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of team-level goal setting and feedback in strengthening motivation to achieve, see “Shipboard Training: The Team’s the Thing!” by this author, October 1983 Proceedings.)
In order to strengthen the effectiveness of on-station drills and help build motivation, team leaders should take the following steps:
► Drill on the basic disruption skills until your team has them well learned. Figure 1 shows that true qualification in some of these skills requires that they be demonstrable under conditions specified by other disruption skills (for example, “manning and shifting” should be handled while “operating in adverse environments” and while “performing with casualties”). Team leaders, using their own “subjective” professional judgment, will decide when their respective teams’ skills are “well learned.” At any time, of course, a spot check of team qualifications can be made by the ship’s battle control officers, the executive officer, the commanding officer, or so on. The most important indication of the authenticity of a grade entered on a qualification card is the name or initials of the person making the evaluation.
►Lay out a drill program for the immediate future. Recall that each drill should comprise one element of a systematic program aimed at achieving and sustaining an expert ability to fight. The simplest way to lay out a good program- one with a coherent sense of direction— is to work directly with the visual display. Team leaders should talk with their teams and arrange the qualification cards in a reasonable order. The flexibility of the visual display will make it easy to change the program as it goes along (and there will be plenty of changes). Most important: Put the one qualification card that describes the next planned drill at the top of the display. Do not try to schedule a specific drill several weeks in advance; it never works.
► Achieve the first training goal. Plan
and conduct the drills necessary to achieve the battle capability selected as the team’s first goal.
►Evaluate the first battle skill and update the visual display. Again, the first criterion for a declaration of “ready to proceed” is always the team leader’s professional judgment, guided by that of the team’s battle control officer.
►Continue the program until your team is ready to fight. Keep track of progress and setbacks, setting new goals and attacking them, always keeping all of the team’s members involved in the thinking and planning.
►Plan every drill thoroughly. A drill plan leader (DPL), officer or enlisted, should be named by the team leader after each drill to think through, in advance, the procedures to make the next drill productive and to see to it that all necessary preparations are made beforehand. He will ensure that the drill is effective and that drill time is not wasted on activities that could just as well be accomplished off station. When a drill or exercise requires coordinated action by two or more teams, then the cognizant battle control officers must ensure coordinated planning by DPLs from all teams concerned, guided by a DPL from the leading combat team.
A drill plan need not be a written document in any formal sense. It can be entirely in the DPL’s head or scribbled in rough notes on a piece of scratch paper. In any case, it will comprise a first-class exercise in management and leadership. Following is a shotgun list of items the DPL might take into account:
1. What teams will drill together?
2. Will the drill be on station or at some instruction location?
3. Is the instruction location arranged?
4. What are the drill’s objectives?
5. What skills will be exercised?
6. Who will do the teaching? What will be needed?
7. What is the starting condition? What is the drill condition? What is the secur
8. What drill calls will be used to get people to stations?
9. If the drill condition is to be Genera Quarters or Condition II or III, vv*ult problem will be set up beforehand? Who will set it up? Is that person ready?
10. Who will observe? What materials will they need?
11. What special materials will he needed? (Examples: markerboards, leS son plans, source documents, sm°K bombs, flashlights, area markers, blind
folds, armbands, visual aids, films
projection devices, computer programs' wound moulages, stretchers, st°P watches, clipboards, writing tools.)
12. What homework or other speed preparations should be accomplished ' team members in advance?
13. How will the officer of the deck e
kept informed of the status of the
14. Should the drill be noted m plan of the day? Has this been requests
15. What arrangements are needed
make sure any interruption of ship’s is anticipated by division officers department heads?
Then, following the “secure from drill” order, the DPL should: debriet t team; find out what happened and ^ qualifications were achieved; cons with the team leader, who marks the ual display to show the current state team qualification; and suggest object1 for the next drill.
Captain Appleton is a graduate of the Naval j emy, the Naval Postgraduate School, the A ^ Forces Staff College, and the Naval War Coll'J-^i;t(.. holds a master’s degree in information systems agement and a doctorate in administrative ma ^ ment from the University of California. “<■ ^ served in battleships, cruisers, destroyers, an _ phibious force ships and has held four sea mands. Captain Appleton was the winner °f me ,.|£, cation and Training Minicontest with his a “Shipboard Training: The Team’s the Thing' L„|, lished in October 1983, and of the 1985 A^ „ Burke Essay Contest with his article, “Endg published in April 1985.
Design Doldrums: SWATH & Sea Knife
By Commander K. M. Smith, Jr., U. S. Navy
The Sea Knife triangular waterplane small craft and the small waterplane-area twin hull (SWATH) are two advanced- hull forms with severe limitations.
The key question to be considered when selecting a ship design is whether, in the aggregate, the advantages offset the limitations. High-performance ships have appropriate roles. Unfortunately,
high-performance ships, such as the Sea Knife and SWATH, tend to have narrow bands of optimum performance. Conventional ships tend to be able to adapt to a wider range of capabilities with less compromise when they are operating outside their optimum.
Sea Knife is advertised as a supercritical planing hull. Supercritical refers to
the hull form’s slow pitch resonance high-seaway encounter frequency performance in waves, compared to ventional planing boats, and the tena ’ of its advocates are its chief attrib ( Small prototypes have demonstrated ^ the hull form lives up to its b***'n®a|- pitch response at high speeds. The P ties for this sterling response, howe
Proceedings / Jl,b
j’as been forced to pick alternative hull 0rms for every mission considered: a c°nventional planing craft, a hydrofoil, aa air-cushion craft, or a small surface- '•‘fect ship. Sea Knife suffers from many es>gn drawbacks.
Planing craft depend on lift to raise the U*1 in the water and shape to leave their j^ave drag behind. Sea Knife has a poor u-to-drag ratio at high speeds and re- W'tes much higher power than altema- Ve designs to achieve its supercritical ^formance.
achieve high-speed performance,
, e Sea Knife’s center of gravity must be
eral waterplane. This means the craft °ats with bow trimmed down when it is Jot planing. The waterplane forward is .pty narrow. Designing the craft to han- e variable loads, like fuel, to accommo- ,ate both reasonable trim at low speed ^ proper trim for supercritical perfor- ance is exceedingly difficult. As a re- I ’ Sea Knife has stability problems at speed and at rest.
Much of any high-speed craft’s mis- °n time is spent either in low-speed (ransit or loitering. The Sea Knife’s mo. °ns at no speed in any seaway are poor .comparison to alternative hull designs.
: ?°w down trim and narrow waterplane ti()Vlte 3 wet (leclc- High drag, poor direc- anal stability, and poor maneuverability , l°w speed make low-speed transit desirable.
^he narrow hull also contains little 0 “ble volume for mission spaces, fuel, Propulsion machinery.
improvement in performance is not lced in larger Sea Knife versions. nger craft deal with longer waves in Srv!^0rt'onate sea states. Unless vessel Cl e^s increase, wave encounter frequen- * are lower, causing the craft to re- pV*n<J in pitch. To attain supercritical r,°rmance as the craft is scaled larger,
e(l and power requirements become
offshore powerboat competitions, in
„ lch speed alone is the measure of suc- •j^s> Sea Knife has not been successful. 1^ most successful competitors lately Ve been catamaran-configured pris-
|)j ^ATH ships are advocated for many caii Peed’ high-deck area missions bede ^e> compared to designs with a similar t-. area, they have lower wavemaking
'ls(ance and reduced motions. SWATH a comfortable ride because accelera-
tJs often are less than ships of compa-
displacement, comparable deck °r comparable length.
SWATH proponents within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the ship design communities have ensured that SWATH has been considered as an alternative for every naval ship class under development from salvage ships to aircraft carriers.
The shortcomings of the hull form have overcome the advantages in every case except T-AGOS (ocean surveillance) and research missions. These ships require course keeping, high endurance, and low speeds at a variety of sea states. For these missions, SWATH is fully suited, but SWATH also has many drawbacks.
The small waterplane, which lets the ship motions be uncoupled from the sea motions, makes the ship change draft and trim whenever weight or deck loads are changed. To overcome this, a large portion of the ship’s displacement in “light ship” consists of ballast. Light ship normally means without consumable loads. SWATH must remain at constant displacement to retain its desirable motion characteristics. The large ballast tanks adversely affect the SWATH ship’s usa
The ship’s mission dictates the volume and deck area required. SWATH has significantly less arrangable enclosed space compared to deck area. Modern combatants are almost always volume-limited.
Artists who draw SWATH carriers forget the volume required to house equipment, men, fuel, aircraft, and the electronic suite required to support aircraft operations. SWATH ships are light per unit length. Much of the carrier’s enclosed volume—ballast tanks and small spaces in the thin struts—is unusable.
Arranging machinery also is difficult because of the need for narrow struts. Machinery must be placed either at the bottom of long access trunks, through which it cannot be removed, or at one end of a complex drive train, to ensure that the propeller has a source of power from an engine well above the waterline. The larger and more powerful the ship, the more difficult this problem becomes.
Accelerations caused by changes in ship course and speed cause relatively severe heel and trim changes. This is overcome to some extent by a complex array of active and passive foils. Typically, a high-speed turn involves two rudders and two “ailerons” moving. This additional complexity reduces reliability.
Long, deep, slender hulls resist turning forces. The rudders are not in the wash from the propellers, reducing the rudders’ effectiveness. At low speeds, the widely spaced propulsors can be used to compensate for sluggish response. As anyone who has raced catamarans will testify, when at speed, catamarans go in a straight line.
SWATH ships also are unable to handle deck loads well. Towing, lifting, or mooring loads cause heel and trim problems. These are exaggerated by the height above water of the weather deck, where these loads often are applied.
A SWATH loses its advantage in waves high enough to strike its lowest continuous deck, thereby limiting its operations envelope. Some courses in some sea states can cause combined pitch, roll, and heave motions which are more severe than monohull motions. When out of synch with the environment, SWATH ships provide a rough ride. While it is easy to develop sea legs on a monohull, the SWATH deck may move in any direction without predictable rhythm. Smaller and slower SWATH ships may contour, or move with, larger waves. Larger and faster SWATH ships may not and, hence, they are subject to the slamming of their support structure.
A final drawback is that a destroyersized SWATH may be too deep to enter
"Igs / July 1988
many ports. It will be so high and beamy that adequate pier space will be at a premium. It will occupy the space of several destroyers and require special fendering and mooring.
Consequently, it now appears evident that the advantages of the Sea Knife and SWATH designs seldom outweigh their limitations. All the facts—not just the glamorous ones—need to be considered when selecting a hull form.
Commander Smith is a naval architect and engineering duty officer, presently serving at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin. He served as project engineer in 1982-83 on the ARS-50 project at Naval Sea Systems Command PMS-383, where he participated in discussions and a critique of a hypothetical SWATH salvage ship.
U. S. Naval Academy course on advanced marine vehicles, taught by Roger Compton.
Three presentations by Peter Payne, owner of the Sea Knife patent.
Discussions with Ray Fulton, formerly of the NavSea hydrodynamics branch.
Discussion with NAVSEA Combat Engineering $ta tion, Norfolk, Chief Naval Architect Donald • Blount.
Unpublished test reports on the Sea Knife.
Does Canada Own the Northwest Passage?
By Donat Pharand
In August 1985. the U. S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea (WAGES-11), on her voyage from Thule, Greenland, to the Chukchi Sea, steamed through the Northwest Passage. Once notified of the impending transit, Canada informed the ynited States that it considered all waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago as historic internal waters and that a request for authorization to transit the Northwest Passage would be necessary. The United States refused to make such a request, taking the position that the Northwest Passage was an international strait. As a result, the two governments agreed that the Polar Sea's transit would take place without prejudice to their respective legal positions.
The incident aroused deep emotion in Canada and, the very next month, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, announced a number of measures to enable Canada to exercise effective control over the Arctic waters in general and those of the Northwest Passage in particular. Two of those measures were the construction of a “Polar 8” icebreaker and the establishment of straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago. The latter is of special legal consequence to Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.
In his announcement, Clark specified that the baselines defined “the outer limit of Canada’s historic internal waters.”1 To make it clear that Canada stood ready to have the International Court of Justice adjudicate the international validity of its sovereignty claim, Clark announced at the same time that the government was withdrawing the 1970 reservation to its acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction.
There can be only two legal bases for Canada’s claim of sovereignty: a historic title and the straight baselines themselves. (The sector theory, occasionally
Canada’s Arctic Waters
Straight Baselines lllllllllltfHifl 100-mile Pollution Prevention Zone 200-mile Fishing Zone Route of the Polar Sea
Canada's territorial waters extend 12 miles seaward of the straight baselines that define the outer limit of Canada's historic internal waters. Canada's concern is that if it does not take effective territorial control measures—such as acquiring nuclear-powered submarines would provide—the Northwest Passage could become an international strait through which vessels of all nations would have the right of transit.