Book Reviews, Professional Reading & Book List

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East Asia & Pacific

vs

Dollars

Billions

Soviet Military Power: The Pentagon’s Propaganda document, Annotated and Corrected

Gervasi. New York: Random House, ^l988. 159 pp. Illus. Maps. $14.95 ($13.45).

^viewed by Steven Llanso and Norman pbnar

During the life of the Reagan adminis- ^trstion, Soviet Military Power has Solved from an alarmist catalog of rapid Soviet military growth to a measured as­^Sessment of Soviet strengths and weak­nesses. In this year’s edition of the annual ^a new section (Part II) assesses the bal­ance between the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective allies in several major areas.

This latest edition is creditably Com­dex in its evaluation. The assessment ^argues against complacency, but does not °ften overstate Soviet military develop­ments. Also, much less “bean-counting” ^ls evident—there are far fewer quantita­te data than in the six previous editions, ^umerical comparisons between the United States and the Soviet Union, both ^cnrrent and historical, are much more general, reducing the value of the work to “‘any audiences. At the same time, the “’any charts are now computer-gener­ated; while more attractive, too fre- Tuently they are not easy to interpret.

Few new Soviet weapons are revealed, ‘he first weapon featured is the rail- tnobile SS-24 Mod 1 intercontinental bal- hstic missile, shown here in a dramatic list’s rendering and also illustrated in Previous editions. By comparison, the '987 edition opened with a dramatic fir- ‘ⁿg view of the new ZSU-30-2 (NATO designation Ml986) mobile air-defense Sun system. Indeed, in the 1988 edition.

three of the first four illustrations are views of people.

The new Soviet equipment that is illus­trated includes the long-expected Midas tanker, shown refueling a Bear-H bomber; a large Fulcrum fighter going off a ski-ramp, apparently in trials for the new Soviet aircraft carrier; and the Pill Box phased-array radar, part of the Mos­cow missile defense system. Artist’s con­cepts illustrate the first two; the Pill Box radar appears in a low-level aerial photo.

The most dramatic illustrations in the 1988 edition are several commercial SPOT satellite photos. These include the fleet base at Vladivostok in the Far East

In previous years an alarmist catalog given to “bean-counting,” the 1988 edition of Soviet Military Power is a more judicious summary of the Pen­tagon’s assessment of Soviet military intentions and capabilities. Top, art­ist’s concept of the Fulcrum.

and the carrier-building yard at Nikolayev on the Black Sea.

The traditional stark, alternating red and white covers of Soviet Military Power are gone, replaced by a photo­graph of General Secretary Mikhail Gor­bachev greeting the crew of a Typhoon- class ballistic-missile submarine. Set against the cover’s grey backdrop, the picture resembles a surrealistic “still” from a science fiction movie.

This year’s more scholarly approach also addresses recent Soviet changes in domestic and international strategy. The impact of these Gorbachev initiatives on the Soviet military establishment is un­clear, according to Soviet Military Power. The primacy of Soviet military requirements in the economy would seem unchallengeable, and the current political and organizational thrusts indicate that “the Soviets may be searching for ways to limit, or at least delay, the develop-

he

commander in the Naval Reserves,

as

characters to examine such issues

ment and deployment of new weapon systems” because of their vast invest­ment in contemporary weapons. And Soviet military experts

. appear to be increasingly con­cerned . . . about their mid- to long­term prospects (five to 10 years and beyond). . . . This concern is rein­forced by a growing doubt that the overall performance of the Soviet economy will support a full range of options to resolve mid- and long-term military requirements.”

There are many noticeable changes this year in the annual’s style and format. Artist’s impressions (previously a source of much debate) are fewer in number and less dramatic. Style and graphics are important in a document that has the pur­pose of reminding citizens, friends, al­lies, and enemies why the United States annually spends more than $300 billion for defense. The change to a more sub­dued style in the 1988 edition is signifi­cant not only because it continues a trend » toward moderation, but also because it accurately reflects the publication’s con­tent.

Unfortunately, some of the changes are poorly executed. For example, subject and illustration indexes have been added. The first entry we checked was the Fencer aircraft, which recently entered naval service. The index gave two page references—but the Fencer was not men­tioned on one; four pages of text where the Fencer was mentioned were not in­dexed.

There will be more severe critics of So­viet Military Power. One will undoubt­edly be Tom Gervasi, who prepared a remarkable critique of the 1987 edition. Gervasi has written previously, in articles and books, that the Pentagon has exag­gerated the Soviet military threat to the West. In this unusual document Gervasi faithfully reproduces the Department of Defense report with detailed annotations, literally attacking almost every page, par­agraph, and table of the 1987 edition of Soviet Military Power.

It is difficult to know where to start (or finish) with Gervasi’s work. But since the back cover of his document shows page 98 (of the 1987 edition), which discusses Soviet and U. S. military transport air­craft, that seems a reasonable example. Gervasi cites nine errors, of which eight are “wrong” numbers in aircraft num­bers and dimensions. But he does not cite specific sources for his data, and they tend to disagree with the best published information (as does Soviet Military Power in some places). For example, Gervasi gives the Soviet Cock and Can­did cargo aircraft significantly less capa­bility than does the distinguished John W. R. Taylor in Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft (1986-1987 edition). For U. S. aircraft (C-5B, C-141B, C-130H), Ger­vasi provides more capabilities than ei­ther Soviet Military Power or Jane’s.

In his one substantive comment on page 98, Gervasi tells how U. S. military cargo aircraft have a higher airlift capac­ity than those of the Soviet Union. But the data in the government document do not disagree with Gervasi’s comment. Rather, the U. S. document shows the significant increase in relative Soviet air­craft capabilities—from approximately

18.0           metric tons in 1977 to slightly more than 20,000 tons in 1987 and (with the new Condor aircraft) to more than

25.0           tons by 1992. Indeed, Gervasi’s dramatic statement that the Condor was not yet in service (in 1987) was supported by the material in Soviet Military Power\

Past editions of Soviet Military Power as well as the current one have many weak points. But few of Gervasi’s criti­cisms have any real significance.

Some passages in the Pentagon’s re­port are hard to take. The extensive dis­cussion of the Soviets’ reconditioning of worked-out mines to serve as relocation centers in a nuclear conflict has faint overtones of the “mineshaft gap” in Doctor Strangelove. On another page we find the assertion that restricted flight hours for Soviet fighters and bombers “. . . ensure that a combat-ready fleet of relatively new or recently overhauled air­craft is available.” From the perspective of the U. S. defense establishment, which is fighting hard to fund flight time and at-sea operations, this is a remarkable conclusion.

Overall, however, the restructured So­viet Military Power offers a cogent and comprehensive summary of the Penta­gon’s view of Soviet military capabilities and intentions. The judicious tone of this seventh edition is welcome. Some (or even many) of the conclusions that the authors draw may be debatable; but they have cast the discussion of Soviet mili­tary power in terms that can be debated, and that is a pleasant change.

Although not as useful in several re­spects as the previous editions, Soviet Military Power remains an important annual for those interested in contempo­rary military affairs.

Mr. Llanso is assistant editor of the USNI Military Database. Mr. Polmar is a Proceedings columnist and the author of the Naval Institute reference books Guide to the Soviet Navy and The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet. He is also the director of the USNI Military Database.

The Med

David Poyer. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 1988. 512 pp. $19.95 (17.95).

Reviewed by Captain C. P. Neimeyer,

U. S. Marine Corps

If you have ever served in the U. S- Navy’s Sixth Fleet, pulled liberty in M^a" pies, been crammed on board an ‘ ³¹¹¹ phib,” or simply been counted among ® women who anxiously await the return o their men from a deployment, then this novel is for you.

David Poyer’s scenario is frightening Y familiar. (As a 1971 Naval Academy graduate who still serves as a lieutenan knows enough about the Navy and the international arena in which it operates to get the details just right.) Taking advan tage of the unstable political situation *ⁿ Cyprus, Palestinian terrorists suddenY seize 100 American and British hostages- including the wife and daughter of one ⁰ the central characters.

On superficial reading it may apP^eai that The Med is just another hostag^e novel ending with the inevitable rescue- But this is much more than a mechanic³ story about good versus evil. It focuses on major contemporary problems of [ peacetime military. Poyer uses his maj

ambition, racism, dedication to duty. ^an most important, careerism in the high^e echelons of the Navy.                                               .

Dan Lenson is the competent jun* officer, haunted by a mistake in his p^a that potentially taints his future with t Navy. His wife and daughter are am°ⁿ& the hostages. Susan Lenson is the disn* sioned Navy wife who gave up her care as an archaeologist to follow her husba from port to port. The Lensons’ simm^er ing marital problems emerge when Sus and her daughter are taken hostage.

Isaac Sundstrom is the careerist com mander of Task Force 61. He is not abo^v^ covering up a grounding report to ⁿ superiors, berating his subordinates o trivial matters such as coffee cups on t bridge, or waffling over decisions m ultimately cost men their lives, y “Oreo” Givens is a young black Marm^e' trying to fit in with his unit, tom betv/ec ^ race and dedication to the Corps. Cl"^e Kelly Wronowicz is the hardbitten ^afl absolutely indispensable old-salt ^eI’ gineman who knows his duties inside o • And finally there is the chief terroris - Hanna Abu Harisah, “the Majd,” ^rU* lessly efficient and willing to die for " cause.

Poyer has created an authentic cast

aracters, people we have all worked I or known. The stress deployments j^{J ace} °n the Lensons will be especially ^niar to Proceedings readers. _u tempo of the novel rapidly picks P after Task Force 61 precipitously de­_s °^^s during another of the political cri- p^5s characteristic of the Mediterranean. °yer subtly points out the impact of the ¹ itary habit of hiding things that might us look bad. The careerist who ^0rnes about appearances rather than ^Porting actual readiness is almost cul­Pable of dereliction of duty. The novel’s areerist, Sundstrom, has no redeeming j. ^anties. During the crisis he is indeci- _e'^Ve’ overbearing, duplicitous, and in the ⁿ • unconcerned about his men. He con-

tofessiQnally and conventionally trained p 'cers? These are among the questions jeer's story asks. Its moral is simple: ^rave decisions can only be made by ^brave men.

^ antly calculates what his decisions will

⁰          |°, or for, his career. When forced to ^c'de whether to use naval gunfire in PPort of the assaulting Marines, he hes-

_Q^ates and bucks the decision up the chain ^c°mmand. Poyer reminds us that tak- _d ^{g Care} of your men has to take prece- ^ace over taking care of yourself.

he Majd, on the other hand, despite ^e despicable nature of his duties, is in °sitive command of his men and his Jfion. He makes decisions resolutely quickly. He has no career to worry p °ut since he has already decided to die. erhaps Poyer is suggesting that we th°Uld figuratively make the commitment ^at the Majd has made literally. One day _to ^to° may have to sacrifice our careers save lives or accomplish a mission. ,, ^p°yer’s story loses credibility when san Lenson—after being taken hos- ^a8o, having her best friend threatened

¹               h death and her child nearly molested— r_ef ^S '^nt0 ^d with the Majd. A passing

®^rence to the “Stockholm syndrome” _b^nd Susan’s past problems with her hus- ^and fail to convince us that she would do tu ^a thing, even if she felt it might save 'heir lives.

in the Final analysis, Poyer gives the ^ader a tightly written account of men at _Cf^ar ’ⁿ the 1980s. Future low-intensity Conflicts will be “come-as-you-are” af- _r ^lrs- Can our bureaucracy handle the p,P'd pace of events in these situations? _b °uld it be that terrorist commanders are ^etter suited for such affairs than our own

p ^aPtain Neimeyer is serving as an instructor in the ^ory department of the U. S. Naval Academy.

The Korean War

Max Hastings. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987. 334 pp. Photos. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $22.45.

Reviewed by Shelby L. Stanton

The Korean War was fought by sol­diers, sailors, and airmen under some of the most brutal combat conditions en­countered in military history, yet the U. S. public ignored their sacrifice and suffering for decades. Perhaps the great­est insult was President Harry Truman’s politically imposed description of the conflict as a “police action,” a statement bitterly resented by anyone who served on Korea’s jagged mountain ridges or freezing, typhoon-tossed waters. For years, however, this public misconcep­tion has lingered, broken only by a few sincere efforts to recount the war’s actual circumstances—most notably T. R. Feh- renbach’s This Kind of War. Classifica­tion restrictions and apparent official dis­interest in their work stifled the military histories by expert scholars such as Roy Appleman. Within the past three years, a number of excellent histories have sud­denly appeared, proving it is never too late to correct historic injustices.

Max Hastings, a well-known military authority on modem warfare, has added his own history of the Korean War to this literature. This book is more than the usual military narrative, although it also serves as an overview of actual battles. Hastings interweaves his accounts of the war and its origins, then summarizes the conflict’s effects on current events in an insightful chapter appropriately titled “Hindsight.” The book has a chronology and one appendix, which gives a well- researched summation of all United Na­tions offers of military assistance for Korea. A detailed chart displays the great differences between the U.N. forces of-

fered and those Korea accepted or fielded. The appendix is conveniently divided into categories, including one for naval forces. It presents hard-to-find in­formation on the naval participation of such nations as Colombia and Thailand.

A distinguished British analyst, Hast­ings also offers healthy criticism of American methods of waging the war, drawn from the viewpoint of other U.N. participants. This perspective is espe­cially important in today’s coordinated military arena, where understanding al­lied concerns is vital to any multinational

The U. S. military often dealt high­handedly with its U.N. allies in Korea (here, Royal Australian infan­trymen)—an example the Navy should eschew in the Persian Gulf today.

effort. This description of the arrival of the British 27th Brigade on the Korean front is typical of Hastings’s treatment: The brigade was “met by an American officer with the cheerful greeting, ‘Glad you British have arrived—you’re the real experts at retreating.’ When Coad [the British brigadier] and his staff were taken on an introductory tour of the line by an American general, the British were dis­concerted to find that their movements were stage-managed for the benefit of the accompanying photographers. They were staggered by the lack of military security, above all by the freedom with which men could telephone on civilian circuits from the perimeter to girlfriends in Japan.” Hastings s harsh criticism of American arrogance offers a lesson applicable to our ongoing operations in the Persian Gulf, where Navy commanders must continue to emphasize mutual respect in their communications with the other peacekeeping nations.

Hastings has gone out of his way to credit the United States for its determined

Is a commander’s willingness to expose himself to personal risk the chief test of heroic leadership?

yal

the

field with the head of state. For the na commander escorting oil tankers in Persian Gulf, tracking Soviet submartn in the Mediterranean, or defending a ^c rier battle group against the air thi® ’ there is little in this book that applies rectly to our profession. For Keeg ' command “is ultimately quite strata forward; its exercise turns on the ^rec0“_uSl tion that those who are asked to die m ,, not be left to feel that they die alone- From the standpoint of the sea servicej this view of command is simplistic an narrowly focused. In my view, the her ideal and its imperatives are alive an well at sea, even in this nuclear age-

stance against communism: “Only America’s absolute dominance of the Korean campaign enabled it to be fought to a tolerable conclusion.” He brings his considerable knowledge of military oper­ations to these pages, without flooding them in a morass of detail or overempha­sizing certain controversies. While this book does not possess the technical com­prehension found in his previous works, such as The Battle for the Falklands (with Simon Jenkins, Norton, 1983), this is not a tactical treatise. It is a survey of an en­tire war, and Max Hastings does not hesi­tate to make some controversial state­ments that fly in the face of accepted logic, such as: “The navy and air force are likely to advocate more hawkish courses than the army.” This book stim­ulates thought and serves as a valuable overview of the Korean War and its rami­fications on current strategy.

Mr. Stanton is currently writing the official order of battle on the Korean War for the U. S. Army Center , of Military History. He is an attorney, a senior editor of Vietnam magazine, and the author of six books, including U. S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War (Stackpole, 1988) and The Rise and Fall of an Ameri­can Army (Presidio, 1985). He served as a Green Beret Army officer during the Vietnam War.

The Mask of Command

John Keegan. New York: Viking, 1987.

368 pp. Photos. Maps. Bib. Index. $18.95 ($17.05).

Reviewed by Commander John P. Morse, U. S. Navy

In his classic book The Face of Battle author John Keegan carefully explains that he is not a soldier but a historian, and that his study of battles and fighting men is academic rather than experiential. No such caveat appears in The Mask of Com­mand. Though Keegan has established himself as a first-rate military historian whose latest book is a fascinating mixture of history, biography, and psychology, I found it overreaching. The major premise is deductive: that the study of battles can tell us something about the leadership of the commanders involved and how they reflect the sentiment of the times. The book is “not about the evolution of war­fare but about the technique and ethos of leadership and command.”

An ambitious survey of battlefield leadership during the last 2,400 years, Keegan’s book reduces all the changes in warfighting tactics, technology, and command and control—and in civiliza­tion itself—to four archetypes of leader­ship: heroic, anti-heroic, unheroic, and false heroic. A leader’s greater or lesser

willingness to expose himself to risk is the defining criterion for each of these categories.

Alexander the Great is Keegan’s model of heroic leadership. His style is “ag­gressive, invasive, exemplary, risk­taking.” Keegan claims that Alexander’s “total exposure to risk was his secret of total victory,” yet also gives him high marks as a tactician of brute force.

Skipping nearly the entire 2,000 years after Alexander reigned and fought, Kee­gan introduces Wellington as the first of the modern “anti-heroes,” a leader whose style was “reflective and manage­rial,” and who chose to lead from the safety of a comfortable chateau in the rear. At Waterloo, Wellington was a fre­quent if cautious visitor to the front and not at all reluctant to “take trouble,” to observe the action himself rather than re­lying on the reports of his subordinates.

The archetype of the style Keegan la­bels “unheroic” is General Ulysses S. Grant, a populist leader whose strength of command rested on a belief in drill, disci­pline, and the rallying cause. Like Wel­lington, Grant represents a further depar­ture from the heroic, for he felt no need to share the risks of the individual soldier, commanding not by example but by brief telegraph dispatches.

Hitler’s is the final portrait in Keegan’s study and the model for the “false he­roic” style of command. As a trench messenger in World War I, Adolf Hitler was regarded as a soldier with “uncom­mon conscientiousness as well as per­sonal courage.” Leading the Third Reich from command posts sometimes hun­dreds of miles from the front, he used skillful propaganda to establish and maintain his ties to the common soldier

and his risks. In Hitler we see the distC tion of the heroic ideal to a “crazed an ultimately criminal generalship."

Keegan concludes by citing what takes to be the traditional imperatives ⁰ heroic command—kinship, prescription sanction, action, and example—and e*^ plores their validity in the nuclear age- , conservative, cerebral “post-heroi style of leadership is required today, believes, because of the curious revers of risk: the man entrusted with the a^u thority to release nuclear weapons fa little or no personal risk. According to ^ author, the traditional imperatives command are now dangerous, and heroic ideal is dead.

Much of the book rests on the qaes tionable premise that risk equals lead ship. It lacks the chronological cohesri ness of The Face of Battle, and Keegn¹ writes from a confusing perspective t often equates the general on the bat

Commander Morse is the commanding officer of ^ USS Nicholson (DD-982).

Books of Interest

By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy

Atteck Helicopters: A History of Rotary- ^ln8 Combat Aircraft

Howard A. Wheeler. Baltimore, MD: Nautical and _R‘^at'^on Publishing, 1987. 117 pp. Photos. Notes. ^lb- >nd. $22.95 ($20.65).

J^{his c}°ncise book traces the evolution of the •copter as a combat aircraft, focusing on its _w^es 'ⁿ the Malayan Emergency, the Korean ] ^ar; ‘he French-Algerian War, Vietnam, the /^aaian hostage rescue attempt, and the Falk­^s Conflict. Howard A. Wheeler, a retired ^avy commander, helicopter pilot, and former ,o^anagi-g editor of Naval Aviation News, also *^{s to} the future of helicopters in warfare _(a observes that "it is unlikely that any mili- ^ry operation would be carried out today with­out them.”

^ The Big E: The Story of the USS Enterprise

^"nmander Edward P. Stafford, USN (Ret.). Unapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

"otos. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $21.95 ^,J17.56)

j^otnmander Edward Stafford’s book about the °^st famous ship of World War 11 was first Published in 1962 and has been fittingly resur- ^^cted in the Naval Institute’s Classics of ^avalLiterature series. It is a well-written his­. ^ry. created from official records, personal uterviews, and private diaries, that traces the .on but incredibly successful career of the at \ Enterprise (CV-6). She played key roles Midway, Guadalcanal, and the Marianas I . ^Ufkey Shoot”; she fought at Truk, Kwaja- Leyte Gulf, Okinawa, and in many I ucr crucial battles; she is credited with sink­S 71 ships, damaging nearly 200 others, and owning 911 enemy planes. In his introduc- l!?ⁿ, Paul Stillwell (the Naval Institute’s oral ^•storian and editor of Naval History maga- 'uc) laments the scrapping of the Enterprise hen she might have been preserved as a na- _w°^nal shrine. But “be that as it may,” he ntes, “the ship and the thousands of men ^ ho lived, served, and fought in and above her ^ave a lasting memorial to their deeds; that ^memorial is a book titled The Big £.”

^ Code to Keep

D3»^eSt ^ ®^race- New York: St. Martin’s Press,

⁸⁸- 264 pp. Photos. Illus. $16.95 ($15.25).

|^^edal of Honor-winning prisoner of war Vice dmiral James Stockdale writes, “Thank God Hie Brace’s heroic story is finally in print.” Code to Keep is an extraordinary memoir of ^a decorated pilot in the Korean War who was

subsequently dishonorably discharged from the Marine Corps for deserting the scene of an aircraft accident. Then, vowing to regain his honor, during the Vietnam War he flew secret supply missions into Laos for the CIA. The North Vietnamese captured him in 1965. He remained a prisoner of war until 1973, earning the deep respect of his fellow prisoners. Presi­dent Gerald Ford granted Brace a full pardon and awarded him the Distinguished Service Medal upon his release. General Alexander Haig describes this book as “an inspiring per­sonal account of adherence to the Code of Conduct that should be read by those in and out of uniform.”

Combat Aircraft of World War II: Poster Book Series

Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi. New York: Orion Books, 1988. Approx. 65 pp. per volume. Photos. Illus. Charts. $17.95 ($16.15) each volume.

Organized chronologically, the eight volumes in this series provide color illustrations and black and white photographs of the combat air­craft of World War II. These coffee table books also contain the vital statistics and a brief history of each aircraft.

Douglas A-3 Skywarrior

Rene Francillon with Edward H. Heinemann. Arlington, TX: Aerofax. 1987. 136 pp. Photos. Ulus. Tables. Append. Bib. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95) paper.

Known affectionately as the “Whale,” the A-3 Skywarrior has been in continuous service for 30 years. Loaded with photographs and il­lustrations, this book commemorates that ser­vice from the world's heaviest carrier aircraft and pays tribute to its designer, Edward Heine­mann.

The Dragon’s Teeth: Inside China’s Armed Forces

John Robert Young. New York: Orion Books,

1987. 224 pp. Photos. Illus. Maps. Tables. Ind. $29.95 ($26.95).

John Robert Young was the first Western pho- tojoumalist permitted to study China’s armed forces for the purpose of producing a book. The result is an in-depth look at the People’s Liberation Army as well as the Chinese Navy and Air Force through archival research and striking color photography. This close-up por­trait will interest military analysts and those seeking a better understanding of what goes on

behind the increasingly diaphanous “bamboo curtain.”

Forged by Fire: General Robert L. Eichelberger and the Pacific War

John Francis Shortal. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987. 154 pp. Photos.

Maps. Gloss. Notes. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

U. S. Army Lieutenant General Robert Eichel­berger was General Douglas MacArthur’s most trusted combat general in the Southwest­ern Pacific. He was an innovative tactician and a strong leader. Relying upon Eichelberger's personal papers as source material, in Forged by Fire John F. Shortal carefully studies the man and his methods during the battles of Buna, Biak. and Manila, and provides useful historical insight into the relationship between MacArthur and his generals during this impor­tant period in World War II.

The Geopolitics of Super Power

Colin S. Gray. Lexington. KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1988. 274 pp. Maps. Notes Ind $26.00 ($23.40).

Colin S. Gray sees the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States as "grounded in history” and believes that "the essential strategic relationship of antagonism . . . constitutes a realm of necessity for U. S. policymakers.” He advocates an active U. S. containment policy rather than disengagement from the struggle or a “rollback of the Soviet empire. He also calls for the deemphasis of nuclear weapons and for better use of the West’s political, economic, and technological strengths. Readers of Proceedings will recog­nize Mr. Gray as a frequent contributor to the magazine.

M. V. Frunze, Military Theorist

Col. Gen. Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev.

Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1988 40"> pn Notes. $44.00 ($39.60).

Many analysts have written about M. V. Frunze, student and associate of Lenin and famous leader of the Red Army who is best known for his contributions as a military theo­rist. But this book is unusual in that the author is a serving deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces and is offering, in his own words, “an analysis of [Frunze] from modem positions.” In his introductory note, national security affairs consultant Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., describes this work as “espe­cially noteworthy . . . because of the insights it provides on current Soviet thinking” and

Book Order Service

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points out that it “is viewed by many defense analysts as one of the more important books written by a Soviet military leader.”

Selling the Rope to Hang Capitalism? The Debate on East-West Trade & Technology Transfer

Charles M. Perry and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Jr., editors. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1987.

246 pp. Gloss. Notes. Ind. $30.00 ($27.00).

In this timely and thought-provoking book, scholars, policymakers, and industry officials debate the merits and dangers of the flow of technology, both legally and clandestinely, from West to East. The contributors weigh the effects of technology trade upon Soviet and Sino relations against the impact upon national security and also examine the roles of espio­nage and theft.

The Wolf of the Kremlin: The First Biography of L. M. Kaganovich, the Soviet Union’s Architect of Fear

Stuart Kahan. New York: William Morrow, 1987. 331 pp. Photos. Bib. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).

Lazar M. Kaganovich is a name unknown to most Americans. Yet he is reputed to be re­sponsible for the death of 20 million people, for amalgamating the state security forces we know today as the KGB, and for instituting more restrictions and quotas on the Jews than anyone else (despite the fact that he was Jew­ish himself). Stuart Kahan is an American journalist and editor and a nephew of the still­living Kaganovich, whom Kahan interviewed in Moscow to obtain much of the material in this book. This is an enlightening account of Kaganovich’s life as well as a revealing and detailed look at the Soviet Union under Stalin.

Game

Gulf Strike: 2nd Edition

Mark Herman. New York: Victory Games, 1988. Four mapsheets, 1,040 counters, six scenarios. $24.00.

This expanded and updated version of an ear­lier simulation of war in the volatile Persian Gulf now includes Silkworm missiles, Kurdish mountain troops, Iranian speedboats and mines, and U. S. night-capable helicopters. The various scenarios incorporate land, air, and sea warfare. Playing time may vary be­tween two and 45 hours depending upon play­ers’ stamina.

Other Titles of Interest

Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry

Gregory Belenky, editor. Westport, CT- Greenwood Press, 1987. 271 pp. Tables- Notes. Bib. Ind. $39.95 ($35.95).

Military Space-A Air Opportunities Around the World

William Roy and Lela Ann Crawford. Falls Church, VA: Military Living Publication' 1988. 378 pp. Charts. Append. $15.45 pap^er-

The Night Tokyo Burned: The IncendiaO Campaign Against Japan, March-Augus,

1945

Hoito Edoin. New York: St. Martin’s Pre^ss’ 1987. 248 pp. Ind. $16.95 ($15.25).

Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation of Postwar Japan

Meirion and Susie Harries. New York: millan, 1987. 364 pp. Photos. Notes. $23.95 ($21.55).

The Splicing Handbook: Techniques f°^r Modern and Traditional Ropes

Barbara Merry with John Darwin. Camden ME: International Marine, 1987. 100 pp- l^^uS' Gloss. $9.95 ($8.95) paper.

Total War: What It Is, How It Got That

Way

Thomas Powers and Ruthven Tremain. N«^IV York: William Morrow, 1988. 188 pp. Notes- Bib. Ind. $16.95 ($15.25).

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