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The officers and crew of the USS Virginia (CGN-38), and those of the rest of the surface navy, appear to have all their ducks in a row. But high-tech weapons, an excellent inspection record, and a complement of SWO-qualified officers do not a warship make. New fleetwide standards for the SWO designator, shipboard SWO training, and the selected exercise program could go a long way to build the corps of surface warriors today’s Navy needs.
What training program? Nearly all ships have exten training programs for the enlisted members of the ere yet there is rarely a coherent plan for officer training- ^ crew’s training may vary in effectiveness and degree, most ships pay more than passing lip service to this o ous requirement. The same can rarely be said for ot > ^ training. If a ship devotes one hour during each vveevell officer training, it has been a good week, although e
U. S. Navy Captain John Byron’s December 1987 Proceedings article “The Surface Navy is Not Ready” inflamed the surface community. His questionable (at best) contentions that we are less talented than other communities, complacent, and (perhaps more accurately) overburdened caused a ruckus that has masked some valid criticism. Captain Byron raised several good points and proposals to address current shortfalls in surface ship readiness. In the ensuing months, the causes he discussed for these shortfalls have become an emotional issue in the surface navy, preventing rational discussion of the excellent proposals addressing officer training and, most important, answering the question: “What is a surface warfare officer?”
Most surface warfare officers (SWOs) will agree that improvements can be made in training, particularly in officer training. They also will agree that despite all the chestbeating, there are doubts about whether the SWO is indeed a warrior. These issues apply to the submarine and aviation communities as well, but the situation is particularly ironic in the surface navy given the quantum gains made in the last few years in sensors (Aegis) and weapons (Tomahawk and Standard SM-2 missiles), and the marked increase in the number of powerful surface platforms. But the key to readiness lies with the officers; the lack of readiness shown by the command in the USS Stark (FFG-31) may be a manifestation.
The lack of a definite concept of what the SWO should be is intertwined with the realities of day-to-day life in a surface ship. From ensign to executive officer, the SWO is rewarded for administrative excellence and, too rarely. f°r his abilities as a warrior. The problem with training in surface ships is that officers are not trained for combat- This is not a shore-based problem; the Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) does an excellent job. But owing to time limitations and the large variety of platforms, SWOS training is largely generic and focused on providing a foundation for growth. The problem begins when the SWO or prospective SWO arrives on board ship: forma training stops, skills languish, and the surface warrior ro begins to be questioned.
Unlike the aviator, who arrives at his or her command a bonafide pilot, the prospective SWO arrives with only the oretical knowledge and very basic watchstanding expert ence gained at SWOS or on midshipman cruises. And un like a future submariner, who is sent aft to qualify in engineering before assuming his full duties, the young SWO is assaulted with the reality of being a division of1 cer in a division that may have as many as 50 pe°P|e' Within days, the bold talk of early qualification is forgot ten and survival in an administratively hostile environme becomes the goal. Consequently, warfare training and t perception of the SWO as a warrior are too often ign°r in favor of administration and management.
Four major areas need improvement or revision if w are to train effectively for combat:
► The lack of time devoted to professional growth
► The general lack of a coherent approach to shipb°a
SWO training .
► The inadequacies of the current selected exerct (SelEx) program
► The lack of fleetwide standardization for the SWO oeS
ignator . .
No time to be a warrior: In the surface navy, the dlVI sion officers end each day without having given nuue thought to combat training. The demands of managing affairs of the division—from writing letters of indents ness to counseling to investigating report chits—are tim consuming. SWOs produce a mountain of paperwork- planned maintenance system, personnel qualification sja dards (PQS), casualty reports, training records, eva u^ tions, and award recommendations. Also vying f°r SWOs’ time are collateral duties, often under the exec ^ tive officer’s direct supervision. The duties of the lefa^ welfare and recreation, and public affairs officers are 1 portant, but only tangential to the readiness of the s T These nonwarfare-related demands are tough enough the division officer, yet the time devoted to these taS , increases as one advances, first to department head a
then to XO. .
sive
, PQS by means of a training plan, unless, perhaps, it is Jvised by the officer striving to acquire the pin. As with beer training, completing the PQS is catch-as-catch- n- The requirements for a signature (denoting command , lhe specific task) vary greatly, and a signature may
etl°te anything from the actual performance of the task to
tr '
!^e requirements are stated clearly, PQS completion rou- l|He’
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^is training often lacks coherency. There are many things the SWO must know, but because of time limitations, the Gaining jumps around to fill the most obvious and immediate needs of the ship. Rarely is this training aimed at the nonqualified officers, and even more rarely is it warfare- elated. Thus, completion of the SWO PQS and the final ^0 qualification is accomplished catch-as-catch-can or °n watch. This approach may be adequate (but not desira- b*e) for the officer of the deck or combat information cen- ,er watch officer, but it is no substitute for an organized, national approach to the complexities of current combat sVstems and tactics.
The SelEx Facade: The selected exercise program needs to be completely revised. In most cases, the crew of the ship being graded chooses its own observer, thus the re- snlts are inherently suspect. “I’ll scratch your back ...” and the like is rampant. Even if such an agreement is not v°iced, there is a tendency to view the drills through rose- c°lored glasses. Most exercises are graded by your peers, s° few risk alienating a potential grader of one of your °wn SelExs.
The observed ship chooses the exercise, the time, and be place. This ensures only that the involved ship is ready ari(l probably drilled to handle that precise scenario, at that Incise time, with that specific equipment, and those exact ^°ple. All of this amounts to superb gamesmanship, but °es not offer an accurate appraisal of the ship’s relative readiness. In the rare event that the drill goes awry, the (n°rmal procedure is for both parties to call it an unreported fining exercise. Thus no one but the ship’s crew and the |.bserver know that the ship could not achieve even these Aited aims, and the squadron or group commander is eAed a fair appraisal of his ship’s readiness.
. The SWO Pin: When a pilot puts on his or her wings it ls recognized that he or she has completed a prescribed ^°gram and has a recognizable skill that is roughly the bivalent of all others who wear those wings. The same C^Aot be said of the SWO pin, which is earned by combing the applicable PQS, and normally awarded after C()Ap!eting an oral board chaired by the officer’s commanding officer. There is nothing fundamentally wrong 'v'th either of these requirements, but there is no force sJandard and thus no recognizable level of knowledge or denoted by the SWO pin.
The manner in which SWO PQS is accomplished varies ^rc;itly among ships. Only rarely does a SWO complete
merely an explanation by a qualified officer. Even when
‘e*y wanders from the expressed requirement. As a re- j personnel qualification standards do not serve to stan- ardize SWO training.
c ^ral boards may vary even more than the PQS. The Airlanding officer must have the final word on SWO Aification, but as COs vary, so do their requirements.
One may stress warfare, another a complete knowledge of the ship. A telling observation is the length of the board. A successful board may last five hours; another only an hour. On some ships, hot-running ensigns wear the pin; on others, hot-running lieutenants (junior grade) do not. Clearly, the oral board is not, and probably should not be, the source of a fleetwide SWO standard.
Whatever the cause, the SWO pin does not indicate a definitive level of training or skill. The variety of requirements and the lack of a warfare-based standard result in a lack of understanding and respect for the surface warfare officer in other communities and poor morale within the SWO community. A restructuring and new emphasis are needed to standardize the SWO program and redirect it toward its original goal: making the surface warfare officer a true warrior.
The solutions to these problems will require a departure from current practice:
► Replace the current SelEx program
► Develop and implement a warfare-based SWO exam
► Create the time for training
Fixing the SelEx Program: In the surface navy, the most widely respected inspection team is from the Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet Propulsion Examining Board (PEB). Having the PEB on board for a light-off exam or an operational propulsion plant exam (OPPE) is not much fun, but few will argue that the preparations and the exams benefit the people and the engineering plant. Since its inception more than a decade ago, the PEB has unarguably increased engineering readiness. A similar organization is needed that will test a ship’s ability to fight.
Ideally this group should be headed and manned by exceptional senior personnel. It should not duplicate the fleet training groups. Instead, it should impose difficult, realistic scenarios for the main players in a combat environment: the CO, XO, tactical action officer, ship’s weapons coordinator, ASW evaluator, and air controllers. This new board should test warfare knowledge and include oral examinations. This collection of what should be the finest warriors the Navy has to offer should take a blunt, nononsense view and should be the sole determinant of a ship’s readiness.
The keys to the success of such an organization are support at the highest levels of the chain of command and uncompromising inspections. The board should be responsible only to the fleet or, at a minimum, the type commander. This would ensure that the board has the backing and thus the confidence to develop an accurate readiness picture. Ships that report themselves as ready should be candidates for an inspection on minimal notice. The drills to be conducted, and even whether the inspection will require a live firing, should be kept from the ship’s company until the problem itself is imposed. Once the initial scenario is introduced, the ship should prepare and react in all ways as if it were actual combat.
At the new board’s outset, the Navy would suffer a high failure rate and overall readiness would appear to decline. But this would merely reflect the overly optimistic picture painted by the current SelEx program. These inspections
would drive improvements, and as a result of this hard look at all warfare-related exercises, readiness in fact— not on paper—would benefit. In addition, material status reporting and casualty report problems would improve because no commanding officer would be able to face the embarrassment of being asked to use equipment that was reported operational, but in fact was not. The practice of loading up for an inspection would cease. Eventually, squadron and group commanders will have a more accurate picture of all aspects of their ships’ readiness.
Standardizing the SWO Pin: To standardize SWO requirements, we must create a fleetwide SWO exam such as that for command qualification. However, the application of this simple task is crucial and complex. Failure to
MARK FREEMAN
develop the proper emphasis and proper means of administration will provide merely another paperwork requirement to be met—on paper. The examination should be administered like the command qualification examination. When the CO decides that a person is ready, he or she should request the exam, which should arrive sealed. The completed exam would be mailed to a central facility for correction and determination of eligibility for SWO qualification.
The examination’s emphasis is crucial. We should put ourselves clearly behind what is important in a surface warrior. Above all the exam should test warfare skills— systems, capabilities, and tactics. Engineering differences among ships mean that candidates should be questioned on only the most basic concepts. Intimate knowledge of propulsion plants other than your own is not essential in a combat environment. But the complexity of modem warfare demands an awareness and knowledge of the entire spectrum of the battle—our own combat systems and tactics, as well as those of our allies and potential adversaries.
The written SWO exam should be difficult and must require extensive preparation. All of the ship’s experts would have to participate in the preparation, requiring an in-depth officers’ training plan. Because the number of candidates taking the exam, the success rate, and the final number qualified are reported to the appropriate corn- mander, the ship’s officers would be motivated to teach the young officers. The junior officers would, of course, benefit from this, but so would the qualified SWOs. The latter would have to review constantly to remain abreast o the latest developments. And the unit commander woul have a tool for judging the success of a ship’s warfare training.
the commanding officer. In addition, we must provide f°r the officer who could not pass the exam, but who, in nj opinion of the CO, is qualified. This exemption should e the rare exception. The exam would in no way reduce tn CO’s prerogatives, but if properly instituted, it would re suit in a warfare-related standard for the surface warfare community.
• ’ll re-
The Time: The two previous recommendations wu>
quire a significant increase in the time that the SWO vVl^
devote to training. Under the current structure, there is^
amount of unused time that could be so employed- ^
stead, we need to restructure the current organization a
redefine some of the roles of the SWO. There are thr
approaches to this problem:
► Reduce the SWO’s administrative and managerial r sponsibilities
► Alter the current emphasis on collateral duties fS
► Alter the current roles of several of the ship’s offlc6
sion officers, department heads, and the executive ^ challenges Navy tradition. Yet the complexity and ne ^ for training in today’s warfare environment require sue radical shift. Certainly, the managerial needs of the cr ^ will not diminish. Maintenance, training, and inspect! must continue, and young sailors always will need co seling and advice. But many of these tasks and resp°neCj bilities could be shifted to the chief petty officers. duty officers (LDOs) and warrant officers, whose e*P j tise with equipment and personnel is clearly recogm2 could handle many of these roles. This is being d°Pe.t0ons with great success in some of the more complex divisi and is the norm in many allied navies. y
In many cases, this reassigning of roles—particu
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for the division officer—involves a shift of responsibility °nly. The chief petty officer or, when available, the LDO/ "'arrant officer normally accomplishes these tasks under foe auspices of the division officer. The nature of this shift Either abrogates the traditional role of the division officer °r department head, nor divorces the SWO from the crew,
effect creating another mere watchstander. The officer’s leadership remains important; the SWO only gains by this experience and by absorbing the technical knowledge as- ?°ciated with running a department or division. The intent ls merely to free the SWO from time-consuming, day-to- ,ay administration and management, and thus create more fofie for training.
Another way to increase training time is to modify the j-arrent collateral duty structure. A collateral duty should just that—a duty to be performed only if it does not "rterfere with an officer’s primary duty. Some collateral fo*ties must remain in their current form: the CMS custo- foan, collateral duty intelligence officer, the security offiCer, and gas-free engineer, for example. All these duties are not only operationally important, but closely related to ae officer’s primary duty. On the other hand, collateral forties such as the welfare and recreation custodian, legal °fficer, and public affairs officer are not related to combat 'cadiness and represent dead time to the surface warrior. *hese programs are important, but many of these duties c°uld be shifted to the support staffs. The ship could main- foin a liaison officer, but the administrative burden and the °nrts for a successful program would pass to the support's command. Any number of the time-killing collateral uties could be handled so that there is more time for lining.
Attempting to restructure the shipboard chain of command also flies in the face of naval tradition, but it may be foe key to developing real war-fighting skills. As long as ae XO remains primarily responsible for the ship’s ad- fo'rtistrative programs, a radical shift away from these proems may be impossible. It is difficult to envision any whose career rests on the success of his administra- '°rt, accepting less than the best talent to help achieve ^se goals. This burden falls squarely on the shoulders of the department heads and the division officers, and at the expense of warfare training.
But what if the executive officer’s career were directly tied to the operational and war-fighting skills of the ship? In the Atlantic Fleet, the XO is normally the navigator, a position he fills more in name than in fact. This is a good start, but the XO should fill a position roughly the equivalent of the current operations officer. Because his next seagoing billet is presumably going to be in command, what better way to train for his future responsibilities than to be in charge of the ship’s day-to-day operations? It would certainly help bring the two-tour engineer up to speed with the latest in operations. The ship would benefit, gaining a senior officer with a full-bore commitment to combat readiness. A logical collateral duty for the XO would be to train the SWOs, so even the newest ensign would benefit from this change. The remainder of the ship’s billets would stay roughly the same. An administrative officer position must be added, but this should not be a SWO billet. An LDO or warrant officer from the yeoman or personnelman rates, or a restricted line officer, would be ideal.
Despite the hurdles, many SWOs muster the determination to become warriors, and many commanding officers develop exceptional training programs for their officers. Consequently, many ships operate at high levels of readiness. But the systems we have developed and live by do not make this easy, and too often the innovators are not rewarded. The naval officer is the foundation of operational readiness, and all efforts should be made to develop highly trained warriors. We owe it to our crews and our country. In this era of “violent peace” it is not enough for most ships to be ready most of the time.
A surface warfare officer and master training specialist, Lieutenant James is serving as an instructor for the Division Officers Course at the Surface Warfare Officers School. He served as electrical officer in the Mobile Bay (LKA-115), combat information center officer in the Blakely (FF-1072), and damage control assistant in the Biddle (CG-34). He graduated from Harvard University with a history degree in 1980 and was commissioned through Officer Candidate School in 1981.
_________________________________________ Open Mouth, Insert Foot_______________________________
It happened in Norfolk, during an orientation program for senior Naval Reserve officers. The group was visiting a training activity, where a commander was expounding on the problems of training in the fleet today. Among the many decorations on the commander’s chest was the dark red Good Conduct Ribbon that identifies the “mustang” officer.
“Finally,” concluded the commander, “the chiefs still have the problem of training the young officers. Ensigns can be pretty green. The chief is older, more experienced, maybe even smarter; still, the young man is an officer and must be treated with respect.”
“The commander may not be aware of this,” interrupted a reserve captain from the back of the room, a bank president in civilian life, “but when he was a chief, I was his ensign.”
Once the commander regained his composure, a joyful reunion ensued.
Captain Richard A. Dirks, U. S. Naval Reserve
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)