This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
“Every revolution was first an idea in one man’s mind,” said Emerson. Thus far, the
Revolution at Sea has survived the retirement of its outspoken progenitor, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf. Whether it steams ahead on the course of radical reform or drifts into evolution, only time will tell.
"aximize ordnance on target!” So goes the rallying cry of the surface warfare com- .munity’s crusade to ensure that the U. S. Navy’s next generation of warships will be able to execute the combat operations necessary to support the nation’s maritime and national military strategies. From spring 1986 until his retirement from the Navy in November 1987, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare (OP-03), steered a series of far-reaching studies intended to analyze the way the Navy designs, builds, acquires, mans, and fights its surface combatants.
Completed in spring 1988, the results of these initial studies will
now guide the Navy as it procures a family of surface combatants for the 21st century.
Dubbed the ‘‘Revolution at Sea,” this multifaceted ef' fort amounts to a critical self-examination by the surface warfare community. Mindful of Pogo’s statement that ‘‘we have met the enemy and he is us,” Admiral Metcalf insisted that the unrestricted line—the surface warriof^f themselves—bear much of the responsibility for the numerous challenges confronting surface warfare, and they therefore must assume^ the initiative in ensuring that these difficulties will not frustrate future developments and programs.
Since taking
over as the chief of suf' face warfare (a job tha* ^ now carries the title of AssistanI
„ Chief of Naval Operations for Surface WaJ' _ fare) in November 1987, Vice Admiral John yquist has committed himself to keeping the hoped-f°f revolution alive. Carrying forward another man’s crusade is a difficult task in the best of times. Admiral Nyquists labors, focused as they are on reaching and institutional1' zing the revolution’s goals and the process that achieveS them, are made much more difficult by the fight for in' creasingly scarce defense resources.
a
■If': /
JBH
Ji
* *; '■> ’JS v wn^m
t ^ v i^MHB
,,■ ; .. -, 53fefe m J
r Zs ^, • * *
©p
pv1
tionary Weapons, Chubby Frigates?
j > Revolution-at-Sea studies officially got under way Pl late summer 1986, when the Director, Navy Program ^anning, approved a request from Admiral Metcalf and ft)6 ^lrector> Naval Warfare, to conduct a study on the tarce'level requirements for surface combatants.1 Cer- prmly> Admiral Metcalf’s personal experiences figured ^0lhinently in his conviction that a break with the past <.a* long overdue. In spring 1986 he had cancelled the gg ubby frigate,” the flawed result of the Navy’s next- oration frigate (FFX) design process. Speaking at a ttiposium of the American Society of Naval Engineers in Pnl 1986, Metcalf commented that the FFX concepts ered no real war-fighting improvements over the frigs they would have replaced. Moreover, in his view, the shi^ression since the end of World War II of U. S. war- 'fesign compared to that of combat system capabilities van °Cen gTOS5]y uneven- He c'ted “revolutionary” ad- Ces in war-fighting brought about by the Aegis weapon
system, the Tomahawk cruise iiissile, the vertical launch system ""(yLS), and the LAMPS-III/SQQ-89 rantisubmarine combat system. But ironi- rcally, according to Admiral Metcalf, “. . . in rmany ways we are building and equipping our rships ... as we have been for years and years.”2 le goal of the Revolution at Sea, therefore, was to rextend the post-World War II revolution in combat systems to the hulls, machinery, and electrical systems (HM&E) of all future surface warships, making them truly integrated weapon systems from the keel up.
Revolutionary Structure, Process, and Objectives
The initial Revolution-at-Sea studies launched in fall 1986 were conducted by a small cadre of naval officers from all warfare communities—not just surface warfare— and civilians from government and industry. Three separate studies eventually took shape: “Group Mike”—the Surface Combatants of the 21st Century Study; the Surface Combatant Force Requirements Study (SCFRS); and the Ship Operational Characteristics Study (SOCS).3
From the outset, Admiral Metcalf and his fellow revolutionaries knew they would encounter antagonism and resistance from various sectors of the Navy establishment that perceived the Revolution at Sea either as separate from the mainstream of Navy planning and programming (and therefore no more than a transitory phenomenon to be endured or ignored until its champion left the scene), or worse, as a threat to conventional ways of doing business.
Group Mike was conceived to short-circuit the potential for such trouble. Its role was to link the other two groups— SOCS and SCFRS—and the principal actors in other parts of the Navy, especially the Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSea). Nerves were still raw in late summer 1986 over the acrimony that the FFX debacle produced. Only the most open, complete, and “jam-resistant” communications among all key participants would ensure success.
SOCS, moreover, took on the arduous task of mobilizing the unrestricted line, and made the linkage to the fleet explicit in all SOCS initiatives.
If anything useful were to come from the Revolution at
Group Mike
Navy Secretary CNO
T
Ship Operational Characteristics Study
Study
Review Group ★ ★
and the Naval Surface Warfare Center at White
:d
for
promise for achieving the goal of total weapon systems
Originally called the “Surface Combatant Force Lfyl
* iri
Study” until former Secretary of the Navy John F.
proved in 1981 and developing requirements for sui
rfac*
the era of the 15-carrier battle group/600-ship Navy.
-y]C>
tin?'
Sea, everybody would have to be on board as early as possible. Hence the decision to put the Revolution-at-Sea studies firmly within the existing Navy hierarchy and to have them “commissioned” by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).4
This was meant to obviate another potential difficulty: the close identification of the Revolution at Sea with Admiral Metcalf himself. Had the revolution been perceived as no more than “Joe Metcalfs Future Warship Study,” the risk of losing the significant momentum achieved during his watch would have been great, much to the detriment of future surface warfare developments.
As it was, in the months following his retirement, several observers began referring to Admiral Metcalf as “the Ghost of Revolutions Past,” indicating how closely the movement was aligned with the man. The witticism also pointed to an emerging belief that the “revolution” had settled into a much more comfortable “evolution.”
The organizational hierarchy of the Revolution at Sea links the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO with the OP-03, who serves as the chairman of Group Mike. SOCS and SCFRS provided input to the Group Mike working group. As shown in Figure 1, Group Mike also is tied directly, via a review group at the two-star level, to specific organizations within the Navy’s systems commands and the Navy laboratories. Group Mike’s members consist of the Navy’s principal three-star “players” in surface warship design and requirements issues: OP-03; the Commander, NavSea, vice chairman; the Director, Naval Warfare; the Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command; the Director, Research Development, Requirements, Test, and Evaluation; a member designated by the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Shipbuilding and Logistics; and a fleet representative.
The major objective of Group Mike is to arrange unfettered communication among all participants in the development of the next generation of the Navy’s surface combatants. Group Mike specifically provides high-level support and guidance to the two-star review group and the Group Mike working group through periodic briefings. Group Mike briefings also keep the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO apprised of the revolution’s progress and findings, and permit easy communication of guidance from the Secretary and the CNO to the participants.
Perhaps most important, having a three-star panel and a two-star review group composed of individuals from throughout the Navy’s hierarchy has helped to ensure consistency and compatibility with overall Navy objectives. Had it been otherwise—had Group Mike and the Revolution-at-Sea effort operated in an institutional vacuum—it would have been extremely unlikely that the revolution could have achieved any worthwhile results that the Navy could incorporate.
The Revolution at Sea had a tight timetable. As shown in Figure 2, the plan required SCFRS and SOCS to complete their inputs by spring 1988, after which the design process began. Early efforts at designing the Revolution- at-Sea ships actually started in January 1988, as engineers at the Navy’s David Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center in Annapolis and Carderock, Maryland,
Figure 1 Revolution-at-Sea Group Mike Organization
Surface Combat""' Force Require"*"1’
Executive
Coordinating
Group
1 |
------------ 1---------- |
1 |
----------- |
Hull, Mechanical and Electrical |
Combat Systems |
Command, Control and | Communications |
Laboratory |
NavSea 05 |
NavSea 06A |
SpaWar 30 I |
Oonav |
— Hull
-Mechanical
-Electrical
■ Antiair Warfare . Antisubmarine Warfare . Antisurface Warfare . Electronic Warfare
-C‘
.Sensors -On-board -Off-board Battle Group Architecture
— Navy Labs i
- Defense AdvJ"
Research Pml*" Agency pii*
_CNO E*ecul|Ve
Figure 2 Revolution-at-Sea Timetable .
..... 1 |
^ I,,™. |qH7 At |
uq^^W.Septen.hr. IWrmh- MaoH |
|
at Sea— |
Force Architecture Technology A»*e*»ment |
Force Requirement* Technology Application* |
Ship Requirement* |
|
“82*
Maryland, started identifying technologies that shoWf1
the new family of warships. Design work is expected continue until the mid-1990s, when the Navy will reque‘ funds to acquire the ships.
SCFRS—Laying the Analytic Foundation man reportedly objected to the inclusion of the W° “level”—“We already know the Navy’s force level ■ / ' it’s 600 ships!”—SCFRS’s objectives included review'11' the surface combatant force requirements the CNO "P
warship force levels and unit capabilities necessary meet the threats of 2010. Following the Reagan admi"1.^ tration’s inauguration in January 1981, which ushered^
CNO approved a “notional” 137-ship cruiser/destroy1 force level. (If frigates are included in this account
Efface warfare’s combatant needs totaled 238 ships.)
As early as mid-1985, however, impending budget constraints and the introduction into the fleet of the ‘ ‘revolu- tonary” Aegis ships—first the USS Ticonderoga (CG- l-class cruisers and the then-soon-to-be constructed Ar- Burke (DDG-51)—led analysts in and outside the avy to question the 137-ship force-level objective. Gen- ^rally, they argued that anticipated budget shortfalls °uld make it impossible to meet the stated requirement, jat the ships that would be commissioned during the next 5 years would be much more capable than those they Placed (on a nearly one-for-one basis, according to Navy pectations). Hence, several outsiders argued that fewer an 137 ships would suffice to support the 15-carrier bata group Navy. (By comparison, the 1967 Major Fleet -Jc°rt Study derived a notional force level goal of some _340 surface combatants—including frigates—during Period when the Navy’s aircraft carrier force included 24 ships.)
Jr.
calf’6SP*te these budgetary issues, however, Admiral Met
memorandum requesting authority to undertake the
SPrfa
p ^he Navy’s concern about the effects budgetary and rScal constraints would exert on surface warfare was and emains valid.5 Congress reduced the Navy’s Shipbuilding an <“onvers'on (SCN) request 15.8% in fiscal year 1986 en^ 7.6% in fiscal year 1987. The overall Navy budget . Pured real, after-inflation decreases in spending author- 7 °f some 7% in those two years.
These trends are expected to continue, despite the 0maly of the fiscal year 1988 SCN increases—easily Plained by congressional willingness to support naval I 'ation (the legislators fully funded two nuclear-propel- tio Carr'ers 1° a single year) at the cost in the eyes of some ^aviators of shortchanging other Navy programs. For g arnPle, in 1987 Congress “zeroed” the three Arleigh l9s»e Aegis sll*Ps the Navy had requested for fiscal year jj. ° (while adding three CG-47 Aegis cruisers the Navy l n°t request to the two that were in the President’s ^get submission). In January 1988, Secretary of De- surf6 ^ran*c Carlucci required the Navy to retire 16 pi ace combatants much earlier than the service had ,, nned, a directive that was the proximate cause of the retirement” of former Secretary of the Navy James 9s f'ace Combatant Force Requirements Study mentioned ob' 6 Pr'nc'Pal reason for reassessing the 1981 force level th^ect'ves new information concerning future threats and cexPerience gained from fleet operations with “such §g^hat systems as AEGIS, SM-2, Tomahawk, and SQQ- p0LaMPS III which will affect the balance of naval S( ^er ” Indeed, throughout the initial Revolution-at-Sea 0les, the major emphasis was on war-fighting and other eff rat‘°nal requirements and characteristics, not cost- ectiveness, although affordability issues ultimately e* considered.
pc SCFRS team reported the findings of its two-phase a y to the CNO and Group Mike in early winter 1987 Cq *ssued its final report in late March 1988. Phase I, ^Ppleted in May 1987, compared the 1995 threat as the ai Technical Intelligence Center had predicted it in
1979 to the Center’s updated projections of 1987. The team also considered in this phase the Navy’s 1987 systems performance capabilities—the Aegis/SM-2/ Tomahawk/SQQ-89/LAMPS-III combination—comparing the 1979 projections with actual 1987 fleet performance levels. The analysis showed that in 1979 the Navy had done an exceptionally good job of predicting what its own systems’ performance levels would be in 1987; but dramatic increases in the Soviets’ threat capabilities, especially in submarines, presented troubling surprises.
Second-phase SCFRS efforts identified force requirements and unit capabilities for three generic ship types: a battle force-capable combatant, essentially a cruiser/ destroyer replacement; a mission-essential unit—that is, a large surface warship to replace the battleships; and a protection of shipping (PoS) combatant, a frigate follow-on. The subsequent engagement analyses encompassed simulations of various force levels, battle force/action group mixes, and sensors and systems performance in five scenarios selected to represent the principal operational task- ings of the Navy’s maritime strategy:
► Carrier battle force strikes of short duration in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea
► Carrier battle force strikes of extended duration in the Northwest Pacific
► Surface action group strikes within the Southeast Asian littoral
► Protection of shipping in the Atlantic—convoy operations
► Protection of shipping in the Atlantic—defended lane operations
Briefed to the CNO in early 1988, the analyses identified specific aspects of the projected threat and scenarios that were force-level drivers. SCFRS specified force-level requirements for mission essential units, battle force- capable combatants, and PoS ships based upon unit and force performance levels that could reasonably be achieved (within broad “affordability” guidelines) to carry out future operations. Finally, the March 1988 final report provided broad guidance to Group Mike and the Navy’s ship-design community concerning weapon systems capabilities, and specific trade-offs in capabilities, for defeating the threats of 2010.
Getting there from here was a serious concern, and the report specified annual ship acquisition and production rates to achieve the new force-level goals. Finally, SCFRS proposed an innovative program called “flexible transition” for acquiring new ships, back-fitting modem systems into older ships, and replacing obsolescent ships. Even if the Navy implements only part of them, these changes will have profound implications for future operations and program planning and budgeting.
SOCS—Attempting to Move Mountains
The SOCS team focused on recommending the policies applicable to ships entering service in the first decades of the next century. It held the broadest charter, and perhaps the most unwieldy task, of all the Revolution-at-Sea study groups: all aspects of the operations of the future family of
21st
Sea with a blueprint for the surface combatants of the
surface warships were open to critical analysis and revolutionary innovation. With its emphasis on policies, the SOCS charter required the study team to examine 17 major study areas: ship control, navigation, propulsion control, communications, combat direction and combat systems, deck and boat seamanship, aviation operations, damage control and restoration, survivability, security and integrity, training, crew support, maintenance, administration, supply and logistics, growth margins and design modularity, and signature reduction.
In July 1987 the SOCS team delivered a Phase I briefing to the CNO and Vice CNO, Group Mike, and the staffs of fleet commanders-in-chief and surface type commanders. Subsequent research, analysis, and briefings to the fleet led to a final report delivered in April 1988, which provided specific policy recommendations for the operational characteristics that will govern the design of the next generation of surface warships. (SOCS exceeded its formal charter somewhat, in that the final report also included specific guidelines and recommendations as to how the Navy—not just surface warfare—could institutionalize the process established in the Revolution at Sea. The idea was to ensure that the accomplishments would not be a one-shot effort, and that lessons learned for surface warfare would also benefit naval aviation and submarine warfare.) The SOCS “Operational Report” spelled out 12
“imperative characteristics” for future ships, within f°u priorities:6 .
► Priority A: Cooperative engagement in all miss'6
areas; Integrated machinery systems; Survivability and tn ability to “fight hurt” .
► Priority B: Embedded readiness assessment, miss'0
planning, and training; Condition-based maintenance Torpedo self-defense .
► Priority C: Co-location of ship control and combat i” formation center; Access control and security; Alterna" [peacetime/wartime] use of volume
► Priority D: Smooth topsides; New information manage ment; Organic aviation and other off-board vehicles
Group Mike then began to integrate the SOCS p°l_ recommendations with the force and unit capabilities c°n_ siderations offered by the Surface Combatant Force l4 quirements Study.
Group Mike—Integrating Innovation _____ ^
Established by CNO direction in November 1^’ Group Mike and its Office of the Chief of Naval Opefj| tions (OpNav) working group ultimately will provide Na
century. The Group Mike study group is responsible f exploring total force architecture and the technology ^ and for making specific recommendations affecting 0 signs of future ship concepts. The objectives of the Gf° Mike study will be anything but simple to achieve: |
► Institutionalize the design and construction of naV.
warships as integrated weapon systems in order to ma* mize ordnance on target s
► Introduce innovation in HM&E and combat syste ^
► Increase combat effectiveness at minimum cost throve •^novations in design and construction One important aspect of Group Mike’s efforts is to iden- j*fy and apply emerging technologies to future ships and , attle forces—including HM&E, combat systems, and the Industrial base. In its role as a technology bridge, Group "like already has begun to incorporate promising new technologies into design concepts, and, working closely "'dh NavSea and Navy laboratories, to transfer these con- ^ePts into reality. The goal is to achieve surface combatant jksigns capable of defeating the threat in 2010 while still eing affordable to acquire and maintain in the required
numbers.
Related to the Group Mike process is a separate, albeit ?0rnplementary, effort initiated by Vice Admiral William R- Rowden (Retired), former Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, in June 1987.7 As a result of the inde- j^udent NavSea preparation in early 1987 of an “HM&E R&D [Research and Development] Master Plan’’ for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Engineering, and Systems) and the continuing OpNav Revolution-at- ea studies, Admiral Rowden established a NavSea Future Urface Combatant Ship R&D Group in the office of the nief Engineer. To this “ChEng-R” group went the responsibility for managing the strategic planning for sur- .ace combatant research and development. This is three J°us, actually: design of the Flight III Arleigh Burke-cUss snips (DDG-80 and the remainder of the original 62-ship Pr°gram); Revolution-at-Sea support; and management of a classified program. More to the point of direct liaison Group Mike, the NavSea group’s activities include: Porecasting future ship R&D needs by reviewing arcats, current and future mission requirements, R&D Pr°grams, and promising technologies Coordinating the collection and description of all technologies design integration, and producibility concepts uat have the potential for increasing ships’ military worth and reducing their cost
Conducting independent assessments of existing and Projected R&D initiatives, recommending priorities, and ' entifying shortfalls in NavSea R&D programs Preparing a “Total Ship R&D Master Plan” to provide a coordinated, strategic long-range plan encompassing oth HM&E and combat systems According to several NavSea and OpNav observers, °Wever, the early progress of this group was halting, at pst- Apparent reticence within NavSea to embrace hEng-R may have emerged from its baldly cutting across °re familiar lines of responsibility and communication. J*|leed, in early 1988 the Navy considered reassigning .Eng-R’s Revolution-at-Sea responsibilities under an ktsting NavSea directorate to help ameliorate the bureau- • ratic situation. Nevertheless, from its beginning the links setWeen ChEng-R and Group Mike were secure, and per- °nnel in the two shops worked well together.
^volution? What Revolution?
. The Navy’s surface warfare community has enjoyed Pressive progress in recent years, achieving significant Vances in war-fighting capabilities despite recent criti-
cisms that surface warfare forces are not operationally ready.8 Aegis is finally at sea in meaningful numbers. The best antiair warfare (AAW) system of any navy (notwithstanding the furor over the destruction by the USS Vincennes [CG-49] of Iran Air Flight 655), the Aegis combat system encompasses as well the world’s most capable surface antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, and strike systems. The building blocks of surface warfare’s revolution in combat systems are in place: Aegis; the vertical launch system (VLS) in the USS Bunker Hill (CG-52) that will be built also in subsequent Ticonderoga-cluss cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, as well as being back-fitted into selected Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers; the Tomahawk land-attack/antiship cruise missiles; the “hotter” and longer range Standard (SM)-2/ Block IV AAW missiles; and the SQQ-89/LAMPS-III total ASW system. But, as Admiral Metcalf repeatedly stated, this revolution has been unbalanced in emphasis and funding, has failed in some instances to make the best and most rapid use of available and emerging technologies, and is constrained by numerous “religious issues,” institutional inertia, and, at times, petty jealousies among individuals. Looking in from the outside, it is apparent that, notwithstanding good intentions, these issues continue to dog the Navy.
As the May 1987 attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31) and the April 1988 mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-53) dramatized clearly, the naval combat environment is an increasingly dangerous place in which to conduct even “peacetime” operations. The crew of a surface ship today must beware of attacks from more sources and by more means than ever before. The rapid development and global proliferation of sophisticated threats to the Navy s surface ships present formidable problems for future programs and operations. If the Navy is serious about building highly capable and survivable ships for fleet introduction in the first decades of the 21st century—surface combatants that are truly integrated weapon systems— yesterday was not too early to begin.
It is sobering to consider in this regard that the antecedents of the Aegis combat system date to the mid-1950s, when the Navy first attempted to design and build the Typhon AAW system. And, starting with the Advanced Surface Missile System program in the early 1960s, it took two decades to get Aegis into the fleet; even then it went into a pre-existing hull and engineering plant design, the 1983-commissioned Ticonderoga.
Even more troubling, for many years after the 1969 start of the Aegis program, especially with the demise of the Navy’s proposed nuclear-propelled strike cruiser in the mid-1970s, Aegis was literally a system looking for a home. Aegis was available too late to be incorporated into the Virginia (CGN-38)-class cruisers for which it originally was intended; it was almost by happy coincidence that the Spruance-class design was sufficiently large to accommodate the system.
Two of the “revolutionary” advances in war-fighting capability Admiral Metcalf cited most often while he was at the helm of the revolution—the Tomahawk cruise missile and the VLS—emerged at a similarly laggard rate.
The Navy knew about surface-launched tactical and strategic cruise missiles in the early 1950s, yet the “revolutionary” Tomahawk (really an evolutionary development based upon Harpoon technology) did not enter service until 1984. Likewise, the virtues of the VLS were touted first in the mid-1960s. It enjoyed a slightly faster adoption than Aegis and the Tomahawk, perhaps because of the system’s inherently simple design. But the R&D funding the VLS program received in 1975-76 resulted from pressure within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, not OpNav or the fleet. And the VLS did not go to sea until 1986.
Perhaps what is most truly “revolutionary” about these weapon systems is that they exist at all: they survived numerous challenges from within and outside the Navy; they finally are all in the hands of the fleet operators at the same time; and the radical innovations in doctrine and tactics—which these systems make possible, but not inevitable—have begun. Even so, in 1988, there remains doubt in some Navy circles about the overall tactical usefulness of Tomahawk, and numerous civilian reformers remain unconvinced that Aegis is as capable as the Navy has claimed or proved.
However, the Navy cannot any longer be permitted the luxury of taking this egregiously dilatory approach to incorporating advanced technology, into the fleet and developing intelligent tactics and training for its use. We will have to do it right and expeditiously the first time or suffer the dire consequences in combat endured by the Stark and her crew ... or even by the Vincennes.
In the surface navy’s Revolution at Sea, Admiral Metcalf created a novel environment for creativity; he generated strong top-level Navy support for innovation and critical assessment in the search for future surface combatants—combatants that are warships in the fullest sense of the term. While not ensuring it, the structure of the Revolution at Sea facilitates free communication among the participants. In a bureaucratic sense, the revolution is itself a cardinal innovation in attempting to bridge the chasms among individuals and Navy activities, and to expedite the process by which new technologies enter the fleet, a process that so often in the past has frustrated Navy (as opposed to “union”) objectives.
Nevertheless, it has proved difficult, this attempt to shake off the complacent baggage of years of tradition and uncritical thinking. Whether the incipient gains of the revolution will long survive Admiral Metcalf’s departure from the Navy is unsure. Rumors abound that top-level Navy support for the Revolution at Sea, focused as it is on the next century (even if that is only 12 years away), is waning as current and near-term programmatic crises compete for attention. And privately voiced comments to the effect of, “Metcalf’s long gone, I give the ‘revolution’ another six months, maybe a little more, before it mushes into ‘evolution,’ ” point to the difficulties facing Admiral Nyquist, notwithstanding his strong personal commitment to protect Admiral Metcalf’s unfinished legacy.
Historian Crane Britten once described revolution as a process of “rising expectations.” A true revolution is impossible so long as the potential revolutionaries remain prostrate, without hope for the future. Once their lot improves and Utopia emerges in vague outline on the horizon, their “rising expectations” begin to fuel their revolutionary ardor. So it is with surface warfare. In the days when the budget-starved surface force was no more than an escort for aircraft carriers and the merchant marine, revolution was impossible. But once a string of successes buoyed Admiral Metcalf and his followers with new expectations, the assault could begin.
It is clear that the Navy must preserve this climate if tbe service is to benefit from Admiral Metcalf’s vision and commitment, and from that of the officers and civilian8 who supported him and who continue to undergird Admiral Nyquist’s efforts. At this juncture of the uprising, there are three possible outcomes. First, the revolutionaries could be defeated, lined up against a wall, and shot. So far, this has not happened. Second, after achieving a wild success they could round up the members of the old order and have them shot. That, too, has not occurred—yet. A third possibility is that elements of the revolution could be embraced and institutionalized by enlightened individuals- That, apparently, is now going on. Without doubt, however, the next few months will be critically important to the future course of the Navy’s (nee Joe Metcalf’s) Revolution at Sea.
In addition to the specific sources cited here, information for this art1 cle came from interviews and personal communications with VAdn1- Joseph Metcalf III, USN (Ret.); VAdm. John W. Nyquist, USN; VA^ William H. Rowden, USN (Ret.); Capt. Lee Gunn, USN (Op-03K ^ Director, SOCS); Capt. Mike Rodgers, USN (Op-03C and Director Group Mike Study Group); Capt. Tim O’Keefe, USN (Ret.) (fortnew Op-03C and Director, Group Mike Study Group); Capt. Tom Mo°r®’ USN (Director, SCFRS); and Capt. Tom Bush, USN (Ret.) (formew ChEng-R), among others.
'Memorandum for the Director, Navy Program Planning (Op-090), Serial S288-86, 13 August 1986.
2“Keynote Address: ‘Join the Revolution at Sea!’ ” Naval Engineers Journal, J" ’
1986.
3A fourth OP-03 study group, the “Paperless Ship Project,” is peripheral to Revolution at Sea. But, if successful, its findings will contribute significantly 1 cutting down ships’ overhead costs by reducing dramatically the thousands pounds of paper—manuals, forms, and the like—that are stored on every ship- 8 , “Pursuit of the ‘Paperless Ship,’ ” Washington Post, 5 May 1987, p. A-17. tj" “Admiral Would Jettison Paper to Speed Navy,” The New York Times, 5 ” ■
1987, p. A-25.
4CN0 Memorandum Serial 00/6U300341, 20 November 1986. -
5Scott C. Truver, "Gramm-Rudman and the Future of the 600-Ship Fleet,” UNaval Institute ProceedingsINaval Review, May 1987, pp. 111-123.
6SOCS Operational Report, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-03K. April 1988, pp. 2-19. ,
7NavSea Notice 5400, Future Surface Combatant Ship R&D Croup (ChEng'l' ■ OPR 905/032, 9 June 1987. .
8Capt. John L. Byron, “The Surface Navy is Not Ready,” U. S. Naval Institu Proceedings, December 1987, pp. 34-40. -
See also: VAdm. Joseph Metcalf III, USN (Ret.), “Revolution at Sea,”
Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, pp. 34-39.
Dr. Truver is head of the Naval and Maritime Policy Department, tional Security and Warfare Analysis Group, at Information Spectru111' Inc. A frequent contributor to Proceedings, he assisted the Naval Instl tute in the planning and presentation of its 1988 San Diego conferee6’ “The Future of U. S. Naval Power: Policy, Strategy, and Operation81 the 21st Century.”
l