decision points may have defended the Stark from incoming attack.

The Aegis C&D has taken the first step to infu^se new technology into CDS processing. The “if ■ ■                                                                  ,,

then” doctrine statement processing that Aegis C& _f. providing to the fleet today performs situation mon¹

the^^{Ue s}'^tuat*^on- For example, until now,

: ^e CE>Ss have offered a man-machine ^efface (MMI) that was rigidly fixed, ^a consideration for change. While the f. °f the world adopted holographs in Spectrum color, the Navy has labored ard with primarily monochrome ^C0^at systems

^ ^why th_e MMI inflexibility? The MMI _0n^{s a}*^ways been a design football. Every- ^ seems to “know” how to build the i^^st MMI. Meanwhile, the fleet supplies °hcn conflicting inputs and waits for one approach or another to garner enough supporters and momentum to hurdle the competing approaches and get deployed. Thus, the MMI that finally arrives in the fleet is the product of the design and ap­proval of a relatively small number of agencies and personnel who never envi­sioned half of the display needs imposed by integrated environmental data, for example. How much better would it be instead to allow a commander to select an MMI scheme with tailorable display for­mats and colors and display filters, cus­tomized to his operations?

The design community must recognize that it cannot define the ultimate capabil­ity for systems that are scheduled to be deployed years from the design’s incep­tion. Older software technology, limited by its rigid software code, may have im­posed such restrictive, early design deci­sions. New software technologies such as object-oriented databases, don’t impose that rigidity. The community cannot build the ultimate system (as defined ten years before it is introduced and deployed

dj_s ^ Block 1 software provides tactical full-color of P.T^S on modified UYQ-21 consoles. Here, a Gulf ’ 'dra scenario.

i_nfo ^^at helps the TAO and combat direction (formerly and Nation) ^center (CDC) personnel to respond quickly ^ambiguously to the tactical situation. More im- >h_e ^a?^[’ °P^erational Aegis personnel view the CDS as sh_0u| |^lCc where tactical support for the CDC operator ^ d be implemented.

^eir Technology for New CDSs: The Naval Sea Sys- ⁽'hief⁽~^0rnrnand, ^ur,der the direction of the office of the °Prn ^aval Operations, is responsible for the devel- cr_uj ^ent °f the CDS for the carriers and non-Aegis sy_s, ^ers of the 1990s. The advanced combat direction Pew⁰*¹¹ (ACDS) brings new hardware (in Block 0) and •he fatware and software technology (in Block 1) to ^eet- As the next-generation CDS, ACDS Block 1

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lt»^rg_er^ne P^rocessing to be expressed in a significantly la_rge ^nUfnber of statements, which can be applied to a tq_re ^ar|d detailed track file. With this doctrine struc- ^s°Hn | °P^erational commander, TAO, and even per- •he _c⁶ *°Wer in the CDC hierarchy will benefit from Mtrvi,°^nt'^nual software assessment of a vastly increased g_e^nt of tactical data.

ci|j_t ^^0t,d doctrine processing, ACDS Block 1 will fa- •ija^ ^e 'he integration of Link 16 (a high-volume, an- ^9chiev ³¹³ *'ⁿk) ^w*^,d ^new tracking algorithms to <tet_aj| ^e higher track data accuracy, more identification - and greater track processing capacity. An inte-

grated intelligence database will improve features such as automated status board (ASTAB) development and threat evaluation. In addition, task organization and combat system status ASTABs are provided, the threat summary is supported by continual processing of oper­ator-controlled automation, doctrine statements can ex­press the ROEs and preplanned responses, and force TAO and shipboard TAO pass-down logs are stored and recalled by system software for rapid review.

Automatic Combat System Checklists: ACDS will also provide a creative application of the “if . . . then” doctrine processing, called automatic combat system checklists (ACSCL), which will support both the force and ship-board TAOs. This feature allows the system operator to input combat system checklists that represent specific combat system configurations, prede­termined by the CO and his staff to be the best config­uration to deal with a specific tactical situation.

The checklist contains system operating modes and required actions that will be taken to place the force or ship into a posture that optimizes the use of its sensor, weapon, and communications equipment. Although each checklist may be recalled and reviewed at any time, a specified checklist can be automatically dis­played as a doctrine statement response. The selection of criteria for the doctrine statement is the means by which the tactical situation is described. The checklist is input to a CDS file and then specified as part of the doctrine statement response. When the CDS detects the predefined tactical situation, the system initiates the set of operator-prespecified responses at computer speed, including the recall and display of the appropriate com­bat system checklist, which details the CO-approved combat system posture.

The ACSCL capability represents the type of CDS support that will be essential in the tactical evolutions of the next decade. Many systems deployed today fea­ture hard-wired, inflexible capabilities, which may or may not meet the needs of tomorrow’s exercises or battles. With the ACSCL feature (as with ACDS Block 1 doctrine), the force TAO and the ship’s CO/TAO decide how to respond to specific tactical situations; that guidance is then incorporated into system doctrine. The checklist file gives them the absolute flexibility to select the required tactical response—from system acti­vations, to CDC procedures, to required tactical com­munications. The result, created by a meshing of the operator’s irreplaceable tactical expertise with the data assessment power and speed of the CDS computer, will be timely and accurate combat system responses.

—Jay P. Parker