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Military base officials from El Toro to Oceana and residents of the surrounding communities are often at odds with each other. Aircraft like this F/A-18A Hornet may be creating noise problems or waste oil may be polluting the groundwater. Closing all or part of the base is not the only answer, but communities will call for that, if their concerns are mishandled.
was
■ted.
turned over to the Air Force. An airfield was construe and that part of the facility was renamed Otis Air F°r Base.
The airfield became an important component
the
the
President John F. Kennedy during trips to his su
miner
tivity
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new activities included an Air Force phased-array station, a Coast Guard air station, and components Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps serve, Naval Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, Air F° Reserve, and Air Force National Guard. Additions' ^
the early 1980s, Camp Edwards/Otis Air Force Base
i3fd-
nity. The first was noise. The base could accornmo' ^ artillery, up to 155-mm. howitzers. The firing coUafest
At the meeting, the woman began to cry as she continued to berate the base officials.
“You are not a good neighbor to me. Don’t you dare say you are! Any civilian doing what you did would be put in jail. You are an intruder in my house!”
The officials had called the meeting to increase understanding between the local community and the base, and to alleviate rising concern about base activities. But things went much differently than planned. Instead of bringing the base and the community together, the meeting heightened differences that already existed between them.
The facilities engineer left the meeting, shaking his head. Feeling like the damage control officer on the Titanic, he said, “We are really fighting a losing battle here.1
Meetings like this have occurred throughout the country, and stories about military facilities with problems outside their gates have appeared frequently in the media and before Congress.
A short list includes:
► Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada (aircraft noise)
► Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California (aircraft noise)
► Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia (aircraft noise, potential danger due to proximity to community)
► Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (artillery noise, environmental concerns)
► Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona (airspace restrictions)
► Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California (base housing construction)
► Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Facility, Virginia Beach, Virginia (noise)
► Naval Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey (base housing construction).
Tensions between bases and communities have existed for decades. As Morris Janowitz pointed out in his classic study The Professional Soldier: A Social & Political Portrait (Free Press, 1964):
“The military community remains a kind of foreign settlement on a local community, and relations are uneasy and even exploitive. But increasingly a new source of friction has appeared, and it will only get worse with time.”2
When the bases or facilities were originally established, they were isolated military outposts within small, if any, civilian communities. Decades of growth have seen the bases engulfed by expanding civilian communities. Activities on the base that never presented any problems before now become major issues for civilians living nearby. Civilian complaints often lead to curtailment of base activities and serious reductions in base training and operational functions. Such restrictions strike at the very purpose of the armed forces. Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a look at the relationship between a base and its adjacent community, to determine how the relationship might be managed more effectively.
Camp Edwards/Otis Air Force Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, was the subject of a case study conducted by
Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Govern ment.3 A brief history of the base reveals several issue that evolved in the relationship between the military an civilian communities.
Camp Edwards was created in 1935 by the Massachn setts state legislature as a training base for the Nat<°n Guard. During World War II, it was taken over by 11 Army and became a major training base. After the ^ the base was deactivated until 1950, the start of the rean War. After the Korean War, a portion of the base
of the
U. S. defense against Soviet bombers. In addition to airfield, the remaining maneuver and range areas were largest in New England, and contained the only art"e ^ range east of Fort Drum, New York. The base enjoy some prominence in the early 1960s when it was use"
White House in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. But act' fell off dramatically after 1972, because of the administration’s policy to reduce continental air defen ^ The base then was once again converted to a Nati°n , Guard facility. Many new activities were brought on bo' during the 1970s in an effort to keep the base open. T*6
serve units, stationed elsewhere, came there to train-
;wasa
very active facility, with many organizations on boar^ While the base was changing, so was the community 1940, Cape Cod had 40,000 inhabitants. By 1980, t were 150,000, and the number was growing rapidly- w’Vj a summer resort, Cape Cod was now a large, year-h"^ community, and the towns surrounding the base had ^ panded nearly 100% until they reached its perime fence.
The Problems: During the late 1970s and early 1 number of issues arose that affected the Cape Cod com11
heard across the Cape, and was quite loud in the neJsj,y towns. The Army was phasing in a new, low-inten ij training round for 155-mm. artillery, but very little c°^ be done about the 105-mm. artillery or the 81-mm- 111 ^ tars. Some residents asked why training with the 105-r11 ^ howitzers continued, since the Army had declared thel11^ be obsolete and was replacing them with 155s. They a j wondered why less noisy simulators could not be instead.
In addition, aircraft noise was a nuisance. The A'rs tional Guard maintained a force of 18 F-106 intercep on the airfield. The landing pattern for the intercep^^ was directly over the nearby town of Mashpee. The was scheduled to be replaced by the F-15, but some crl
noisier than the F-106. Low-flying helicopters also
lain
^egreasers containing volatile organic compounds
ated directly under the base. This leakage, called the ^7-nouth plume” after one of the nearby towns, was
M V fact
naSe that had occurred before the 1970s. The base did re dispose of battery electrolyte as prescribed by state pStations (which were tougher than federal guidelines). a|'y, hazardous wastes were being commingled with oil. This meant that the oil had to be handled under- S(. tttore stringent state regulations that covered hazardous frostance disposal. Local newspapers charged that wastes 111 the base had contaminated some nearby public fresh tin Cr PUmpmg sites. As public discussion heated up, dis- •. l0ns between “hazardous” waste and more dangerous
taXic
Air
waste quickly became blurred.
•lad
reated irritation in nearby communities, p residents also expressed their environmental concerns. °table water for the entire Cape Cod area came from l(,°Und wells fed by a single underground aquifer. In » a report by the Army Environmental Hygiene iJ&ncy indicated that, at one of the base’s activities, cer-
h. ' VUJVl J vV/111 Cl 11 111 1C, YOlUlllW
8ht have seepe(j int0 the upper part of the aquifer, looted d ' ' ‘
bFalmc
^ leved to have been caused years earlier during regular ^lr Porce occupancy, and not by any current activity. In faCt>. (he National Guard had upgraded its own sewage C|Hties in 1981, at a cost of more than $1 million. In any a part of the aquifer had been contaminated.
^ 0 make matters worse, another 1983 report by the f0my Environmental Hygiene Agency criticized the base 'ts incomplete hazardous waste management program
i, 'ack of an environmental coordinator. Included in the sp?d°us waste noted at the base was rocket propellant
t>e “r quality was another serious environmental issue, j r)°dically, the grass in the artillery range’s impact area i^'ted, setting off brush fires. In 1982, 2,000 acres of the Fact area burned and blanketed the surrounding area ley Sm°'ce’ particularly the town of Sandwich. The fire •Hit6r SPread beyond the impact area—much less the base— critics in Sandwich felt that it had come much closer to
tem.
^t'other concern was safety. Several times, children
had sneaked on the base, found dud hand grenades, and taken them home. The base began a series of in-school programs to educate the students about the hazards of explosives, and began to erect a fence to limit access to dangerous areas. Critics charged that this would make the area more interesting to children, and claimed that the fence would not prove to be enough of an obstacle.
National issues also were played out at Camp Edwards, because of its close proximity to Boston. For instance, demonstrators protested Army Reserve Special Forces training at the base, claiming that it supported the administration’s policy in Central America, which they opposed. When a station for the Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN) was established, another demonstration occurred. Protestors argued that the equipment supported a policy of prolonged nuclear war. These demonstrations received substantial media coverage, but did not elicit much response from the elected officials in Washington, D. C. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Representative Gerry Studds (D-MA), the local congressman, both said that national problems should be resolved at the national, not the local, level.
The Response: In its own defense, the base argued that it had made a large contribution to the local economy, nearly $80,000,000. This argument found resonance in local chambers of commerce. Local labor union officials were also very supportive. They regarded prospects for continuing renovations to the base as an important boost to the local construction industry. Opponents of the base, on the other hand, claimed that converting the base to nonmilitary use would create jobs. A representative from the Bay State Center for Economic Conversion cited data from the Department of Defense (DoD). At closed bases, 123,000 civilian jobs had been created where there had previously been only 87,000 DoD-related positions.
In bringing its argument to the community, the base was hampered by its own organization. Because there were so many different organizations on the base, there was no single official below the President of the United States who could issue a directive that would apply to all of them. A council existed to coordinate organization activities, but a feeling of “every man for himself” inevitably developed. When the Army National Guard was criticized for the grass fire, for example, the Air National Guard said that the fire was an Army problem and not their concern. Similarly, later tenants of the base were reluctant to assume responsibility for solving waste disposal problems that began during earlier Air Force occupancy.
The base’s problem with fragmentation extended to its public relations. There was no central public affairs office,
1
so matters were handled by most organizations on an ad hoc basis, often by the commanders. Frequently, press inquiries were handled by the first person to pick up the phone. As a result, responses were not coordinated among organizations on base, and they did not always reflect actual base policies.
the organization was a smokescreen for the status The task force then began to conduct hearings so it c°u eventually advise the governor—although what form tna advice would take, and the task force’s exact role in reC ommending or implementing any action, were left an clear.
I
1
1
The Master Plan: The situation came to a head in the spring of 1984, when the Camp Edwards Master Plan became public.4 The Master Plan was essentially a five-year military construction plan that covered renovation of base facilities and ranges. Many of these facilities, dating back to World War II, were badly decayed. For example, the two-story wooden barracks that had been built as temporary structures back then were the most common type of building at Camp Edwards.
Military officials found nothing very controversial about the Master Plan. It was like any other five-year plan for military construction. Written by facilities engineers, it had a professional and technical tone and was intended for internal distribution only. The plan became public when it was mentioned by an official, in an off-handed manner, at one of the town meetings. It was then acquired by one of the base’s more vocal opponents, a professor at the local community college.
The master plan was controversial in two ways. The first was the issue of whether the plan represented an expansion or merely a renovation of the base. Guard officials argued that this was only a renovation, and that an expansion was not envisioned. The number of troops stationed at Camp Edwards at any time would remain capped at 3,000, the ceiling in effect for a long time. Most of the work described in the master plan involved renovating only what had decayed. But opponents of the base argued that renovation would inevitably lead to heavier use, and that this would in turn lead to more traffic, more noise, and more threats to the environment.
The other problem arose with the tone of the plan, written by facilities engineers, for in-house military readers. One section read:
“The attitude that the installation will become more military and more Army is critical. Steps should be taken to regain control of ranges and land that are needed for Army use. In the case of overgrown ranges in need of controlled burning, it should be allowed with less concern for the subtleties of local public relations.”5
This did not sit well with local public officials or citizens.
As the controversy deepened in 1984, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis established an Otis/Edwards Task Force. Its mandate was to gather information concerning current activities on the base, proposed uses, the scope of necessary renovations, the potential impact on the surrounding community, and the public’s understanding of these issues. The task force included area selectmen, town planners, residents, environmentalists, and officials from Boston. The governor’s staff believed that the committee was representative, but it did not include the most vocal critics of the base who charged that
The Conclusions: Some general conclusions about munity/base relations can be drawn from the example 1 Camp Edwards.6
Who got there first is irrelevant: The fact that the was there first and the community came later is not re
The
military may feel with some justification that it settl&|J there first and that the civilians who moved in later kne^ the base was there and should accommodate themselveS the base’s activities. This argument generally plays p°°r • in the community and does not sit well with elected repre sentatives in local and national government. As the siW5 tion changes, the base must accept the fact that it no Ion? exists during a period when it can operate in a vacua Things change, and so must the base’s strategy for deal' with the community.
They can hurt you: Denial of this notion has sometirjT been called “the lawyer’s fallacy.” The “lawyer’s lacy” is that, ultimately, the base belongs to the fede^ government, has been established for purposes of sa^
vant in the relationship. They are both there now.
guarding the nation, and that the local community, . jS final analysis, has to live with it. Legally, of course, th*s^ true under the federal supremacy doctrine in Article I ’
in'
the Constitution. But, in a larger sense, it is false.
As one observer noted, “Federal supremacy is not used to be (and probably never was). The vision o doctrine as the instrument of certain subordination
childlike lower governments by a wise and powerful g° emment is inaccurate.”7
In fact, the community can influence what occurs a1 j. base. Events can be influenced locally, by elected o* cials, demonstrations, and the local press, or nation3* r by elected representatives in Congress. A 1979 report the Commandant of the Marine Corps noted that civ* * encroachment had caused “inordinate managerial sh ^ fling, increased fiscal costs, and reduction in quality tra'of ing.” It is very easy, for example, for a congressman ^ senator to insert some clause in an appropriations or thorization bill that requires the base to accommodate^ ^ community. This does not have to mandate the closing the base, but it could restrict base activity. For instat1 perhaps the airfield could only be open during ceft j.. hours, or firing could be forbidden before 0900 on ends, or certain areas of the base could be placed off I*1® for training because they are located too close to the co munities. ^
Separate national and local issues: Bases located a, politically active, populated areas frequently will he f° ^ points of national issues. Chanting demonstrators masS the front gates, hoping for media coverage. For the ha however, these events are not always the most accufl indicator of community attitude.
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Shultz, Weinberger Warned Against Deal On Iran, Reagan Says
By Eleanor Randolph
Wuhnimon Pod Staff Wiser
President Reagan said yesterday Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger “were right and I was wrong* when they advised him “strongly* against the arms-for-hos- tage swap with Iran.
The assertion by Reagan that Shultz and Weinberger gave him forceful advice against the Iran arms exchange came after both secretaries publicly complained about their treatment in the Tower panel report on the arms sales.
The report, a review ot the Iran
"hll mobilize the entire community because everyone dean water.
fee ,e.'vcan be useful, but only if mobilized: Every base hWtt. that some people in the community will sup- °f n eiTl' Sometimes these are former military personnel, ‘’’til °P'e wh° just believe deeply in the mission of the e<) forces. Sometimes these are members of local Pact 6rs °P commerce who recognize the economic im- bCtl °f the base and are anxious to continue that local li*ej U' But such allies are useful only if they are mobi- vated ^ater,t support may be present, but it has to be culti- Pq • Inaudible support is no support at all. Vocal sup- ag ’ °n the other hand, affects attitudes and the political its „a< hhe base should not be forming organizations for
■ rrW11--------------- uiui Yvuiuu uc- impi , »» -------- c—
rase commanders can meet with chambers of comity ?e’ and give speeches to civic organizations to bring
►v S Cacp tr\ ornnnc \x/hn mioht hp <;vmnathetic.
l °Cal issues are generally far more important to the At Camp Edwards, environmental and safety issues d0re (he local concern. Although housewives and retirees n°t usually demonstrate at the front gate to protest dam- ifi.the environment, these issues have great resonance 0r e community because they affect everyone, regardless ()riee'r political beliefs. A political demonstration like the ^ a8ainst the Green Berets and the situation in Central tyj|.eriCa may draw students from the local colleges, but it grQn°t mobilize the majority of the voters. But fears that ^^dwatef may be contaminated by pollutants from a
N
A///,
bh,°^n support—that would be improper, if not illegal—
k, bas "
erce.
g ~~ S case to groups who might be sympathetic. rJ CQreful about entering the lion’s den: This caveat it)gss h°m the “planner’s fallacy”—a belief that gather- (V °* Proponents and opponents can solve any problem, an J^nication is important and helpful, and, indeed, is hoty Ration of every government official. Believing, ting jVer’ l^at opposition can be overcome by merely sit- biay i°Wn an(l talking is often misplaced optimism. What tnel- aPPen is that opponents of the base will use the ln8 to publicize their concerns, and not to build
How may people know that the widely reported Coast Guard lifesaving response to last year’s sinking of a Soviet freighter off the East Coast was launched from the Coast Guard air station on Edwards (inset)? Some do, because it was reported; more might if base commanders were better prepared to work with the press.
bridges. Military officers are inclined to believe that their sincerity, the rightness of their cause, and their ability as leaders to deal with people will overcome any opposition. But there is a big difference between getting up in front of a battalion and speaking to an opposing political group.
Picture the front page: The press is paid to find things out, and there are people in every community who will help them. Therefore, documents written on board the base, or meetings held on the base should always be conducted with the understanding that what transpires may appear in a local paper.
The Edwards master plan provides case in point. The engineers who wrote it never thought it would receive attention off the base. But the plan’s public release created problems for base officials that were matters of tone, not substance—totally unnecessary.
It is possible to get good press. No one receives good press coverage all the time, even though we all believe we deserve it. The average over the long run is what really counts. There is a strong feeling among journalists that two things are true in the military: senior officers tend to be self-serving and dedicated to policy, so everything they say is party line. As a result, senior officers tend to have little credibility. This is a big problem, not only for the Army’s Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations, but for every local base commander as well. On the other hand, reporters also believe in the innate goodness of the American armed forces, particularly lower echelon personnel, who are not involved in policy and budget decisions. Consequently a sergeant can be far more credible
But i»
the civilian community, secrecy engenders suspicl°a There have been too many movies and books about
trust its government blindly. Sometimes, when pro1
iblef15
kerP
out-
They impose costs on a local community for the benefit a much wider community. As an academic study of
bettd
This tension can be managed so that both sides are off than they would be otherwise.
--------- ,v‘,‘,uu'5 lieu puiliuu U1 Illy dlllCIC. OUlll Ills
writing, (e.g., "A Public Manager Looks Back: What I Wish I'd Been - ^
New England Journal of Public Policy ~ ~~ - ------- “
influenced my thinking on this subject. ,. 0. -
’Captain Andrew C.A. Jampoler, U. S. Navy, “The Navy: A Neighbor- Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1982, p. 55. nef1^
"Richard Halloran, To Arm A Nation: Rebuilding America's Endangered (Macmillan: New York, 1986), pp. 142-143. ^ftf"
9MichaeI O’Hare, Lawrence Bacon and Debra Sanderson, Facility Siting a lie Opposition, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983, pp. 68-69.
,viW
than the base commander.
Richard Halloran, a New York Times military correspondent, explained this attitude in his book To Arm A Nation: Why America Isn’t Ready to Defend Itself (Macmillan, 1986)8:
“There is a discouraging contrast between the forces in the field and the high command. Our soldiers and sergeants and combatant commanders . . . guard the nation well. The same cannot be said for those who plan and finance the forces . . ..”
What appear in the paper, therefore, are positive stories about field units that are operating, training, and exercising. A reporter who wrote many critical articles about Camp Edwards also wrote glowing articles about Coast Guard search-and-rescue operations staged from there.
Someone must be in charge: Dealing with the community requires some sort of strategy—a coherent set of policies and procedures aimed at accomplishing a certain objective. In this case, a strategy would coordinate base policies about dealing with the press and local community leaders. This could be handled by the public affairs office, if one exists. But someone has to be in charge.
Bases like Camp Edwards, which have fragmented command structures, need to be particularly sensitive to this point, and need to designate a central office to handle this problem. Athough there are different organizations on base, the average civilian does not make distinctions. To outsiders, the base is a unified entity.
Technical quality is not enough: This might be termed the “engineer’s fallacy”: If the plan is technically sound, well thought-out, and based on the most professional criteria and analysis, then its quality will be apparent and ultimately will prevail. There is no substitute for quality in any base plan, but quality alone is not enough. What a facility engineer considers to be a high-quality plan may well be viewed by a town resident as an infringement upon his rights. A plan to renovate a range, for example, may be valid with respect to engineering principles, but local communities may just see it as one more source of noise.
Good faith efforts are necessary: Some critics of the base can never be accommodated, but many of the community’s concerns can be alleviated, sometimes easily.
At Camp Edwards erecting a fence along the base perimeter was a simple way to keep children from picking up duds, even though some critics still objected.
Help local politicians: Local politicians will often be caught in the middle. On one hand, they want to be responsive to citizens, but they also recognize the benefit of having a military activity in their district, and do not want to lose that benefit. Local and state politicians, therefore, generally will take neither a consistently pro- nor antibase stance, but will push for some sort of compromise between the base and the community. Base officials should be responsive to this desire, and assist in solving the problem. The base should never expect local politicians to step in and save them from the community, however.
Secrecy is a problem: For members of the armed forces, secrecy is a fact of life. Some things are classified, are for official use only, or are off-limits. It is a natural and necessary part of maintaining a military establishment.
Nti )Ut
evil behind government’s closed doors for the citizenry
or embarrassments occur on base, officials tend to them quiet. In time, however, everything comes Someone on the base will talk, or a report will beco public. Attempts to keep problems unpublicized wifi u ally backfire, and engender more suspicion, ill will;a embarrassment. It may hurt at first, but a policy of d'sC sure will pay dividends in the long run.
The relationship between a base and its surround- community is always going to create tension. In s° . ways, military bases are like power plants or PrlS° f
benetu “
■ off*!
ity siting noted, this is a general problem common in111 ern society:
“The per capita costs that a facility threatens to it°P' on a small number of people—especially the s° ^ costs imposed on the people who live near the tend to be large for groups that are numerically s£ . . . Because they have so much at stake, each of1 ^ neighbors is likely to be willing to invest substun resources to see that the facility (does not damage 1 interests) ...”
Military facilities, therefore, are not the only institut'^ with inherent community problems. But although asymmetry in costs and benefits inevitably produce5 ^ sion, the consequence of the tension is not foreorda111
. £n£i'
'Interview with Lieutenant Colonel John “Jack” A. Stockhaus. FaciI>tieS neer, Massachusetts National Guard . (fie*1
2Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portr#1; York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 204-207. „ ^
"“Local Military-Community Relations: The Camp Edwards Master plal’ ' jla^ nedy School of Government, Harvard University, Case #C15-87-740- from Case Distribution Office, Kennedy School of Government, Harvar sity, 79 John F. Kennedy St., Cambridge, MA 02138. sacl»u'
4Camp Edwards Military Reservation-Master Plan, 30 January 1984, setts Army National Guard, Directorate of Facilities Engineering.
5Master Plan, p. 55. t \\tf'
6I want to note the contributions of Professor Dan Fenn, adjunct lecturer ^ ^ vard, to the “lessons learned” portion of my article. Both his teaching j,t, writing, (e.g., “A Public Manager Looks Back: What I Wish I’d Been „■ New England Journal of Public Policy, Summer/Fall 1987, pp. 53-65)
■ Pfd^f*
Major Cancian is the assistant director of the National Security ‘ (i at the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Governnje^. He serves as operations officer (S-3) of the 1st Battalion, 25th jr which drills at Camp Edwards. He received both his baccalaur gree and a masters in business administration from Harvard.