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Th
C|eare recent Soviet leasing of a nu- (SSr\ir°Pelled 8u*ded-missile submarine newto India marks the beginning of a ’•on Cf-a 'n nava’ warfare—the prolifera- °n, °‘ nuclear submarines. Heretofore, cleat- bvc natl°ns that have built nu- ■rhoSeSUbmarines have operated them.
•an arms deal, following the _ °i modern tanks, combat aircraft, clud^ Variety °f warships. The last in- destrQ ntodified Kashin-class missile sile (//ers. Tarantul and Nanuchka missis'
tfai
•nsfer
•v,
except for nuclear propulsion UpoClear weapons.
n arrival of the submarine, named a by India, Indian Prime Minister
I95. nations are the United States (since ajn 1-Soviet Union (1958), Great Brit- (19^4^3), France (1971), and China Can h
tiUc]acla plans to acquire as many as ten toarear'Pr°PeHed submarines, according leas(^ent Defence White Paper, while at the r, ree °’her countries are considering Purchase of such craft, lieq e. Soviet Union transferred a Charge F 3SS SSGN to the Indian Navy in arrananuary 1988 under a four-year lease riVc|l8enient. The Charlie-I SSGN ar- itig ^ ln India in late January 1988, hav- cificCcfn transferred from the Soviet Pa- Viaj. ’’cut to an Indian crew at Sovi1V?tok- The transfer was the latest
.... .'Indi;
and
sii°rVettes, Petya light frigates, Osa MteSe|C boats, and Kilo and Foxtrot ditj0rielectric attack submarines. In ad- ttiodif! ’be Indian Navy has ordered three sr, Kresta Il-class missile cruisers ngUr .e Soviet Union, although the con- Ptoj, 10n and scheduling details of this t)eam are not clear.[1] ahhs fPlte ’bo size and scope of Soviet hUclearansfers t0 India, the leasing of a lava| r submarine took most Western D5QsexPerts by surprise. From the early C°tW Wben Nikita Khrushchev opened Vet) -.a, and military relations be- ^ti0ns‘hc Soviet Union and nonaligned se|] , ’ ’he Soviets appeared ready to W^er, or give away all types of
Rajiv Gandhi declared that “our officers and men will gain valuable experience in manning and operating a vessel with nuclear propulsion. ... All modem naval powers have acquired or are trying to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. We will not be left behind.”
Mr. Gandhi left open the issue of whether the Indian Navy will obtain additional nuclear submarines. He made it clear, however, that India sought no nuclear weapons for the submarine, which can be armed with SS-N-7 antiship missiles and torpedoes fitted with nuclear warheads.
On a strategic level, the SSGN provides the Indian Navy with the capability of long-range, high-speed deployment of a submarine; on a tactical level, the SSGN is fast (but noisy) and can fire eight underwater-launched SS-N-7 missiles with a range of approximately 35 nautical miles.
While India is the sixth nation to have nuclear submarines, the seventh will probably be Canada. The Canadian government is actively seeking nuclear- propelled submarines, with Great Britain offering the Trafalgar-class nuclear- propelled attack submarine (SSN) and France the Amethyste, a modification of the Rubis-class SSN.2 The U. S. Navy opposes the proliferation of nuclear submarines, and the United States may be able to block British sale of SSNs to Canada because of the terms of agreement signed in the late 1950s when S5W reactor-plant technology was transferred to Britain for the first Royal Navy submarine, the Dreadnought.
However, on 27 April, President Ronald Reagan told Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney that he would permit Britain to transfer sensitive nuclear tech-
The Soviet transfer of this Charlie-I- class SSGN to India took many Western experts by surprise. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi commissioned the submarine Chakra in Visakhapat- nam in February. The proliferation genie is now out of the bottle.
committee in March, the U. S. D>re' of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral
liam O. Studeman, stated that Arge as well as Brazil and India “have nU'
iche.
oft[2]*
nuclear technology.
oil1
of Un°
to join the Soviets as suppliers sea nuclear craft.
nology to Canada if Congress approved such a move. The U. S. Navy can be expected to lobby Congress to oppose the concession with the submarine community claiming that the U. S. nuclear propulsion technology given to Britain in the 1950s is still highly sensitive. Also, the Canadians want nuclear submarines to monitor U. S. as well as Soviet submarine operations in Arctic waters that border Canada. (Not being raised, of course, is the possibility that U. S. shipyards could build those submarines for Canada, another moved opposed by the U. S. submarine community.)
The alternative candidate for Canadian service is the Rubis-Amethyste. She is a relatively small craft (2,670 tons submerged versus 5,300 tons for the Trafalgar). The Rubis is now in series production in France, which could enable the Canadian government to take delivery of a unit already on the building ways. The first Amethyste SSN was ordered in 1984, and a total of three are now on order for the French Navy.
While neither French submarine has an under-ice capability—a key requirement for Canadian SSNs—the designs probably could be modified with minimal impact. (This was done to provide the later U. S. Los Angeles [SSN-688]-class submarines with an Arctic capability.) Furthermore, since the French nuclear program was developed without any U. S. assistance, the U. S. government will be unable to stop a French sale. However, the high costs of acquiring and operating nuclear submarines are a more likely obstruction to Canadian ambitions. And both Canadian opposition parties have stated that they would not support procurement of nuclear undersea craft.
In the past, several other nations have expressed interest in obtaining nuclear- propelled submarines. The Netherlands Navy sought U. S. assistance in the late 1950s in building its own class of nuclear attack submarines. The U. S. Navy, at the urging of Admiral H.G. Rickover, opposed such assistance and the project died. (The U. S. government did transfer nuclear antisubmarine weapons to the Netherlands Navy.)
More recently, Brazil and Pakistan have expressed interest in nuclear-propel- led submarines. Brazil has become a major arms manufacturer and is now constructing a German-designed Type-1400 diesel-electric submarine (to complement two similar boats being built in Germany). A Brazilian SSN program would probably see the lead or all units built in France, possibly with later units built in Brazil with French propulsion plants.
Pakistan, alarmed by the rapid in
creases in Indian military forces, is aS said to be seeking nuclear submarine^ although it has no capability to bw them. The Pakistan Navy now has 0 French-built, diesel-electric submafl^ of the Daphne class and two ot Agosta class. Reportedly, Pakistan ordered two more of the latter design ^ be built in Spain with French techm assistance. A Pakistani SSN Pro^raoI1 would thus rely on French construct11 and propulsion plants. . a|
And, in addressing a congress10^
V
:ntina
icleat
propulsion programs to ultimately „ velop their own nuclear program*1 [3] [4] However, the current economic ProBntjna and political instability in Argetl |C make such an effort highly question' for the foreseeable future. 0f
One of the most intriguing examp e “interest” in the acquisition of nuc submarines did not, in fact, occur. 'n 1984, while Israel was seeking t0c struct diesel-electric submarines in United States, the Israeli naval atta*
Captain Micha Ram, and Secretary Navy John Lehman were talking ^ (0 Washington reception. Ram re^er[tlnaiy the submarine issue. Lehman joK U. responded that he was planning t° . fer some older U. S. nuclear subm to the Israelis. , re-
This remark was overheard an ^ ported to Jane’s Defence Weekly, v' ,| declared, “The USA has offered two nuclear-powered submarines^ t Israel has rejected the proposal- s Lehman neither offered the subnet ^ nor could he have done so with0 expressed permission of CongresS’ 0f cause of the laws limiting the trans
let
The proverbial genie has been 1 ^} of the jug by the Soviet transfer ^ Charlie SSGN to India. More may <°e0f as the Indians seek naval dornina e the Indian Ocean region. At the ^ time, the psychological wall aga'h j transfer of such craft to other n°na nations—especially Brazil and Pak1 has been breached. The French g°.^ ment, in particular, is ready and ,ef.
118
Proceedings
/June
[1] June 1988
'For a recent analysis of Indian naval deve 0 see Ashley J. Tellis, “Banking on ^ctf^gg.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 148-152. pS U'J'
[3]See LCol John E. McGee, Canadian Force ^97. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1988, PP' o3ts.
[4]“Israel declines America’s nuclear-powerc ^0
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 February 198 *