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Wh,
pCOn°mic and strategic importance of the ,ersian Gulf in the 1960s, it made a deci- restraint and attempted to influ- events in that region with a modest
S|°n for ence
client for Ptevit
°Pmi
"'ho;
en the United States realized the
°w-the-fiag force of three ships. This .y was considered a great success, ar,icularly in light of the strong British ^esence for the first 25 years after World ar II.1 We also hoped that stability in e Gulf would come from the develop- .nt °f local forces by means of foreign 1 '•ary sales and regional security agree- ents.- iran was considered a primary this peaceful plan because of its j> 10us experiences with the United a,es: during World War II, to resupply c Soviet armies; afterward, to force the , Wrawal of Soviet occupation forces in 6; and, finally, to reestablish the °narchy in 1953.3
he U. S. policy of local naval devel- ent also extended to Saudi Arabia, ^"ose cordial relationship with the j .lted States dates from a historic mcet- ® °f President Franklin D. Roosevelt q . King Ibn Saud on board the USS (CA-71) in the Great Bitter Lake g *ne Suez Canal during February 1945.4 J recognizing the fundamental reli- lvvUs’ ethnic, and historic rivalry be- [[lce°n 'he Arabian and Persian sections of -Gulf, the United States attempted to a a counterbalanced group of Gulf associates and ensure a continued supply of petroleum to its industrial trading partners, Japan and Western Europe, as well as to itself.5 Unfortunately, the Shah of Iran and the President of Iraq saw an opportunity, afforded by their vast oil wealth, to build powerful military forces to dominate the Gulf and exclude all “foreign” interference. This created an arms race of unusual intensity.6
Both Iran and Iraq went shopping in the world arms bazaar at a pace that overwhelmed the ability of their military and political structures to adapt. Iraq saw a succession of military coups, and the Shah had to build a massive secret police apparatus to maintain control. The naval race in the Gulf was part of their larger arms programs. Iraq, a client of the Soviet Union, was hampered by an abbreviated coastline, which placed its only major port 100 miles up the Shatt al-Arab (shore of the Arab) waterway—historically the boundary between Arabic and Persian, Sunni and Sh'ite, and now between radical socialism and an imperial monarchy. Observing these proceedings was the wealthiest nation in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia.
While Iran and Iraq rushed to fill the power vacuum left by the 1971 British withdrawal, the Saudi government took action in the cautious, conservative, methodical manner that has been a hallmark of its political process. The Royal Family of Saudi Arabia, led by the King, forms a governing committee that has guaranteed consistent policies despite unexpected political changes. The political and economic influence of Saudi Arabia worldwide has parallels within the Middle East and the Islamic world. A true appreciation of Saudi dominance in the Persian Gulf has become central to the United States strategy, but only since the fall of the Iranian Monarchy.7
As the arms race got out of hand between Iran and Iraq—neither of whom were considered trustworthy allies by Saudi Arabia—the Royal Saudi Naval Force (RSNF) was being planned and procured, one step at a time. The Saudi’s built major naval bases from scratch at Jiddah and Jubail; started naval training programs to develop the required technical skills; and gathered officers from other Saudi armed forces—primarily the army and the national guard—to administer the new military service. The RSNF is an extremely respectable force within
The time may have arrived for the rapidly growing RSNF fleet to leave the grandstands and field more of its ships, like the guided-missile corvette Al-Yarmook (here off Bahrain), in the Persian Gulf.
bo,.
145
The RSNF has modern, capable combatants, like its F-2000-type guided missile frigate Abah, here steaming with the Durance-type replenishment oiler Yunbou (part of the Sawari program), and its minesweeper Al-Quysumah. But the navy also needs better training and maintenance programs to make its force, now good on paper, also good at sea.
the Gulf, at least on paper.8 Nevertheless, a pressing question still remains: Where is the Saudi Navy today?
A number of growing pains come with the rapid expansion of any program; the RSNF has its share. Most of Saudi society has little experience at sea, possibly because of past shortages in the materials required to build the traditional Arabic sailing ships, called “dhows.” The Saudi regards himself almost exclusively as a landsman, with a Bedouin heritage. With the sea still a strange and dangerous environment, the build-up from a few fast patrol craft and about 2,000 personnel in 1978 to today’s fleet and a 7,000-plus force has severely strained the supply of traditional seamen as well as technically oriented individuals. Additionally, Islamic tradition restricts the ability of Saudi wives to take care of the family business, and makes few allowances for the husband to absent himself for any length of time. The average Saudi sailor has little appreciation for the value of getting under way on board a complex platform he doesn’t even completely understand.
Prudently, the Saudi Navy bought a training package with every major weapons purchase. The Royal Saudi Naval School facilities have some of the finest classrooms available for naval education. They are filled with excellent teaching aids, such as cut-away equipment, full- scale working models of hydraulic steering and controllable pitch propellers, and actual installations of equipment for hands-on operation and maintenance experience. With each procurement, a new classroom was built, equipped, and staffed. Consequently, within a block of each other on the Jubail Naval Base, there are three diesel engine schools: one for the German Motoren and Turbinen Union, one as part of the U. S. Saudi Naval Expansion Program, and the newest for the French “Sawari” program. Each diesel engine school has a unique curriculum, its own instructor, distinct training aids, and a separate administration. This, however, highlights an inherent problem within the Saudi enlisted personnel structure.
The quick growth of the RSNF has outpaced any professional development or career advancement plan, if there ever was one. There is no effective rotation of personnel. Qualified enlisted men may find themselves stuck on the same class of ship—if not the same ship—for their entire careers. If a man is good, and many of them are very competent, the captain is hesitant to approve a transfer, knowing that a new recruit is all that may be available. Consequently, older, smaller ships are overmanned with senior experienced petty officers, while new- construction vessels may have an inordinately high percentage of fresh talent.
This detailing failure results in the continuation of “temporary" instructors at schools where experienced Saudi petty officers should have taken over long ago. The “temporary” is usually an ex-U. S., British, or French Navy chief petty officer who will think twice about training his replacement for what is a very lucrative second career, where the actual teaching time may be less than 50%. This is a major flaw in the development of a truly professional RSNF, but it is quite common to all areas of the Saudi society as it moves into an industrial economy. Moreover, there is a separate RSNF commanding officer or officer liaison for each school, who, more likely than not, views the operation within his building as his private domain. Any effort to streamline the administration of this group of training activities will bruise many an ego.
Some of these problems have been identified by the RSNF, and solutions must first come from the officer corps before they can be passed along to the fleet. To develop an expanding officer cadre, the RSNF sent personnel to the Pakistani Naval Academy (Muslim, friendly, and nearby). Unfortunately, those young gentlemen were on full pay
tha*
stani instructor, it suffices to say there were many ways to pass the cou To correct this, a Basic Ship’s Ofjj® course was initiated in 1985 and taugn Jubail by two U. S. Naval Reserve cers and a retired British lieutenant co mander. The Saudi Naval AcaC*a ^ began its course of instruction in I ’ and the first class will graduate in 1 * This is a three-year technical Pr0". nt> built on the British curriculum °ut 1;)| and temporarily staffed by a British training team. It will be another deca L
Vi M«aaaaa^ t>hll ,,, ,, ww — - - dg j
so before these graduating profession can begin to influence RSNF policy- Early in 1986, when the British cj}1^ ulum was being installed at the b ^ Naval Academy, just across the s ^
as--run
- -
from the French “Sawari” program
two blocks down from the U.
Basic Ship’s Officer Course, s0lT,f°gf
realized that yet another system damage control compartment numbs ^
marking was about to be taugW- . , mfferencc-
point paper demonstrated the differ® (
in each system, and recommended
the same compartment marking and ilUI bering systems be taught by all sen ^
The recommended system
was
Frenc
because of the relative size and cornp'e,(
M
ity of the new French F-2000S-desig^.^
Madinah-class frigates and mm Durance-class combat support vesS ,0r The British damage control 'nstr!^nly recommended it to the Naval Aca ® , authorities, since there were no Bn f built ships in the RSNF. The Direc?0 the Damage Control and Firefig ^ School recommended it, as “id ^
French and U. S. Military Training ^
sions. It was further recommended
consideration be given to adopting . French system for damage control m
\
ls a man who manages his affairs sipping tea or spiced coffee. To do
Cers u
Shipsave neither commanded major war- The , u nor f’Sgcd extensive sea time.
ley havi
ks and compartment numbering r°ughout the Saudi fleet. None of these e^ommendations were accepted.
The approach of the RSNF toward a|ntenance parallels the training pro-
ani- The Saudi image of the ideal Bed- °um j
Hile sJlnual labor is beneath his dignity. The 1^ la* §°al for the average Saudi is to ^ Ve a maid and a gardener. The routine 'atenance which is necessary to keep tu, ern> high-tech, missile-firing, gas ve ‘ne-powered, electronic-age naval ssels ready for sea is often equated to tu^l labor. When an RSNF ship re- tj0^s ^rorri a cruise of even a day’s dura- ■ she is greeted by a maintenance
ret,ntry- t0 obtain the list of necessary clajjlrs' Generally, the list includes some civ ma'ntenance items and a few tHean8e'the-Iightbulb”-type require- Ihe S ^'s deprives the Saudi sailor of eqUj0PPortunity to really get to know the ‘tu ^>rnent’ and thereby learn his rate. A tivn'key” navy has yet to prove effec- lr> survival at sea.
the RoderslliP comes from the top, and efpe . F leadership has demonstrated its exp. IVer|ess by overseeing the rapid sltipinS*0n °* navy’ h°th in terms of in , anc* Personnel. The infrastructure is f0reace and it is time to fine-tune the cerj.C, The majority of senior RSNF offi-
stliPs
e a good navy on paper—and in
port—but the RSNF Headquarters in Riyadh may not know how to use it. Such is indicated by Saudi talk of procuring even larger ships and some submarines. Both of these would be out of place in either the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea, and both would be unsupportable by current Saudi training, maintenance, or port facilities.
The opportunity to test the RSNF in its designed mission exists now. The Saudis need to review the lessons from the ongoing naval conflict between Iran and Iraq. Within the first six months of that war, both of those potential RSNF adversaries suffered a drastic reduction in the capabilities of their naval squadrons.9 This combat has been an excellent lesson on conservation of assets. Iran is politically hampered from obtaining replacement ships. Iraq has an Italian-built force at the ready, but no secure maritime port at which to base it.10 Active RSNF patrol of the approaches to Saudi ports in the Gulf would invite confrontation with Iran and risk an “accidental” attack by the Iraqi Air Force. An occasional nuisance attack by Iranian Revolutionary Guards on a Saudi-owned tanker is a short-term tactical problem. How to bring an effective and lasting peace to a very narrow waterway and to live with both Iran and Iraq is the long-range strategic consideration of Saudi diplomacy.
The only way for the RSNF commanders and the Saudi government to gain confidence in the capabilities of their ships is to use them. But they must use them wisely. Given the present situation, with a major change in U. S. policy only an election away, it is no surprise that the Saudi Navy is still in port. If an international naval force is formed for minesweeping or convoy duty, there is every reason to expect the RSNF to join in— and gain valuable operational experience. Saudi minesweepers are 25 years younger than the Naval Reserve Force ships towed into the region by the United States. RSNF patrol craft and corvettes are configured to combat helicopter and small boat threats. The F-2000S frigate has the capabilities of any frigate currently patrolling the Gulf, with the possible exception of operational experience. With advanced warning and tactical air support from the Saudi Air Force, the RSNF could replace many of the European naval units. If the Saudi Navy makes use of these training opportunities, it will emerge as the primary naval power within the Gulf and Red Sea region. If not, morale may supplant training and maintenance as the major problem.
The Royal Saudi Naval Forces are a potential element of the post-war security of the Persian Gulf and may be instrumental in the minesweeping operations that always continue long after the treaties have been signed.11 In order to realize improvements in its overall program, the Saudi Navy needs a Bureau of Naval Personnel and a Chief of Naval Education and Training. They must streamline the personnel pipeline and the schools’ apparatus. They must also eliminate dependence on outside instructional and maintenance assistance. The senior officers who lack an at-sea command background should be offered early retirement or reassignment to RSNF support programs, in order to make way for younger officers with underway experience. Finally, the RSNF must seek an opportunity to go operational at some point in this Iran-Iraq war. Until these steps are taken, the RSNF will lack credibility with other naval powers and with its own government, and should—in its own best interest—stay at home and out of harm’s way.
' LCdr. P. W. DeForth, USNR, “U. S. Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf: The Mideast Force Since WW1I," Naval War College Review. Summer 1975, pp. 28-37.
2Cdr. W. C. Remick, USNR, “The Case for Foreign Military Sales in American Persian Gulf Strategy," U. S. Naval Institute (USNI) Proceedings. January 1977, pp. 18-26.
’Col. V. J. Croizat, USMC, "Stability in the Persian Gulf,” USNI Proceedings. April 1973, pp. 48-59. 4Capt. J. S. Keating, USN, "Mission to Mecca: A Postscript,” USNI Proceedings. April 1978, pp. 74-77.
5Remick, op. cit.
6R. Danziger, "The Naval Race in the Persian Gulf,” USNI Proceedings. March 1982, pp. 93-98. 7Adm. W. J. Crowe, USN. "The Persian Gulf: Central or Peripheral to United States Strategy?” USNI Proceedings. May 1978, pp. 184-209.
HCapt. John Moore, RN (Ret.), Editor, Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-1987 (New York: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1986), pp. 440-43.
yCdr. W. L. Dowdy, USNR. "Nava! War in the Gulf: Iraq vs. Iran.” USNI Proceedings. June 1981, pp. 114-17.
"’Capt. B. L. Liner, USN, "Iran and Iraq: An Overview,” Naval War College Review. July-August 1984, pp. 97-102.
“Capt. J. E. Laeouture, USN, "Seapower in the Indian Ocean: A Requirement for Western Security," USNI Proceedings. August 1979, pp. 30-41.
Commander Blanton graduated from the Naval Academy in 1971. He served on board the USS Vogel- gesang (DD-862) and the USS Mullinix (DD-944) before being assigned to the SOSUS system in 1976 at Naval Facility Grand Turk and later at Commander Oceanographic Systems. Atlantic. After completing Department Head Class 60, Commander Blanton reported to the USS Hoel (DDG-13). He detached from active duly in 1981. As a Naval Reserve officer, he served as an instructor at the Royal Saudi Naval Forces School in Jubail from 1985 to 1986. He is currently the training officer for Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 211 in Charlotte, North Carolina, and is completing a master’s degree in Physical Oceanography at the University of North Carolina. Chapel Hill.
147
llnRs / March 1988