We Need More Warning

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s, cherubs one.” An alert call from a sharp surveil- ^ance operator.

“Anything to investigate this contact with?” asks the ^TAO.

. “No sir, the Harriers are 50 miles out to the west prac- ^l>cing air combat maneuvering [ACM]. Bogey now 22 ^iles.” Pressure mounts in the CIC on board the amphibi- °^Us assault ship (LHA), sitting on Bagel Station. “Launch the alert Cobras. Check all close-in weapon

More Warning

b,

^est. Aye aye, Sir.”

general quarters, general QUARTERS­'LL HANDS MAN YOUR BATTLE STATIONS!

^sVstem [CIWS] mounts,” commands the TAO, as he P'^cks up the line to the Old Man.

“Sir, bogey now 19 miles. Steady bearing 030, 200 ⁿ°ts, still cherubs one,” reports surveillance.

“Skipper, this is CIC, we have an unidentified contact ^c*°sing at 19 miles, 100 feet off the deck. I’ve ordered the ^)^ert Cobras airborne. I recommend that the ship come to ~^eneral Quarters. The intercept is going to be close at

“Sir, bogey now 14 miles. CIWS mount two is down, k-ombat is manned and ready,” the duty chief reports.

“Sir, the Air Boss reports Gunrunner 52 now turning ^sP°t two. The second Cobra is down. Bogey now 11 miles ^a,1d closing.”

‘Gunrunner 52, bogey 030, nine miles, 200 knots, ^cherubs one, weapons red and tight.”

“52, roger.”

Sir, that bearing is right down the throat of mount ^tvv°> I sure hope that Cobra gets there soon,” says the ^c°ntroller.

‘Range?” queries the TAO.

“Now, six miles. Gunrunner 52, bogey now one ⁰ clock, five miles.”

“No joy—it’s really hazy out here. Keep the bogey dope coming,” replies Gunrunner.

“One o’clock, four miles, cherubs one. Sir, range now is five miles.”

Tension builds in the CIC as all hands watch the event unfold.

“Sir, there still is no response to the warning calls on guard. This guy’s headed right toward us!”

“Gunrunner 52, weapons free. I repeat, weapons free on your bogey, now one o’clock less than a mile,” says the TAO.

“Roger, weapons free. Judy on a civil twin. Engag­ing!”

“Bogey now one mile, sir,” says the controller.

“The winder’s a miss! 52’s closing to guns,” from the Cobra pilot.

The sound of .50-caliber machine guns on deck rever­berates through CIC. The crew watches in horror. “Star­board observer reports a Stinger hit on the bogey in . . .”

Still, the terrorist aircraft hits the side of the ship at the 0-3 level, and a ton of TNT sends another martyr to Mo­hammed’s paradise. The United States is humiliated once again by foreign terrorists—for the want of a weapon sys­tem to counter the low-altitude threat to our naval ships.

The 600-ship Navy, with its 15 CVBGs, will ind^u ^ four surface action groups built around our refurbish® battleships. The battleship SAG has the same employm^en limitations as the ATF, because of LOS sensors. EmphA ment concepts for the BB-SAGs have not been fully d^eve

If the bogey had been cruising at 200 knots, less than eight minutes would have elapsed between the LHA’s ini­tial detection of the bogey and its striking the ship. That is not enough time to employ amphibious shipboard aircraft adequately in the antiair role. The threat of high-speed antiship missiles (ASMs) makes this time factor even more critical. The tragic loss of life on board the USS Stark (FFG-31) demonstrates our vulnerability and the horrible consequences of an ASM attack.

The ultimate British success during the Falklands Con­flict demonstrated the effectiveness of small-deck V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft) forces against a moderate threat in a medium-to-high-intensity conflict. The British successes would have been even greater, and losses from Argentine air-to-surface missiles reduced, if the universally recognized deficiency of the British battle force—lack of airborne early warning (AEW)—had been addressed and rectified before the out­break of hostilities.

The solution to the lack of AEW capability for the U. S. Navy’s amphibious fleet and battleship surface action groups (BB-SAGs) will help the Marine air command and control system (MACCS), as well. The problem for both the Navy and the Marine Corps is that—because of the •limitations of surface/ground based sensors—their sys­tems need an airborne sensor for surveillance and detec­tion against low-flying threats (aircraft and missiles). Without platforms capable of airborne detection that over­come line-of-sight (LOS) limitations, both the Navy’s amphibious forces and the Marines can, at best, count on a 25-nautical-mile detection against a target flying 100 feet above the deck. This barely provides enough time to pre­pare the troops and sailors for the attack, much less to mount an effective defense against the standoff weapon threat. Each service also suffers from lack of communica­tions connectivity and electronic surveillance capability as a result of LOS limitations. An AEW platform would cor­rect these deficiencies.

In the Navy’s amphibious task forces (ATFs), the issue of employing embarked Marine aircraft for fleet defense arises frequently. The primary role for the AV-8 Harrier and the AH-1 SeaCobra is to provide support to the Ma­rine ground combat element (GCE).

When Marine forces deploy ashore, both the Harrier and the Cobra must be allowed to focus solely on GCE support. However, when not tasked with GCE support, these aircraft should be used for ship defense. With the recent use of the amphibious task forces in the political “presence” role, as in Lebanon, the need for coordinated Navy-Marine ship defense operations has increased. Cur­rent shipboard sensors can neither detect threats nor cue Marine aircraft properly at the required ranges. Further­more, the carrier battle group (CVBG) AEW umbrella, consisting of E-2Cs deployed from a carrier, is sometimes not available because of other tasking. It also suffers from system degradation in the primary operating arenas for an ATF, the overland and land-sea interface environments. The limited range, dash speeds, and lack of an on-board radar in both the AV-8 and AH-1 limit them severely in the ship defense role. These problems could be overcome

by adding an AEW sensor package to the ATF. It would relieve the CVBG from supplying AEW to the ATF and allow the carrier battle group to concentrate on its own mission—power projection. In lieu of the carrier tactics developed for the outer air battle, tactics and procedures will have to be developed for the employment of Marine aircraft in the ship defense role—with AEW aircraft tai­lored to those specific platforms.

The greatest problem facing the tactician in the employ^-

ment of Marine ATF embarked air is that both air-to-a* capable platforms, the Cobra and Harrier, depend prim^ar ily on the “Mk-I eyeball” for target acquisition and gagement. The standoff range of antiship weapons of t 1980s and 1990s requires that opposition platforms ^c engaged well beyond their weapons’ launch envelopes. There are not enough antiair assets embarked on our A¹ ships to set up a combat air patrol (CAP) barrier similar ^t0 the vector logic sector defense of the CVBG. In addition- neither the Harrier nor the Cobra has long enough legs^t0 be employed in the “loiter” CAP role. This lack of a'^r- craft requires that targets be detected, classified, and id^e^ tified in time for a deck-launched intercept before t ^e enemy reaches the outer limits of his delivery envelope With the addition of an AEW platform capable of detect ing targets at the ranges required, the Harrier could employed in the “alert” interceptor mode under AE control. To provide the ATF with true defense-in-depm; the Cobra forces would then be used as “gap fillers, once the AEW platform determined the threat axis. Em ploying the AH-1 outside the envelope of close-in sh'P defense systems, in conjunction with longer range A’^- interceptors, would force enemy platforms: to run ¹ gauntlet of three separate systems; untie the hands of m*^s sile shooters in the inner defense zone; and alleviate t potential problem of friendly forces firing on one another An airborne AEW platform would not be a panacea 1 ^ defense against multiple regimental-sized raids, but would provide an ATF with the redundant defensive pa pacity necessary to combat a less sophisticated threat, * Navy then could use an ATF in the “presence” mode m variety of moderate threat scenarios, without tasking ¹ primary striking arm of the Navy, the CVBG.

^Y (D. BROCKSCHMIDT)

°P^ed, even though they have deployed on “presence”- type missions. The BB-SAG would benefit from a deploy­^able AEW asset that can provide surface-to-air missile ^Cueing and long-range surveillance, communications, and electronic support measures (ESM) augmentation. An oEW aircraft would bolster the effect of the BB-SAG in a ^edium-intensity environment, enabling it to employ its efensive systems at their maximum ranges.

The “Gator” force has been ignored as a potential leg °^f a naval surface triad (CVBG, BB-SAG, ATF) and has ^een viewed as a weak sister, requiring constant nursing ^and unable to stand on its own. Our amphibious task ^0rces are already being employed in “presence” mis- ^Sl°ns. An organic AEW capability, once developed, will Provide us with an ATF and BB-SAG that can stand alone, Etching the self-protection capability of the CVBG. This ^ould expand the options available to military and civilian strategists. With such a boost in capabilities, the ATF will .^e a well-balanced force that will enhance the Navy’s abil- 'ty to respond to varied levels of conflict. Long-standing ^arguments within the naval establishment about big-deck ^Vefsus small-deck carriers would become moot. The ATF, Properly equipped, can be the Navy’s small-deck carrier torce.

A Marine Corps AEW system is also needed. Control of Marine air in support of the ground combat element is •naited by the same LOS restraints that Navy shipboard ^Sensors face. Although MACCS is a fully developed and "ttegrated system, there are occasions within the amphibi- °^Us assault framework when the Marine air command and patrol system is either not employed or not yet opera- '°nal. For example, in the task-organized Marine expedi- ^lQnary unit (MEU) there is no provision for air-defense ^tontrol elements of the MACCS to be present. This takes °ⁿ greater significance when consideration is given to the fanned employment of an MEU in special operations. ^^uick in-out special operations require organic antiair pro­ton with AEW cueing and stand-alone command and e°ntrol linked to the command, control, and communica- >°n (C³) elements embarked. Marine AEW in the special °Perations-capable Marine expeditionary units will act in injunction with the assault force, using sensor range cov- iage to provide surveillance, indications, and warnings.

⁰ employ blindly an asset of this size and capability with- it AEW protection is foolhardy at best and criminal at tvorst.

In assaults at the Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) id Marine expeditionary force (MEF) levels, a hierarchy °P men and material is phased across the beach. The first

In May, the Navy established an operational requirement for further development of a Marine Corps AEW plat­form. Some feel strongly that the platform should be a sensor package built around the existing LAMPS-III SH-60B airframe (left) or the CH-53 Sea Stallion (right); others, who may prevail, do not support a ship-deployable platform.

control elements of a MACCS is an early warning and control (EWC) site. The EWC would not be present and operational for four days (D + 3), at best. During the first days of an amphibious assault, the Navy and Marine forces are the most vulnerable. Thus, the addition of an AEW system capable of sensor augmentation and limited stand-alone command and control would be an additional capability welcomed by any amphibious task force com­mander (CATF). An advanced communications suite would provide the MACCS with a new link, unhampered by current LOS limitations. A Marine AEW platform’s electronic support measure systems would provide emitter recognition, classification, and location for the tactical commander—something currently lacking. The ability to deploy the AEW sensor from ATF ships and ashore would provide unprecedented flexibility for the Marine Corps in the area of AEW, compared to the problems inherent in interoperability with Air Force airborne warning and con­trol system (AWACS) aircraft and Navy E-2Cs. The dy­namic, fluid nature of the amphibious assault dictates that the CATF exercise total control over his organic AEW support.

Numerous constraints will affect the configuration of a Marine AEW platform:

►  It must be V/STOL, for operations from the flight decks of amphibious assault and amphibious support ships.

► It must be capable of sensor operation in the amphibious environment—particularly at the land-sea interface and over land.

► It should be compatible with existing naval systems and be deployed on an existing Navy platform, for commonal­ity of parts, maintenance, and training.

► It should be capable of augmenting shipboard sensors from the air and providing stand-alone sensor employment and command-and-control functions.

► It should be able to perform its missions—in the face of communications and radar jamming—in all weather con­ditions and warfare environments.

^ It should have an ESM suite to provide for operations during emission control (EmCon) conditions. It then could provide added flexibility during EmCon employment of surface-based sensors (in silent or blinking modes) that protect against the air-to-surface missile threat.

A heliborne AEW platform operating at altitudes of 10— 20,000-feet could extend the CATF’s vision more than 150 miles beyond the limits of his surface-based radars. A platform with off-the-shelf systems could be fielded in less than 18 months, with minimal expenditures of research and development (R&D) funds. At a unit cost of about $11 million for airframe and AEW system, sufficient numbers could be built to provide each ATF, BB-SAG, and MEU with two aircraft, thus enabling independent or surge oper­ations to be conducted around the clock.¹

The need for an organic AEW capability is recognized within the Marine Corps, but there is disagreement about the best platform for it.² Because the Corps wants to re­duce the number of aircraft types in its inventory, adding a new airframe to conduct this mission is not a desirable option. Both the CH-46 and CH-53 have the lift capacity and on-station time to support an AEW application. How­ever, the CH-46 is scheduled to be replaced by the Osprey MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and thus is not a logical candi­date. The configuration of both the Navy and Marine Corps AEW capability may eventually be incorporated in the MV-22, but replacing the CH-46 fleet with Ospreys is the Corps’s first priority. Any AEW application will be delayed until that is,accomplished. The CH-53 is also a suitable platform, but, in light of extensive current task­ing, adding the AEW mission would degrade the availabil­ity of CH-53s for heavy lift. Once provided with organic AEW, the CATF or landing force commander (CLF) would employ it exclusively as an AEW asset. There ex­ists now barely enough heavy-lift capacity for current as­sault requirements. Therefore, arguments supporting mul­timission capability for Marine aircraft do not apply to an AEW system.

The need to replace the aging UH-1 utility helicopter 'fleet could facilitate the selection of a Marine AEW plat­form. If compatibility with the MV-22 in speed and range

is desired, then the UH-1 replacement will have to wait for the new LHX or tilt-rotor (XV-15 type) platforms. The AH-1W now being procured is not compatible as an escort for the MV-22 because of speed and range differentials, so the argument for total Marine rotary compatibility with the MV-22 is moot. The MV-22 itself is too large to perform many of the utility roles of the UH-1, and is therefore illogical choice.

The Marine Corps must make two difficult decisions- First, the Corps must decide whether to replace the UH- with a conventional helicopter, or wait for MV-22' compatible technology. Second, if the heavy-lift availabt ity loss involved in a CH-53 AEW application is unaccept able, could the Corps accept limited numbers (20-29) ⁰ dissimilar airframes dedicated to full-time AEW? Replac­ing the UH-1 with a conventional helicopter could cause the second decision to be overtaken by events. If the Corps chooses a Sikorsky SH-60 variant for the UH-1 replace ment, then the Navy and the Marine Corps could procure the ATF/BB-SAG/Marine Corps AEW platform together in an existing airframe with in-place maintenance and sup ply systems.            ₎₍

The proposed AEW platform is a sensor package bu around the existing SH-60B airframe and LAMPS-IH data link, providing multimode, secure data, video, ESM, ^an voice transmission capacity. By eliminating antisubmarme

Figure 1

East Coast Squadron

Dedicated

Detachment

BB SAG 1 2 Aircraft

BB SAG 2 2 Aircraft

RAG

BB SAG 3 2 Aircraft