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U. S. submarines are still lengths ahead of the Soviets in the grim race to control the underwater battlefield. But to keep pulling ahead U. S. submariners must change operations, tactics, and system designs. Most of all, they must recognize that winning the war beneath the sea may depend on combining arms with the ASW forces above it.
Recently testifying before Congress, Vice Admiral Bruce DeMars, the U. S. Navy’s Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare, said that “our nation has enjoyed submarine superiority since World War II and has, to a degree, taken it for granted.” Until recently, U. S. submarines were literally several orders of magnitude better than those of the Soviets. It was as if the American Indians—the original stealthy weapon system—had also had the guns, and the cowboys nothing but bows and arrows. It is not surprising that the Soviets chose to correct this imbalance and gave the drive for submarine parity a national priority equal to that President John F. Kennedy assigned to landing on the moon.
What is surprising is that the Soviets chose to wait so long before throwing money at the “decibel gap.” They must have known their submarines were acoustically inferior. Perhaps their “better is the enemy of good enough” complacency was finally shaken if part of the Walker/ Whitworth “package” was irrefutable evidence of just how inferior their subs really were.
In any case, although U. S. submarine superiority is still considerable, our submariners face the prospect of Fighting a threat against which their edge might be marginal. Unless we significantly change our way of doing business—in operations, tactics, and system design— antisubmarine warfare (ASW) will likely revert to the methods employed during the world wars: Put large quantities of ordnance in the water when someone blows up. Nowadays, of course, this approach doesn’t work as well, since we can no longer assume that the object of that ordnance is within a mile of the explosion.
What changes should we consider, then, at this point in our race with the Soviets to maintain a clear submarine superiority? How can we increase our present lead? Since previous circumstances allowed us the luxury of intellectual laziness, the first step is to evaluate the basic problem.
A pioneer of the “combined-arms” approach to ASW (which heralded the feasibility of what has come to be known as the Maritime Strategy), recently retired Rear Admiral W. J. Holland, Jr., often notes that while everyone realizes that there are several different types of “airplanes”—from small fast ones that carry one person and come down about 90 minutes after leaving the ground through large, slower ones that take half-a-thousand people on vacation—nonsubmariners think that all submarines are basically alike, and that measures appropriate in dealing with one will apply to all. This is far from the truth. To simplify the discussion, divide submarines into three types: nonnukes, noisy nukes, and quiet nukes.
Although its subtleties warrant major discussion, as a first principle, diesel-electric ASW is a game of avoidance. The noisy nuke is what our entire ASW empire is contrived to counter (somewhat adequately). The problem, then, is the quiet nuclear submarine.
Let’s recognize before proceeding further that U. S. submariners are concerned, not panicked, about dealing with the Soviets’ quiet nuclear subs. We have played our ASW cards well. In fact, the U. S. military has given no better demonstration of former Secretary of Defense Cas-
‘en-
par Weinberger’s “competitive strategy,” wherein during American strengths are aligned against endurinr Soviet weaknesses. ” The paranoia our Permit (SSN-594F’ Sturgeon (SSN-637)-, and Los Angeles (SSN-688)-daS^ submarines have generated in the Soviets has trigger? perhaps the most inefficient expenditure of assets in 1 history of warfare.
Nothing consumes more time, manpower, and won ’ than constructing and fielding a “first-of-a-class” subn13 rine. For example, in the early 1970s, Electric Boat"'
pumping out long-hull Sturgeons at ten-month interval*
.£*
Then came a six-year hiatus in nuclear-powered atta1 submarine (SSN) deliveries while the yard wrestled to pr0.( duce the first Los Angeles. It was difficult to believe then, but the timing was perfect for starting the serial p^jj duction of a new submarine class with far greater poten11
than its predecessors, just as the time is ripe now to g1
rad11'
ate from the easily built but fully developed Los Ang1
•el&
class to the Seawolf (SSN-21) class. In contrast, the So'1
ets have undertaken a dozen or so new designs during
same period. Although some widely published
the
defeflSe
SSNS;
analysts marvel at the capabilities of the Alfa-class , the first of that class took more than a decade to build- must have cost more than any two or three of our conte poraneous boats. In return for that investment, the S°vl have the Edsels of the global submarine community- wisdom of the U. S. submarine force’s creed—stea -
mobility, Firepower, and endurance—is that it is a chain^ serious deficiency in one link renders the others id111
meaningless. g
There are four areas to discuss as we assess how and Soviet submarines measure up to one another. I take the Rickoverian tack, largely ignoring the g°°
dwell on the imperfect.
Air ASW: As uncharacteristically nonparochial aS^( might sound from a submariner, air ASW could've the key manned element of any future antisubmarine s^( tern, especially if we fail to address the emerging challenge with adequate resources and determinatl _ However, several deFiciencies within this commurl must be addressed.
First, the passive sonobuoy can no longer provide
siWef
effective area-search capability. But this cloud has a -
lining: when buoy number 35 “goes hot,” it is not juSj
- all”
beginning of a long, mathematically aesthetic “l°cacf). tion phase.” Buoy-35 activation should satisfy attack^ ^
teria, within the capabilities of the weapons’ senS°j^fal
conduct the vernier part of the attack. Note the P “weapons”: No one will be doing the taxpayers an)' vors if—after hours or days on-station—weapon* . carefully husbanded against a real target. But if a ‘ b°1 ^ the-buoy” tactic is used, remember that any bn°y u three locations: Where you put it, where you though1; put it, and where it is now.
Solving these problems should not be overwhelm
in?'
though. The burning nautical problem of a century ^
u t9-
“What time is it?” has yielded completely to the J’
■ ■ “Wlie^
quartz digital watch. The answer to the question, VT
am I?” now seems almost as trivial, whether aske
64
Proceedings / Julie
that “ *S ^ebated publicly and privately; and the argument
. IlllPlpor nn no 1 ittln on/1 linear
"'ati
er
(actions of matador and banderilleros are coordinated, rOtySlrtluhaneous. To change the metaphor, the hail of arty^' tbat rained upon opposing troops in earlier centuries the i-Il!eant less to kill than to improve the probability that
oni e,h*ng in a Marine’s helmet or a low-cost, “transmit fen 'V'len tripped” sonobuoy. With small detection enve- Soes’ however, in the time it takes an aircraft to reach the Sjt]e°bu°y, the target could easily escape; we should con- $eaiad°pting an air'launched variant of the submariners’ U) *“ance standoff weapon. Also implicit is that platforms ‘•jjl c°nduct most post-detection classification, and that 0perUe;On-Blue” attacks would be minimized through areatl0nal procedures—methods with which submariners jfl.^^fortable. The sonobuoy field begins to resemble an My k nt’ quickly inserted, economical minefield in u the sensors are many but the warheads few. bea(je. lethality of lightweight torpedo conventional war
nuclear doesn’t count as long as it’s little and under- Was^'~~and maybe they won’t notice!” doesn’t really av .j Until more powerful conventional explosives are c0nvable, perhaps this less-than-certain probability that 'hih ent'°nal torpedo hits will kill Soviet subs is some- extg We should accept, or even better, exploit. To some ‘Cont’ we have fallen into a semantic trap of thinking that equated” means “simultaneous.” This is not the tea •’ n a bullfight, quick banderilleros first dance about bull and sticking barbed steel sticks into his the m hater, the matador dispatches the animal. Betting on t^Q.^atador would be unwise if he chooses to make his T[le ® before the banderilleros have hurt and tired the bull
%t ow-on “heavyweight” weapon systems—be they
broadswords, pikes, or tomahawks—could survive to beat the enemy.
Perhaps the optimum “synergism” between maritime patrol aircraft and SSNs is for the airborne “banderillero” to get in a lick or two before the “matador” closes for a Mark-48 and advanced-capability torpedo finale against a degraded, noisier opponent. We should also play against the “enduring Soviet weakness” of double hulls— optimizing our warheads not so much to penetrate the pressure hull as to achieve the lateral disruptive effects of detonations in main ballast tanks full of high-pressure air flasks and critical pipes and cables.
Surface ASW: It is quite likely that lengthy surface operations will be simply unadvisable when an enemy has a lot of quiet nuclear submarines around. For short and platform-, sensor-, and weapon-intensive periods, a protective “bubble” might be put up (or down) to inhibit a lossconscious opponent from striking, but this will not be feasible for long. The Soviets’ famed bastions might have “Blue” counterparts, from which short spoiling raids could sortie, relying on surprise and mobility. This does not mean that surface ships cannot go anywhere. It means they will be challenged in going anywhere the Soviets do
65
l,ngs / June 1988
acoustically superior nuclear-powered ballistic
ofan
Captain Patton is now the president of the research firm Submarin
pc- red ‘
not want them to go, and where Soviet quiet nukes can contest their presence. The key to coexisting with imperfection is to make the enemy’s attacks expensive and unprofitable.
Incidentally, the real ASW problem here is not the nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine (SSGN) firing at the carrier from hundreds of miles away. The defense against that threat is largely antiair warfare, emphasizing point defense. The SSGN attacks will likely coincide with Soviet naval aviation strikes, after the quiet nukes have nibbled away with torpedoes—from within visual range— on the antiair warfare and support ships for many days. We urgently need the capability to detect incoming torpedoes quickly—to permit evasion, softkill countermeasuring or, failing that, point-defense hardkill. Having thereby reduced the damage we suffer per attack, every possible platform must pour ordnance simultaneously onto solved or probable launch points. An airborne standoff weapon would certainly be appropriate here, launched by what we might visualize as ASW combat patrol aircraft. Certainly, some of the newer escorts’ vertical launch system holes should be filled with ASW weapons—ones whose reach matches the expected attack ranges of Soviet torpedoes.
Submarine ASW: Buried deep in the hearts of nonsubmariners is a regrettably vindictive satisfaction that “at least the Soviet quiet nuke will give those ‘bubbleheads’ something to worry about!” Their hope is false. If Soviet SSNs reach acoustic peerage with U. S. submarines, no one will be able to find anyone anymore—barring the chance encounter. With the ASW role gone, subs will undertake the next mission on the waiting list. It is important to keep our SSNs in the ASW battle, however; to do it, we must develop better sonar arrays and signal processing to prevent the Soviets from gaining acoustic peerage. The more sophisticated quieting techniques in the Trident missile submarines and the Seawolf will tip the decibel scale still more to our advantage.
After a quarter century of taking our lead for granted, the greatest challenge the U. S. submarine force faces is to develop tactics and techniques to fully exploit our still considerably superior platforms. Part of this challenge is to exploit every quirk and anomaly of the environment above and below the air-water interface—acoustic or otherwise. Prudently conceived and executed assistance from other warfare specialties cannot help but increase the U. S. submarine advantage. Perhaps this combined-arms effort at the theater level might not require supplying an ASW airborne waming-and-control system aircraft with radio frequency line-of-sight to most players—including sonobuoys and remotely piloted vehicles. Seasonally and geographically specific tactics? That is certainly an intriguing string to pull. We must also develop and apply advanced materials and sensors—from metal, ceramic, and polymer designer composites to the unique characteristics of the blue-green laser.
ASW Mining: In the classic view, there are but two types of minefields, offensive and defensive. But in a combined-arms ASW battle, it makes a big difference
whether it is “their” or “our” ASW mine in “their 0 “our” waters.
► Their mine in their waters: Assuming a “bastion’ Ilien
tality, could modem overhead-observation eapabih ^ make it prudent to lay defensive mines covertly, to av revealing transit routes and bastion locations? KnoWi r such things would be marvelously helpful to SSN c° manders seeking targets. Laying a large field of mines difficult enough without having to do it covertly, eSP^ dally when other tasks would be urgently competing the minelaying units. . ,
► Their mine in our waters: For similar reasons, sweep - channels through real or suspected offshore minefiel deployment sites would require great care. We would a^ to assume that Soviet submarine “linebackers’ . watching the minefields. The Soviet sub commands search-and-area-coverage problem would be simpl'*1 greatly by knowing where the roads were. Finding a^ avoiding mines would likely take precedence over . straying them. Even then, we might use a covert platf°
► Our mine in their waters: If commanders believe an a . harbors both mines and submarines, how do they reSP yy to an underwater explosion? If they mount a local A effort, and the culprit was a mine, the unlucky comma ers may be sending additional targets to these PatlfS weapons. If the commanders deploy scarce minesweep
a lurking SSN may get a chance to run up his tonn?olls
► Our mine in our waters: Considering the tremen strategic benefits of getting lucky, it could be worths to have an SSN roam the vast suspected patrol area
submarine (SSBN)—with only a 1 in 10,000 chance encounter. That rationale weakens, however, when ^ SSN has a 50% chance of hitting the mines with whic ^ SSBN has fouled his own nest. (Having put them 111 . marked them on his charts, of course, the SSBN c mander carefully avoids these navigational hazards-) Much more could be said about the role of mmin^ve modem ASW. But we clearly need a rebirth of innova^ thinking about both mining and mine countermeasu^ The global aviation community has learned the har j that ordnance and their countermeasures are best deph’ . in concert; about mines, torpedoes, and their counte sures, however, we have not only insufficient coop tion, but virtual hostility. ,^\c
The stakes are high in the battle to retain a ere ASW capability, but most of the issues favor the en jj0n strengths of the United States—technological mn°vaalld and high-quality manufacturing of superior platfon*1^.^ weapons. Institutionalized pessimism aside, there is doubt that we will meet the challenge.
tics and Technology after a 25-year career in the Navy. He ^ seven nuclear submarines, commanding the USS Pargo (SSN- . ^1, also served as Director of Tactical Training at the Submarine aIjd Groton, Connecticut, Deputy Commander for Tactical Develop^ ^ ^ chief staff officer with Submarine Development Squadron 12, 3 head of computer systems at the Center for Wargaming, U. S . Na College.
66
Proceedings
/June>