Comment and Discussion

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

—Proceedings displayed ^l1'^0st commendable and rare insight not

^e°mi

judications by publishing this article and during it prominently. In the bevy of tip²¹¹¹ affairs affecting our national in- p|^Cs| and the resulting demands this , ^Ces on our Navy, it is easy to lose per- Pective and forget what really consti- ^es the strength of the United States. (- Was commanding officer of Gary’s ^st fleet squadron (VA-93) that he

[flonly associated with professional

safety and security.

The article may have been for Gary, but I believe it is really for every Ameri­can flier like Gary whose love of country, family, and flying sent him down the cat­apult track on the blackest of nights with courage, resolve, and faith in the impor­tance of his mission.

Joined

in 1967. We flew many missions

iM ^^0rt^ ^anti South Vietnam, Laos, li the Demilitarized Zone. Gary never |L ’tated to press the attack and, on more " °ne occasion, returned to the ship d_e !* flak damage attesting to the rugged lg '8° of the A4-F Skyhawk and chal- the skill of the squadron

i Headstone for Gary” is a poignant sy ‘ⁿder that our survival doesn’t rest tc_c, ^on ’^^e thickness of armor plate, the

atacy of missiles, or the number of we cram in a cockpit; nor can it _si equated only to the quality and inten- (_v^{-V !)}f training. The courage and effec- L«ess of even our most highly trained t_t], “atants, naval aviators, rest ulti- C^ly on those years of preparation at ^c> school, and church. A nation that Id ^0s< its collective sense of dedication Conditional ideals and values will shun

fed:

bsk taking that is indispensable to the

foie as leader of the West.

f,/¹ his recent autobiography, Right \'ⁿ the Beginning (Boston: Little, and Company, 1988), noted (L hington commentator Patrick J. Bu- ^an concludes with this sentence, "Untry, family and faith, these are the

,ⁿgs

worth dying for; these are the IL‘^SS worth fighting for; these are the

Worth living for.” ry₀₍hat the parents of Gary Simkins and ^edings have done is to reveal, in a tn_tJⁿ8 tribute, the essence of that funda- ^a* strength of the United States. And ₍^rs of Proceedings, and all Ameri- ldr|^0r that matter, should be concerned -_t ^attentive to trends and practices un- ^{L ln}>ng those traditional values that ^s° inextricably entwined with our

“The Stark Report”

(See M. Vlahos, pp. 64-67, May 1988; N. L.

Flacco, p. 17, June 1988; H. C. Boshen, p. 16,

July 1988 Proceedings)

Stanley Peek—As a former naval officer who served on board the Stark (FFG-31), and transferred off the ship one-half hour before the ship deployed, I agree that people were to blame for letting the Exocets hit the Stark. The roots of the problem, however, lie within the Navy’s personnel management and assignment system itself, not with the people as­signed to the ship. Having known those involved, I can say that there were many highly intelligent, motivated, and capable members in the ship’s crew.

To many members of the Navy, the idea of a “career” is not just a word, but a goal sought after with zeal. The idea of a career of dedicated, devoted service to your country is very honorable. The Navy and the other branches of the mili­tary use career incentives to retain both officers and enlisted personnel.

The Navy’s officer evaluation system, or fitness reports (FitReps), is flawed. A “cover yourself” mentality is prevalent. Everyone is more concerned with pro­tecting his or her career. As long as you get the right “tickets punched” and don’t make a mistake, you (and 90% of your peers) will get a top 1% FitRep, be pro­moted on time, and retire with security after 20 years. But if you rock the boat or take an initiative that might not work, instead of being noticed as someone with new ideas or one who is not afraid to take risks, you could receive an unfavorable FitRep and hurt or ruin your career.

Instead of encouraging an aggressive attitude, “pass the inspection and hope nothing breaks” becomes the order of the day. This was partly responsible for what happened to the Stark. No one believed it would happen to them, so no one took action. Taking no action was safer than risking embarrassment and possibly a

Contents:

A Headstone for Gary

The Stark Report

Knowing the Law

The End of the Submarine’s Era?

From Cockpit to Bridge

Memo to Carrier COs

A Few Good Sea Stories

Yankee Sub, Go Home!

The Death of the Coast Guard

So Long, Mr. Nice Guy

Flag and General Officers of the Naval Services

Reopen the S-3 Line Far Eastern Navies The Coast Guard Example

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

rer — ^Ship

>ieved by new people.

chief

the

^;,r reliefs on board for a turnover while

Guif

Out

cha,

the 14 officer billets, 10 had

, ⁱⁿged. The only officers who had gone thr₀ •         °

the

tactical action officers (TAOs) from

ra were gone. The general quarters

°ffi.

^Cri breaking up that combat team before ship deploys. Military units in combat

over a long period of time.

$

^avy career by wrongly shooting down ^an airplane. 1 know many of the ship’s crew members, officer and enlisted alike, idn’t appreciate the dangers of a Persian ^Gu]f deployment.

The personnel assignment system put j/^e Stark in danger. The Stark went rough refresher training (RefTra) at ^uantanamo Bay, Cuba, in July 1986, to P^^ePare for her deployment in February ,P- Everyone who has been through ^Is knows that after RefTra a ship is °ⁿed for deployment, in a combat frame ⁰ mind. On the Stark, between the end RefTra and deploying six-and-a-half °nths later, the auxiliary officer, main Impulsion assistant, combat systems of- ^Cer, ordnance officer, combat informa- °ⁿ center officer, electronics repair offi­^Cer- and ship control officer all were In addition, the engineer and supply officer had ^siting the Atlantic Ocean. A new ex- ^cutive officer took over in the Persian

shortly after the ship’s arrival there. Out of

°^ugh combat training in Cuba and ^^re still with the ship at the time of the d ^ack were the commanding officer, ^ntage control assistant, antisubmarine _c ^arfure officer, and the disbursing offi- ^r- Even the commanding officer was ^Paring for his change of command. ^Very department head had changed; all ^lcer of the deck and TAO were differ- than in Cuba. The TAO at the time of j. ® ^attack arrived on board one-and-one-

0         ¹ months before deploying, after being ^shore duty for more than two years.

_ti 'here also had been a high turnover in l_e^{e e}nlisted ranks. I would estimate at j,^st one-third of the crew had changed. _c^ls was especially noticeable in the op­tions specialist and electronic warfare ^es in the combat information center.

1$        ¹¹ short, the combat organization that

1                ,^trained for the deployment during _tv ^ra had been shattered before the ship

ipft her home port. There is no sense •' lining a ship’s crew to deploy and

Ht, _

PGff

°^rrn best when the members have and worked together as a cohesive

j_t)J:^0w do we prevent this from happen- That is a question that needs to be c_ail'^Vered. The solution may mean drasti- h,.,-^v changing established manning ‘•cies.

surface warfare officer currently ⁿds three to four years as a shipboard

L department head, but this time is spent on two different ships, and quite possibly two different ship types, and your re­sponsibilities on each ship are totally dif­ferent. The operations officer billet on a Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer, is different from being an operations officer on an Iwo Jima (LPH-2)-class amphibi­ous assault ship. A department head may be on board for only 18 months, and then he is gone. There is no consistency or unit cohesiveness. Unfortunately, this happens to be a fleet-wide problem. On my first ship, I made three deployments

Typical Tactical C² Display.

in my 34 months on board, and there was a different commanding officer for each deployment.

In the future, after a ship goes through RefTra prior to deployment, personnel transfers should be limited to a small group—those who are leaving the ser­vice, and those who are not essential to the combat organization of the ship (i.e., supply, medical, etc.). All officers and combat rates should be extended until after the deployment. Cases in which a person reports to a ship prior to overhaul, looks at the deployment schedule, and

C² for Tactical and Battle Group Commanders C² for Non-NTDS Ships • Sensor Data Correlation

EDO’s new mission-specific software and data acquisition capability are helping Tactical Commanders in complex multi-warfare operations make time-critical decisions—quickly, correctly and confidently.

It is an entirely new dimension of EDO’s continuing commitment to the Department of Defense, shaping the future.

Contact: Marketing Department, EDO Corporation, Government Systems Division, College Point, NY 11356-1434, USA Phone (718) 445-6000 • Telex 127431

Mznn government CUtl SYSTEMS CORPORATION DIVISION

Where Technological Innovation Becomes Reality

“Knowing the Law”

validi^

touchable. While few doubt the

see the trial procedures themselves ^aS example of the winners bashing the 1° behind a facade of legality. ^_0l-’s

D°^eS

I also, take exception to the auth°^r

Our Quality Runs Deep Above And Below The Sea.

Now Sub-Sea Systems can satisfy your most demanding video needs. In harsh environments. Above and below the sea.

•                                 Surveillance        • Monitoring

•                                 Security • Inspection

TheSS-117

The world's smallest high quality color CCD camera.

The SL-99

The highest performance SIT low light camera available.

The MS-1000

The surveillance camera used at Cape Kennedy and Pearl Harbor because it performs under the most demanding conditions.

When you need the best, contact Sub-Sea Systems to discuss your particular viewing requirements.

Sub-Sea Systems, 753 W. Washington Ave., P.O. Box 2038, Escondido, California 92025, USA. Phone: (619) 747-4223. Fax: (619) 747-8828. Cable: Sub-Sea San Diego. Telex: 695409.

Sub-Sea Systems

learns that his 18-month assignment may include RefTra but end prior to the de­ployment should cease. By the time these individuals are intimately familiar with their jobs, they are transferred, and re­placed by someone prior to deployment.

Split tours at the division officer and department head level should be elimi­nated. Department head tours should be on one ship in one billet, and a six-month minimum should be established as the period between each department head change. Having the combat systems offi­cer, ship control officer, and engineer officer leave within only a few months of each other is disruptive to the command structure of any ship.

In the May 1988 Naval Review issue of Proceedings (see “The Soviet Navy, 1987: The Soviets on the Soviets,” p. 229) there was an account told of an offi­cer who started out at the division officer level and rose through department head, executive officer, and eventually com­manding officer on the same ship. This could lead to complete knowledge of one specific ship type, or tunnel vision. Our system produces a jack of all trades, mas­ter of none. There must be an acceptable middle ground somewhere, and we should find it.

The television shots of a U. S. Navy frigate listing to port with smoke billow­ing out and a gaping hole in the side is a sight that none of us ever wants to see again. But until we stop breaking up trained combat teams prior to deploying, we may be sending ships and people to crisis “hot spots,” in support of govern­ment policy, that are not prepared to do battle.

Lieutenant (junior grade) Lawrence B. Jackson, U. S. Navy, Main Propulsion Assistant, USS Conyngham (DDG-17)— Dr. Vlahos did a commendable job of examining the many aspects of the attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31), and of ex­plaining the complexities involved with duty in the Persian Gulf. I therefore was surprised to read that the crew of the Stark was able to put out the fire and re­turn to port unassisted.

While I do not wish to detract from the efforts of the Stark's crew, which were truly magnificent, I must point out that Dr. Vlahos is wrong. The crew of the Stark was assisted by crews from the USS Coontz (DDG-40), USS Waddell (DDG- 24), and Conyngham. Oxygen-breathing apparatus (OBA) canisters, submersible pumps, and other damage control items were flown in from the USS La Salle (AGF-3). By the time the fire was out, the Conyngham and the Waddell had ex­pended all but a few reserve OBA canis­ters. Even as the Stark was being towe into port, the combined damage contro crews were still busy putting out severa reflash fires and dewatering compart­ments.

If the other ships had not been able to respond as they did, I doubt that the Star' would have made it back to port, despite the most valiant efforts of her crew.

(See F. A. Graf, pp. 58-61, June 1988 Proceedings)

Robert M. Cardwell—I have just r^ea^ this article and cannot allow it to P^aS' without dissent. I am not a naval off¹^ but I served as an enlisted man during tj¹ Korean War (that UN “Police Action and I am a retired policeman with a h long interest in history.

I see the military as a police depart ment on a large scale. The imminent h and-death decisions faced by a patrolrnj* correspond to situations confronted > military officers. The military, supp°^s edly, is restricted by international 1* ' the police are burdened by legisl^atl°ⁿ’ court decisions, and rules and regulation^

It seems odd that the police should tied by rules while criminals have non Obviously, however, if the criming went by the rules, there would be no n® for policemen in the first place. Li wise, the military is necessary beca someone is committing internal’¹¹ crimes. If all disputes could be ^sett^_oUr international law, we would disband ¹ armed forces.

Neither police work nor war are p^,e , ant. I am certainly in favor of civd’^ behavior, but clouding a military ⁰ cer’s mind with pettifogging rules ¹¹ f use up the seconds he has to make a a

sion,                                                       _nl.

Lieutenant Graf mentions the Nun- ^ berg trials, which have been held up the general public as the epitome ot J tice and have become sacrosanct and

f_e\V

of most of the charges, more than a ^

swipe at the USS Wahoo (SS-238)-      ^

he know that the Wahoo is on the bot of the ocean with all hands? Perhap^^y they had shot a few more survivors, would have gotten the one that got¹ To paraphrase a police saying: “B ^IS^ ^ ter to shoot first and take your chance ^ a court-martial than to get the deep

wrapped in a flag.”

(Continued on p°S^e

82)

Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 24)

1987;

In our navy, chiefs and petty link the officers and the ratings. The fore, they should be cultivated, accoi

“The End of the Submarine’s Era?”

(See G. G. O'Rourke, pp. 64-68, February 1988; W. J. Ruhe, p. 139, April 1988; J. F. McGowan, pp. 23-24, May 1988; R. T.

Ackley, M. McHugh, M. B. Wachendorf, M. J. Shewchuk, W. J. Holland, M. J. Hoernemann,

J. H. Patton, R. E. May, and S. J. Tangredi, pp. 68-72, July 1988 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Paul D. Hullinger, U. S. Navy, USS Helena (SSN-725)—The “ad­vanced” antisubmarine warfare technol­ogy Captain O’Rourke is searching for already exists. It is called a nuclear- powered submarine. To those of us who operate nuclear-powered submarines, the , ocean’s sound environment is compli­cated, but we are hardly “groping,” as Captain O’Rourke contends. There is a great deal more science than art involved in passive sonar employment. Highly skilled operators take care of the rest.

The attack submarine is the quintes­sential way to hunt enemy submarines and kill them. Furthermore, it is the only effective way to project ASW to remote bodies of water or to areas where we do not enjoy air/surface superiority.

The surface fleet has a very difficult tactical picture to solve. A surface ship is faced with threats from the surface, air, and subsurface. With proper use of weap­ons, it is clear that the surface ship can adequately withstand attacks from sur­face and air and still carry out her mis­sion. The same cannot be said for her ability to withstand a submerged attack. Despite Captain O’Rourke’s tedious pre­dictions that “galloping technological progress” will soon result in airborne sensors that merely “see” through sev-

Surface skippers would love to be able to take pictures like this of submarines. But they can’t.

eral thousand feet of water, the plain facts are that the submarine is both the best friend and worst enemy of a surface ship. The equation simply depends on whose side the submarine is fighting.

The number of four-star admirals wearing dolphins illustrates the impor­tance of the submarine to our defense. At present, these number six of a possible nine, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. This isn’t bad for a commu­nity that comprises roughly 10% of the officer corps. Still, when debates such as this flare up, submarine commanding of­ficers have an annoying tendency to pres­ent surface skippers with periscope pho­tographs of their ships. And in today’s world, I don’t need to see you to shoot you.

Would surface captains like to return the favor? You bet. The fact that they don’t should tell you something.

“From Cockpit to Bridge”

(See F. C. Seitz and T. F. Davis, pp. 52-56, January 1988; W. M. McBride, pp. 26-28,

April 1988; W. G. Carson, p. 18, May 1988 Proceedings)

Captain H. T. Rittenour, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS La Salle (AGF-3)—As an aviator who now serves on the bridge, I have followed with great interest the debate concerning who should command aircraft carriers. Al­though this discussion has surfaced peri­odically, it is now receiving increased attention as a result of the birth of the Super CAG (air group commander) posi­tion and initial approved funding for two additional nuclear-powered carriers. The debate has certain parochial aspects, each having its own merits. But regardless of which community provides the CO, a couple of facts bear mentioning.

First, the training pipeline for the pro­spective CO must be strengthened to give him the required skills and confidence to do the job right. Captains Seitz and Davis covered this area well.

Second, the organization within the carrier must be manned to support the commanding officer in the surface war­fare arena. On a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier all of the senior department heads

are either aviation officers or staff °1¹ cers who support aviation departments^ The exceptions are the chief engineer an reactor officer. Neither of these °ffi^c®^r have much time to become meaningful1 involved with surface warfare train¹¹¹® issues. Upward-moving surface warn ■ do not routinely fill the other surface fare billets on the carrier because there - a stigma associated with carrier dutf Junior surface warriors, therefore, d° ⁿ have many places to turn for counsel an advice in such a large, dynamic organ¹²² tion as a carrier.   .

What is needed is a meeting of avia¹¹⁰ and surface officers chartered to recon¹ mend ways to improve surface wart' development on board the carrier. A P°^ sible solution would be to have the na^vl

gator billet filled by a post-command su

face warrior. Surface warfare pr°g^ra ^ would benefit tremendously from experience that an officer of this call would bring to the job. The CO w°^u^ feel more secure knowing that a P^r0 ., expert was directing the movement ot ship. And junior surface warriors won have an ideal role model to whom ¹ could look for advice and direction, command will always benefit when proper mix of leaders is in place.

“Memo to Carrier COs”

(See R. F. Dunn, pp. 96-99, December 1 R. W. Bruce, p. 26, June 1988 Proceedings)

Captain R. P. Khanna, Indian Navy ( ^

tired)—Although the recornmendatm

in Admiral Dunn’s memo are dir^eC^j-₍ toward commanding officers of atrc carriers, most are equally applicable COs of all ships and shore estabh^ ments. Having commanded both m Indian Navy, I would like to share so _g thoughts with the readers and would ¹

to hear their views as well. ,_c

office

rde^d

due respect, and encouraged to ^reP°^r₍ the CO and the executive officer all f ^ is happening in the lower decks, P^artl larly any discontent. It is a good >d^ea^ call the most senior chief petty or P^e officer of each department to the C

Big performers... in small, lightweight packages ... that’ll go anywhere... for a lot less.

MAGNETOMETERS

"Stung by a Hornet" dramatically depicts a fictitious engagement of a Marine Corps F/A-18A Hornet and a Soviet MiG-29 "Fulcrum" over the Indian Ocean. Featuringthe squadron markings of VMFA-531, the "Grey Ghosts" of El Toro MCAS, this beautiful lithograph is extensively detailed, and has been faithfully reproduced on museum quality, 80 lb. Quintessence Dull Cover Stock. This certified Archival paper is acid and alum free, has a neutral pH and and is buffered against environmental contamination.

Add $5.00 for shipping and handling- (CA. residents add 6% sales tax).

DYNAMIC DESIGNS ILLUSTRATION STUDIO,

P.O. Box 4053, Dept. NP5, Big Bear Lake, CA 92315

cabin for a small, informal chat over ^a glass of beer or rum. As CO, 1 found t ^ls quite effective.

Another way we take care of the ere" members is through a committee know¹¹ as the Welfare Committee, chaired by ^t'^ie XO of each ship. As much as possib e- this committee sorts out all the crew problems. If the chairman cannot acce to a certain demand, he explains the reu sons or states that he will refer the math to the higher authority for a decision-

tn attf

: of

Sometimes the CO is invited to attend

sions and groundings where it has impossible to establish beyond any who

been

douM

had the conn of the ship. There 1°^ in the captain’s standing orders, it ⁿ¹

be stated explicitly that if, at any

A complete line of magnetome­ters for use in a wide range of operational environments... in the air... on land ... or under­water. Included are: single-axis, dual-axis, and three-axis models; strapdown three-axis hybridised models; digital head­ing sensors, magnetic under­water sensors; and special application units.

For more information write or call:

Humphrey, Inc. Dept. NIP 888 9212 Balboa Ave.

San Diego, CA 92123 U.S.A. Telephone (619) 565-6631 Ext.102 TWX: 910-335-2001

For Heading and Attitude:

•    RPV’s/Drones             • Towed Arrays

•    Air and Sea Missiles • Torpedoes

For Detection:

•    Magnetic Anomalies in Equipment

•    Magnetic Signature of Equipment

•    Underwater Ranges to Profile Ships

•    Data buoys • Sonobuoys

these meetings so he can feel the pul^se the ratings.

To boost morale and inculcate g^r°^uP with a sense of belonging, the CO sh°^u^ encourage interdepartmental or division competitions in such activities as sp°^rj^ keeping the cleanest mess, and having highest turnout at the Sunday Division But when the interdepartmental riva u goes beyond the game stage, the CO m curb it. Immediately on taking over co mand of the ship, the CO should brnv home to department heads the important- of this principle.

The CO must talk to the ship’s con pany regularly to keep everybody formed of the ship’s program and ⁰ items of interest, particularly those affect the officers and sailors direct y This gives them a sense of trust and kinging.   _y

The ship’s company must be kept o ^ at all times, especially at sea, with in esting exercises, indoor sports, quiz^zc- etc. _cq

Finally, on another matter, the always must make it clear who has conn. There have been a number of c°

us'

time’

the CO gives the conn or engine m°^v^ ment order, then the CO has the con This must remain until he tells the ofh ^ of the watch to take over the ship- ®^uc orders leave no ambiguity.

“A Few Good Sea Stories”

(See p. 75, June 1988 Proceedings)

Major David H. Graft, U. S.

Corps Reserve (Retired)—May I ^a       j.

more? Away AH Boats by Kenneth son (Boston: Little, Brown and Co¹^. pany, 1954) is a cracking good ^stofy amphibious warfare in the Pacific duP World War II by a naval officer ^vv^ wrote what he saw and experienced- describes events and people with hu and insight. I highly recommend it-

^vankee Sub, Go Home!

Commander John D. Harbron, Royal “nadian Navy Reserve (Retired), now a onadian defense and foreign affairs col­onist—The submarines that have been conducting secret missions under the ^fctic ice for more than 20 years are not ^iet but Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class J'Uclear-powered attack submarines ^(i>sNs) of the U. S. Navy.

This near-constant U. S. presence ^under Arctic waters has annoyed succes- ^^Ve Canadian governments. Since 1985, anada has issued unilateral statements lining sovereignty over many Arctic Waters regions.

^But both Washington and Ottawa a'aintain a permanent veil of secrecy ah°ut (j 5 Navy SSN voyages, includ- ^lng their transits under Canadian internal "'aters without first requesting Canada’s ^mission to do so. In Washington, the Public affairs officer for Vice Admiral cuce DeMars, Assistant Chief of Naval P^erations for Underseas Warfare, re- Pcats the longstanding U. S. Navy policy: h is a security matter that we never dis- ^c.^Uss the operations of U. S. subma- ^r‘^nes.” In Ottawa, Prime Minister Brian "■ulroney is just as explicit: “We do not ^lscuss them for obvious reasons.” General Paul Manson, Canada’s Chief /he Defense Staff and head of Cana- ^a s armed forces, is more open, admit- ^ln§ “I can’t tell you about any unauthor­ized presence of submarines in the Canadian Arctic for the simple reason that Canada has no means to detect such a presence.” Manson was referring to the fact that Canada does not yet have nu­clear subs of its own to keep track of both friendly and hostile nuclear subs on their many Arctic patrols.

Neither General Manson nor Vice Admiral DeMars’s spokesman will admit that the U. S. Navy refuses to inform Canada before a U. S. sub leaves for the Arctic. “For good military reasons, I cannot comment in detail on the move­ment of allied subs in Canadian waters,” says Manson. So far, the U. S. Depart­ment of Defense has publicized only two North Pole submarine surfacings, in 1986 and 1987—as exercises in showing the U. S. flag. Such displays gall the Cana­dian government because they give no credit to Canada’s huge geographic land and sea presence in the Arctic.

It makes operational sense, however, for U. S. SSNs to conduct their long under-ice Arctic sonar fact-gathering missions both in the narrow archipelagic sea passages between the high Arctic is­lands that are internal Canadian waters, and under the international straits.

Retired Canadian Rear Admiral Fred­erick Crickard, former deputy com­mander of Maritime Command in Hali­fax, Nova Scotia, points out that “under the 1982 International Law of the Sea Convention, subs on the surface with their national ensigns flying, have the right-of-passage through international straits.” But both the United States and the Soviet Union, as submarine super­powers, insisted that a special clause in the convention be added to permit subs to move submerged through such passages. But, speculates Crickard, because the United States has neither signed nor rati­fied that convention, “technically speak­ing, its subs can roam underwater any­where at will in the Arctic.”

Between 1970 and 1987, Sturgeon- class SSNs carried out more than 30 un­derwater Arctic voyages of 30-50 days duration. They operated from Pearl Har­bor in the Pacific and from the Atlantic coast submarine bases at Groton and Charleston. Some of these SSNs—all specially configured for under-ice sonar and inert navigational research—have visited the Arctic two and three times. These include the USS Gurnard (SSN-

Wrangel

Island

CHUKCHI

SEA

ALASKA

ROBESON

CHANNEL

NARES

STRAIT

PENNY

STRAIT

GREENLAND

IH¹ CL UR£

BAFFIN

BAY

V y

Parry ^Channel,

'ViscouRt Melvtll

^k PRINCE OF WALES STRATT

Amundsen'

Gulf

VICTORIAN i ISLAND Pf

barrGwJ^ P\T

STRAITS /sf \

ill Prince 1 Regent > / V /n/af

BELLOT 1 \ STRAIT

DISKO' ISLAND

DOLPHIN AND UNION STRAIT

VICTORIA

STRAIT

SIMPSON

STRAIT

JAMES

ROSS

STRAIT

FURY AND HECLA a STRAIT/

HUDSON STRAIT

CANADA

HUDSON

BAY

All newly commissioned officers and warrant officers in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are eligible.

For information and sign up, contact:

Membership Services U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis, MD 21402 301/268-6110 ^

NEWLY

COMMISSIONED?

Let us introduce you to membership in your professional organization with 3 FREE issues of Proceedings.

for

1988

agreement he signed on 11 January

current version.

tions.

Com­

U- ^s-

mand’s operational staff, says:

told

ary 1988, President Ronald Reagan the Canadian leader he will support ¹

_sub

icum-Jlugj- emu uau w. .mv.w-.                                     _

Canada chooses to buy the British o’

sudden^

overruled opposition from the sei

ni°^r

vice. These senior officers objected j

Canada’s becoming the third party

first

The basis of such U. S. Navy fe^ars

can

be found in the comments from Cana'

ntiy

retired Maritime Command comma

nde^f-

Shipbuilding, which is building nine

Canada’s twelve new antisubmarine

in

CLASSIC!

A tie says a lot about the person who wears it.

The U.S. Naval Institute new Classic Tie featuring the pen and sword emblem.

Beautifully tailored, silk blend. Only for USNI Members.

Only $16.00.

order, call 1800 233 USNI In MD, 301-224-3378 Or use the "Books of Interest” form in this issue of Proceedings.

Another New USNI insignia item...

Garment

Bag

Featuring an extra large storage pouch, this classic black garment bag is made of 100% nylon. The USNI crest is dis­played in gold. Made in the U.S.A.

To order, call toll free (800) 233-USNI

662) and the USS Pintado (SSN-672), which surfaced on 1 December 1984 at the North Pole as part of the 1985 Pacific submarine exercise staged from Pearl Harbor.

The USS Trepang (SSN-674), which has made at least three North Pole sur- facings, was boarded in May 1985 in the high Arctic by then-Chief of Naval Oper­ations Admiral James Watkins and Cap­tain F. N. Pastorious, U.S. Navy, com­mander of the Washington-based Naval Oceans Systems and its subsidiary Arctic Submarine Laboratories. Before surfac­ing, the Trepang submerged with these senior officers on board on an eight-hour exercise for “a state-of-the-art under-the- ice demonstration.”

In his letter of 3 May 1985 from lati­tude 90, U. S. Navy Commander J. D. Woolrich, then the commanding officer of the Trepang, confirmed the number of such voyages made by U. S. SSNs over the years: ‘‘One or more United States submarines nearly every year” has reached the North Pole since “the epic voyage” in 1958 of the USS Nautilus (SSN-571). In May 1987, the USS Billfish (SSN-676) and the USS Sea Devil (SSN-664), along with HMS Superb (one of Britain’s nuclear subs) made the first three-sub surfacing at the North Pole.

From eastern Arctic waters, Sturgeon- class subs transit to the North Pole via three routes, one of which can bring them into Canadian internal waters under the high Arctic’s Queen Elizabeth Island ar­chipelago. U. S. SSNs outbound from Pearl Harbor proceed across the Pacific, through the shallow and dangerous Chuk­chi Sea off Alaska, then under the perma­nent ice pack that covers both the Cana­dian and U. S. western Arctic Ocean regions. Atlantic-based U.S. subs com­ing north from Groton and Charleston can reach the North Pole either around Greenland or through the Davis and Nares Straits and then the narrow Robe­son Channel that separates Greenland from Canada’s Ellesmere Island.

In September 1985, less than two years before the June 1987 Canadian Defence White Paper announced Canada will ac­quire 10-12 SSNs of its own, Crickard called for “a submarine detection system on the Arctic ocean floor’ ’ and an Arctic military base at Frobisher Bay. Last 5 February, National Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced that Canada will build such a base at remote Nanisivik, a mining community at the eastern entrance to the ocean passage between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, near the northern end of Baffin Island, and about 60 kilometers from Lancaster Sound. Nanisivik should be operational as a new Arctic sover­eignty surveillance establishment Canadian army and navy units by 199 Canadian External Affairs Minister Joe Clark claims that the Arctic sovereignty in Ottawa with Secretary of State George Shultz “significantly advances Canadian [Arctic] interests” because he secure Shultz’s promise that “all navigation ) U. S. icebreakers in waters claimed 1 Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of Canada.” Nevert e less, that agreement applies only to sur face ships and specifically excludes U. • nuclear subs operating in Arctic watery Despite Canada’s current negotiation⁵’ to build 10-12 SSNs of its own, the se­cret Arctic presence of so many U- ' subs remains a Canadian sovereignty ^ lemma, in part because the Pentagon > preparing to build bigger ice-resista subs to replace the 20-year-old Stu geons. In mid-March, Vice Adnnm DeMars told congressional hearings t “a full Arctic-capable SSN-688 of 17 are under construction, will P¹'⁰'⁷¹^ more than twice the effectiveness ot

Nevertheless, there are signs that t U. S. Navy’s top brass is becoming ^se sitive to Canadian concerns about the quency of these U. S. Arctic SSN °P^era retired Canadian °a J commodore formerly on Maritime nuclear sub skippers going to the Am are under strict orders never to surta when operating in waters that Can , considers to be territorial or interna ■ During Prime Minister Mulroney official visit to Washington on 27 Fern necessary transfer of U. S. nuclear . technology and use of nuclear tu^e

By doing so, the President si ranks of the U. S. Navy’s submarine ^se shared U. S. nuclear technology available in 1958 to the Royal Navy- diart

Vice Admiral James Wood, the rece

He is now Vice President of St. do war­fare patrol frigates. During a speec 1987 to naval officer veterans. Woo ^ with his well-known whimsy ^ commented: “the nice thing with nuc ® subs is that you can do what Britain di ,, the Falklands . . . say they are there-

to

get involved.

P(

dru

b.

°^sse Comitatus Act, the Navy can chase ^lg runners. If it buys a few patrol

Environmental protection was in ’°gue in the 1960s and early 1970s. The

hot

'W'ar on Drugs” was the Coast Guard’s

number in the late 1970s and early

The Death of the Coast Guard”

(See C. Walter, pp. 29-33, June 1988 Proceedings)

So Long, Mr. Nice Guy”

R. Fraser, pp. 36-44, July 1988 Proceedings)

^eutenant Robert E. Korroch, U. S. °ast Guard—A fine line separates so- ‘citing support from the Navy and selling °^at- In his article. Commander Walter Willfully treads this line. As he points °^ut> it is time for the Navy to realize that ^he Coast Guard provides vital maritime Services in which the Navy does not want

¹ disagree, however, with Commander Walter’s statement that “the Navy holds tie key to the continued survival and vi- ^b|lity of its sister service.” The Coast ^JUard holds it own key. Rather than peeking recognition by emulating the ^avy, as Commander Fraser suggests, ^ne Coast Guard must stress its own indi- ^V|c|ual identity.

If the U. S. government amends the

'°ats, the Navy can keep the Persian Gulf Retire without Coast Guard assistance. ^u< nobody can save lives like the Coast ^uard. The Coast Guard is the world’s I’^remier seagoing search-and-rescue ser- ^V|Ce- The Coast Guard can do a lot of ^other things well, but the search-and-res- ^aUe mission is what makes the Coast ^^uard special.

In its attempts to draw attention to it- ?^eIf> the Coast Guard has suffered an '^entity crisis. Is the Coast Guard a mili­^ary force? Is it a police force? An envi- ^r°nrnental protection force? A scientific Search agency? The Coast Guard is all °f these things, but its primary mission “‘Ways should remain search and rescue ^at sea.

The Coast Guard’s other missions ^cJ^>tne and go, but search and rescue will ..Ways be its greatest service to the pub-

®80s. And during the Reagan years the °ast Guard has tried to enhance its mili­^ary readiness. Now, because 1988 is an Action year, the War on Drugs is the °ast Guard mission receiving the most Mention.

I suspect that with the upcoming I’ange in administrations, “old” mis- ^Sl°ns such as environmental protection ??ay be coming back to the forefront, hrough all this coming and going of ^ashionable mission areas, however, the

public demand for reliable and profes­sional search-and-rescue service has not changed.

Commander Fraser is wrong and Com­mander Walter is correct: the Coast Guard’s search-and-rescue mission is what makes the service special and worth keeping. To survive, the Coast Guard must never waiver in its dedication to this premier function.

“Flag and General Officers of

the Naval Services”

(See pp. 241-273, May 1988 Proceedings)

Editor’s Note: Because we were aware of many planned changes in the Coast Guard when the Naval Review Issue went to press, the Coast Guard flag list pre­sented reflected the Coast Guard’s plan for 1 July 1988.

We also made some mistakes. On page 260, Rear Admiral Albert Rieder is Com­mander Naval Base Philadelphia, not the Philippines. On page 261, the correct name under Rear Admiral (lower half) is Larry B. Franklin, not Richard K. Frank­lin. On the next page, Thomas E. Cour- neya is shown as a fiscal year 1989 se­lectee for rear admiral (intelligence), when he is, in fact, a fiscal year 1989 selectee for rear admiral (lower half) (cryptology). Finally, on page 264, Rear Admiral Aaron Landes, Civil Engineers Corps, is a lower half, not a selectee.

“Reopen the S-3 Line”

(See R. D. Nevitt, pp. 136-137, October 1987;

R. P. Krulis, p. 20, March 1988 Proceedings)

Lieutenant D. R. Coughlin, U. S. Navy— The S-3 Viking acquisition was clearly an interim fix to provide fixed-wing ASW aircraft to the carrier. Fewer than 200 S-3s were produced in the mid- 1970s, with no intention for continuation or significant product support. Today, the S-3 community seems reluctant to recog­nize how impractical it would be to re­sume production of this aircraft. The motivation to reopen the S-3 line seems to be based less on concern for the U. S. defense dollar than a need to be recog­nized as a member of a legitimate line of work—the community of air antisubma­rine squadrons (VS).

To this day, newcomers to the VS community are told that the Viking is the sole solution to the ASW needs of the next century. In 1984, however, Lock­heed engineers concluded that reopening the S-3 line would be cost prohibitive because its avionics are obsolete. Imag­ine asking Ford to remanufacture the Edsel; the technology has been buried.

author of Hunt for Red October, Red Storm Ris­ing and Patriot Games.

a powerful story, told with a breakneck pace. This book is so real, you can smell the smoke.”

Tom Clancy,

^rj tunning!

Name ___________________________

Address _________________________

City/State_________________________

Zip ___________________

_____ Team Yankee @ $17.95

Calif, residents add 6% sales tax______________

Shipping & Handling S2-50

TOTAL $_______________________________

□ Check/MO Enel. □ Visa □ MC □ Am. Exp.

Card #_________________________________

___________ Exp. Date___________________