Comment and Discussion

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ivvay ,tial dan­ger is a foolhardy way of exercising ^c0lTj_t mand. Over the past several y^eaj^_ve seems that some of our commanders taken the easy way out by blaming^sU ^ dinates. Training and preparation sponsibilities of the commanding ⁰ j_t or so I thought. When a ship, whet be the Chesapeake or the USS BW’ poorly fought, it is the responsibility

from his station in times of potent

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Removing ground-launched ^ missiles (GLCMs) and ground-ladⁿ , ballistic missiles (GLBMs—P^{ers 1} j|jf and II) from Europe, as agreed in th ^ treaty, will diminish our theater n jy_t options. Our German allies, particy^. are understandably concerned by a

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tion of missiles that have range ad^ett

i their

territory.

The Stark Report

The Triad After INF and START

Women in the Brigade

The Surface Navy is Not Ready

Money Matters

Antishark Warfare?

Satellites and Naval Warfare

We Need a Little Dash and Daring

The Link to the Boomers

HS to VS: Leave the Hovering to US

The Caldas Incident

Nickels: A New Approach to Carrier Landings

Mine Warfare Focus

ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare Opera­tor First Class Seibert L. Murphy, U. S. Naval Reserve, Patrol Squadron 60— Commander King’s article is timely. The time between identifying a problem and finding a tactical solution is too long.

Timely tactical updates to tactical memorandums and naval warfare publi­cations can be made if the fleet has a di­rect line of communication with the shore-based decision makers. Too often, the best available information about a threat takes too long to disseminate widely enough to develop effective tac­tics. There is a perception that direct fleet inputs are less valuable to the tactical planners because the information is in “raw” form. In fact, if fleet personnel could review with the tacticians the threats encountered and tactics employed in the fleet, more timely decisions could be made. Those decisions then could be published as current tactics, to deal with current threats.

Within a command, discussion of tac­tics should be encouraged. The best ideas about accomplishing tasks come from personnel with experience. Exchanging information among tactical crew mem­bers also must be a regular activity. Tac­tics departments should hold regular ses­sions with key personnel, to ensure that everyone is up to speed on tactics.

Industry also must be considered in the tactical decision-making process. Tech­nology may drive the tactics, but without guidance the technology may drive the decision maker the wrong way. The greatest advances in effective weapon system design occur when military and industry discuss the threat problems to­gether. There is a wealth of knowledge and enthusiasm in the industrial complex. If tapped, it will lead to high-quality, cost-effective weapon systems.

“The Stark Report”

(See M. Vlahos, pp. 63-67, May 1988; N. L. Flacco, p. 17, June 1988 Proceedings)

Commander Henry C. Boschen, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—I agree with Dr. Vlahos’s conclusions indicating that “the Navy’s natural selection during peace­time mirrors American society.” I have

been concerned that many ranking ^na officers recognize that promotion ⁰ goes to the officer who spends ^a 8                             ,

deal of time in the desk positions a ^ only goes to sea to have his ¹¹ punched.        _s

As I read the article, I noted what said about the USS Coontz’s (DD ^ reaction in a similar situation. The c ^ manding officer of a U. S. naval vesse^ ^ in an awkward position; he is damn he does and damned if he doesn t- ^ only real choice is to ensure the sate y his crew to the best of his ability- For a commanding officer to be a

command. As naval officers, we all recognize this. Congratulations Vlahos on his observation.

“The Triad After INF and START”

(See J. L. George, pp. 112-122, May J. T. Merino Castro, pp. 76-80, June Proceedings)

Russell S. Hibbs—The Intermediate ^ clear Forces (INF) treaty eliminates ^ ^ ground-launched missiles, but it ⁿ ^_ct. in motion a current that is already a ing the Navy’s course and could foundly change its structure.

to strike Warsaw Pact forces on _ate^{ territory and by a correspondingly 8 ₀f reliance on weapons which, beca their short range, are limited to G

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Some European allies have ^sU®?£id) that sea-launched cruise missiles (-> ₀f could fill the gap left by the ^reI^⁾. <_s da GLCMs and GLBMs. While SLCJV'           _f

not have the rapid flight time of ?^er

*• Such considerations are valid, but

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■§an deploying Tomahawk land-attack 'ssiles (TLAM/N) with ranges exceed- 8 600 kilometers.

jjf¹' the Reykjavik summit, the two j^^es agreed to a ceiling of 6,000 war- lj_c^ac*^s deployed on intercontinental ballis- missiles, sea-launched ballistic- pru^,S'*^eS (SLBMs), and air-launched _ci '^Se missiles. They also agreed to ex- ne SLCMs from the 6,000 limit and to 8°tiate a separate SLCM limit.¹ II a J_u|y 1987, the Soviets proposed a « of 400 nuclear SLCMs deployed on specified types of submarines.

United States rejected the proposal as i- “finable. The Soviets also suggested

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.fistic missiles, in European eyes they ^ ^Ve another important advantage—they not provide the Soviets targets on Eu- ^mP^ean territory.

Navy has resisted assigning '-Ms to theater operations and target ^ans on the grounds that it would ad- fsely affect other missions such as

AS\v.

Pefully those making decisions will ^^s° consider William Shakespeare’s ^rds: “We must take the current when it

^eVOr lose our ventures.”

I_a^lavmg agreed to eliminate all ground- nched ballistic and cruise missiles ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilo- ^ters, Soviet and U. S. arms control ■J>°tiators are now focusing on SLCMs. t,^ls*^s not the first time. A protocol to ^J-T ii limited the range of SLCMs to kilometers. The protocol expired on Member 1981, and in 1984 the U. S.

ⁿg conventional SLCMs, but did hiention a specific number.² _(1|) ne United States will negotiate limits fj J'f-CMs only if the limits can be veri- t, ; Verification is extremely difficult, if ^ '^possible. In 1984, when consider- 'ke deployment of Tomahawks, the ^Se of Representatives noted:

*ⁿ view of the deployment of nu- Uear-armed sea-launched cruise mis­^siles by the Soviet Union since 1962, j*nd the absence of any existing relia- ^le means whereby the presence (or absence), range, warhead or capabili- ^t,es of sea-launched cruise missiles '•an be verified, the conferees do not ^elieve that a moratorium on the de­ployment of nuclear-armed Toma- nawk sea-launched cruise missiles '''ould be consistent with the national ^Security of the United States.”³ Th

l₀^ne House then directed the President c₀n^Submit a report describing an arms _sib|^lr°l method by which it would be pos- t_0(i^e *° determine whether an SLCM is ^v'^entionaIly armed or nuclear armed, 'though various executive depart­ments and agencies addressed the ques­tion, none was able to describe such a method other than actual boarding and inspection of ships and submarines. But even this would not ensure that nuclear SLCMs would not be subsequently loaded aboard.

One can, of course, count a given type of vessel as having a given number of SLCMs. Although this approach is usu­ally discussed in the context of subma­rines, it could be applied to surface ves­sels. The approach does not, however, distinguish between conventional and

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nuclear SLCMs, should separate limits be imposed. A platform with a given missile capacity could carry either conventional or nuclear SLCMs, or a combination of both. Consequently, the vessel would have to be counted against both nuclear and conventional limits.

In his Washington summit farewell speech Mikhail Gorbachev declared that the Soviets have a technique enabling them remotely to identify not only the presence, but also the capacity of nuclear warheads on board ships. If such a device exists, it probably emits high-energy neu-

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academies and was the first to a' women, starting in 1974. The other a'

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Since the initial class of female m'<

1978’

(See J. L. Byron, pp. 34-40, December

J. F. Stavridis, G. D. Pash, and R O ,

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1987:

O’Neill. PC'

28-30, February 1988; J. M. Rodgers !

numerous articles in professiona ^ cations indicate that no one com....,, has a monopoly on the “right j_tjes

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trons to induce a small amount of fission in any nuclear warhead. However, detec­tion would have to be made at close range and water or lead shielding could foil the inspection.⁴

Applying INF range criteria (500— 5,500 kilometers) to SLCMs would elim­inate all Tomahawks. Both the conven­tional and nuclear land-attack versions have ranges prohibited by the INF treaty. (The Tomahawk antiship version has a range slightly less than 500 kilometers, but would be prohibited unless some ac­ceptable manner to distinguish it from land-attack Tomahawks was negotiated.)

If applied to SLBMs, INF range crite­ria would eliminate Poseidons, which have a range of approximately 4,000 ki­lometers, and Soviet ballistic SS-N-6 and SS-N-17 missiles. Two Soviet sea- launched cruise missiles, the SS-NX-21 and the SS-NX-24, would be eliminated under range parameters corresponding to those of the INF treaty.

Elimination of depressed-trajectory SLBMs could be significant and stabiliz­ing because those close to the coast could strike command-and-control centers and infrastructure with little warning as a pre­liminary step in a preemptive first strike.

Elimination of SLCMs in the desig­nated ranges would have less immediate strategic impact, but would have a pro­found long-term effect on U. S. ship de­sign, force structure', and concept of op­erations. The Navy has already begun widespread deployment of Tomahawk missiles. Some 500 nuclear TLAM/Ns will be deployed on surface ships and some 270 on submarines.⁵

The INF treaty calls for elimination not only of missiles, but also of their launch­ers and canisters. Should an agreement eliminating Tomahawks be reached, it could affect the vertical launch system (VLS) and have a profound impact on the entire U. S. Navy missile program. Such an agreement would steer us back from whence we come, not to where we have set course.

¹Arms Control Today, October 1987, p. 12.

²Ibid.

³Russell S. Hibbs, “An Uncontrollable Toma­hawk?” Proceedings, January 1985, p. 65.

⁴John A. Adam, “Verification: Keeping Ivan Hon­est,” The Washington Post, 24 January 1988, p. C3. ⁵Arms Control Today, October 1987, pp. 12-13.

“Women in the Brigade”

0See K. M. Klein and J. E. Good, pp. 103­108, April 1988 Proceedings)

Midshipman First Class Michael Camilleri, U. S. Navy—Captain Klein’s and Dr. Good’s article is informative but

it fails to address one problem. Taxpayer are paying for women at the Naval Aca emy to be trained for combat roles they currently cannot lawfully fill- ^ government needs to decide either allow women to engage in combat, or get them out of the military altog^{ct e}

John J. Tarpey, Jr.—Whether by d^es^_ or otherwise, this article makes no me tion of the seemingly forgotten ^serV1 the U. S. Coast Guard, and its ^oUtst’J₍._n„ ing academy in New London, Conn cut. The article also fails to address ^ remaining federal academy, the u- Merchant Marine Academy at K Point, New York. This academy, ⁱⁿ , served as a test site for women at te

emies looked to Kings Point for in such areas as administrative a< ment, regimental policies, berthing commodations, formal and informa tire, and physical fitness require⁰¹²^

men graduated from Kings Point m more than 140 have complete ^ academy’s difficult curriculum an ^ ceived their naval commissions mate’s or engineer’s licenses.

“The Surface Navy is Not Ready”

D. W. Meadows, pp. 20-24, March 19*^  _

M. B. Sturgis, C. Johnson, and L- R- j. \1 p. 22 April 1988; J. K. Kuhn, D. G. cl ’ Miller, R. R. Harris, D. M. Norton, ^w- ’ Sullivan, R. B. Shields, and J. L. Byron. 78-93, May 1988 Proceedings)

IV

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derson II, U. S. Navy, and Lie^lt ^ Charles R. Landrum, U■ j_oljbt- Aviators and submariners are t*n \>e edly good at what they do and c commended for helping create _ world’s best navy. But the surface fare community, despite its H^aW*’_tj_ier.

binds the whole organization tog Retention figures, safety statistics^];.

exist cannot be denied. Aviators, very nature of their job, tend to ^e ^ dynamic and have quicker refle*^e the average surface warfare offtc^e( ’         ,]y

have not, however, earned ^conslS_nl;_niie high marks for readiness. There co to be “hangar queens,” ye'*⁰ ^\\) shortages, and aircraft launched p^a

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mission capable to fulfill an air plan. When faced with maintaining and com­manding a surface ship, aviators have not demonstrated any superiority over their surface counterparts; some would say they do worse.

Submariners have the comfort of a more one-dimensional existence and ca­reer progression. The complexities of cruising surreptitiously beneath the waves are mind-boggling. Nuclear pro­pulsion requires step-by-step precision. But the variety of threats, missions, con­tingencies, and external interferences are much narrower.

Comparisons of which community at­tracts the best officers is a tempest in a teapot. “Best” in what way? What makes the best warrior? A good leader must be multidimensional, and no com­munity, despite its strengths, can boast of having found the one right formula.

None of the above is intended to offend or to be seen as an attack on our comrades above or below the sea. Nor is this an impassioned defense of the surface line community; there is a lot the surface force can learn to do better. But remem­ber, if a storm arises at sea, a pilot will not fly and a submariner will seek the quiet of the deep. But the surface navy must face its fury. All three communities face imminent danger on a daily basis, and it is therefore unlikely that submari­ners and aviators are more “intense” in the performance of their duties.

“Money Matters”

(See R. Granum, p. 122, June 1988

Proceedings)

Midshipman C. J. Simones, U. S. Navy, U. S. Naval Academy—Bravo to Captain Granum for his tips on an oft-overlooked subject in naval training: the proper man­agement of personal finances. When a person enters the armed services, he or she rarely has had any experience or training in budgeting. This knowledge is a necessity.

The thought of being responsible for my own finances after graduation is wor­risome to me. There are so many deci­sions to be made regarding money man­agement that good advice is both necessary and welcome. Captain Granum is providing a real service with his col­umn. Thanks.

“Antishark Warfare?”

(See H. D. Baldridge and C. S. Johnson, pp. 119-120, December 1987 Proceedings)

Captain Frank Beamon Martin, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Circa 1961, I was intensely interested in (J subject of antishark warfare. As an S-* aircraft pilot, I spent many hours o' water working with the “cans and subs- We were all well trained in survival an carried the latest gear, including s’¹" repellent. But none of us had much c°^{n 1} dence that it would work, and we we eagerly awaiting an electrical device t was supposedly being tested at the B versity of Miami in Florida.

This replacement for the chemical pellent, as I recall, consisted of noth>ⁿ-" more than two electrodes connected to dry-cell battery. The electrodes we sewn into the diver’s flight suit at ⁰ arm and one leg cuff. When submejS in salt water, the device produced electric field too weak for the diver feel, but of sufficient strength to cau distress to the shark. It seemed like sue good idea at the time, and 1 have wondered what became of it.

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electric shark repeller, it experience^, shock. The magnitude of the stin'¹¹^ depends upon the strength of the fie*^d ^ the orientation of the shark vis-a-^vlS potential gradient.        ^

Beginning in the early 1960s vvit*¹ Hicks Electronic Shark Repell^er' ^ U. S. Navy has evaluated a nufflb^y electrical antishark devices. Not j were the pulsed (to conserve battery voltages of early models so high ^aS^its

quickly acclimated and would then ^ ally take baits within the electrical i noticibly twitching with each pulse ⁰ repeller.                . j_n-

Some years later, Electromagnet¹^,^

nificantly reduced shark dam³?® _a shrimp nets and then set out to d^eVI" j a miniaturized model for divers. It coffee-can-sized power pack at the ^ er’s belt, with the zippers or condu ^ strips of rubber in the wetsuit servi electrodes down the arms and leg^s- package achieved only limited sue South Africans have been ^eva*^ua_ro- the success of electrical barriers tecting areas and preventing sharks ^ entering narrow passes into bays or ^ moving up rivers. Electrode array’⁵_a[)d shallowly buried in the sand botto¹¹¹^. energized so as to inflict intolerab e ditions on sharks attempting to ^tra j Although highly effective, this u^jgli may not be practical because of tn^e cost of providing adequate electric

battery life, voltages that repel _es^s hut are not safe for the user, and tnih ^iaHy noofi'uatization by a shark that _S|^ ' have plenty of time in a survival

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and maintaining the electrode array. _r principal of electrical shark and ^6rS *^{S We}" known ^anc* Q¹¹'¹⁶ sound, . 'his approach probably holds far for r P^rom'^se 'han chemical repellents “als ^eVe'°P'ⁿ8 devices to protect individ- ha_v^areas’ ^or g^rouPS- However, we still ll^.^e to solve the significant problems of

¹⁰n to learn that electric shock is y not all that bad.

| coauthor, Dr. C. Scott Johnson, tj^ hold a patent for an electric an- ^arh dart deliverable by a conventional *ea"^^{Un or} hand-held lance. This ^shoot°ⁿ P^rov'des an internal electrical ^K and can instantly immobilize very Sharks. Such a device, however, is »ot ■ °^{r use} hy the highly trained and is _s^{at a|}l suitable as a piece of individual * ^1Val gear.

and Naval Warfare’

hi Howard, pp. 39-50, April 1988 Ceding,)   ™            ^H

.\_Q,, ^Under David C. Leestma, U. S. ■\l_t^' NASA Johnson Space Center— ^lhati°^Ugh ^^r- Howard’s article is infor­^e and offers great insight into the

^ls to photograph such phe- ^cdit ^{as s}h*ps’ wakes (here, in t ^erfanean).

role of satellites in modern naval warfare, the opening photograph's subhead is grossly misleading. It leads the reader to conclude that such a view of ships from space is common with satellite photogra­phy. Such is not the case!

The opening photograph, shot on 7 October 1984, was not taken by a satel­lite, but by the crew—of which I was a member—of the Space Shuttle Chal­lenger. The role of man in space is still evolving, but pictures like this one can only be taken by a person who has real­time assessment capability. It is ex­tremely difficult to design a satellite sys­tem that can react to rapidly changing sun glint patterns on the ocean surface that reveal ship wakes, internal waves, and other oceanographic phenomena. A human, however, can do this with a nom­inal amount of training and experience.

Timely satellite sensor information is critical to fleet operations, but one must distinguish between the limitations of sat­ellite visual imagery and the advantages of hand-held cameras (or other sensors) on manned platforms. Both systems have unique, complementary capabilities, and both need to be exploited.

“We Need a Little Dash and

Daring’’

(See C. A. Abel. pp. 94-97. April 1988; A.

Iglesias and R. A. Grimes, p. 85, June 1988

Proceedings)

J. C. McDonald— It is easy to agree wholeheartedly with Lieutenant Abel’s contention that we need to develop a cou­rageous and vigorous officer corps capa­ble of innovative tactics and unexpected action. I presume that Lieutenant Abel would not write such an excellent essay unless he thought there was a need for it, but I wish that he had given his evalua­tion of today’s officer corps.

I think that the United States is devel­oping an entire generation of overly cau­tious officers who are afraid of making a mistake. Some may dismiss this as a gen­eralization and a consequence of a peace­time Navy, but in the age of “violent peace” it is a consequence the country can ill afford.

The cause of this mentality, 1 believe, is a promotion system that advances those who have not made a mistake. Promotion boards do not look for reasons to advance an officer; they look for reasons to deny advancement. One who never ventures anything lessens his chances of making a mistake. In the present system, an honest mistake, even with a full dose of common sense, is just as deadly to a career as a foolish one.

(Continued on page 74)

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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 29)

its

All active prosecution, whether by active sonobuoy, a dipping sonar,

or u basic

theory. Therefore, the S-3 or P

>_3 aviati°ⁿ

have

ac-

“The Link to the Boomers”

(See R. B. Kelley and W. J. Holland, pp. 40­51, January 1988; J. L. Kelleher and J. T.

Hayward, pp. 168-169, March 1988; A. F.

Campbell, p. 139, April 1988; J. Miller, p. 24,

June Proceedings)

Lieutenant Rodney M. Adams, U. S. Navy, Engineer Officer, USS Von Steu­ben (SSBN-632) (Gold)—The authors of the original article follow predictable lines of reasoning when their back­grounds are considered. Of course, I am biased toward the view expressed by Rear Admiral Holland, in part because of my background and experience.

Mr. Kelley’s dismissal of the only sur- vivable leg of the strategic triad because of communications vulnerabilities is not supported by data gathered during the pjst 30 years of strategic submarine oper­ations. The communications readiness and performance of every patrol that fleet ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) make is subjected to close scrutiny. The standard is high. Performance that is less than 100% must be explained in detail and corrective action is taken when war­ranted. The current system is being tested constantly under both peacetime and sim­ulated wartime scenarios, and it has proved to be extremely effective at deliv­ering required emergency action mes­sages to patrolling SSBNs.

Communications with submarines are not easy and the current systems are not perfect; however, the needed improve­ments are being developed and they cer­tainly are less expensive than systems designed to make the land-based forces survivable. To amplify Admiral Hol­land’s point, commanders know that the submarines are listening because they have proved that they can and do listen and because the submarines’ ability to do so is inspected continually.

I also take exception to the implication that naval communications are suspect because a spy has compromised a small percentage of our cryptological gear. If we assume that the mere broadcast of messages enables enemies to comprehend them, then we might as well not deploy any naval forces because they are not able to remain hooked to land lines. Aircraft also communicate via radio and thus are just as likely to have their communica­tions signals intercepted. In addition, it is rather surprising that anyone would think that terrestrial communications are im­mune to interception when wiretaps are a mature technology.

Mr. Kelley also implies that our pres­ent communications facilities are some­how less resistant to attack than our polit­ical leaders. This is simply not true.

On the issue of battle management and reporting, I suspect that Mr. Kelley does not know what a submarine’s reporting requirements are.

Mr. Kelley and 1 do agree on one im­portant point, however. Twenty strategic submarines cannot do the job of 41, even if they are bigger, more reliable, and qui­eter. Our adversary must cope with less uncertainty if the United States has fewer submarines. Instead of decommissioning submarines to comply with the limits of a treaty that was never ratified, the United States should continue to deploy those assets that are still useful and also should plan to build more submarines as others become too old to use.

If the United States decides it must reduce the number of strategic missiles or warheads, then instead of scrapping one 16-missile submarine, four launchers from four submarines should be re­moved. This would remove the same number of warheads from our inventory, give the submarine added storage space that could be used to increase its endur­ance, and keep our adversary just as un­certain. If the United States used this scheme on Poseidon subs that have been modified to carry the Trident C-4 missile, it still would have submarines capable of carrying 12 extremely accurate weapons.

Submarines are too expensive and too strategically valuable to throw away when they are still usable.

“HS to VS: Leave the Hovering to Us”

(See M. A. Toombs, pp. 145-146, October 1987 Proceedings)

Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare Opera­tor First Class Gary Leigh, U. S. Navy— I do not agree with Lieutenant (junior grade) Toombs’s assertion that personnel from the helicopter antisubmarine (HS) community are the logical choice to man the SV-22 Osprey. By assigning S-3 and P-3 acoustic operators primarily to mari­time patrol aircraft platforms, you are losing the expertise these operators have

with acoustic processing systems. You are also losing the most important thuu that no pipeline can teach: experience ^ analyzing acoustics. Though the on- helo does have a limited ability to mon> tor sonobuoys with its dipping sonar, specialty is active prosecution. This one of the reasons for the multichanne Jezebel relay. The Osprey’s acoustic pabilities, however, will most likely more similar to the P-3 and S-3 than ¹ helicopter platforms.     ^

Proposals have been made to use SV-22 in both inner and outer ASW z°° missions. In this case, being an expert ¹ one field of ASW is not going to cut t

'    a*¹ ship’s sonar, is based on the same

ASW operator (AW) should not much trouble adapting to a different ^ tive processing system. The AW ^rat,nj^!_[Q flexible and multidimensional. Try¹¹^ segregate us to one particular p‘^at only hurts the fleet’s capability to ^c duct airborne ASW.

“The Caldas Incident”              _h

(See C. E. Hernandez Gonzales, p- 1

1988 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Rafael R■ 0)^e ■ Venezuelan Navy (Retired)—By ^c ^ dence, I was on my annual vacatioⁿ Venezuela during the Caldas itict f Naturally, I kept abreast of the situa not only because I’m a Venezuelan ^ zen, but also because I served in the for 18 years. Having participated in ^ face, air, and submarine operations patrols in the Gulf of Venezuela, ^1I^_£ne, ing the reaffirmation ceremony ot _$ zuelan sovereignty over the Los M ¹ ^ Islands, I have firsthand knowledfc ^ geographical, political, and ^eC°ⁿ° _en considerations of the dispute bet Colombia and Venezuela in these ^

Generally, I agree with the ^aU* account of the incident. However,                ,_s

gree with his statement that Colon¹,j₀ Minister of Foreign Affairs, ^^r’„_aSed Londono, conceived the incident-    ^

on my experience, no Colombian ^ vessel will execute a provocative

without the consent of the Co o

an⁰

ion^s'

force

president, his executive cabinet, and the armed forces’ hierarchy. If and when Mr. Londono did, in fact, hatch this folly, it must have been with total disregard to the balance of power in the area and without a comprehensive intelligence report of what the Venezuelan government and its armed forces would do in response. Therefore, I do not believe that only one official in the Colombian government could have contrived this hostile provo­cation unless a political and military con­sensus existed.

One other thing caught my attention. The photograph by Dr. Scheina is of the Venezuelan missile patrol boat Libertad, the one that intervened in the incident, not the Colombian frigate Caldas.

“‘Nickels’: A New Approach to Carrier Landings”

(See J. M. Jenista, pp. 93-97, February 1988 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander William Readdy, U. S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Jenis- ra’s thoughtful article certainly gives rise to some questions regarding the tradi­tional approach to the complex and de­manding task of carrier landings.

I thought the picture of the current paint scheme for our fleet carrier decks revealed the major problem causing per­ceptual distortions that lead to ramp strikes. To the experienced fleet carrier pilot, it looks so familiar that it warrants no further inspection. But because land­ing on board ships is still, in the final moments, a visual task (day and night) and because ramp strikes still occur even with highly qualified landing signal offi­cers on station, it strikes me as suspect that the landing area threshold currently painted on fleet carrier decks coincides with the ramp.

With the passage of the 27C-class car­riers into history and the amount of deck area on the USS Forrestal (CV-59) and subsequent carriers, surely enough “real estate” is available to provide a satisfac­tory visual impression of the landing area with the threshold markings displaced 50 feet or so away from the ramp (where the pilot is really intended to land anyway). This way, when the pilot’s scan breaks down as he settles onto the marked land­ing area—as it inevitably will, given the complications of pitching decks, de­creased visibility, low fuel, aircraft anomalies, emergencies, etc.—at least he won’t be settling onto the real ramp. Displaced threshold lighting at night should be equally effective.

Displaced threshold markings would result in safer carrier landings and virtu­ally eliminate ramp strikes. And they would not require any alteration of P¹'⁰* technique or training, any modification to the aircraft of any kind, or any change to the fresnel lens or automatic carrier land­ing system. The cost of a couple buckets of paint is hardly worth mentioning. The cost to move the existing lighting fr^onl the ramp would be as inexpensive.

Even with our current fiscal con straints, the resources exist to keep ¹⁽¹ day’s pilot off the ramp when things stan going south in a hurry and his situation³ awareness dwindles. Are there any sup^ef carrier air group commanders or carrk^r skippers out there willing to bet a coup ^ buckets of paint to prevent a ramp strike • What do you say Office of Chief of Na^va Operations, Naval Air Systems Con¹ mand, and Atlantic and Pacific Fleet A¹ Forces? Give it a try.

“Mine Warfare Focus”

min^e

countermeasures assets of the U. S. ^^aV- are under Commander Mine Warfare This is untrue. They are under the tyP commanders, Commander Naval Surta Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and Co¹¹¹ mander Naval Surface Force, U. S- ‘ cific Fleet, who are responsible for units’ condition and capabilities.

It was while under Commander M¹ Warfare Command, through careful pl^a ning by those who controlled the P^uf strings in the 1960s, that the U. S. Surface Mine Countermeasures was lowed to deteriorate. While attending ¹ j Mine Warfare School in the 1950s- learned that if the budget re*!¹¹¹^ something to be cut back or sold oft mine force is always the first choice- * held true again in the 1960s and 19'

The resurgence began in 1978, ^vVtl ] retired Captain Cyrus R. Christensf ’ U. S. Navy (then Commander M¹ Squadron Twelve), found he had inc­ited a force incapable of accomplish its mission. His ability to sell his ^tra'^nlJ

day

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