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Imagine that you’re 24—perhaps, again. The year is 1997, or some other year far enough away in the future to sPark your imagination. You’re soon to enter your first fleet squadron, an attack squadron. It is a squadron unlike any •mown today, partly because it now exists Under two distinct chains of command and not entirely in either. It’s not a Navy Squadron, not an Air Force squadron, but noth. It represents the synthesis of the nest ideas from the best squadrons in both
services.
This synergistic squadron is ideal in Several aspects. First, everyone knows what is expected of them and what they Can expect in return. The goals are clear, definitive, and current. Proposals or projects that subsequently arise are evaluated |n relation to established goals and rejected if found conflicting or unnecesSary. Second, aircrewmen are given adequate time and material resources to Pursue professional and personal development, ensuring that they remain tactical experts who are capable, well informed, and well conditioned physically. Neither time nor materials are stretched excessively or repeatedly by bravado or naive “can do” attitudes. Finally, the squadron enjoys the right mix of measured guidance and generous personal attention necessary to foster the dedica- tlQn and enthusiasm required for aircrews to excel.
The Squadron Experience: Even be- mre I arrive at my new squadron, it is obvious that things are being done right, 'hilfway through my replacement train- lng unit (RTU) class, the assignments are made to operational squadrons. Promptly, the squadron commander Mites, inviting me to come by and meet everybody at my convenience. When I u°, the first aircrewman I meet knows to |akc me by the operations officer (Air . °rce)/executive officer (Navy). He’s not "L but his office hours for the day are Posted, so I know he’s not an impossible 'Pan to see. When I return later, we have 3 30-minute interview, which begins with Questions about me and then goes into Squadron policy. The ops officer/XO in- 0rms me that the squadron has a: r Squadron policy manual
Regulation depicting organizational ^Ucture
. Message board
. Immediate action directive read file . Aircrew information read file
Safety read file
► Weapons/tactics read file (including classified portions secured in the safe)
► Master question file for NATOPS (naval air training and operating procedures standardization)/standard evaluation testing
► Master question file in intelligence testing
► Master question file for weapons/ tactics testing
I don’t have to remember all of this because it’s outlined in a Welcome to the New Guy Book, which covers briefly the squadron organization, schedule, and aircrew procedures. Finally, the ops officer/ XO offers a brief oral essay on the importance of being earnest and his willingness to counsel and assist me in any way possible during my transition from student to expert. He adds that I will be crewed with a more senior member of the aircrew to protect my interests as well as the squadron’s, but that the exact match, as well as my job, will not be decided until just before I complete replacement training.
I’m instructed to report to my new squadron at 0730 the day after I complete my RTU class. The squadron is expecting me, because the same individual who told me to report also informed the squadron’s central point of contact that I would be there. When I arrive, an aircrewman who has been scheduled just to show me around for two hours takes me through all the shops. Each shop signs off my checkin sheet, found in the back of my orientation book. What we don’t get done to-
U. S. NAVY (W. DODGE) gether, I can finish on my own later. The orientation book is specific about the procedure for integrating into the squadron, so all my escort has to do is show me where things are. He tells me that the squadron really follows the published time schedule that is outlined in the orientation book, so I can expect to have one week for administrative work and selfstudy before I start flying again. The air wing focuses on the big picture and doesn’t send new aircrewmen into the middle of pack-ups or exercises as did air wings of the past. Perhaps this is a factor that explains why the retention rate is up quite a bit from where it used to be.
The indoctrination program proceeds as outlined. Schedulers set aside time for new squadron members to receive the required training briefings and match each of us with an instructor. They don’t try to do it all at once, but instead use a one- to two-hour block a day. The coordinated program of simulators and special mission flights rounds out the tactical
The best aviation units set clear, definitive goals, put their people and their safety first, and build depth within their ranks. They reflect the best attributes of both Navy and Air Force squadrons. (Here, HS-3 on board the USS Saratoga [CV-60], left, and the U. S. Air Force 527th Aggressor Squadron at RAF Alconbury, England.)
► Minimizing Parochialism: Opportum ties for interservice squadron visits pr° vide an excellent opportunity for gleam c the best of the best and integrating into the fabric of operations. A two- three-day visit by an operations offic^r’ XO, or CO to one of their counterpart A> Force squadrons would yield great benc^ fits. Air wing-endorsed local initial' programs could be designed to mom and evaluate the changes that squadro commanders institute.
Of the ideas for the ideal squadro noted previously, about half come fr° the Air Force and half from the Navy-
emphasis begun in the RTU. Since we don’t fly many flights with right-seat pilots in the RTU, the crew transition was not even noticeable. The squadron writes the “top off” training syllabus, but the air wing in its facilitator role keeps the squadrons informed of the best ideas being generated throughout the entire wing. A real-world scenario mission planning and briefing completes the transition. Now, three months after joining the squadron, I am given my collateral duty.
The squadron’s self-inspection program ensures that 1 don’t have to start from scratch. The job description is up to date and includes names and phone numbers that I will need to perform my duties. Job requirements cite specific references so that as the references change, it will be easy to update the job requirements. The job description itself is an annex to the squadron organization and regulations. That keeps the administrative officers from having to redo the regulations over and over. They are kept basic while the job description goes into detail.
The squadron organization is clear cut and straight forward. I’ve got one boss. He’s responsible for my day-to-day performance, my development as an aviator, and my social integration into the group. Where the squadron is headed is clear, too. Quarterly goals are posted on the operations board, and all supervisors of major squadron areas are held accountable for setting their own goals and meeting them. They’re not nebulous “make- everybody-feel-important” or “do- everything-right” goals, either. These are measurable. Upcoming events are clearly posted on the master three-month calendar along with projects and who is responsible for them. The names of personnel on leave are posted along with their phone numbers, if appropriate. An up-to-date recall/social roster also helps reduce confusion.
The squadron commander discourages pet projects, because they distract from more important duties. The CO likes to keep things simple. Once a month we are all informally evaluated on our skills and job performance. The only paperwork involved is a squadron-generated form that the supervisors use. It lists “things you do well” and “things you need to improve on.” One of the collateral duties in the squadron is to keep track of individual bomb scores and provide a monthly report, which helps in evaluating performance.
The training is structured, but flexible. The squadron schedulers ensure that low- level range and military operating areas (MOAs) are reserved for every flight and maintain a balance between formation and single-ship operations. Crew members modify the profile to meet personal training objectives and the training requirements dictated by higher authority. The range time and the MOA overlap so crews can pull off the range as they see fit. Our squadron commander believes that air-to-air training is the best kind of situational awareness training for air-to- ground squadrons, so we aim for a 50-50 mix in range/MOA use over a three- month period. Squadron performance and quarterly goals, therefore, don’t remain static.
The squadron’s excellent flight planning area has all the tools and references needed to plan a good training mission without starting from scratch every time. The tools are also easily packed for deployment. Once a week, there is a miniwar day with a planned scenario, a fullblown briefing, and video recordings made of the attack from the range tower’s point of view. Usually, aircraft carry heavy ordnance unless the mission commanders select practice ordnance to test a tactic better. Even on the day-to-day flights, there is a great emphasis at the beginning of the flight planning on defining those training elements that will be accomplished. Fortunately, the squadron planners are not so narrow-minded as to think that only what is tracked in the computer is important. They do a good job of narrowing the training objectives to something specific and debriefable.
The number of “checkout programs” is small, just some defined basics for flight lead training and mission commander qualification. The required experience and performance levels are clearly defined, so everyone knows what is expected. Of course, the commanding officer has the last word, but the guidance from above is that once qualified by experience, aircrewmen should be counseled and certified or told exactly what additional performance is expected of them.
Academics are still a big part of the squadron’s proficiency training. The master question files are excellent study tools. The air wing produces these to help limit the collateral duty workload of the aircrews. Both intelligence and weapons also have a basic self-study list, which changes monthly. New tactical reading material that comes into the squadron is posted on the master operations board. If it is deemed mandatory reading, it is placed in the weapons/tactics read file. Monday mornings and Friday afternoons are “no-fly” periods, during which we conduct ground training and aircrew meetings. Anybody who goes crosscountry has to read the notes that are tiled in the aircrew read file.
The quality I appreciate most in this squadron, though, is that we can be professionals without having to believe that the job is the most important priority. We seldom work more than nine hours a day, and when we do, it’s clearly called for. We are held accountable for the way we spend our time, though. The leadership doesn’t tolerate the individual who holds a coffee cup more than a pencil, but tactics bull sessions are encouraged during debriefs and self-study discussions. Again, we are told what is expected. The guidance on using time and setting priorities is to take at least 30 minutes a day to do self-study and professional reading- On days we don’t fly, we are expected t° take time off for exercise. Job descnP' tions, self-inspections, and goals are to be kept visible on our desks while working files are kept centrally located- Everyone is expected to keep informa notes on good things subordinates do, good things we do, and a log of all paPe*T work we send out of the office. Each cilice keeps mini operations boards (resembling the master board), which are updated in regular supervisor meetings-
What would it take for such a squadron to exist in reality? It would take a maj°r reorientation of thinking at a high level in the chain of command. Squadron com manders often are not innovators because they are evaluated and promoted based on their success in fostering established ser vice norms. For change to take root, sev eral changes in the way we “do busl^ ness” are required at the air want organizational level and above to provi an atmosphere that encourages squadron commanders to structure and admims their squadrons in the way describe • Parochialism needs to be set aside, a c|c distinction between practice and pert°r mance must be established, and the divl sion of responsibility for showing the t> & in the world should be reevaluated. .
lhe past, the differences between the two services have been entirely credited to differing missions and operations. Having spent an equivalent amount of time in f’oth organizations, I’m not so convinced. Can there really be a logical explanation f°r the fact that Air Force and Navy antigravity suits zip in opposite directions? Sharing ideas and effort will not only re- Suh in improved aircrew readiness, but a|so economical savings. For example, •he Air Force’s tactical intelligence program is clearly superior to the Navy’s and so applicable that the entire Navy effort c°uld be eliminated easily through in- leased interservice cooperation, saving •he Navy both time and money.
’ Distinct Competition Periods: Commanders must make it clear to squadron a,rcrews when they are practicing and "'hen they are performing. Timid skip- P^s who are constantly being evaluated "'•I perpetually put their best people for- "‘Ud at the expense of building depth in their ranks. It would not be unusual in today’s Navy for a lieutenant commander with less than two weeks left on sea duty to be assigned to a unique training mission over a more junior aviator who has far more operational time ahead of him. Such practices are common, because when continuous evaluation is present, the desire to look good drives the training plan. If times for squadron performance evaluation were distinct from daily training, squadron skippers would be free to take advantage of the varied training opportunities that are available and prepare their aviators in the way they think best. Evaluation guidelines that prevent handpicked gladiatorial competitions will encourage personal development and maximize squadron resources.
► Share the Adventure: The Navy enjoys an almost exclusive role in showing the U. S. flag worldwide. Given the fact that sea lanes are international and air bases are not, it would be unrealistic to suggest equalizing the task responsibility. However, increasing the mobility and deployment of Air Force assets while lessening the steaming commitments of Navy battle groups would accomplish at least two desirable goals. Air Force pilots would develop versatility from increased exposure to scenarios beyond their defined theater of operations, and naval aviators would enjoy improved morale and more time available for shore-based training.
If you were 24 again, would you want to be in the squadron or air wing you serve in today? Then why not change it a little?
Lieutenant Swanson serves in the Naval Air Reserve Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota. He completed his active-duty career in the pilot exchange program with 27 TFW, flying the F-111D as an instructor pilot. Previously, he was assigned to VA-196, with whom he completed two cruises and 300 traps, earning the Navy Achievement Medal, the "Battle E” award, the McClusky Award, and the Navy Unit Commendation. Lieutenant Swanson is a 1978 graduate of the University of Colorado.
Soviet Subs vs. the Resupply of NATO
•fy Lieutenant Commander Michael J. Gouge, U. S. Naval Reserve
20 million tons of shipping in World War I and 13.5 million tons—2,603 merchant ships—in World War II. This compares with 784 U-boats that the Allies sank to provide a merchant-ship-to-submarine- exchange ratio of 3.32:1.1 In the Pacific, U. S. submarines destroyed about five million tons of Japanese merchant shipping—1,178 merchant ships.2 Fifty-two U. S. submarines were lost in this conflict. The platform exchange ratio was 22.7:1. The better Pacific exchange ratio resulted from the use of the convoy system in the Atlantic after mid-1942, intense antisubmarine warfare efforts in the North Atlantic in 1943-45, operational constraints imposed on U-boats by the German High Command, and more geographical flexibility in the Pacific.
What kind of exchange ratios could NATO expect today with the Soviet attack submarine force?
U. S. merchant ships today are less maneuverable, much larger, slightly faster, but no more survivable than their
The bottoms are fewer and weaker than in World War II, when this merchant was torpedoed, and their submarine predators are more numerous and better. But today the Navy considers “going in harm’s way” more glamorous than giving convoys the protection they need.