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Nobody asked me, but..
By Staff Sergeant Martha B. Hall, U. S. Marine Corps
women Marines are taught nothing about protecting themselves on the tlefield in wartime. During a
full-scale
conflict there will not be enough g1
Is there a place for the woman Marine?
“Free a man to fight!” The battle cry of World War II justified the inclusion of women in the Marine Corps, the other armed forces, and war-related industries. Today’s Marine Corps integrates women into the force structure more completely than ever before.
They serve in virtually all echelons of command in all noncombat related military occupational specialties (MOSs). But do women truly have a place in a Corps whose doctrine designs it to be a highly mobile amphibious fighting force?
The modem battlefield has no well- defined line between front-echelon combat and noncombat rear-area support. Commanders are thus understandably hesitant to take women on a battalion or squadron rotation cycle, because U. S. law prevents them from serving on amphibious ships or aircraft carriers. What happens if a potential combat crisis develops and women deployed on such ships must be replaced? How will a manpower pool always short of qualified individuals supply their replacements? These constraints dictate that women Marines either serve only in upper-echelon staff and support billets, or they rotate from unit to unit during stateside evolutions. Such shifting violates unit integrity and degrades morale. Women never become a real part of any unit; they are just add-ons who transfer when the unit’s next rotation cycle begins.
Women Marines, however, serve in many peacetime noncombatant MOSs that could prove critical in wartime: component repair personnel, computer operators and programmers, communicators, and intelligence specialists. All these support personnel would be indispensable on the battlefield.
Women Marines have performed their duties in an exemplary fashion. Innovative ideas, a sense of honor, and dedication to duty are our legacy. But the time has come to reevaluate the role of women in the modem Corps. Greater mobility of combat fighting forces has led to fewer billets that women can fill in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Women find career paths blocked because they have not served enough time in FMF or Marine Air- Ground Task Force (MAGTF) billets. The general feeling within the service is that there are too many women in the Marine Corps, and that we are not filling an equitable share of the “hard” billets.
Women are clearly a permanent part of our country’s armed forces. But if women Marines are to contribute in anything other than a peacetime role, the Marine Corps and Congress must seriously consider making several reforms:
► Women must be allowed to serve on combat ships, including amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships and aircraft carriers. Women Marines muS be able to rotate with their units. An) one assigned to a mobile MAGTF headquarters must be able to ship °ut to meet operational requirements.
► The Department of Defense shoul develop better definitions of combat versus noncombat roles and location • Foxholes are clearly combat location*- but what about a fortified beachhead- an expeditionary airfield, or a forvvajn area supply dump? Women Marines their current MOSs could be found >n any of these areas.
► The Marine Corps must give its women better training in the arts ot war. Beyond basic rifle qualification
ba1" runts
to fight the enemy and protect the echelon both. If women are there, will have to pull their fair share of^ load. But are we going to put on PL rimeter duty a person who has neVL used a challenge and password cod • thrown a grenade, or practiced simp defense tactics? uSt
To be effective women Marines be used, not viewed as a liability- are Marines, a part of our Corp s ’' tory and a vital link to its future.
Sergeant Hall is serving with the Fleet Intc Center Europe and Atlantic as an instructor intelligence training section.
Nobody asked
me either, but..
By Commander Don Waylett, U. S.
Why aren’t we experimenting with the LCAC?
For at least a decade, the Navy and Marine Corps have talked about using landing craft air cushion (LCACs) for over-the-horizon assault, coordinated
112
Navy
missions with helicopters, and other tasks. Now, however, with LCACs available, the services appear to be hesitant to employ them fully. This reticence seems to be rooted in a general misreckoning of the craft’s capabilities and limitations, an unwillingness to
(jjiid1
risk a limited asset, or a refusal to ^ flexibly about what the LCAC cj^O In recent exercises involving k the assets were employed simply j^s). high-speed utility landing cratt (L Personnel who misunderstood the LCACs’ capacities were puttin;
. 'Cushion to run in standard assembly .lr6|es before heading to the beach in .. Uional amphibious waves—a prac- (|Ce l^at eliminates the LCAC’s advan- Ses of speed over water and maneuverability on shore. Are tradition-bound Pnibious planners resisting this new set because it does not fit the 12-knot (a 1 e speed that has dominated the his- amphibious assault? lhe lcac is faster and safer to op- aj.e than traditional displacement fh ’ and requires less manpower.
I ere's no need to ballast and debal- st an LCAC-capable ship between
load-outs. Once the ship is ballasted to the sill, has its gate down and its doors open, no further adjustment is required for either launch or recovery. Moreover, in contrast to conventional amphibious craft, it is unnecessary to back vehicles onto the LCAC to off-load them on the beach; because the LCAC can maneuver on shore instead of beaching in the surf line. Marine Corps drivers can roll off the LCAC on the beach and drive directly onto it from the well of an amphibious landing ship. Finally, deck personnel are safer launching and recovering LCACs because there is none of the line-handling involved with conventional craft. From the standpoints of tactics and deck seamanship, the LCAC is a quantum leap forward for amphibious operations.
The only bad thing about LCACs is that we do not have enough of them. But they are on the way, and we should have effective employments firmly established for them when they arrive. The time to experiment is now.
Commander Waylett recently served as the executive officer of the USS Fort Fisher (LSD-40).
And nobody asked me...
% Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes, U. S. Marine Corps
nanqi
diti0ne atrictly naval matters. This con- the f, S lou'd not be allowed to obscure ^a8shipC ^raud 'n the Navy’s case for a
forCgVa* doctrine requires afloat task- c°nlrnCornrnanders, but not afloat fleet Urt(j ,.aaders ■ Most fleet commanders
staffs
c°mm
CdinKs / November 1988
Pi
a8ships far Fleet Commanders?
desk 11161110 rccent|y crossed my shi l^at ’Seated another amphibious for^ ma^ requisitioned as a flagship sCara dcct commander. Diverting our vyaC6 amphibious warfare assets in this ring has Proved vexing for many Ma- peS' Luring naval operations in the have*4*0 <oU*L LJ. S. amphibious ships H0|)eProvcd very versatile. In fact, in ., has screamed for more carriers 8ulf. just for more gators! of arines question the continued use bgc^^'hious ships as fleet flagships $car_Sc the practice removes already Tf(,Ce assets from normal availability. (LQ^mPhibious command ships ne| s* are crowded with staff person- overtanc* LCC communication gear is The °ahed with fleet-command traffic. ConvaSSauh ships (LPDs) have been de<i„ertec* and are unavailable for their
ffned role.
Navvarines have not challenged the CfS anCr’ter'a for placing the command- agree °at because of a gentlemen’s ti°ns \Cnt concern'ng interservice rela- hahai Marine tells a sailor how to
Would benefit greatly from -ns and. control, communica- faciij’tjCornPuters, and intelligence (C4I) lha|(in6s available on shore, rather than b do with the more limited capabilities that exist afloat. The modern role of the fleet commander is to support the theater commander, not to command the line of battle.
Fleet staffs have grown far beyond the operational cells they once constituted. Now they have supply, aviation support, training, legal, personnel, and other administrative functions. These fleet staffs once could fit on board World War II cruisers like the St. Paul (CA-73), Oklahoma City (CLG-5, ex- CL-91), and Little Rock (CLG-4, ex- CL-92). But today, the Belknap's (CG-26, ex-DLG-26) 1980 conversion from a guided-missile cruiser to a guided-missile flagship may be considered inadequate to accommodate the personnel and equipment of a contemporary fleet staff. Indeed, the LCC- class command ships have required extensive ship alterations to meet the seemingly insatiable command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) demands of the fleet staffs.
If the fleet commander must go to sea to “fight” the fleet, as the commanders of the Third, Fifth, and Seventh fleets did in World War II, he and his staff should be on board a combatant capable of independent steaming or incorporation into the battle force as desired. The early fleet doctrines that endorsed fleet flagships stated this policy. Any use of a Navy ship that is unable to keep pace with the battle force during its mission will render the commander vulnerable to enemy action, and the ship will require escorts not now provided to our amphibious and service squadrons on a regular basis.
The fleet staffs should be based ashore and the commanders should embark when necessary for operations and peacetime diplomatic initiatives. In fact, fleet commanders now spend much time away from their LCC- and miscellaneous command ship (AGF)- class ships, traveling by government and commercial aircraft to make visits, attend conferences, and be present at other events.
The Navy has a suitable number of potential flagships that are more viable than are LCCs/LPDs for the modem realities of fleet command:
► Four Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships
► The Long Beach (CGN-9) nuclear- powered guided-missile cruiser
► Various guided-missile cruiser conversions (especially the Leahy [CG- 16] class nearing the end of its usefulness in antiair warfare)
► The post-World War II cruisers Albany (CG-10, ex-CA-123). Des Moines (CA-134), and Salem (CA-139) in the Naval Reserve Force
► Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines scheduled for disarmament under the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.
It’s time that the Navy’s rationale for using amphibious warfare ships as fleet flagships be challenged.
Colonel Estes is a Marine Corps tank officer who has participated in amphibious exercises in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Pacific oceans.
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