Who Needs PALs?

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Trident submarine skippers—here, the first COs of the USS Ohio (SSBN-726), the first Trident—seem to rank behind only the superpower heads of state in terms of access to the nuclear button, because use- control devices (PALs) are not installed in their subs. To prevent an unauthorized or inadvertent missile launch, some think the Navy needs PALs. The Navy thinks otherwise.

The U. S. Army and Air Force now have “use- control” devices, designed to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized arming of nuclear weapons, in vir­tually all of their nuclear weapon systems. The Navy does not use these permissive action links (PALs) in its subma­rine-launched ballistic missiles, nuclear-armed naval avia­tion weapons, or cruise missiles launched from subma­rines, surface ships, or aircraft—and that bothers many academics.

You hear tales about how the idea for PALs, which have been around for about 25 years, originated when someone realized that the remote-control devices used to operate a television set could be adapted to control the use of a nu­clear weapon. The tales are probably not true, but a PAL does work in a similar fashion, keeping a weapon in an unarmed condition until someone introduces the proper signal in a proper manner. The PAL prevents an on-scene commander from using a nuclear weapon until higher au­thority directs the weapon to be used. That higher author­ity “enables” the weapon by providing the proper arming code.

Members of the academic world seem to be the group most interested in nuclear weapons, particularly their con­trol. Ever since Robert Oppenheimer, Edward Teller, George Kistiakowsky, and other prominent scientists built the atomic bomb, the control of the weapon has been a sub­ject of intense interest, especially at Harvard, Stanford, Cornell, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Most active in the study of nuclear weapons has been the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA), now affiliated with the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Recent research by the CSIA has focused on arms control and military command and control, including nuclear operations. As part of this research, the CSIA sponsored a conference 7-8 February 1986—“Assuring

Control of Nuclear Weapons.” This conference br⁰¹¹^ together members of the retired military community * an interesting collection of academics, including ^seve_Qf who helped create PALs. Two key players, Peter Stein Cornell and Peter Feaver of Harvard, published a ^reP°^r _on the meeting, adding much useful background inf°^rilia and analysis of the problem of controlling nuclear * ons. They placed considerable emphasis on PALs U. S. Navy nuclear weapons.¹

There are several types of PALs, which have been scribed in various terms, such as “one of the mosUmP tant owlish ideas of the past—devices for reducing y risks of unauthorized uses of nuclear weapons.’ " ^ can be mechanical locks or electronic/electrical ^c ^ switches with varying numbers in the codes. They ^caa j_n internally mounted within a nuclear warhead or loca ^e ^ a command module, such as the cockpit of an ^a'^rcra-u_S. the launch control center for a group of ballistic nu^sS _f The function of a PAL is described by Stein and F^ea^. ₃ as “a device whose function is to focus the control ^ nuclear weapon directly and exclusively onto the iuu* ual or individuals who are authorized to order its use- • The function of a PAL . . . is to guard against the ^var* g . . . possibilities of unauthorized use without intern^" with the duly authorized use of nuclear weapons. j_s command and control problem of nuclear weap°ⁿ^_at neatly described as an “always/never” situation, i-^e,’_r, we “always” want the weapon to function when ^aU₄ ized, but “never” to function when not authorized-^ In military terms, PALs are devices for keeping ^t*^ie₍,j_Vil itary operator from using a weapon until the prop^er ^ authority deems the use appropriate. It gives the ^clV'_of a thority a form of physical control over the use . weapon, in addition to being in control of the syste¹¹¹ authorizes such use.

The Development of PALs: As the United States s ^ to develop nuclear weapon programs for its armed t® ^ there were very tight controls on the possession ⁰ ^

weapons. The Atomic Energy Commission had ^c ^_c control, and the congressional Joint Committee on ^                                                                                         ₀{

Energy acted as oversight authority. But as the num ^ weapons multiplied and we placed more reliance on ^ _a as our primary means of maintaining peace (or fig®¹, war), the tight controls were somewhat relaxed. Pr^eS1 Dwight D. Eisenhower was a powerful supp⁰^ _ns NATO, and during his administration nuclear ^wea‘j were deployed in Europe. U. S. nuclear weapons co found hanging on the wings of West German tactica

Inadvertent launch from a ship is prevented by:

►Numerous electrical and mechanical interlocks on the launch and fire-control systems

► Rigid procedures that must be followed in the prop^er sequence

►The requirement that numerous qualified personnel^ including the commanding officer—must conduct certain procedural steps to execute the launch

Unauthorized launch is prevented by:                                  .

► Numerous qualified personnel operating as a team, ⁱⁿ eluding the CO, who must be involved in the launch ^se quence

► Physical security measures and guard forces to pr^eve unauthorized access to the weapons or launch and arffliⁿ= equipment

► Physical security afforded by the ship itself to rep^el

threat from outsiders, at sea and in port                           .

While the nuclear weapon systems of all the ^serVlC.. employ some form of these procedures and controls, major difference with the Navy concerns the physical sc curity afforded by ships. Access to any weapon in ^a _ storage site is always difficult, but the added physical^s curity provided by the ship itself makes considerable ference in the confidence the Navy has in its security P grams. At least a few scientists agree that Navy weap⁰ are quite secure and that the requirement for PALs is ⁿ^_f

it i^s It is

craft on German airfields, with German pilots in the cock­pits ready to launch and deliver the weapons when the proper orders were issued. Similar programs existed for medium-range missiles, such as the Jupiter and Thor, and nuclear artillery weapons for overseas Army units located in various storage sites in forward areas.

In 1960, some of the bright young laboratory scientists involved in the development of nuclear weapons were part of a European inspection trip. “The sight of Turkish and German planes, with nuclear weapons, sitting on the tar­mac at the airports had a powerful effect on the policy­makers.”⁵ This concern about the possibility of a weapon falling into unfriendly hands, resulting in unauthorized use, exacerbated existing fears about accidental detona­tion. Commendably, they took action.

The result of the scientists’ efforts was the creation of the PAL. It was originally referred to as a “preventive,” “prescribed,” or “proscribed” action link, but that termi­nology was too restrictive in connotation, so the term “permissive” was applied.

According to Stein and Feaver, the history of the PAL reflects civil-military relationships with respect to nuclear weapons. “The deep-rooted reluctance on the part of ci­vilians to let the military treat nuclear weapons as large conventional weapons created the background. . . . ”⁶At first, the military rejected the entire PAL concept, but it was obvious that a potentially dangerous custodial prob­lem did exist in certain circumstances. The pressure to do something in a hurry and to attack the most pressing part of the problem led first to the introduction of the PAL on weapons that were deployed in Europe. Weapons assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Navy were not initially included.

The attention shifted to the U. S. military in the late 1960s. An examination of the subject in 1967 led to the conclusion that “the most serious threat that emerged . . . was the danger that, in time of war, a well-intentioned, hard-pressed local commander might order the release of nuclear weapons before he had received proper authoriza­tion.”⁷ Consequently, a decision was made to extend PALs to weapons carried by SAC bombers. PALs for the Navy were also considered at this time, but were rejected. PALs were extended to weapons based on foreign territory in the Far East in the early 1970s and eventually included in SAC Minuteman missiles in the mid-1970s.

The Navy Position: The Navy employs use-control de­vices such as the PAL on nuclear weapons stored ashore or during logistic moves, but not on nuclear weapons on board ships. The Navy has frequently reviewed its policy on use-control devices for weapons on board ships and has always decided that no change is required. The reasons are fairly basic. First, there is no need. In the Navy’s opinion, there are already plenty of safeguards in place to protect against inadvertent or unauthorized use. The danger is not sufficient to justify the expense of adding PALs, particu­larly in a time of budget reductions. Second, the introduc­tion of PALs may affect the reliability of nuclear weapon systems. Third, there is a psychological reaction to more technical controls over the use of nuclear weapons.

high priority. The weapons are in secure spaces heavy guard. A ship is not like an overseas shorebase, more like a piece of the state of Maine or Nebraska- - ^ U. S. property, with the weapons in the possession U. S. personnel who have been strictly screened for^re ,| ability. The storage sites—the ships themselves—are ^ protected and secure. Some Army and Air Force weap®’. may be more accessible to elements intending ^m'^sC _a0t PALs for those weapons are necessary. There does seem to be such an urgent requirement for the

There has been no case of difficulty with control o ^ Navy’s nuclear arsenal, nor, for that matter, with th°s^e^ the other services. Inadvertent detonation might have ^e a risk in the early days of the nuclear age, but exp^erie ^ and major scientific advances have reduced that con^ce^_f There are so many other higher priority requirements ^ weapon systems that it would be a waste of time, ^e‘ ⁰ and money to develop and install a Navy PAL ^sy^ste_yef particularly amid budget reductions. Stein and F®^a _t characterize the clamor for Navy PALs simply ^{as 6} need, greatest resistance.”⁸

Another reason the Navy is opposed to use-contro vices is that it is believed that such devices can hav^.^ adverse impact on weapon-system reliability. The ^re*^ia-_a|s ity of any weapon system is important, but Navy ⁰ j_gar give the impression that as the U. S. develops its n^uC deterrence program, Navy weapons, particularly th⁰⁵^, SSBNs, will increase in significance. The Trident su fine with D-5 missiles has a tremendous responsibmA the deterrent force, and the Navy considers its reliant¹ j^ factor of high order. Use-control devices mean addi i electro/mechanical and personnel/procedural comp^le j_s which usually means less reliability. Of major conc^e ^ the communications link with the SSBN force. Putting

additional load on that system could adversely affect reli­ability.

The communications reliability issue may be a paradox, however. In an excellent piece in the January 1988 Pro­ceedings, “The Link to the Boomers,” academic Richard Kelley refers to communications with ballistic-missile submarines as a “bad connection.” If he is correct, in­stalling PALs in SSBNs would jeopardize reliability and defeat the academics’ purpose.

In a companion article in the same issue, retired sub­mariner Rear Admiral William Holland claims that com­munications links with the “boomers” are the best in the strategic triad. If Holland is right, then the academic won­ders what the Navy has to worry about should the PAL be installed in the command module of the submarine. If the reliability of the communications system is good enough to ensure receipt of the authorization to use the weapons, surely it must be good enough to ensure receipt of the PAL code for “enabling” the arming circuits. If you do not get the first, you will not need the latter.

Another possible reason the Navy is so opposed to PALs is a psychological rejection of “rudder orders from the beach.” Stein and Feaverconclude that “the similarity between rudder orders and PALs, however, is not at all clear, and the naval opposition to use control devices seems more firmly rooted in tradition than in logic.”⁹

It is hard to describe this rudder-order issue to the land­lubber, but anyone who has spent much time at sea ends up in a crisis situation at some time or other. The crisis can be created by a major storm, a collision, a weapon catas­trophe such as the Enterprise (CVN-65) flight-deck explo­sions during the Vietnam War, etc. The last thing a CO is looking for at that time is a rudder order from the beach— someone a thousand miles away giving instructions on how to handle the crisis. This is a psychologically condi­tioned characteristic of all sailors of all nationalities. The meticulous care that U. S. Navy Admirals Chester Nimitz and Ernest King took to avoid giving Admiral William Halsey rudder orders during the sea battles of World War II is a good illustration. It is doubtful that you will ever find a U. S. sailor advocating that the National Command Authority delegate the authority to use nuclear weapons, although such delegation did exist in certain cases even as late as the early 1970s. However, that same sailor will resist steps that will jeopardize the performance of the weapon system after authority for use has been properly transmitted. Sailors do not want rudder orders from the beach; they interpret the PAL as another rudder order.

However logical that argument may seem to a sailor, it is not going to be understood or accepted by the academic community. In defense of the academic, the terrible de­structive capabilities of the nuclear weapon and its poten­tial impact on civilization necessitates that its use be au-

The Navy position is that those who clamor for Navy PALs cannot see the forest for the trees. Inadvertent and unauthorized launches from Navy ships are currently prevented by electrical and mechanical interlocks, rigid team procedures, and tight physical security.

‘ngs / July 1988

53

Purdue University professor Leon Beres uses ^vV°^r^_n such as “apocalypse” and “terrorism” in his writings ^ the possibilities of unauthorized and inadvertent use nuclear weapons. The Navy cooperated with Beres, ⁱⁿ least some of his work, providing him with consid^era information about PALs, personnel reliability P^r°S^ra|_ear and procedures for guaranteeing the security of u^u° weapons, particularly those in SSBNs. He included Navy material in his works, but was not convinced. ^ describing the control systems, he then contended tha following hypothetical scenarios were plausible:

Central to the issue is the so-called “great divorce” between the military and academia. Some academics, unwilling to accept the special trust and confidence the President and his senior military advisers have placed in their officers and enlisted personnel, still want physical control in the hands of civil authorities.

thorized by a “rudder order from the beach.” No sailor will argue against that premise. It is the additional physi­cal technical control the PAL introduces after proper au­thority for use has been received that is resisted.

Other Influences: In his article “The Third Most Pow­erful Man in the World,” Norman Cousins states that, after the leaders of the two superpowers, “the third most powerful man in the world is a commander of a Trident submarine.”

“The men who operate it are in a position, theoreti­cally at least, to make their own decisions about the use of the total power at their command. Suppose one of them decides, out of what he believes to be a higher patriotism, to activate a thermonuclear bomb. Trident commanders are human beings subject to all the stresses and quirks of human personality that make other mortals fallible and unpredictable. We can be cer­tain that every test for stability and reliability has been applied in the selection of Trident officers. But psy­chologists cannot guarantee that any individual will not be seized at some point by a totally irrational idea or by an aberration.

“Military and political annals are replete with exam­ples of men—from the lowliest orderlies to generals

“A submarine commander conspires with the e*^e ^ tive officer, weapons officer, and launcher °“^lce_nCy deceive the crew into believing that an Emerg^e^_g Action Message has been received. As a resul, submarine fires its nuclear missile complement- ^ “A submarine bearing nuclear missiles collide*j a Soviet submarine. As a consequence of the be- or of any follow-up torpedo action, the subman gins to flood rapidly. There is no chance to ^eS° ^js Survival is impossible. The captain, fearing tha j boat has been mortally wounded as part of a Sovie strike, resolves to make use of his assigned nu missiles. His officers and crew obey.”¹¹

In addressing the personnel reliability programs so tial to the security of nuclear weapons, Beres states-

A ab°^u

“Perhaps we should be even more concerne ^ those individuals who are not disqualified and w , certified to be ‘reliable,’ since a basic reliability

dard is ‘positive attitude toward nuclear weapons duty.’ As the matter was put recently by a seaman on the U. S. nuclear submarine John Marshall: ‘Maybe crazy guys do better on this duty. If you’re normal, you couldn’t stand it.”¹²

This doubt about the integrity, loyalty, and normalcy of °^Ur SSBN COs must be frustrating and irritating to the ^suPerb personnel in those positions. After a constant, in­tensive screening process and many years of dedicated Proven service, to rise to the top, receive command of one ^ose great submarines, and then be slurred by the aca- . ^err>ic community as being capable of collusion, lacking ^ln good judgment, or even irrational in behavior, must 'j'ork against better relations between the military and aca- ^emic societies.

„ Stein and Feaver address the problem of mutual trust. The problem is broader than a simple question of trusting ^e military to obey orders. Regardless of the amount of ,^rust in the officers of the U. S. armed forces, the civilian ^eadership has wanted an extensive degree of subjective ^c°ntrol over the disposition and employment of nuclear "capons.”¹³ The authors are quick to point out that ^arn°ng the exact issues and dangers that prompted the PAL ^ec'sion, “distrust of the military was not a major factor, ^at '^east not explicitly.”¹⁴

, The British, according to Stein and Feaver, “may, °Wever, feel that unauthorized use is not a serious prob- , ¹⁴¹ for them since Britain has had a history of civil peace j orderly exercise of military power and its nuclear .^rce is not exposed to the same threats to its security that

they

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ish

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• S. force faces.”¹⁵ Some sensitive military person-

may believe those words imply that although the Brit­^armed forces can be trusted, you cannot be sure about ^Se in the U. S. military. “Finally,” Stein and Feaver

^ntinue, “it was felt that a PAL was necessary to guard _s§^amst an unauthorized use by U. S. forces, implicitly ,Resting the possibility of a psychotic commander in a : ^r- Strangelove’-type scenario.”¹⁶ (Another cinematic T'tant was the 1987 television piece “The Fifth Missile,” _c ^aijtasy that included an entire Trident SSBN crew be- °ming crazed by toxic fumes emanating from painted “^aces inside the submarine.)

„ Many ^academics do not seem to comprehend or accept j⁴¹ the military is based on “special trust and confi- placed in commissioned officers by the President Placed in petty officers by higher authority appointed _n ^er them. When the CO of an SSBN states that he will [₎^CVer make any attempt to launch the nuclear weapons in tig ^CUstody without proper authority, the military authori- _tj ^{s Ca}n readily accept it. Civilian academics have a hard living with that position; they want some insurance.

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_^ct'ons that the experienced CO or petty officer would ⁿsid_er impossible are often considered to be highly °°able by the academic student of nuclear matters.

_Sj ^Uur*ng the closing days of 1987, before he actually ^gfied the intermediate nuclear force (INF) treaty with the ■ ^v,et leadership, President Ronald Reagan often used the

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trust—but verify,” implying that he was ready to ^st the Soviets, but he wanted some insurance—an elab-

orate verification program. The academic world has a sim­ilar attitude regarding the control of nuclear weapons by the U. S. armed forces.

The military can protest this lack of trust, but it is a fact of military life. Academics, working with politicians, set the basic policy and often the strategies for military af­fairs. Both groups generally have little military experi­ence, particularly in combat where trust and confidence are tested to the utmost. So it is not realistic to expect that they will trust a military professional just because he has a “commission” from the President saying he can be trusted. This void is particularly evident in the so-called “elite” academic world that no longer embraces reserve officer training, adjunct military professors on campus, or other military presence. This has been termed the “great divorce” by Arthur Hadley, an established military affairs correspondent who tried to alleviate the situation by help­ing establish a military history chair at Yale University. That is a step in the right direction, but until that “great divorce” is annulled, the military will have to accept the academic attitudes about trust and confidence, and try to persuade through actions and deeds rather than emotional reactions.

The press has taken on the PAL issue only occasionally. In a Washington Post article dated 22 January 1986, Wal­ter Pincus reported that the CSIA published a study by Australian academic Desmond Ball, quoting him as saying that “arguments advanced by the U. S. Navy to justify its refusal to equip naval nuclear weapons with ‘permissive action’ devices are unpersuasive [sic].” Pincus also quoted retired U. S. Navy Rear Admiral Gene Carroll of the Center for Defense Information, a “critic of the tacti­cal nuclear weapons policies,” to support the apparent contention that the Navy is out of control. Desmond Ball and his study were the genesis of an article in the 31 Janu­ary 1986 issue of Navy News and Undersea Technology entitled “Navy Nuclear Mishaps Feared.” This article begins: “The danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is greatest at sea. ...”

The specter of a Navy ship with nuclear weapons on board being captured alongside a pier has introduced a new dimension to the debate. In June 1985, the “Confer­ence on International Terrorism: The Nuclear Dimension” was held in Washington, D.C., with representatives from several nations in attendance. Rear Admiral Tom Davies, U. S. Navy (Retired), former key executive in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was one of the cochairmen and Admiral Stansfield Turner, U. S. Navy (Retired), former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was a member of the task force conducting the meeting. The conference report states that “U. S. Navy weapons, mostly large missiles on submarines, but also many tactical weapons, do not have PALs, at least on board ship. . . . Navy tactical weapons are vulnerable to use by terrorists if successfully seized. PAL systems on tactical weapons would increase security of nuclear weap­ons on ships making visits to foreign ports, especially in regions of high terrorist activity.”¹⁷ In a 27 August 1986 letter to the Wall Street Journal, Paul Leventhal, President of the Nuclear Control Institute, the organization that

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