Revolution at Sea

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There is a revolution at sea. The Navy is in the midst of a fu*^u mental change in the way it designs, builds, mans, and f'?¹ ships. The surface Navy is in the vanguard, but the changes^;1 so fundamental that eventually the warfighting struct*¹

of the entire Navy will cha'¹*

The revolution at sea has been building over the years, and it will soon bring momentous change. Forty-two years have passed since the United States and its allies prevailed in World War II. A key factor in our victory was the effective use of new technologies. To the pre-World War II generation of naval officers, the present seemed to stretch from the distant past, unaltered into the future. The Navy felt secure that it would fight far into the future with ordnance shot from the barrel of a gun or dropped from an airplane. Today, new weapons and technologies pile up upon themselves as the pace of tech­nological change accelerates. Weapons seem to become obsolete almost at the time of their introduction into the fleet. The current revolution at sea emerges in response to the impact of exploding technology on the one constant of warfare: the basic axiom of surface warfare—ordnance on target.

The issue before the Navy is how to exploit this “revo­lution” that technology has brought. (Actually, the press for change is not only technological but is also a prudent reaction to an aggressive Soviet threat.) The important thing to remember is not that technology creates weapons or battle space, but that it creates opportunities and enor­mous social and organizational challenges. The only con­stant we can be assured to see in the future is change itself—change that goes to the core of the Navy, from shipbuilding to tactics and training. Change is as difficult for the Navy as it is for most individuals. To anticipate and prepare for change means moving from the familiar and the well-understood to something more dimly perceived. Change in the Navy is locked both to the social behavior of people and to the central tendency of large bureaucra­cies to resist change in any form. Hence, individuals who occupy positions of power and have the most to lose will resist change, as will the bureaucrats who strive to main­tain the current order. Therefore, it is understandable that the Navy will tend to cling tenaciously to whatever it per­ceives as working in the present, long after it has become a part of the past. This environment of “steady as she goes” is the one in which the revolution at sea will occur. The issue is not “if” we are going to change, but “how.” The revolution in the Navy today is linked to the enor­mous expansion in the battle space, over the past decade. Although this expansion is generally associated with the surface ship, it applies across the Navy. Not too many years ago, the surface ship battle space went “out” to the range of a battleship gun, “up” as far as a five-inch pro­jectile would wobble, and “down” a few hundred yards to the limits of sound emanating from low-power sonar. A fleet’s outward, offensive reach was determined by the distance an airplane could fly from an aircraft carrier. The surface ship’s role was to defend the battle space around an aircraft carrier.

Today, a surface ship’s battle space extends up to 100,000 feet, to the limits of today’s surface-to-air mis­siles (23,000 miles if space is considered), out on the wings of a cruise missile to 1,200 miles, and down thou­sands of feet to the limits of the deepest diving submarine. This is the warfighting basis of today’s “up, out, and down” challenge of surface warfare.

How will the Navy harness this revolution? The answer is the same as that given to the wag who asked, “How do you handle a 600-pound canary?”—very carefully. This is a sound approach as the Navy attempts to change itself. The issue of the whole Navy’s acceptance of change is critical. The warfighters must accept it. The shore estab­lishment must both accept and understand it for it is the men and women in the systems commands and laborato­ries who design the ships and develop the weapons that use the new technology. Thus, the mechanism for change is important.

To execute the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) order to press on, two “Revolution at Sea” studies, the Surface Combatant Force Requirements Study and the Ship Oper­ational Characteristics Study (SOCS), and a three-star lead work/study group, called Group Mike, are in place. Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav), the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Sur­face Warfare (Op-03) directs the efforts and within the Systems Command (SysCom), Commander Naval Sea Systems Command (ComNavSea) has the lead.

The Surface Combatant Force Requirements Study: The output of this study will be the numbers and general types of surface combatants that the Navy will need during the next quarter century. This type of effort was last under­taken in 1979. It produced the force structure of the new Aegis surface Navy. But the world has changed. Aegis is better than we thought, but the threat is also more demand­ing. The same is true of the SQQ-89 antisubmarine war­fare (ASW) combat system and the submarine threat. The tactical and strategic implications of the vertical launching system (VLS) and the Tomahawk cruise missile are better understood. With the advent of the quiet Soviet subma­rine, ASW is in a state of flux. The results of this force- level study will form the keel block upon which we will build surface combatant warship force levels.

The Ship Operational Characteristics Study: SOCS is the core of the revolution at sea. The SOCS study group is composed ot unrestricted line officers. These officers come from across the spectrum of the Navy, OpNav, the SysComs, the fleet, and type commander staffs. Although the study deals primarily with the surface Navy, all war­fare disciplines are represented because its recommenda­tions will have an impact on the whole Navy.

This study is an examination of the policies and factors that form the foundations of the Navy, from warfighting to ship construction. The study group will examine the oper­ational requirements that drive ship characteristics. It will look at the policies which for a millennium have implicitly or explicitly determined the way we build and operate warships. For example, why do we continue to design ships with spacious navigation bridge structures when the need has disappeared? The group will look at personnel policies that affect the design of warships. For example, should we continue to define habitability in cubic feet or do we focus on privacy for the individual? What are the policies that dictate that modern warships should have spa­cious offices and technical libraries filled with paper? The list goes on. Many of the issues have never been raised before in the context of ship design. Others fall into the category of “it’s tradition.” All will be difficult.

The approach of the SOCS study team is to identify the operational requirements that dictate the design and con­struction of Navy ships. To accomplish this, SOCS will:

*    Identify those factors—legal, institutional, and cul­tural—that establish design and manpower requirements ^and warfighting capabilities for surface combatants

^ Identify essential functions and failure/fall back require­ments and associated manpower

*    Recommend ship functions that can be carried out more ^effectively and efficiently or that can be reduced or elimi­nated through policy decisions, by ship, system, or equip­ment design or automation

*    Recommend policies for surface ship design, for auto­mation of ship functions, and for shipboard and shore- based training and maintenance

For example, one area SOCS must investigate is the

The bridge’s location high in the ship is a throwback to the days when the captain watched the fall of shot. Today, he absorbs the output of countless electronic devices as he fights his ship from the combat information center (CIC). Obviously, it would make sense to locate a basic warfight­ing function, such as ship control, where it would be pro­tected from shot and shell—or at least from a “cheap kill.” Our policy of having the CIC close to a bridge lo­cated high in a ship’s superstructure has meant that we pay a weight penalty for armor to protect the CIC. If the cap­tain must also be capable of fighting his ship from the bridge, then the communications and data to do so must be available. This adds more weight, more cost, and—even worse—reduces combat capability. Could we co-locate ship control with the CIC, where the captain fights the ship, and put both deep in the ship? Of course. It just requires policy direction from the warfighters.

The signal bridge falls into the same category. We pride ourselves on our ability to operate battle forces over an

matter of navigation and signal bridges. The SOCS team ?mst ask why we have either one on a modern warship.

°th add space and weight. Bridges contribute to our ' mps’ high radar cross section. Manning both bridges re­tires people who would be better used elsewhere in a .P’s limited personnel allowance. The function and loca- ^l0n of Navy ship bridges are examples of policies based °ⁿ history. Over the centuries, ship control has moved ^r°m the quarterdeck on a sailing ship—located well aft, ⁿear the helmsman—to its present location in the bridge.

area the size of New England, tacking on New York and Ohio for good measure. This is a challenge for even the best of signalmen. The usefulness of signal flags in battle is an anachronism of the past. Today, Lord Horatio Nelson could not fall back on his blind eye to ignore the direction of the fleet commander. (Instead, he would claim he missed a transmission because of electro-magnetic inter­ference.) Similarly, a technological replacement for the flashing light is within reach.

The issue of the navigation and signal bridge cannot be resolved by only addressing the warfighting arguments. This is both a warfighting and a “religious” issue. To many naval officers, young and old, the bridge and flag bag are fundamental to the traditions of the service. These examples also raise legal and organizational questions. What are the place and function of the officer-of-the-deck (OOD) on a ship that has no bridge? Do we change Navy Regulations'? What about lookouts? Do we seek a change in law? What about the boatswain’s mate of the watch? Ships under way are administered from the bridge. Where do you conn alongside? The list is long. SOCS and the Navy have a challenge.

The kind of policy issues associated with the bridge are the responsibility of the unrestricted line. It can also be appreciated that there is room for both heretical thoughts and foot-dragging in this process. The issues are not clear- cut. If the precept of warfighting is followed relentlessly it is likely that rice bowls will fall and break. The fundamen­tal requirement is ordnance on target. We must examine functions and policies that detract from that premise. If they fail muster, we must get rid of them. The same stern criterion that Admiral Arleigh Burke applied must govern: “If it does not kill the enemy, kill the program.”

Group Mike: This is the final and perhaps the most im­portant element of the revolution at sea. The Surface Com­batant Force Requirements Study and SOCS are essen­tially paper products. Group Mike puts it all together.

Group Mike is actually three groups. The top group is a three-star board headed by Op-03, with the Director, Re­search, Development, and Acquisition (Op-098); Direc­tor, Naval Warfare (Op-095); ComNavSea; Commander Space and Naval Warfare (ComSpaWar); and an Assistant Secretary of the Navy representative as permanent mem­bers. This board reviews all aspects of the revolution at sea. Next in the hierarchy comes a two-star review group with representation from throughout the Navy. The sinews of Group Mike are the working organizations in OpNav and ComNavSea. The OpNav connection is referred to, prosa­ically enough, as the “Group Mike Working Group.” In NavSea, the counterpart organization is “CHENG-R.” Captains head both and have given both groups wide lati­tude of authority and access. In the long term, whether or not the Navy succeeds in executing the revolution at sea will rest with the captain, commander, and lieutenant commander members of the Group Mike working groups. This is as it should be, since it is to be their Navy.

Group Mike’s charter comes from the Chief of Naval Operations; he has charged the group to improve the relia­bility, maintainability, survivability, and sustainability of our surface combatants of the 21st century. The group is directed to recommend ways to improve the characteristics and performance of ships and ship systems through devel­opment and application of technology. Group Mike, in coordination with fleet and type commanders, will de­velop OpNav guidance and operational requirements for future ships. In coordination with NavSea, SpaWar, and other SysComs, it will develop a restructured research and development (R&D) program to mature identified technol­ogies for future combatants. The technological license for Group Mike covers a field of innovation stretching from automation to construction techniques, fiber optics, sur­vivability, quality of life with less space, lasers, and new materials for use in weapons, equipment, and structures.

Group Mike will give particular attention to hull, me­chanical and electrical (HM&E), the forgotten discipline in the shipbuilders’ art. It is not difficult to rationalize why the Navy has not built fast, efficient ships in the past. The answer, in a world of cheap oil, was that construction costs would not be repaid over a ship’s life cycle. Today, there is a high energy as well as warfighting payoff in efficient hull forms. The Navy has a model in the Ameri­ca’s Cup team which won back the cup by exploiting inno­vative hull technology.

Group Mike will have the task of promoting the design of a ship as a weapon system to fit the requirements that have been laid out by the operators in the SOCS. Again, the most difficult area is HM&E. Combat systems designs have far outpaced ship design. In the post-World War H era, it almost seems that we thought of weapons almost as an afterthought for several ship classes. (Ordnance on tar­get was not foremost in our minds when we built a one- gun, 4,000-ton frigate.) It is hard to believe that but a few years ago Aegis was a weapon system looking for a home. Advances in combat systems and weapons in the half cen­tury between the Fletcher (DD-445) and the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) classes have been remarkable. The difference between Aegis and the fire control system on the Fletcher destroyers truly represents a “revolution.” However, in that same interval, changes in overall ship design can be charitably described as “evolutionary” and probably more accurately as “regressive.” The Fletcher class was designed and built as a weapon system from the keel to the truck. A ship designed as a weapon system means every part of a ship is an integral contributor to ordnance on target. From the hull form to the missile launcher to mis­siles, a warship is a weapon system—not a collection of separate parts. Bringing together the ideas, technologies, biases, and differing views to design ships as weapons systems will be Group Mike’s challenge.

A Future Strike Cruiser: If the revolution at sea is suc­cessful, the warfighting design policy for the U. S. Navy will be to maximize a warship’s ability to deliver ordnance on target. Ideally in such a ship the internal volume should be all weapons. In a future strike cruiser, for example, this might mean cruise missiles in VLS cells from stem to stern—a modern-day HMS Dreadnought. (The Dread­nought was the first “big” gun battleship in which the battle space was measured not in yards but in miles. The Tomahawk missile in a VLS cell means we will measure battle space not in tens of miles, but in hundreds of miles.) Such a ship, following the dictum of maximum ordnance on target, would allow an anchor windlass and a three- oaan conning station in the boatswain’s locker (with a peri­scope to view ahead) but nothing else. The rest of the ship Would be ordnance.

Obviously, such a design would be impractical. A ship requires motive power, crew accommodations, communi­cations facilities, etc. Compromise is required to balance the desire for weapons and the need for those other parts of the ship’s weapon system, an engine room, galley, etc. The Ships Characteristics Improvement Board (SCIB) and Group Mike would work out the compromise with opera­tional requirements and get the CNO’s approval. These requirements would then be forwarded to ComNavSea for development into a ship design.

The strike cruiser, for example, might require a speed °f 31 knots and a radar cross-section of ten decibels. These specifications would be given to the naval architects and engineers. ComNavSea would work the design and report back with costs for implementing these require­ments in terms of volume, weight, and VLS cells. Perhaps *he answer for a strike cruiser with these requirements is 200 VLS cells. But the SCIB is dissatisfied and returns with the question, “What can you do for 160 VLS cells?” The dialogue continues, with both the warfighter and naval engineer recognizing that warship design is a com­promise between warfighting capability and the other |hings necessary to make a ship a warship. However, they b°th understand that the design of a warship starts with the Weapons and everything else competes with that premise.

The success of the revolution at sea will depend on how ^Well the Navy balances competing requirements. The technology is either here today or close at hand. Improve­ments in HM&E are only a matter of choice. Do we want ^c°Pper wire and twisted pairs or do we want survivable Warships with fiber optics? If we want the latter then we must commit the modest R&D effort necessary. The entire w&D program must be responsive to warfighting require­ments and no area of ship design is unrelated to placing Ordnance on target. Do we want administrative offices or cells? If we want the ordnance, then space that does ⁿ°t directly contribute to mission must go. The changes will be far-reaching. The way we manage our ships and people will have to change. We must push for a paperless ship. Perhaps ship’s administration will have to move ashore. (This will have the ancillary benefit of allowing more time for leadership instead of management.) Do we want a spacious bridge or a gun mount? The choices will be tough.

The critical element in the execution of the revolution at sea will be the degree of synergism between the fleets, OpNav, the line SysComs, the Navy laboratories, and in­dustry. The institutional entities that make up the Navy are populated with people of good faith. However, our organi­zations have one known, predictable quality—resistance to change. We can plan, write papers, and conduct stud­ies, but if we cannot execute, the revolution will stall and drift in an inconclusive direction. Will the threat wait or move on while we struggle to build a 6,000-ton warship with more than one gun?

Resistance to change is the enemy. The force to beat that enemy will be leadership. Most of our people and institutions can be motivated to do the job. Technology by itself will not lead the way. This is not a task for civilians or politicians. The Navy must take the lead, and the Navy’s officer corps must provide the leaders. The unre­stricted line officer must step up to the mark. At the same time, the officers of the restricted line and staff corps must recognize their leadership roles.

Lead, follow, or get out of the way. This is not a job just for the admirals. This revolution is an all-hands work­ing party, committed for the long pull.

Recently retired. Admiral Metcalf was the Deputy Chief of Naval Op­erations (Surface Warfare). His command at sea duty tours included Commander Second Fleet; Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight, Battle Group Two, Sixth Fleet; Commander, Naval Surface Group Mid­Pacific; Commander Destroyer Squadron Thirty-Three; USS Bradley (FF-1041); Commander, Landing Division Ninety Two; and USS West­chester County (LST-1167); and USS King County (AG-157). In the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Metcalf served as Director of General Planning and Programming Division, and Head. Planning Branch, Programming Division. He also served several tours in the Bureau of Naval Personnel and was an instructor at the Naval Acad­emy. He graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval Academy.