One of the oft-proved laws of the sea is that the difference between a ship sunk and saved is the crew’s ability to perform damage control (DC).
In describing the damage control effort on board the USS Stark (FFG-31) after she was hit by two Iraqi Exocet missiles the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Safety and Survivability, Joseph K. Taussig, Jr., a veteran of the Pearl Harbor attack, stated, “In a surprise attack . . . their reaction to sudden trauma was outstanding. They responded with the same ingenuity, bravery, and dedication that American sailors always seem to.”
And while it may be hard for the families of those sailors who died or were injured in the attack to accept, a number of observers have suggested that it was fortunate that the Stark was the target, since she was arguably better prepared to control the damage than many other fleet units.
Realistic Training for All Hands: It is vitally important that everyone on board ship be fully prepared to react in an emergency situation quickly, correctly, and effectively. This requires dedication to damage control, and a realistic and aggressive training program—one that goes far beyond simply checking off the DC portions of the personnel qualification standards system or conducting the occasional drill for the duty section fire party. While the U. S. Navy has long been recognized for the overall excellence of its damage control programs, we all have seen instances where other shipboard functions have encroached on the time and resources that should have been spent on DC.
Ninety percent of the work necessary to save a damaged ship must be accomplished before the damage occurs. Once the compartment fills with smoke and the fires begin to rage out of control, it is too late to get serious about damage control. The crew of the Stark did take DC seriously from the day the ship was commissioned; that is why she is afloat today. Strong leadership directing a strong DC to program was the foundation of Stark's DC posture.
Years of experience show that simply proclaiming a policy (“DC is important!”) will not change anyone’s behavior. The words must be backed by action. In the Stark, no one was promoted unless he demonstrated a high level of competence in damage control. To be recommended for E-4, for example, a seaman had to be fully qualified as a fire member. To move up to E-5, the petty officer had to be qualified in all stations up to and including investigator. To eligible for first class, crew members were required to qualify as on-scene leaders. And anyone seeking a recommendation for chief petty officer had to be a fully qualified locker leader. In the wardroom, all ensigns had to qualify as on-scene leaders within six months of reporting on board, and had to become a repair locker leader before pinning on lieutenant (junior grade) bars.
These rules applied regardless of rating or designator. They pulled the ship together for a common goal: keeping Stark ready to fight and survive. One measure of the Stark's readiness was that even after taking severe casualties, she still carried 35 crew members who were fully qualified on-scene leaders.
Another way the Stark’s crew prepared to deal with a major disaster was by conducting realistic first aid training for all hands. This included the use of graphically accurate artificial wounds to simulate the carnage of a real accident. To avoid relying repeatedly on the same well-trained individuals, the more experience crew members frequently were seated to pose as casualties during the drills to force less seasoned personnel to assume greater responsibilities. Each drill was scripted, prebriefed, and conducted as if it were in preparation for a major inspection. Written scenarios were developed for each drill, with the emphasis on realism and dealing with the unexpected.
By varying the simulated damage, substituting new members into fire-fighting teams, and forcing innovation and creativity into each scenario, the crew’s actions began to be second nature.
Most home ports provide many assets to help hone the crew’s damage control skills. On board the Stark, crew members made every effort to use such help whenever possible. Quotas for fire-fighting school were never missed, and the services of the portable DC trainer at the Little Creek Fleet training unit were used as late as one week before beginning the deployment that was cut short by the Exocet missiles. The entire crew went through the trainer, from the commanding officer on down. The sight of the skipper, dripping wet from fighting simulated fire and flooding, did a great deal to underline the importance he placed on DC.
In looking back after the accident, it becomes obvious that even though the crew trained and drilled with demanding scenarios, these scenarios were never big enough or challenging enough to simulate the degree of damage faced after the missile attacks. Even the “mass conflagration” drill on which the crew exercised during refresher training (RefTra) off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, failed to simulate the horrifying situation faced on board ship the day of the attack. One lesson learned: when planning major drills, throw in every contingency and complexity you can think of, and then double it!
After-Action Report: Following the attack, the Secretary of the Navy convened a Blue Ribbon Panel to analyze some of the technical aspects of the Stark incident. Chaired by the Under Secretary of the Navy, the panel included the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering, and Systems; the Commander Naval Sea Systems Command; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare; and other advisers. The panel studied the evidence of the U. S. Navy’s first encounter with a missile-fuel fire, and determined that revised doctrine and some additional DC equipment were required to meet this new challenge successfully. The panel recommended that the Navy:
- Improve its ability to contain vertical fires and set it down in doctrine
- Improve fire protection relative to weapon-related fires
- Provide additional firemain isolation valves and remotely-operated cross-connects
- Incorporate adequate fire pump separation and redundancy in future designs
- Improve magazine sprinkler system redundancy and design
- Develop noncombustible, low-fuel load cables
- Install improved and additional insulation and coatings
- Provide improved means to control smoke
- Develop superstructure dewatering procedures and guidance
- Improve allowance and quality damage control equipment and clothing
- Improve new ship design in accordance with emerging survivability design principles
- Improve ship design to meet future threat parameters
- Improve electric power continuity
The panel ultimately concluded that the damage of the Stark could have been worse had it not been for the effective organization and heroic damage control efforts of the crew and the inherent survivability features of the ship. It further concluded that the incident demonstrated that the U. S. Navy has an ongoing, effective, and comprehensive surface ship survivability program.
The Legacy of the USS Stark: Following its hearings on the Stark incident, Congress provided $64 million in emergency funding to augment shipboard DC gear across the fleet. All ships now have three times as many oxygen-breathing apparatus (OBA) devices as before and twice as many canisters. Extra fire- retardant clothing has been purchased, along with cutting devices called the “jaws of life,” and thermal imaging cameras to help fire fighters see through dense smoke. This additional equipment is now on board or en route to ships throughout the Navy. The Stark attack also raised the fleet’s consciousness regarding the importance of damage control. Lessons learned from the Stark’s experience were rapidly disseminated and the scope of the mass conflagration drill used during RefTra in Guantanamo Bay was changed to incorporate many of the factors encountered on board the Stark. The changes in equipment and procedure that grew out of the incident were carefully studied and incorporated in many ships, including the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), which completed RefTra after the Stark attack. Months later when the Samuel B. Roberts fell victim to an Iranian mine in the Persian Gulf, members of her crew stated that their success in saving their ship was partly the result of the lessons they learned from the Stark’s experience and of their increased sensitivity to damage control that the Stark attack heightened.