Blinding Lasers: The Need for Control

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°^naId Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initi-

ers ,^are equipped with laser range find- lase_rs ^tacL aircraft and helicopters use ^a,tuch’ _K^eitBer mounted internally or on both _n ⁶ Po^. Fire-control systems dsi_nB ^a l^and and at sea are increasingly

W⁸ lasers.

either to supplement fire-

o_n lasers carry a potential for peacetime abuse, perhaps already the case °^ard the Soviet ship Chukotka.

Lasers, an integral part of President

Th <;^{are not} J^ust weapons of the future, ap.. ^V'^6tS demonstrated one potential _nil Ration of laser weapons during their ^teinb ^{6 tCStS} Hawaii at the end of Sep- tr_at- ^er ^87. According to an adminis- ^l0n statement, a laser from the Soviet

Sibir’ ,

ship pi*^ass missile-range instrumentation (j hukotka apparently irradiated two blind! ^SUrve'H^ance aircraft, temporarily lated'¹¹® °^ne P*'^ot- This was not an iso- '^'°rlc]^CaSe "b’^ov'^et irradiation of Free vv_a$ ^SUrveillance aircraft and ships” Vt"?. in Soviet Military Power Pubij *^^e defense Department’s annual ^viet _u^{atl0n on} developments in the So- de_nts ⁿⁱ°n’s armed forces. These inci- ^c°nce ^SU®®^{est a} pattern that should raise of | ^ns °ver harassing or pernicious use ^{ers ev}en outside of war.

Th

are tens of thousands of lasers ^nlcs ^ ^today. Modem main battle

^tr°ni_c ^rac*^ars or for use in heavy elec­tee |_as^WarL^are environments. Man-porta- •or_{s ar}^{er r}ange finders and target designa­te ^e also in widespread use.

^CaPabif ^tBese lasers have a blinding b>iliti_es '^ty: furthermore, blinding capa- tlep|₀ ^W'H grow enormously with the ment of low-power lasers designed

specifically for attacking human eyes and electro-optical sensors.

The laser’s characteristics make it a tempting peacetime weapon. Recent events underscore the fact that lasers can be used to impede surveillance by air­craft, ships, and satellites. And because laser irradiation is not specifically regu­lated under current international agree­ments, it is also available as a means to show displeasure at being under surveil­lance. Political and military leaders may construe laser irradiation as an intermedi­ate measure between passivity and injuri­ous action—a forceful way of sending a message. In addition, lasers offer a tech­nique for provoking incidents and caus­ing injuries when other methods would be less desirable or would leave more evidence.

The danger from lasers is clear: The use of blinding laser irradiation is as harmful and provocative as firing ord­nance. If unrestricted deployment and use of such weapons continues, laser-induced damage or injuries could heighten ten­sions or provoke hostilities during an in­ternational crisis. Taking preventive action in the form of an international pro­hibition seems the most reasonable course. The argument for a ban must be that the character of potential injuries to individual soldiers is simply unacceptable to the world community. Previous pro­scriptions on the use of the so-called dum-dum bullet and the use of chemical and biological weapons serve as two such precedents.

An international ban on blinding laser weapons during war, however, may prove impossible to achieve. Verification is the first obstacle. Laser irradiation meant specifically for permanent blinding will be hard to distinguish from irradiation meant for other purposes, such as range finding, target illumination, or temporary blinding. Furthermore, many nations may not want to forgo the important mili­tary capabilities that lasers provide.

Peacetime limits on laser irradiation may prove much more feasible. Either a separate nonirradiation agreement or an addendum to the Incidents at Sea Agree­ment could prohibit the laser irradiation of personnel in peacetime. The Incidents at Sea Agreement provides for rules of conduct to assure the safety of navigation for U. S. and Soviet ships and aircraft operating in close proximity. Its relevant articles require that “ships and aircraft of the Parties shall not make simulated at­tacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons” in the direction of military and nonmilitary ships, and “not use searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illumi­nate the navigation bridges of passing ships of the other Party.” These rules would apply to lasers, as well. Provisions restricting laser irradiation of ships and aircraft could be added to the Incidents at Sea Agreement during its annual review.

The many additional possibilities for laser incidents not on or over the high seas, such as attacks on satellite sensors, warrant a separate, specific agreement. The terms would be straightforward: No laser irradiation of another country’s per­sonnel or equipment during peacetime would be permitted. Verification would be simple: Detection of any laser irradia­tion would constitute a violation. The success of the agreement would depend on the parties’ common interest in avoid­ing injurious or provocative incidents. Such an agreement would be easy to im­plement, and it would help to limit the risk of conflict between the superpowers.

Dr. Fridling recently joined the research staff of the Science and Technology Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses. His previous positions included terms as a MacArthur Fellow in international peace and security, a research fellow at the Center for Sci­ence and International Affairs of Harvard University, and a guest arms control intern at Lawrence Liver­more National Laboratory. Dr. Fridling received a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Brown University in May 1986.