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Per:
sian Gulf, shot down a Iranian Airbus civilian airliner. The airliner
had been challei
By Norman Friedman
Air Force wants 55 C V-22 A Ospreys for its special operations forces, and the Navy wants 50 HV-22As for special warfare, combat search-and- rescue, and fleet logistics support.
Although the Army has claimed that it has no requirement for the „
T bell helicopter
Osprey, it will probably want Ospreys for special forces operations and casualty evacuation. Bell and Boeing estimate that the Army will require 231 aircraft.
In theory, the Osprey could replace both the Navy LAMPS helicopters and (to some extent) the S-3 Vikings in ship-based ASW missions. An SV-22 could reach a datum faster than a helicopter, and its high speed (about 300 miles per hour) might be valuable in the event future submarine targets could shoot back. SV-22s might also be able to deposit and retrieve large passive arrays far enough from a moving force to keep them clear of the force’s self-noise. That might become more important as potential target submarines become quieter.
Compared to the S-3 (or an S-3 successor), the Osprey is slower and has significantly less range. However, it can be moved off the carrier, thus its employment could increase the numbers of fighter and attack aircraft on each carrier. Before the early 1970s, the big carriers had no ASW aircraft on board; all ASW aircraft were accommodated on board specialized ASW carriers (CVSs). The specialized CVSs are gone, but it can be argued that they were useful enough to be revived now if the cost in aircraft operations is low enough, for example with the Osprey.
Operating the Osprey is inherently difficult, because relatively small engines must lift the aircraft directly. Critics of the project have argued that it cannot meet its payload goals. That remains to be seen. Certainly payload capacity would determine the viability of an SV-22, particularly if part of its mission were to plant ASW sensors far from a convoy or battle group.
The sponsors of the idea can point to a rich potential reward: a revolutionary change in local air traffic. Commercial air travellers are painfully aware of the congestion besetting U. S. air traffic lanes. European air space is even more congested, because the continental air traffic control system has been patched out of so many national systems. A verticallv landing commuter airliner would solve much of the problem, which accounts for the strong congressional support for the V-22 program.
NASA currently predicts that tilt-rotor aircraft will be in commercial use by 1995, particularly in the dense eastern U. S. corridor between Boston and Washington. Bell and Boeing are assessing the military and civil potential of the aircraft in Britain and West Germany, and are negotiating with two Japanese trading companies for similar studies in Japan
Unmanned ASW Sub Developed
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has announced that an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) will be one of its first two prototyping initiatives. The agency has recently been given responsibility for prototyping projects relatively close to operational feasibility In the past, DARPA has been responsible for very advanced projects which were transferred to the individual services before they reached the prototype stage.
The UUV, called the Scout, is conceived as an ASW platform- the prototype will be 40 feet long, four feet in diameter, and battery powered. No other details have been released, but a vehicle of this size would probably be carried either by a surface ship or a large helicopter. It might
USS Vincennes Downs Airliner
On 2 July the Aegis cruiser USS Vincennes (CG-49), on patrol in the
tracked on radar and had failed to identify itself despite seven ..... nges. The cruiser also attempted to identify the airliner by iden- 1 |cation-friend-or-foe (IFF) interrogation, but the ship reportedly re- Ce,ved only a confusing reply. The result—almost 300 dead Iranian cii lans—would appear to be a terrible example of the effect of IFF error n a cold war situation.
Many commentators have suggested that the cruiser could easily have ^cognized that its target was a large civilian airliner on the basis of the eer size of the radar blip it produced. But Aegis uses computer-proc- assed tracks, not raw radar blips. The blip would not have been a particu- ar|y accurate identification, in any case, because aircraft radar crossactions are only loosely related to the physical cross-sections of aircraft. °r example, an F-14 (for which the Airbus is reported to have been ^‘staken) has a highly reflective radar dish in its nose. In principle, the egts ship identifies incoming air contacts by analyzing the characteris- lcs °f their tracks and whatever other data may be available. The Airbus aPPeared to be flying unusually low, and the Vincennes reported that it eSan to dive.
The United States reportedly knew that the Iranians planned an attack “tt the weekend of 4 July. Many commentators have asked how an F-14, ich cannot carry bombs or antiship missiles efficiently, could have reatened the Vincennes and thus justified the U. S. missile firings. The ranian F-14s probably have little service life left because the supply of Pare parts must be very limited. In the past, Iranian-backed irregulars ave often practiced kamikaze tactics (generally using explosive-loaded tucks), so surely it is conceivable that an F-14 would be expended simi- r'y- the aircraft could avoid a missile hit at moderate range, it could /obably fly through the ship’s defensive gunfire in good enough condi- *°n to have a fair chance of crashing into the ship. The tactics employed y the Vincennes’ commanding officer, Captain Will Rogers III, U. S. Jvy, appear to have been consistent with this hypothesis. He was able Wait until the last moment because the incoming air contact was well 'thin air-to-surface missile-launching range, but not yet within (diving) ^auge of the ship. That final dive, the reported descent from 9,000 to '"00 feet, would presumably have confirmed that the Iranian pilot in- euded to hit the Vincennes. We cannot know what the Iranian pilot s jutentions were, or even whether an Iranian F-14 was flying close enough u the Airbus for its radar image to merge with that of the larger aircraft. e do know that the Airbus was observed climbing just before it was estroyed, but this may have been an attempt to evade the missile or a esponse to an ordered change of altitude.
The point of all this is that however sophisticated the electronics and °8ic of an IFF system may be, ultimately human factors—and human Ultent—are inescapable, and even dominant. After all, Captain Rogers °uld not be sure that, even if what he saw was an Airbus, it was not an jUtborne equivalent of the explosive-laden truck that destroyed the U. S. arine Corps barracks in Beirut.
First V-22 Osprey Rolled Out
The first Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which was rolled °ut at the Bell Helicopter Flight Research Center on 23 May, is expected A* % late this summer. The Marine Corps will be the first to use the . "22, as a troop and tactical cargo transport. It is expected that the V-22, conjunction with air-cushion landing craft, will enable the Marines to er>Velop future battlefields from ships well over the defenders’ horizon, Providing the tactical surprise that the Marines have successfully excited in the past. Current Marine plans call for 552 MV-22A Ospreys. 0rrie presumably would be configured as gunships to deal with enerny helicopter gunships opposing deep-envelopment landings. The
123
•‘oeeedings / August 1988
be able
company’s president recently suggested that the Navy will never
to expend the expensive A-12s in limited warfare, i.e., against the
the
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next four decades than the last four. If so, the A-12 may indeed be right naval attack bomber for the future. The era of proxy warfare in 1 Third World may be ending, because the superpowers may find that they can engage directly.
function as a bi-static sonar receiver, taking advantage of a large pinger and helping provide a three-dimensional sonar picture. Alternatively, it might be used to service or to plant successors to the SOSUS fixed sea-bottom arrays, perhaps even in enemy waters.
The Scout will be too large for a submarine torpedo tube, and it probably cannot be carried externally by a submarine. For example, some provision would have to be made to recharge its battery or to refuel its propulsion system. However, experience gained with the Scout might lead to a submarine-launched UUV, perhaps sized to fit the large torpedo tubes of the new Seawolf (SSN-21) class. As Soviet submarines become quieter, remote sonar platforms, particularly those that can ping without risking counterattack on a U. S. submarine, should become more valuable. The increased weapon capacity of the Seawolf would make it easier to sacrifice one or more torpedo spaces for auxiliaries such as a UUV.
Study Mulls End of Tailhookers
As part of continuing work on future vertical- flight fighters, Lockheed has carried out a feasibility study of an aircraft intended to take off conventionally and land vertically. The result of the study, carried out for NASA, suggests that by the turn of the century the combination of composite airframe ' materials and advanced vectored-thrust engines will make possible a Mach-1.5 fighter with a useful performance and a takeoff weight of about 42,000 pounds. Such a fighter would take off in about 600 feet and land on unprepared sites or on carrier decks not equipped with arresting gear. The Lockheed design study incorporates a Rolls-Royce tandem-fan engine, in which an air-transfer duct separates two fans.
The study shows just how far vertical-flight technology has to go before it can reach the performance levels expected two decades ago. The British P.1154 bi-service, supersonic, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, which was cancelled in 1963. was expected to achieve much the performance claimed for the Lockheed fighter. The Royal Navy intended to use the P. 1154 as a short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft—actually to launch it by catapult (to achieve maximum takeoff load) and land it vertically.
Lockheed’s study also gives some idea of where carrier operations may evolve during the next century. The U. S. Navy may then be able to achieve much the performance levels currently required without depending on arresting gear. Catapults probably will still be extremely important, to maintain sufficient loads. Dispensing with arresting gear would improve the carrier’s resistance to battle damage, because the arresting gear is virtually the only vital element necessary for carrier operations that is not duplicated along the length of the ship. Vertical landing presumably would also eliminate the need for a long clear landing path, and that would increase parking space on the carrier’s deck. If, as some have suggested, future aircraft will need materially less maintenance, thanks to more reliable electronics and less corrodible composite airframes, increased parking space should lead to a larger carrier air wing.
The Lockheed study is probably related to the U. S.-British project to develop an advanced (supersonic) VTOL combat aircraft, to succeed the Harrier.
A-6 Program Gets New Lease
Congress approved a plan to develop an interim version of the Grumman A-6 Intruder, the A-6G, to replace the cancelled A-6F. This decision solves a major problem: Congress appropriated $600 million for new A-6s, but the conference committee on the armed services refused to authorize its expenditure.
Under the new plan, ten A-6Es will be purchased under fiscal year 1988 funds, and the first A-6Gs will be authorized in fiscal year 1990. The A-6G will have the avionics planned for the A-6F and the J52P408 engine, which is the same as that installed in EA-6Bs.
The A-6F was to have combined new digital avionics (related to the
digital cockpit in the F/A-18 Hornet) with new engines (F404s in place o the current J52s), and survivability and aerodynamics improvements, new radar would have provided improved attack capability and the ca pacity to use the AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missi e (AMRAAM), so that A-6Fs might have been better able to defend them selves or operate as outer fleet pickets. Congress killed the program believing that the money would better be spent on the new stealthy A vanced Tactical Aircraft, now designated the A-12. McDonnell Doug as and General Dynamics won the A-12 competition this spring, beating ou the Grumman-Northrop team. Details of that program have not been released.
The A-12 will not enter service for some years, and until that time t A-6 will be the only Navy long-range, all-weather, strike aircraft. Con tinued production is thus justified simply to make up for expected attn tion, and therefore to maintain an essential Navy capability. The ap proved compromise was to upgrade the avionics of the basic A-6E ana improve (but not replace) the engine. .
For Grumman, traditionally a major supplier of naval aircraft, < decision reduces the impact of losing the A-12 contest. However, understanding is still that the A-6 will be replaced altogether by 1 stealthier aircraft. Current plans call for the purchase of 450 A-l2s $4.5 billion.
Grumman hopes that the A-12 decision has not killed the A-6- 1
sort of
tactical targets encountered in Vietnam. Supporters of the A-12 argu that the logistical costs of maintaining a two-aircraft fleet of all-weatn attack aircraft would be prohibitive, even worse than buying more tn the planned 450 A-12s. There is also some suggestion that reduced oper ating and maintenance costs may balance the increased acquisition c ■ of the A-12, but of course that hope cannot be tested for many yeafS,
The argument between the all-A-12 force and the A-12/A-6 nti*®^ force may actually turn on what sort of war the Navy is being designed fight. Stealthy A-12s can be expected to slip through even future Sovte air defenses to destroy vital targets such as air bases. They may be I ■■ well adapted to carrying heavy tonnages against the sort of Third Wor targets the Navy faced in Vietnam, and would presumably face in an' future war against an enemy other than the Soviets. In the past, the NaVV more than any other service, has been adapted to both the Soviet o> Third World scenarios. One way to read the maritime strategy >s aS rejection of the argument, current during the Carter administration, thaI large fraction of Navy investment was useful only in Third World scenaf ios. The Navy’s fight against Air Force efforts to eliminate its carrieh^ (before Korea) was a rejection of the argument that the Navy ought to limited to a Soviet scenario.
During the past three or four decades, war between the superpo'*e^s has been extremely unlikely because of stable nuclear deterrence. ’ indeed, neither superpower any longer considers nuclear warfare li^e J’ that deterrence may be weakening. In that case, superpower war^ar^f albeit in somewhat limited form, may be more conceivable during
Tomahawk Demonstrates New Tactic
A Tomahawk cruise missile recently demonstrated a new multip*® target capability when it dropped bomblets on three targets at C^in^ Lake, then dove into a fourth. In the past, bomblet attacks generally ha' ^ been understood as the (more or less) even distribution of submuninn ■ over the target area, not the precise placement of submunitions on d tinct targets.
The demonstrated attack technique presumably would apply t0 problem of a Soviet airfield with bombers in revetments. In the paSt’ Tomahawk has demonstrated the ability to destroy such aircraft by a.( tacking from above. However, given the numbers of Soviet bombers^ would be difficult to provide one Tomahawk per bomber in, say, Northern Fleet area. If, however, each Tomahawk can destroy three more bombers, the task becomes more manageable.
Initial multiple-target submunitions capability is scheduled for the t of 1988.
124
Proceedings / August