Subs Forever

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

When Captain O’Rourke proclaimed the “End of the Submarine Era’’ in the February 1988 Proceedings, he rattled a lot of cages. Submariners and their friends fdled our mailbox. Here are some responses:

With'

Allied ASW aircraft and surface escorts became available-

Dr. Richard T. Ackley, Commander, U. S. Navy (Retired), Pro­fessor of Political Science and Director of National Security Studies, California State University (San Bernardino)—Captain O’Rourke advances the hypothesis that the preeminence of the near-invincible nuclear-powered submarine is suspect and on the wane because of recent ASW developments. However, it is in­deed this technological progress that, on the contrary, favors the nuclear sub rather than ASW. In fact, it can be argued credibly that the nuclear-powered attack sub (SSN) is the Navy’s premier ASW platform. Nuclear-powered submarines have never been invincible, but they are better today than ever before. In part, this is because advanced technologies have expanded submarine mis­sions from the tradition of closing targets on heavily traveled sea lanes to operating in more remote ocean areas where ASW is increasingly difficult.

Captain O’Rourke employs compelling logic in pointing out the inevitability of change. After all, it is conventional wisdom that nothing lasts forever. Building on this logic, he notes that the pinnacle of naval war-fighting supremacy changed from the battleship to the aircraft carrier to the nuclear-powered subma­rine. He doesn’t know what will succeed the SSN as “King of the Sea,” but he is certain that the SSN will be usurped by ASW because of recent developments, particularly in sensors, data processing, command, control, communications, and intelli­gence (C³I), and the ASW version of the Osprey MV-22 tilt- rotor aircraft, which, incidentally, was delayed in the 1989 Navy budget.¹

» Such conclusions are based on flawed methodology and a lack of balance. For example, the historical predominance of the bat­tleship and then the carrier is the result of retrospective interpre­tation. These things happened and are now considered facts. But

to predict the demise of the SSN and the succession of AS simply does not follow demonstrated evidence. Historical deter minism, like dialectical materialism, cannot predict the direction or nature of research, its timetable, or even the degree of sue cess—if any—that ultimately may result.² In other words, h^,s tory may suggest various paths to the future, but it cannot deti the one taken.             .

Captain O’Rourke is correct in stating that neither submarine warfare nor ASW have been rigorously tested by combat since World War II. However, some lessons were learned in the 1" Falklands Conflict. The sinking of the Argentine cruiser Genera Belgrano (escorted by two destroyers) by the British SSN Con queror suggested that:        .

► The SSN’s high mobility allowed the use of a simple, low-co torpedo in the antiship role. (The General Belgrano was sunk . two Mk-VIII, pre-World War II, straight-running, 45-kn° ■ 5,000-yard, steam torpedoes).

► After the sinking of the cruiser, and aware that at least⁰

British SSN was in the area, the Argentine surface flee^{1 el e} tively took no further part in the campaign.³            .

During World War II, the Battle of the Atlantic against German U-boats turned around when large numbers of U. S. ⁸ out taking credit from the brave seamen and airmen who ^^oU®_aj the U-boat campaigns, another element—“Ultra”—was ^cruC^_r to the Allied success in the Atlantic. Ultra was the code name ^ “special intelligence” provided by the British after they quired the German coding machine known as “Enigma.’ N⁸ Ultra enabled the British to read many instructions sent ^ U-boats at sea and to locate them from U-boat position ^rcP° sent to German naval headquarters. The former Commandc

off course and operating out of his ^eI1^_ lope. First, it is overly simplistic ^t0 .j

subma­

rines began to join the fleet in number^ ridiculous. Carrier battle groups ^ been and continue to be the p^renll\ fensive striking force in the U. S- ₀ It has been said that there are on y kinds of ships in any navy—^su^^nl_ui() be

wo¹

Commander Michael McHugh, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Sword­fish (SSN-579), and former Commanding Officer, USS Haddock (SSN-621)—1 don’t think any submariner can let Cap­tain O’Rourke’s article go by without comment. I think most of us would agree that advances in ASW have been made, but “the end of an era?” Hardly. Captain O’Rourke’s article is not very convinc­ing. The name of the game in ASW is still acoustic detection and, as he points out, this “still remains more an art than a science.” All the best data processing and C³I is not going to change the pecu­liar ways sound acts in a constantly changing environment. The “inevitable” development of a non-acoustic sensor may be possible, but a quick glance at a globe should quickly reinforce the mag­nitude of the problem an aircraft-mounted device would have scanning the oceans for a quiet strategic-missile submarine.

The short description of the capabili­ties of the SV-22 Osprey does not inspire an appreciation for “the dramatic changes it will bring to ASW.” In fact, Captain O’Rourke admits that there will probably be opposition to basing these aircraft at sea. Captain O’Rourke also presents another subtle problem for the

Osprey that has already plagued our other ASW aircraft—its usefulness for “a number of routine tasks.” Just like the S-3 Viking, I can envision a lot of “sur­veillance, C³I, and utility missions” for the Osprey detracting from its ASW role.

Overall, I remain unconvinced by Cap­tain O’Rourke’s contention that ASW has become “ten feet tall,” but it is the con­clusion of the article that disturbs me most. I believe the statement “aside from its stealth, the submarine has not much going for it in terms of naval warfare” could only be made by someone who has not been on board one of our submarines and who has little knowledge of what we do and how well we do it. In addition, to suggest that future submarines would be designed without weapons further de­tracts from the credibility of the article.

Whether submariners consider them­selves “Kings of the Sea” is debatable. I do not believe, however, that submari­ners would question their ability to carry out the missions they are assigned now and will be into the foreseeable future.

Commander Miles B. Wachendorf, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Parche (SSN-683)—Captain O’Rourke is 180°

sign “eras” to any type of warship- ^ warship platforms have strengths ^ weaknesses. The nuclear submarine is^ exception. The key to success in any tile maritime environment is to take vantage of the strengths and offs^et j weaknesses with superior tactics multiplatform employment.      ^

Navy does that very well. To sugg^eS ^ “the beginning of the end of the ^air_>ar|y carrier’s reign” occurred in the 1960s, when nuclear-powered

and targets. But this submariner the first to agree that there are _n things that “targets”—not to me aircraft—have always done better any submarine.                                                     . ^at

Second, aircraft-mounted device^ ^ can “see” through a few thousand ® water have been ASW goals for dec ^ While aircraft, notably the P” , LAMPS-III, are making valuable ^ contributions, to suggest that the ⁰

The improved Los Angeles-class subs—the first will be commissioned in August—will carry 50% more weapons, because they are equipped with the vertical launch system (VLS) for 12 Tomahawk missiles. The VLS tubes, with their hatches open, left, join the eight missiles carried internally for torpedo tube launch.

Chief Slei

^Thd<

^tlc missile (SLBM).

(^ he SSBN security program has outdistanced both U. S. and ^Vlet ASW. It incorporates in-depth intelligence, laboratory j. P^timents, mathematical models, and real-world tests to iden- y and evaluate potential submarine threats. Technologies that i„ ^eatially threaten our SSBNs are not only assessed, but coun- ^easures are developed before a need arises.⁵ Some ASW

Coastal Command, Royal Air Force Marshal Sir John ssor, wrote: “I have the best reason to know that in the Battle the Atlantic Ultra, in conjunction with HF/DF [high-frequen- .i'hirection finding], was a real war-winner.”⁴ The ASW plat- tTns _ma(j_{e a} difference in the heavily traveled North Atlantic ‘t'Pping lanes, but Ultra helped improve the kill ratio and saved ll convoys by providing information to route them around ^u'^b°at wolf packs.

'ⁿ terms of balance, Captain O’Rourke slights the revolution ^Current and developing submarine technologies, and the ex- Y^ed operational missions assigned submarines since the USS ^“ttilus (SSN-571) joined the fleet in the 1950s. Foremost is the °lution of the strategic submarine force from the diesel subma- q,^es armed with Regulus air-breathing cruise missiles, to the ‘° (SSBN-726)-class ballistic-missile subs armed with the lent-I—and soon the Trident-II—submarine-launched ballis- advocates raise the image of a “transparent ocean.” Despite the fact that no one can disprove this possibility, there simply is no credible evidence to indicate this advance is even on the horizon. Strategic ASW is more difficult today than ever before.

To grasp a sense of the enormous patrol areas available to the SSBN, consider the fact that 71% of our planet is covered by water—a volume of 360 million cubic miles. All the world’s population—about two billion—would not displace a single cubic mile of sea water.⁶ In this vast space, the Ohio SSBN carrying the Trident-11 missile can patrol an area of about 50 million square miles below the ocean surface.⁷ With the presence of merchant traffic, naval formations, fishing boats, sea mam­mals, and miscellaneous flotsam and jetsam, any attempt to lo­cate, classify, and attack the submerged SSBN is analogous to finding a needle in a haystack and trying to beat it to death with a stick—even with state-of-the-art ASW technology. The U. S. SSBN is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, far from the “very expensive, highly vulnerable nuclear-powered missile silo” Captain O’Rourke describes.

As demonstrated in the Falklands Conflict, the SSN can suc­cessfully attack unsophisticated surface target groups from close range with “dumb” weapons, and use smart standoff weapons such as the advanced capability (AdCap) Mk-48 torpedo, anti-

Wi]i

1^. ^s°on become transparent is wishful

de ^0st important, Captain O’Rourke’s j^iption of submarines as noisy, blind

^unable to fight off a determined at- not representative of my experi-

5^.y aircraft support against a single % ^^ore °f^{ten tban n}°t, the SSN was rj ^lted only by the number of flares car­. °ⁿ board to simulate torpedo firings ^lnst high-value units.

. » * *■ th_e ^{ln more} i*¹³⁰ 30 ASW exercises in „ 'ast three years, most of which tar-

trn ^t*^{16 combined arms severa}l mod- p ^SW surface warships with maritime ^carr'^er"^bome’ ^and helicopter

M^nant Michael J. Shewchuk, U. S. r,_n ^a Reserve, Helicopter Antisubma- (w Squadron Light 74—Captain ‘^^r*^Ce ^^{ads t0} substantiate his claim submarine supremacy is on the p₀| ^e' ’ While our ASW tactics and tech- _of °8y have improved and show promise ti₀₍ °ⁿtinued improvement, the threat has Hr_e ^remained static. Soviet submarines ha_v^^Uleter’ dive deeper, run faster, and f_0re^e S^reater standoff range than ever be- ■ While I agree that without stealth a submarine doesn’t have much going for it, I see nothing in our current ASW ca­pabilities that can be counted on to de­prive the submarine of that stealth. It is dangerous, wishful thinking (from a tar­get’s point of view) that the submarine of the future will carry few or no weapons.

Rear Admiral W. J. Holland, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain O’Rourke him­self gives the game away when he says: “With the galloping technological prog­ress shaking almost all branches of phys­ics and chemistry, the early development of a practical non-acoustic sensor seems inevitable.” And with no more than this “hunch,” he delivers a eulogy.

The redeeming feature of this article is Captain O’Rourke’s implicit acknowl­edgment that today we are in the subma­rine era. This is an unusual statement from a naval officer who is not a submar­iner. Though the submarine-as-capital- ship era began when appreciable numbers of nuclear submarines were at sea (circa 1965), it was not until the 1982 Falklands Conflict that this became manifest. The total elimination of the Argentine Navy as an effective naval force by the pres­ence of two or three nuclear submarines proclaimed today’s balance of forces at sea.

The submarine era will end when it is replaced by something that has yet to be invented. Even when invented, the vast spaces involved will require massive en­gineering and resource commitment to deploy it. Such developments are not described in Captain O’Rourke’s well- written, but polemic, article. He ignores the factual sciences involved with his proposition and thus his proposition es­capes reality.

The Navy is a scientific service and a technical organization. It is capital inten­sive, and its modernization is driven by technology and economics. The equip­ment Navy personnel operate is among the most complex in the world, much of it in the forefront of scientific and technical endeavor. The Naval Institute should take more care that its published articles rec­ognize these considerations.

If we make that effort to ensure that our publication is a standard of excel­lence as literature—and it is, we ought to make a similar effort to ensure that the articles published do not claim the earth is flat.

500

launched from a submerged submarine and flew more than

latest SSN to be funded and the first unit of the new class submarine. The weapons and combat systems on -   ^

proved SSN-688s will provide the transition to the SSN-21- Navy estimates that the SSN-21, equipped with a new ANM'

2 combat system, will be three times more effective overall the improved SSN-688. It will have the VLS system for 12 ahawks, Harpoon antiship missiles, and eight large-diame^ter

the in¹'

submarine rocket (SubRoc), Harpoon, and Tomahawk against high-value sophisticated targets. The advent of long-range, ter­minal-homing, antiship missiles and torpedoes permits a “con­centration of fire”—a basic principle of warfare—on target groups from widely dispersed SSNs. This revolution in naval warfare (massing weapons, not ships) can overwhelm enemy defenses in general and ASW aggressiveness in particular.⁸

The SSN’s traditional tasks of ASW, antisurface warfare (ASUW), and mine warfare changed for the better when micro­electronic technology became available. Major breakthroughs in high-speed data and signal processing have made the difference. Super-sensitive sonars, sophisticated decoys, advanced electron­ics and electronic countermeasures warfare, and smart standoff weapons have been integrated with faster, quieter submarine platforms to increase mission effectiveness. The Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarine was designed for open-ocean ASW, and thus became an integral part of the carrier battle groups’ ASW defense. Yet in fleet exercises, in which SSNs go head-to- head against the battle group, the submarine usually prevails.

Despite the overwhelming success of the Los Angeles class, a new version of the SSN-688 is being built; the San Juan (SSN- 751) was the first of 27 to be launched (December 1986) and will commission in August 1988. This version will be quieter than the existing model and have improved combat systems that will in­crease significantly its ability to detect targets and determine their range. Central to the subs’ modernization are the AN/BSY-1 combat systems, which began to be delivered in July 1987. The SSN-751 is the first new SSN-688-class boat to be equipped with the vertical launch system (VLS) for 12 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), joining the eight carried internally for launch through the standard 21-inch torpedo tube.⁹

New submarine technologies have permitted expanded subnW fine roles in special warfare and intelligence missions. In au tion to ASUW, the Tomahawk SLCM permitted the SSN to assigned a new mission—land attack, or strike. With either nuclear land-attack (TLAM-N) or conventional (TLAM-C) ^ver^ sion of Tomahawk, the SSN can attack ports, harbors, and inlan targets to a range of 1,500 miles from a submerged firing P°j^ tion. Operations in large ocean areas increase the threat to coas targets and the opponent’s ASW problem.

In November 1987, a submunition-armed Tomahawk ^v/

miles to attack separate targets. The missile dispersed BLU/9 combined-effects bomblets on an aircraft, a missile storage s • and a radar site; all three targets were destroyed. This subm tion-dispensing missile is part of the Navy’s Tomahawk TLA C family. Each of its 166 combined-effects bomblets weighs ■ pounds and has an incendiary fuse, a fragmenting case, ^an . armor-piercing nose.¹⁰ Consider the effect of this land-at missile in a counter-ASW role detonated above an adversary ocean floor sound surveillance system (SOSUS) facility, A command center, satellite down-link, or even above a threa ing ASW surface platform. ASW is advancing, but so is offensive capability of the SSN.                                                           >_s

If this isn’t enough, consider the Seawolf, the U. S. Na ^

Captain O’Rourke touted data processing and artificial intelligence as solutions to ASW. But they can do little than enable ASW forces to digest millions of bits of data, which may keep track of a few loud subs. What about quiet ones, though?

the

^ contention that submarine technology is outdistancing ASW. h*^s is not to claim that ASW may not usurp the nuclear- P°Wered submarine in the future, which would force the “rewrit­es of maritime strategies and naval tactics” that Captain ^ourke suggests. But the evidence suggests it won’t be soon.

Wo tubes that can fire two types of torpedoes—the AdCap ^k-48 and the new Sea Lance rocket-launched, long-range, ^>W standoff weapon. In addition, the SSN-21 is to be under­^ICe-capable, and have infrared sensors, a new passive wide- tyerture array for rapid target detection, as well as fiber optics Hiking sonars with its combat systems.¹¹ ASW will not become ^easier as it expands into larger areas.

To meet mission requirements, U. S. submarine design em­phasizes quiet covertness and superior acoustic capability over ^a,§her speed and deeper depths. Congress, however, in review- **8 recent improvements in Soviet attack submarines, increased ^r,e submarine research budget by more than $100 million. Con- Sress targeted the following “exotic” technologies for acceler- jW research:

Superconductors for propulsion systems that might make the ^ “half the size and twice as deadly”

Boundary-layer control for decreased friction, meaning higher *Peed

; New weapon systems, including autonomous underwater ve- ^lcles, the underwater version of the remotely piloted vehicles |*^sed so effectively by the Israelis¹²

The intent is to increase the submarine technology base suffi- ^C|ently to provide the Navy with design options that are not cur- ^rent]y feasible and to serve as a hedge against technological sur­prise.” ¹³

This shopping list is not exhaustive, but is presented to support

The submarine force is committed to mission effectiveness by improving combat capabilities and readiness. Clearly the subma­rine can’t do everything, but it is and continues to be a major contributor to our national defense.

‘William Matthews, “600-Ship Goal May Slip from Navy’s Grasp,” Navy Times, 29 February 1988, p. 22.

²See Arnold Buchholz’s critique of the dialectic materialism methodology in “W/s- senschaftlich-technische Revolution,” in Osteuropa, XXII (1972), p. 355, cited in John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 31.

³Phoenix, “Submarine Lessons from the Falklands War,” The Submarine Review, April 1983, pp. 38-43.

⁴F. W. Winterbotham. CBE, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. xii, 84-85.

⁵See Rear Admiral Roger F. Bacon, USN, “Undersea Forces Emphasize Role of Nuclear Power to Counter Attack,” ROA National Security Report, July 1986, p. 11; and Capt Jim Hay, USN (Ret.), “The TRIDENT Program,” The Submarine Review, July 1986, pp. 87-91.

⁶Don Walsh and Donald Reach, “Science and Engineering in the Oceans,” in Managing Ocean Resources: A Primer, Robert L. Friedhein, ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 3.

⁷Richard Halloran, “A Silent Battle Surfaces,” The New York Times Magazine, 7 December 1986, p. 94.

⁸Phoenix, “Concentration of Force by Submarines,” The Submarine Review, July 1986, pp. 12-21.

⁹Barbara Starr, “Seawolf Subs Win Full Funding in Congress,” Navy Times, 28 December 1987, p. 26.

¹⁰“Submunition-Armed Tomahawk Tested,” Armed Forces Journal, January 1988, p. 22.

“Starr, p. 27.

^l2See “From the Editor,” The Submarine Review, January 1988, pp. 3-6; and “Superconducting Subs: Twice as Deadly, Half the Size,” Navy News & Under­seas Technology, Summer 1987, p. 5.

^,3Richard Whitmire, “U. S. Boosting Submarine Research by $100 million,” The Sun (San Bernardino, CA), 5 January 1988, p. A-4.

range of latitude given authors to ss their points, including the occa-

faint praise, clearly indicating that ^{e re}ign of the submarine is far from

Pot,

^ential of lasers and the blind faith in a

technological breakthrough. Data

,^,CW/ J. Hoernemann,—An admirable ^aracteristic of the Naval Institute is the ^ide

Jpre

fj',"'^al use of fiction and satire. Captain . Nourke chooses satire to draw atten- _a'°ⁿ to the sorry state of ASW. Under his ₀,^lcle’s provocative title, Captain .Rourke discusses four ASW aspects _c^Ver- The discussion of ASW sensors _s have been taken verbatim from les- _rt'¹¹' Plans I used as an ASW instructor ^0re than 20 years ago, including the

great

^°cessing and artificial intelligence now ₀j.^aBle us to rapidly digest millions of bits th_e^data to electronically pronounce that tw ^{re are} *^ew submarines out there today _tj^{at ar}e loud enough to be detected con- dj ^u°usly. c³I, a military buzzword of ® 1980s, has taken on the status of P|tv^Crh°°d ^an(l apple pie. The lone-wolf p_r T notwithstanding, ASW C³I has cgb'y not returned to the levels of suc- (_ly^Ss achieved by the Tenth Fleet and its Eff^ter'kiH^er g^rouP^s during World War II.

coordinated ASW remains as ^s,Ve in the operating fleet as it does in

the halls of the Pentagon and Crystal City, where no one is in command and no one is in control of ASW programs. As for the Osprey, what right-minded naval analyst can deny the inevitability of the succession from battleship to aircraft car­rier to nuclear submarine to tilt-rotor air­craft. The message of the article is epito­mized by the double-edged photo caption. Yes, the progress in ASW is in­credible, if not downright embarassing.

Captain James H. Patton, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—In summary. Captain O’Rourke seems to be saying:

► Those submariners will eventually “get theirs”

► Maybe someday nonacoustics will help

► Can’t really explain why, but the V-22 is the answer—honest!

As for modern submarines being “fragile,” consider the fact that when the unfortunate incident of a collision at sea now occurs, it is the surface ship, and not the submarine, that is at risk of sinking. As for cumbersome submarines, the first SSN I served on had a turning radius on the same order of magnitude as its length, and documented simultaneous roll-and- pitch angles in excess of 50° on a strip- chart recorder during a controlled maneu­ver. 1 wish Captain O'Rourke could have been on board a ship I served on during an exercise “mini-war” when, starting at test depth and greater than 20 knots, it went to periscope depth for one seven- second look, then returned below layer while firing exercise Mk-48s in an unde­tected combined attack against an active Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer and the “high-value unit” she was escorting. The total elapsed time of the evolution was five minutes, less than two of which were above layer. Maritime patrol air­craft and ASW helicopters were support­ing the surface units.

I implore the Naval Institute to insist on a modicum of technical veracity in anything other than your novels. Contro­versy is great, but not sensationalism. I have enjoyed Proceedings for too long to see it evolve into the National Enquirer of professional defense journals.

Commander Robert E. May, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As I started into Captain O’Rourke’s article, I wondered to my­self: “What kind of a submarine is he talking about?” Then I figured it out. He’s talking about submarines that fire