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"mission workhorse of the fleet, most
Gnir every report from the Persian
U|I cite* M.... u-i:.......................... :j:—
1 v‘sual
jn |/u‘ck check of national news stories ^la 87 would confirm what the U. S. Cla_ 7 helicopter community has been
'mirig for years: the helicopter is the ^uitir-- *
a cites Navy helicopters as providing an .SUal intercept of unidentified aircraft cUe r °atS’ anc* conducting search and res- varj ^R), mine countermeasures, and a c]()e‘y °f other missions. Unfortunately, Port r scrut'ny of these same news re- shoS revea*s that Navy helicopters have ahs in equipment, tactics, and aPonry—as witnessed by the employee ! S. Army AH-6 helicopters in attack mission on the Iran Ajr.
The helicopter community has made great strides. It is now accepted as a critical component in nearly every facet of naval warfare. The SH-60 Seahawk is inspiring a revolution in naval helicopter warfare. Every other U. S. Navy helo has been swept along on the coattails of H-60 development. But command and control of helicopter forces, tactics, and employment are just beginning to receive the attention they deserve. The helicopter will continue to be the workhorse of the fleet until the V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey is fully integrated. Until then, the Navy needs a comprehensive strategy for the best employment, equipping, and command and control of naval helicopters for the 1990s.
Budget constraints in the late 1980s spell doom for the introduction of new airframes for helicopters that would be fully capable for almost every aspect of naval warfare. The marinized AH-64 Sea Apache, for example, would have provided the Navy with a versatile attack platform superior to anything currently in the fleet. The AH-64 also could be a superb escort vehicle for combat SAR and special operations helicopters. But as it stands now, the Navy must make the most of the airframes currently in the fleet or on order. Equipment modifications and add-on packages will enhance the capabilities of the existing naval helicopter force, so that it can maintain its
effectiveness against projected threats.
Optimal employment of naval helicopters requires understanding their individual capabilities. Aside from traditional utility missions, the primary mission of most of the U. S. Navy helicopter fleet has been antisubmarine warfare. But with the introduction of the SH-60B LAMPS- III, the helicopter has been thrust into new primary mission areas. The SH-60B now spends much of its deployed flight hours as an airborne early warning (AEW) and surface surveillance platform. Its excellent radar and electronic surveillance measures (ESM) system, along with its ultra-high frequency communications relay capability, have all but removed it from the ASW arena. When
In the Persian Gulf, the workhorses of the fleet are the beefed-up SH-2F, armed with a Maverick missile and a forward-firing gun, and the AH-IW, here returning to the USS Okinawa (LPH-3) after an escort mission. The HH-60H helicopter combat support aircraft may be armed, like this Cobra, with Sidewinder missiles to provide maximum flexibility to meet mission taskings.
the SH-60B is deployed with a battleship battle group (BBBG), it serves as the battle group’s eyes and ears. When deployed with a carrier battle group (CVBG), it fills the airborne early warning coverage gap when the carrier air wing is standing down. The SH-60B is clearly the high- value unit of the helo community. Its versatility and capabilities make it an integral part of every battle group. In order to support fully the ASW mission with ships equipped with the SQQ-89 integrate ASW combat system, as well as the AEW and surface search-and-attack ni's sion, each CVBG should deploy with a least four SH-60Bs. BBBGs and surface action groups (SAGs) deployed for con voy escort should have at least four ^ 60Bs, as well.
The introduction of the SH-60F w' provide the CVBG with a close-in AS platform that is faster, more reliable, aI1^ more capable than the venerable SH' Sea King. The SH-3/SH-60F is primarily responsible for inner-screen ASW, but should not be relegated strictly to ph'nL guard and to active dipping in the shade of the carrier. These aircraft should D farmed out to LAMPS-capable ship1' (Spruance [DD-963]-class destroyefS' and Aegis-equipped guided-missile crui ers) as detachments whenever an SH'" Seasprite LAMPS-I or LAMPS-lH ne tachment is not embarked. The H-3 has been used with great success in AS special operations. These dctachmc'1 can also be used by middle-screen ship as a highly effective passive and act*' ASW platform whenever the SH-60B 1 tasked to perform surveillance or targe ^ ing missions in the outer screen. PlacUV the H-3/SH-60F on middle- and inns'" screen aviation-capable ships would he V reduce carrier deck loading, and wou bolster the skill with which these avia tion-capable ships conduct helo ope^L tions. When required, the H-3/SH-d ^ could be called in to the carrier to supP° plane-guard taskings. ,
The SH-2F, which many assum® would fade into the sunset as the H- became operational, has risen to pr°^- itself as the multimission platform choice in Persian Gulf escort operatin'1^ The H-2, often referred to as “the m°s bastardized aircraft in the naval invfn tory,” has been resurrected by usi -
Modular
form been
assemblies that allow it to pcr-
a variety of missions. The H-2 has
lo ,outfitted with the AAQ-16 forward e . vjng infrared radar system, the Mav- missile, minehunting equipment,
2.75.
Ward-
With
lrnProv
mch rockets, and .50-caliber for- firing guns, it has also been flown
an acoustic processor that greatly es its ability to perform its primary
Mwuuj to no puuiaij
tivS]10n: The H-2 provides a rela
, e*y low-cost, versatile platform to con- visual identification and the sur- ar>d subsurface attack missions. It d be employed in the outer screen to
ash W'th the LAMPS-m helo> serving me visual identification and attack at °rm after the SH-60B acquires and
<Juct the face anc mould be
ically to carry out special operations. In addition, these helos could also be deployed to perform visual identification and attack missions in the outer screen.
Since the HH-60H is currently slated for assignment in the Naval Air Reserve, employing these helicopter detachments as a regular part of the CVBG would serve to integrate the reserves into the regular Navy. If the Naval Air Reserve is unable to meet this commitment, the HH- 60H and its mission should be shifted to the regular Navy and a new warfare specialty should be created for combat SAR/ special operations pilots. Thirty operational aircraft are needed to support 15 CVBGs. In addition, extra airframes will
,Js'fies the contact. To perform the at-
ASwmiSSi°n—aS we" aS *^e tracfifi°nal
g . and antiship surveillance and tartly ® missions—effectively, at least With6 ^A^pS-I helicopters should deploy q every CVBG, BBBG, or SAG.
,ne mission all fleet helicopters reluc- H-2^ Perf°rm is combat SAR. The H-3, r0ns Pilot.
Ptisi
’ and H-60 fleet replacement squad- now offer rudimentary training to ' and aircrewmen in the complex SA^'°n- The need for a frontline combat bc„ /sPecial operations helicopter has
hen
been c°mb;
.fwill fly 18 HH-60Hs. These aircraft t0 se sPecifically tasked and will train atjQ PP°rt combat SAR and special oper- batas forces. To provide adequate com- twr. AP/special operations capability, a
recognized, and the HH-60H has ordered to serve as the primary at SAR vehicle. The Naval Air Re-
‘WO-;
Nk
operations capability, a aircraft HH-60H detachment should
Tbe" UP and deploy with every CVBG. aUti i Should a*so assist in the plane guard bg ogistics missions. These helos could Cached from the battle group period-
be required to support training and other taskings. Accordingly, at least 40 airframes should be procured.
As the U. S. Navy helicopter has evolved and grown into mission areas other than unopposed ASW, equipment to support these additional taskings has been borrowed from other communities. Over the objections of a few progressive thinkers, helicopter weapon system procurement generally has been based upon the cozy image of a helicopter under the carrier combat air patrol (CAP) umbrella, performing unopposed ASW operations against a cowering submarine. Unfortunately, the Navy’s potential adversaries have not accepted this image. The opportunity for a U. S. Navy helicopter to meet a Soviet helicopter on the high seas without the benefit of the CAP umbrella has increased dramatically with the development of BBBGs and SAGs. The advent of submerged-launched surface-to-air missiles also presents a threat to the unarmed or lightly armed Navy helicopter.
The Navy must dismiss the archaic
notion that its helicopters will always operate with CAP cover. Every U. S. Navy helicopter must have a respectable defensive capability against surface and air threats. At a minimum, this requires forward-firing guns of sufficient caliber to discourage Soviet Hormone and Helix helicopters from taking easy shots. These guns should also be designed to engage and sink a small boat. The door-mounted M-60s on some U. S. Navy helicopters today do not provide an adequate defensive weapon against small patrol boats or Soviet naval helicopters.
U. S. Marine Corps Cobra helicopters have been outfitted to fire the Sidewinder air-to-air missile. The SH-60B/HH-60H and the newly ordered SH-2G should also incorporate a modular package assembly for firing the Sidewinder. This requirement would be critical for helicopters supporting a BBBG or SAG, when no organic fighter cover is available.
As stated, the H-2 has been equipped with several modular packages to enhance its multimission capability. All these packages should be prepositioned, preferably on the carrier. If space is not available on the carrier, then a suitable forward deployment site (Bahrain, At- sugi, Cubi, Sigonella) could be used. This would allow for rapid installation when that particular mission tasking is anticipated. These modular packages should be designed to fit on both the SH- 2F/G and the HH-60H, providing the battle group commander with maximum flexibility to meet mission tasking.
All LAMPS helicopters devote a majority of their deployed time to surface search and identification. In the wartime scenario, the additional step of targeting for surface-to-surface weapon (Harpoon) launch is added. This requires most U. S. surface combatants to close within 70 miles for the best employment of weapons. Rather than steaming a high-value surface unit into harm’s way to execute a weapons launch, the helicopter—with its maneuverability, relatively high speed, low-radar profile, and relatively low cost (compared with the cost of a frigate or destroyer)—becomes an ideal attack platform. A hostile surface target should be engaged at least 100 nautical miles from the friendly surface force.
The LAMPS-III with its APS-124 radar and ALQ-142 ESM system gives the helicopter/surface warfare team the capability of pressing the attack at more than 150 nautical miles. The SH-60B can best be employed to provide targeting data outside of virtually any hostile sea- based surface-to-air missile envelope. This information could be transmitted to a silent attack platform—either an H-2 or
b'H:
Lieutenant Ireland is a 1981 graduate of the
was
commissioned through the NROTC program- completion of flight training, he reported to HSL
After this tour, he transitioned to the SH' . LAMPS-III. He is currently assigned as the aviaf
the HH-60H equipped with the Maverick missile, or another SH-60B equipped with the Penguin missile.
Imagine the hostile surface commander’s surprise when, while 150 nautical miles from the nearest U. S. surface unit, he suddenly comes under attack by a coordinated salvo of three or more Maverick or Penguin missiles, with no warning other than ESM of an APS-124 radar cross-fixed at more than 100 nautical miles from his ship. U. S. Navy helicopters should have the weapons to carry out this type of attack, and the equipment for such attacks is available off the shelf today. If the intra-Navy political muscle that was exercised to acquire the recently installed ALE-39 and ALQ-144 defensive systems could be exercised again to acquire the Maverick and Penguin missile systems, Navy helicopters could be performing the surface attack mission in the Persian Gulf and on the high seas today.
Finally, a comprehensive plan is urgently needed for command and control of helicopters in the CVBG, BBBG, or SAG. Traditionally, the responsibility of assigning helo tasking (outside of the plane guard and utility missions) has rested with the LAMPS element coordinator. The individual who actually performs these duties varies from battle group to battle group; however, the responsibility most often falls on the shoulders of the destroyer squadron (DesRon) air operations officer (frequently a P-3 naval flight officer) or the senior surface captain with a LAMPS detachment embarked. In the latter case, the detachment officer-in-charge (OIC) usually assumes the responsibility for all LAMPS tasking.
This system of scheduling helicopter operations is archaic and should be changed. The DesRon air operations officer rarely understands fully the capabilities of the airframes he is responsible for scheduling. The detachment OIC is a better choice to do this scheduling, but he has other responsibilities on which he should be concentrating.
Responsibility for tasking helicopter assets should rest with the battle group commander. All battle group helicopter tasking, including plane guard, should be issued from a helicopter element coordinator (HEC), a resident expert on helicopter employment assigned to the battle group staff. This expert would be responsible for controlling 15-20 helicopters in each battle group. He should be a post-command commander, senior enough to fight the political battles on the staff to ensure that helicopters receive their fair share of support and to ensure that helicopter operations are integrated with other air assets. In areas of the world where a CVBG cannot operate, such as the Persian Gulf, the HEC should be assigned to the regional commander. He should have the responsibility for planning all helicopter operations and coordinating the interface with land-based fixed-wing assets.
In those instances where a DesRon deploys as a SAG, either in the company of an amphibious unit, a BBBG, or an ASW special operations squadron, the HEC should be a mid-grade lieutenant commander helicopter pilot with a helicopter warfare specialty.
This billet should be reserved for those officers who have displayed command potential. The HEC tour would allow highly motivated, mid-grade helicopter pilots the opportunity for a meaningful disassociated sea tour. It would also provide these officers an opportunity to gain qualification as an officer of the deck under way—a “ticket” for afloat command that is difficult for most helo pilots to obtain during at-sea periods while assigned to a detachment or squadron. But most important, this billet would provide a knowledgeable, tactically astute offi°eJ who would be able to get the most out o the SAG’s sole air assets.
The future of U. S. naval helicoptef warfare has never looked brighter. By recognizing the capability of the helicop' ter to perform in mission areas other than logistics, plane guard, and ASW, Navy can press the attack on hostile surface forces farther from its own surfuce forces. The cost of equipping the helicop ter fleet with the offensive weaponry tcj perform the attack mission is minim3 when compared to the cost of replacing3 frigate or destroyer that has to cl°se within a hostile vessel’s weapons range t° execute an attack. The cost of outfitting the helicopter fleet with a capable defen sive system is also minimal when const0 ering the cost of replacing a SH-60B th3 goes into harm’s way without the we°P ons to protect itself from hostile Patr craft and helicopters.
The opportunity to make the best °se of national defense dollars through pr°P" employment and outfitting, and enlig11 ened command and control of U. S. N° " helicopters is upon us. Perhaps the cv® ning newscasts of the year 2000 will te us how well we have done.
UnWer'
sity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he
35.
where he completed two Western Pacific and Ocean deployments flying the SH-2F LAMP’ -
itio*1
safety officer at HSL 40, the East Coast Fleet placement Squadron, at NAF May port, Florida-
Freeing the Fox______________
By Lieutenant Commander Christopher Walter, U. S. Coast Guard
The wooden trawler rolled gently in the swells 65 miles east of the twin capes guarding the Chesapeake Bay, heading slowly toward Thimble Shoal Channel, the only deep draft exit from Hampton Roads, Virginia. The trawler would arrive at Cape Henry just after midnight and would proceed to lay its cargo of a dozen mines. The captain was confident that his boat was not listed in the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) computer used by the federal government to track suspected drug smugglers. Otherwise, a positive EPIC check would guarantee a
Coast Guard boarding. Moreover, he had been assured that the Coast Guard buoy tender Red Cedar (WLM-688) was working in the northern Bay, and the cutters Aquidneck (WPB-1309) and the Point Arena (WPB-82346) were conducting law enforcement operations too far south to be a threat.
A week earlier, the freighter Anthena, carrying more than her cargo manifest showed—rubber and cocoa beans, left Salvador, Brazil, bound for the Norfolk International Terminal. Three days before arrival, her local agent dutifully notified the Coast Guard, Customs, 0,1 Immigration. The Coast Guard’s c('"' puter check revealed no prior port sap ■ deficiencies and no apparent conned1 to a communist-bloc nation, and the thena was classified as a “no boaru- Four miles east of the bridge-tunnel cOfi necting Norfolk with Virginia’s easte shore, the 631-foot freighter slov’e ’ came about 90°, and stopped direct \ over the tunnel, where her crew scutt’ the ship to block Thimble Shoal Chan',e ^ Two days later, the battle for Westd Europe erupted. Warsaw Pact armies