Nuclear Weapons at Sea

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^Jl»st as the nuclear explosion at Bikini Atoll ^ade U. S. warships look like tiny insects ^fronting a devastating bug bomb, the i°viet preoccupation with land warfare "'''arfs the deterrent effect of the U. S. Davy’s nuclear forces. But giving up naval ^clear weapons would impair both our jjeterrent and war-fighting capabilities, and ^le U. S. Navy would no longer be a navy ^rthy of a superpower.

Iwenty-four hundred years ago, the first great theo­retician of war, Sun Tzu, wrote that “War is a mat- Hj.' ter of vital importance to the State; the province of ^0r death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory ^at it be thoroughly studied.” He had no doubt that his ^ac*ers understood what he meant by war. War was part of

the experience and the duties of all men. Similarly, 1,900 years later, Niccolo Machiavelli could write that a “Prince should have . . . [no] other aim for his study but war,” secure in the knowledge his readers, too, knew from first­hand experience what war meant.

By the 20th century, however, war had become so com­plex that expertise in military matters was no longer ex­pected of civic leaders. But the experts, the military and naval leaders, still understood what war meant. Their ex­perience and their study of past wars was directly relevant to future conflict. In reflecting 40 years later on his years at the Naval War College in the 1920s, Chester Nimitz wrote that the study was “so thorough that after the start of WW1I nothing that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected.” From the feudal Chinese general to the commander of the greatest naval campaign in history, leaders through the centuries knew that their own experi­ence and the study of others’ experience would, in large measure, prepare them for the demands of the future.

On 16 July 1945, at Alamogordo, New Mexico, all that changed, irrevocably. The combination of the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the ease of their delivery altered warfare fundamentally and qualitatively, as nothing had before—not gunpowder, not the gasoline engine, not the airplane. While the lessons of the past remained important, they could shed little light on the implications of nuclear weapons.

Faced with these new weapons, professional military leaders and civilian strategists reacted in various ways. Some, led by a few early civilian nuclear theorists, con­cluded that the sole value of nuclear weapons lay in their very existence, that, since their mere possession had a deterrent effect, it was unnecessary to consider their actual employment. Others, including many naval officers, sim­ply set aside the problem as too hard, concentrating in­stead on preparing for conventional war. Both attitudes were understandable—and both were wrong. Nuclear weapons cannot invalidate Sun Tzu’s dictum; they simply mean the “thorough study” must rest on intellect and the­ory rather than experience.

Nuclear weapons are important to the Navy because they raise policy questions that cannot be separated from general maritime issues. Despite what we might wish, nuclear weapons exist. They cannot be disinvented, nor are they likely to be banished from this world in the near future. We may hope that, as both sides refrained from using poison gas in World War II, so both sides would refrain from using nuclear weapons in a future conflict. But there is little in Soviet doctrine or practice to foster such a hope. It therefore becomes mandatory to under­stand the policy implications that govern the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons.

While the deterrent role of the nuclear-powered bal­listic-missile submarine force is generally understood and accepted, there is great misunderstanding about the deter­rent and military role of other sea-based nuclear weapons. Our lack of understanding of the rationale for these sys­tems could jeopardize future programs and congressional support for them. And, should deterrence fail, it is profes­sional naval officers on the high seas who will confront these dangers most directly.

The Nature of Deterrence: The fundamental purpose of the Navy, like that of the entire U. S. military, is to sup­port the national policy of deterrence. Deterrence means inducing an adversary not to do something he might other­wise wish to do. As the President’s Commission on Strate­gic Forces, popularly known as the Scowcroft Commis­sion, discusses it:

“Deterrence is not . . .a mirror image of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is a set of beliefs in the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires us to determine . . . what would deter them ... not . . . what would deter us.”

Therefore, to determine whether Navy nuclear capabili­ties contribute to deterrence, and if so, what specific weapons and capabilities are important, we must view the situation through Soviet eyes.

Despite the significant legacy of S. G. Gorshkov, the

Soviet Navy is not a leading force in Soviet military af­fairs. Land force officers dominate Soviet military leader­ship; the land campaign in Europe dominates the Soviet strategic view. Thus, the first reality to face is that the Soviets are far more likely to make decisions based on conditions ashore than at sea.

The second reality is that, despite their strong nuclear capabilities and well-developed nuclear doctrine, the So­viets would prefer to keep a future war conventional, bo because of their preponderance of conventional force *ⁿ Europe and their desire to reduce the threat to their home land. They may or may not expect to be able to do this, t>^u they will attempt to.

The final reality is that deterrence is not distinct from warfighting, especially in Soviet eyes. Deterrence an warfighting are two sides of the same coin. Americans have always understood this relationship for convention³ forces; our widespread recognition that the Soviets appo the same relationship to nuclear forces is one of the mo important policy developments of the past ten years.

Given these realities, how can naval nuclear capabilm contribute to deterrence?

The Contribution of the Navy: The first and most \mp°^r tant action the Navy might seek to deter is the initial ou^ break of war. While the basic decision to go to war is political one, Soviet political decision makers must ^c°j^ sider their military’s ability to implement war plans- assessing that ability, they will consider the risks and ^re wards of all types of military power. U. S. Navy nude capability may play a part in this evaluation of the “corre lation of forces”—-a part which, though difficult to <l^uaa tify, should loom increasingly larger in Soviet eyes w> increased U. S. deployment of nuclear Tomahawk crm missiles.                                                          .

If, for whatever reason, deterrence fails and the Sovi attack us or our allies, the Navy might seek to influent the nuclear decision ashore. The Soviets’ superior conve tional land-combat capability may force the West ^t0.^esC„. late to avoid defeat. Should this occur, naval consider tions will play little role. If NATO conventional defen ^ holds, the Soviets, in turn, could elect to escalate. T decision to do so may depend, in part, upon whether t think they can destroy NATO’s nuclear forces preemP lively.                                                     • • _nsa-

NATO’s nonstrategic nuclear forces play an indisp^en ble role in the alliance’s strategy of flexible respo*¹^ They link the conventional defense of Europe and ^ U. S. strategic arsenal. Although traditionally we n ^ thought of such forces as land based, with the rem°^v'^a Pershing-IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles Europe under the terms of the recently ratified Intern^ ate Nuclear Forces treaty, sea-based systems, especi sea-launched cruise missiles, will play an increasing important role. The high survivability of such sea-D*¹⁸^ strike systems should, in logic, have a significant d^ete. y effect. But the land-orientation of both Soviet nan* ^ leaders and Soviet doctrine may mean that their deb tions will give insufficient weight to such naval consi ^ tions. Thus the Soviet decision to use nuclear weap

The U. S. Navy could possess ten times more nuclear weapons and still be impotent against a Soviet Navy with relatively few. The Navy must train to survive in a nuclear war.

^ore is almost certainly beyond the direct influence of Navy.

Alternatively, the Navy might seek to deter initial use of ^Uclear weapons at sea. U. S. initial use is unlikely, given

■^e widespread professional evaluation that such an action

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ⁿ0t in our interest. Should the Soviets be tempted to use ^aclear weapons at sea prior to escalation ashore, there is J ■ S. naval capability to deter them. But this deterrent is our ability to threaten the Soviet surface fleet with .^clear weapons. Because our surface forces are far more ^Portant to us than theirs are to them, threatening to use ^lear weapons against Soviet Navy ships as our sole _s Elation for Soviet use of nuclear weapons at sea is in- ■ 'ficient. It could weaken deterrence, signalling a will- ^Ifress to engage in a tit-for-tat series of nuclear ex- ^anges in which both sides’ surface navies would be

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stroyed. Since it is the West that must use and control ^Seas, the Soviets would find such an exchange accepta- ^e- As a result, it is a poor deterrent.

,'^hile the surface fleet is not crucial to overall Soviet

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>tary strategy, submarines are. Threatening to use nu-

^ar weapons against Soviet submarines, therefore, might ^er Soviet use of their wide variety of nuclear ASW

weapons, even though—if our conventional ASW torpe­does are performing as expected—we will have no mili­tary need to initiate nuclear ASW. The lack of a nuclear ASW capability could leave us completely unable to influ­ence Soviet decision making in this area. Threatening a response in kind, however, may not deter the Soviets, should they lose all confidence in their nonnuclear sys­tems. Thus, while U. S. nuclear ASW weapons are a more powerful deterrent than nuclear antiship weapons, they alone may not be adequate to deter Soviet use of compara­ble systems.

Our real leverage over Soviet nuclear decision making lies in the Soviet preoccupation with the land campaign. The U. S. ability to retaliate against targets ashore serves as a powerful deterrent to Soviet initiation of nuclear war at sea. The Secretary of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1984, for example, notes that “our sea based forces for land attack . . . support our policy that we will not permit the Soviets to limit a nuclear war to the sea.” Simi­lar statements appear in subsequent Annual Reports and in congressional testimony of various senior Defense Depart­ment spokesmen.

While this policy might well deter the Soviets from con­sidering nuclear attacks on the fleet, initial Soviet use at sea is unlikely in any event, given their emphasis on the land battle. Of far greater concern is the need to deter Soviet nuclear use at sea, if nuclear weapons already have been used ashore.

But if either side initiates the use of nuclear weapons ashore it is not certain any naval capability or policy can deter the spread of the nuclear conflict to the sea. The threat of use against targets ashore is highly credible only if nuclear weapons have not been used in the land battle. If that use has already occurred, the only remaining linkage is the threat of widening the war through attacks on the infrastructure supporting the nuclear war at sea— especially operating bases for the most dangerous plat­forms, nuclear-armed Soviet Naval Aviation Badger and Backfire bombers. While striking such bases is militarily effective, it entails making high-risk, direct attacks on the Soviet homeland. While our declared policy makes it clear that we are willing to accept these risks, the Soviets may conclude otherwise. If so, they will not be deterred.

Therefore, the deterrent role of naval nuclear capabili­ties in and of themselves is limited. The Navy is not di­rectly relevant to the Soviet decision to use nuclear weap­ons ashore and is limited in its ability to deter Soviet use at sea once they have been used ashore. Only in the unlikely contingency of Soviet first use at sea is there a unique naval deterrent capability.

Should Deterrence Fail: Responsible military and civil­ian leaders must consider the terrible “what ifs,” should deterrence fail. This is especially true if “deterrence”

Soviet

The relatively limited role of surface forces in

means preventing the use of nuclear weapons at sea once they have been used ashore. Thus, we must understand the Navy’s military requirements should the nuclear threshold be crossed.

The most fundamental Navy requirement is to continue to operate and fight. This demands training and tactics tailored for a nuclear environment. It also requires im­proved ship and aircraft survivability. No sane person be­lieves a ship can survive a direct hit from a nuclear weapon, nor is that being suggested here. But the im­mense destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the wide- ranging nature of their effects raise possibilities of multi­ple kills from the same weapon, of ships destroyed by near misses, and of weapon systems rendered useless over ranges of hundreds of miles. It is these radical conse­quences that Navy hardening and survivability programs must prevent. Such programs and the accompanying train­ing and tactics will be required as long as Soviet nuclear weapons exist, even if there are no U. S. Navy nuclear weapons. Indeed, without such programs, maintaining a U. S. naval nuclear arsenal will be largely futile.

Given adequate survivability, training, and tactics, nu­clear weapons can offer improvements in many Navy ca­pabilities. They may offer the only chance to defeat large- scale nuclear-armed cruise missile attacks on the fleet. First, by threatening to destroy multiple aircraft, nuclear weapons can thwart densely spaced mass raid tactics. More significantly, they increase the probability of killing aircraft-delivered missiles. Finally, assuming the risk of still further escalation is acceptable, nuclear strikes can deal with the air threat to the fleet in the most effective way of all: by destroying attacking bombers at their bases.

In ASW, arguably the Navy’s most important wartime mission, nuclear weapons also offer significant advan­tages. Because we want to keep a war at sea conventional, such systems are not our weapons of choice. Nevertheless, their increased kill radius permits less precise localization, which is, perhaps, the most limiting factor in ASW today. They can be used regardless of target depth or speed. Un­like conventional homing torpedoes, nuclear weapons nei­ther depend on target signature nor require a lengthy time to close on a target after launch. They are thus far less susceptible to countermeasures or evasion. Lastly, the ex­treme destructiveness of nuclear ASW weapons eliminates any question of whether a hit will lead to a kill, even for extremely tough, modem Soviet submarines.

While surface ships are, relatively speaking, the least important component of the Soviet Navy, here too nuclear weapons offer advantages. They provide, for example, an assured single-shot kill against any ship, no matter how large or heavily armored.

These potential military uses of nuclear weapons are independent of whether specific enemy targets are using or even carrying nuclear weapons of their own. They repre­sent capabilities that the Navy could employ at any time, but that it should employ only once deterrence has failed and the nuclear threshold has been breached at sea for other reasons. This restraint is demanded by the primacy of deterrence in U. S. nuclear policy, by the universal professional judgment that the U. S. Navy will fare better

in a conventional conflict than in a nuclear one, and by the difficulty of predicting the course of a war once it has escalated.                                      .

This argument does not imply an irrevocable nationa policy of forgoing the option for first use of naval nuclear weapons. Nor do we advocate informing potential adver saries in advance of our exact intentions. Still, it is dm¹' cult to envision circumstances where first use at sea wou be in U. S. interests. Once nuclear weapons have been used, however, we may need the additional capability they confer on us to reduce the net advantage their use gives a¹¹ adversary and thus to avoid the unacceptable choice be tween defeat and further escalation.

What Kind of Nuclear Weapons: These considerations lead to the question of what type of capability to acqu^ire Although nuclear ASW capabilities could influence a viet decision to employ their own nuclear ASW weapon^ the acquisition of nuclear land-attack weapons is a ^1111111 mum requirement for deterrence. Since other naval we^aP. ons will probably not, in themselves, deter the spread nuclear war to the sea once it has begun ashore, acqu^|SI tion judgments for U. S. sea-based nuclear weapons m be based not only on deterrence, but also on their mih^ia - contribution should deterrence fail.                                                                    . _p

Such considerations suggest that, along with train¹ r and survivability improvements, nuclear antiair wart ^ weapons are almost certainly required to counter unique threat that Soviet nuclear-armed antiship ^crU. missiles pose. The current lack of any program for acq ing such weapons is dangerous.

naval strategy and the comparative vulnerability of ¹¹¹⁰ j Soviet surface ships to conventional attack make the ^nC^ for nuclear antiship weapons less obvious. Finally* judgment of what nuclear ASW capability to procure r^eS on an assessment of U. S. conventional ASW capabibT Ideally, we would require no nuclear ASW weapons, ^ practically, given the immense importance of the S°^vl j submarine force, such weapons may provide an essen ^ hedge against catastrophically poor performance of U- ASW torpedoes in the future. Failure of conventional pedoes in wartime is not unknown in U. S. naval his^t(^₍

It may seem inconsistent to argue simultaneously ¹ sea-based weapons (except land-attack weapons) ^can ensure deterrence but that they should be acquired ne theless. It is not. Deterrence, while the primary reason^ acquiring all weapons, nuclear or not, cannot be our ⁰ goal. The Navy needs a strong nuclear capability to ⁱⁿ^ ence the initial decision to go to war and to enh^anC® . , capability should deterrence fail, even if this capab¹^ would not be decisive in deterring escalation once war begun.

Perception: Other considerations might influence policy. For example, some might argue that the Navy, the United States, must maintain strong nuclear f°^rceS_ays perceptual reasons. The perception of power has al ^ been vital in international affairs. The desire not to be as a militarily impotent, pitiful, helpless giant he P