The NavGard Board at Work: An interview with Vice Admiral J. C. Irwin, USCG

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On 20 November 1987, Com­mander Fraser interviewed Vice Admiral J. C. Irwin, Com­mander Atlantic MDZ (then-Vice Commandant of the U. S. Coast Guard and cochairman of the NavGard Board), at Coast Guard Headquarters in Wash­ington, D.C.

Background: The Navy-Coast Guard (NavGard) Board was es­tablished on 25 November 1980 “to provide high-level coordina­tion and recommendations on major policy issues of mutual interest to the Navy and the Coast Guard.”

Vice Admiral C. T. Lusk, Jr., and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral H. Hardisty, are the board’s current cochair­men. Seventeen other Wash­ington-based flag officers, ten from the Navy and seven from the Coast Guard, round out the board’s membership. Since its creation, the board has met twice annually.

Fraser: I have a feeling the NavGard Board has yet to be fully recognized for its behind- the-scenes, joint-service readi­ness accomplishments, especially in the area of coastal defense. How do you assess the board’s accomplishments thus far?

Irwin: Your first supposition about the NavGard Board and how it has affected the readiness of the two services in the last seven years, I think, is on the mark. It has been a real catalyst in improving Coast Guard readi­ness and an asset in improving the professional relations be­tween the Coast Guard and the Navy, particularly at the very senior levels.

Fraser: Why was the board cre­ated in the first place?

Irwin: Around the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the Coast Guard was really under fire from the admin­istration as to whether it should remain a military organization or not. A number of steps were undertaken to help solidify our belief that yes, we should re­main a military organization.

I have a feeling Admiral

[John B.] Hayes [then-Coast Guard Commandant] may h^aV been looking for ways to ernp size the military aspects of ^{1 L} Coast Guard. Admiral Hayes and CNO [Chief of Naval OP¹- ations] Admiral [Thomas B-l Hayward, his counterpart in Navy, were very close perso ^ friends. This is unusual. Son¹ ^ times you have CNOs and C° mandants who are close, son times you don’t. But those t*' did a lot of talking. I sense of them felt a joint Navy ^aI1 , Coast Guard board was a g°° and necessary event.                               <

Admiral Hayes also believe that the board would help l¹"’ clarify our struggle with the administration about the nu ' character of the Coast Guar ■ But there were other unde” ing reasons for the board s tion. An initial goal of that

Admiral Hayward wanted t® do—the wartime tasking ⁰ Coast Guard. That had not ^c done in 10 or 15 years. We were still operating under t

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^alized version of these ad hoc budget methods must be ^lned and continued. A more dependable funding pipe- must be built between the Congress and the Coast ^3rd’s wartime mission managers. r_es °ⁿgress, DoD, and the Navy (not DoT) will probably P°nd enthusiastically to this shift away from the mud­

^°^ast Guard’s military readiness requirements. This ac- ^0ant supplied $115 million in 1986, $75 million in 1987, $108 million in 1988.

ⁿ each case, Congress set up these supplemental bud- q P'Pelines to overcome the deficiencies endemic to the _t,°^ast Guard’s “normal” budget. Some insiders claim ^Se ad hoc accounts were established in an era of ex- ^ordinarily large DoD appropriations and that in lean JJods they will probably not survive. ^w° conclusions, however, can be drawn. First, Con- j;^ess. DoD, and the Navy have all clearly acknowledged _fu^e inadequacies of DoT’s Function-400 Account for ⁿding the Coast Guard’s military readiness requirements recognize the need to develop alternative funding ^tlannel_s.

^^econd, if the Coast Guard’s ambitious entry into the and harbor defense fields is to continue, an institu-

line

dling through approach that has characterized the Coast Guard’s past wartime planning and budgeting process. The Coast Guard should receive greater budget support during the next decade.

Emphasis on Peacetime Duties That Have Military Ap­plications: The Coast Guard’s operational charter resem­bles the nation’s maritime attic—a collection of marine odds and ends too important to throw out, but not militar­ily important enough to delegate to the Navy. Several of these tasks—aids to navigation and search-and-rescue, in particular—have become bread-and-butter peacetime op­erational duties of the Coast Guard. They consume a major share of the service’s budget and manpower re­sources. But they bring with them certain disadvantages.

First, they are not the stuff from which an armed service is made. Aids to navigation are functions of industrial maintenance. Search-and-rescue is basically a foul- weather rescue and towing service. Each teaches seaman­ship, but not tactical skills specifically related to coastal defense.

Second, neither mission has growth potential. Tech­nological advances, including satellites, have taken much

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mat these skills would per-

r_;i|v^th^m to adapt to wartime

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I suspect that [the

d_llt^SUmPti°n that our roles and _tll'^es were about the same as ^ Were back in World War II. _re ^Were essentially training our _lv>s for walking the beach­' duties-

C₀ ^ls valid. The active-duty Guard had a similar, un- j ^a,1ged mindset. We were train- ^ °ur reservists through aug- p^^nt;iti°n of active-duty „^Cetime operations in the be-

mit

y^Sl0n tasking.

:,_r ^et the world had been n,i_r^rching on for 30 years. Ad­it^^{3 Ha}Ves and others knew ^Jfi(]^C,L^Sblould be some changes § of the Coast Guard’s cur- t_Cr "mftime taskings, then de- lofi ^{,ne w}b*^ch of those were no tli_e^^{er a}Pplicable and whether d₀j ^were things we were not .g that we should be doing.

• ^at is how they really got ‘0arH>

^s creation] related to both Pha ^lr?^b Hayes’s goal of reem- W_a !^Zlng and clarifying new q. ¹¹¹⁶ missions and his con- h;₎₍j whether the Coast Guard ^ae right mix of naval war­time missions.

Also, at the first meeting there was an agenda item ad­dressing the requirements and needs of the former sea fron­tiers. You may recall that some years back the Navy had charged eastern and western sea frontier commands with coastal defense of the United States. These commands went by the wayside in the mid-1970s. By the early 1980s, the Navy was concentrating on projecting power overseas and had ne-

41

"RS / July 1988

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of the search out of search-and-rescue. What was once a manpower-intensive search process is becoming more of an electronic search and helicopter-plucking operation.

Satellites also have largely replaced the Coast Guard’s long-range navigation functions. The service’s short-range navigation responsibilities, consisting mainly of tending buoys and other deep-water aids, could probably be per­formed equally well if contracted out to a private firm.

The point is this: If the Coast Guard is to enhance and maintain its military readiness capabilities, it is mandatory that it shift away from stagnant, nonmilitary duties. It must move into a mix of peacetime and wartime duties that have both growth potential and direct training and equipment relationships to the service’s growing MDZ responsibilities.

Law enforcement—especially against illegal, seaborne drug smuggling—is one area particularly ripe for growth, because of its significant coastal and harbor defense appli­cations. It is, therefore, in the service’s peacetime and wartime interests to shift resources from aids to naviga­tion, for example, into law enforcement. Such a shift would satisfy a growing public demand for a new service, attract new resources to the organization as this mission

expands, and provide a coastal-defense training gr° Coastal defense and coastal law enforcement are c°ⁿ' plementary. With careful planning, a dollar spent on en of these missions will directly benefit the other. All ci zens, regardless of location, benefit directly f^ronl . stronger national defense. This is not the case for. ^s^’ search-and-rescue, which benefits coastal area citizens more than those living in Montana.                                                      u

The Coast Guard must also jettison its long-held m) that all of its functions are equally important. Nati°^a^ survival depends on military readiness. And, because Coast Guard is at all times an armed service, its

missions outrank all other duties in importance country. All nonmilitary duties of the Coast Guard tA be treated as means to the superior end—national survi through military strength. If a peacetime duty does no this agenda, then maybe the service should not be P forming it.

A New Service Culture: Past military exercises ^ shown how difficult, perhaps impossible, it is for the a age Coastguardsman/woman to shift mentally upon m lization from a peacetime “good-guy” to the suspi^cl

glected the sea frontier missions. So there was a void to be filled. Then, at the second meeting of the board, the term maritime defense zone came up. So at the very outset, the board—and I don’t know if it was a Navy or Coast Guard agenda item—made the link between old sea fron­tiers and new maritime defense zones.

Fraser: Do you know of any similar interservice structure, a forerunner of the NavGard Board, perhaps, that brought the top management of each service together on a regular basis?

Irwin: To my knowledge there were no other formal, top- level Coast Guard-Navy policy- coordination structures before the NavGard Board. If emergen­cies come up, we have liaison officers on OpNav’s [the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’s] staff, and the Commandant and CNO will talk on an “as- needed” basis. For most day- to-day communications, these arrangements have been ade­quate. But as a formal joint- service body at the top, the NavGard Board is unique.

Fraser: Has the NavGard Board had an effect on interservice communications beyond the face-to-face meetings of the board?

Irwin: Very much so. The Nav­Gard Board has enhanced the day-to-day, personal relation­ships among all of the board members, not just the cochair­persons. Both sides know who to call. And, the interservice give-and-take around the table on agenda items builds on, and reinforces, these ongoing rela­tionships.

Fraser: What is the most signif­icant accomplishment of the NavGard Board?

Irwin: Oh, I’ve got to say the boost it has given to the MDZ. No doubt about it, because so many other things have flowed out of the MDZ effort.

Fraser: Could the MDZ have been created in the absence of the NavGard Board?

Irwin: I’m sure it would have, but the board has helped a lot. What you have in the MDZ is the Coast Guard executing the Navy’s coastal defense mission. That was decided at the higher levels of both the Coast Guard

and the Navy. There were no real problems in the Coast Guard with this concept, b^ut . everyone in the Navy snpp^otl the idea. It is only natural j some people in the Navy to uneasy, to feel that the MD could mean new players vyⁱⁿ- for Navy resources.           . _g

We’ve identified through NavGard Board, for examp ^e- the need for $65-$70 milh⁰^,

worth of communications ^e4

ment for the MDZ forces. is going to come out of N^a ' money and they have f^u”'^1IT problems just as we do. I^{s1 e} ^ advocates for MDZ tasks, ^sa j

as mine countermeasures, ^

be vying for available funds-

Fraser: Rather than a singly ^ advocate, the MDZ seems a collection of advocates—" j countermeasures, naval ^c°ⁿ of shipping, inshore underse ^ warfare, and others. Under collective MDZ hat, do thes^ small backwater groups hav more budget clout than ^vV°^u otherwise be the case?

Irwin: Yes, and there is ^{a T} newed spirit of purpose an¹ ^ these groups. But I must ^c0 ₀\ you on one point. Naval co

are

^Slgnificant East Coast/West

'^v>n: No, not too much. They ^Ve tracked pretty closely to-

shipping is not at this time ^sidered part of the MDZ. I’m I ^Saying it shouldn’t be, and a jj logic indicates it should j; ^a Part of the MDZ. We ^°uld lik_e to take another look that, especially to see if there

oast differences in the applica- _sl .y of the naval control of 'Pping forces.

^^rase_r: Beyond the naval con- (u °f shipping question, are Q,^ere major East Coast/West . °ast differences in the way the l_r 2 has developed?

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f_e ^ner- Now, there are some dif- p>*s because of the geogra- UjJ 'tivolved. There are many n ^re strategic ports on the East .^ast than on the West Coast. Cr_e'^S .^^as l^ed to the need for, and _Sll,^atl°n of, more sectors and ^Sectors on the East Coast, asequently, the organization ^ y he a little different. But we d_e ^r* for the CinCs [comman- ^rs'>n-chief] on each coast.

J^aser: Does our involvement ^ NATO give the East Coast ^ a more important national role?

Irwin: No, I don’t think so arid the reports I get of the impor­tance CinCPac [Commander-in­Chief Pacific] attaches to the West Coast MDZ and the duties he’s looking to spin off to it assure me he sees the MDZ as a necessary and viable force out there.

Fraser: The NavGard Board passed through an initial “study-the-problem” phase, dur­ing which it identified the need for the MDZ and then became an advocate for better coastal defense. Does the board con­sider itself a policy-level unit ready to turn its plans over to OpNav and Coast Guard Head­quarters for implementation, or will the board, when the going gets tough on the funding front, use its influence to find the money needed to implement its plans?

Irwin: The divisions between the phases in the development of the NavGard Board are not as distinct as you imply. The FRAM [fleet rehabilitation and modernization] of the Coast Guard 378-foot cutter, for exam­ple, called for major improve­ments to this vessel to meet the demands of coastal defense. The Navy realized this was going to cost it money and it still went forward. The same is true of the 270-foot cutter design. Lots of Navy money was involved and it went forward. The communica­tions costs for the MDZ—the same story.

These are NavGard Board items that progressed from study to hardware, and, in each case, the Navy found the money needed to implement the studies. This is not to suggest the Navy paid all the costs, but a signifi­cant portion has come from Navy funds. But, in each case, the Navy worked with the board to arrive at what was needed and the costs involved. We all knew these were big ticket items.

The NavGard Board was a major influence in seeing that the money was available. Just by having the board members around the table as the needs and costs are discussed repeat­edly, the OpNav and Coast Guard office chiefs become more and more familiar with the sub­jects and finally commit them­selves and say, “Let’s do it.”

hard-nosed sailor needed to protect our harbors and coasts from a determined enemy in wartime. Table 2 summarizes the stark contrasts between the Coast Guard’s current peacetime and wartime operating environments.

Just as the MDZ mission requires new sensors and weapons in Coast Guard ships and aircraft, it also de­mands that all Coastguardsmen/women consider them­selves, above all, as members of the armed forces. The “mission of mercy” image so finely honed by Coast Guard recruiters in the past is not compatible with the service’s new military direction. When the objective is a determined, armed, and unpredictable enemy, not a hum­ble fisherman adrift at sea, we must be ready to respond with a trained military force, not a tow line.

As the Coast Guard’s peacetime and wartime activities become more complementary, its personnel will become more adept at passing readily from one environment to the other.

In the end, it will probably be a lot easier to come up with the money to upgrade the Coast Guard’s surface and air fleets than to change the attitudes of its personnel. Both changes, however, must be made simultaneously.

As the Coast Guard progresses through these five

change-filled stages toward a more rational future, it 'J'¹ achieve a new organizational equilibrium. The current dj continuity between peacetime and wartime will gradua ) disappear as the stature of our fifth armed service is °^nae again based on a demonstrated mission-force mate • Semper Paratus.

^lThe Officer, April 1985, p. 19.                                                                                     ^ _va]

²Cdr Lawson W. Brigham, USCG, “U. S. Coast Guard in 1985,” U- ^s- * Institute Proceedings, May 1986, p. 42.

³See LCdr Lynn W. Norden, USNR, comment on “Coastal Defense” and j¹ ing the Coast,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1985, P- ¹ ’ related ideas on the requirements for an entrance control vessel.                                                                                                         ,_Si

⁴VAdm D. C. Thompson, USCG, interview, U. S. Naval Institute Procee ¹ October 1986, pp. 169-174.

⁵Navy Times, 8 February 1988.

Commander Fraser has held operational and staff assignments boi active and reserve duty. He is currently a defense analyst and the Washington, D.C., area.

Fraser: Is attendance at Nav- Gard Board meetings good? Irwin: The meetings are very well attended and these are very senior people. Most of the Navy’s members are three stars and the NavGard Board is a big chunk out of their day. I’m ter­ribly pleased with the level of commitment shown around the table.

Fraser: Does the NavGard Board receive a higher priority from the Coast Guard members than the Navy members, given the fact that the Navy is so much larger and has worldwide responsibilities?

Irwin: You’re asking, I think, if one service or the other receives a disproportionate share of the benefits. I would have to say it is a pretty equally divided ar­rangement. Yes, the Coast Guard is a net recipient of money. But that money im­proves our capability to perform Navy missions. If you upgrade the 378-foot cutter so it can per­form like an FFG-7 [Oliver Haz­ard Perry-class frigate], who benefits?

It works both ways, though. The use of buoy-tending vessels in the mine countermeasures arena—for channel condi­tioning—is a good example of resources taken out of the Coast Guard’s hide to serve a naval mission.

Fraser: What are two or three major agenda items that the board recently faced?

Irwin: One important item was the wartime tasking of Coast Guard aircraft. That has really been in limbo Over the years. Unlike our ships and personnel, we have assumed our Coast Guard aircraft would be doing in wartime what they do in peace­time. Now we need to ensure effective wartime tasking for our aircraft too.

One of the issues prompting this was the Coast Guard’s re­cent acquisition of two Navy E-2C aircraft, major weapon systems. And I say, “What hap­pens to these two craft upon mobilization?” That question, in turn, led us to ask a similar question about our other aircraft.

Another agenda item was the transfer of Coast Guard forces to the Navy in situations short of declared war and national emer­gencies. Under these circum­

stances, the integration of the services is pretty clear. But if contingency situations, such ^aS the Persian Gulf today, whet* the President isn’t going to c^a ^ up 200,000 reserves or ded⁸^ national emergency, just how we ensure that the Coast G^uaf^_s is able to quickly provide f°^rCt to the Navy?

Fraser: Are there any ^s'8ⁿ'_way cant barriers standing in the of making the NavGard Boat work well and perform its ¹⁰ service role into the future- Irwin: I haven’t been able to think of any. The board is ⁿ° seven years old and has g°^ne ^

through three Commandants ^a

CNOs and our agendas are s engaging.

Interestingly, the board n functions with very little dire Commandant or CNO in^{v0 v} _up ment. We do keep the bosses to date, but we do not rely ⁰ their direct involvement. Art that’s a strength, because the^ board can continue on with without the involvement of two men.