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pee M. Vlahos, pp. 63-67, May 1988 Pro^dings)
Stark threatens to leave the more fundamental, systemic failures dangerously
nnrhprlreH
pi Ulenant Commander Nicholas L. the' f0’ ^Navy—Dr. Vlahos echoes 'ned IC'a' investigation reports he exam- iook’ and, like those reports, neglects to the °ey°nci the ship’s lifelines to expose bill Strategic failures that share responsi-
) y *or the Stark (FFG-31) incident. f Ambi,
'w s;
ro! Provide a “neutral presence.” This fjq . hsnslates poorly into operational Ciiji lrernents for ships at sea. Dr. Vlahos oV(.(|IZes the Stark severely for being pr y concerned about initiating any ajrc °^ative action against unidentified ®ut *t is natural that a feeling of to r'l’11 wiH prevail on a ship attempting ^ h a vaguely defined role.
$tQrh< uous r°*e: essence °P the
to nS missi°n was apparently political:
t[(o'l rules of engagement
pro,si; The Stark's ROEs authorized air„ h’°nate defense measures only if an
Di^.demonstrated “hostile intent. Hi 'Hrfl
Cerning “hostile intent” in a Gulf war
S. *rac|i warplanes conduct frequent lghts> fire on unidentified radar
1PS
ietT ’ and refuse to answer radio chal- J0jq s ls not as easy as it sounds. The ^o* Chiefs of Staff (JCS) tacitly ac- I00 , ehgcd this flawed prerequisite a sup i aher the attack, when they issued dC]cerncntary ROE guidance and sent a prcvtUt'0n to Iraq to establish measures to
Sis"*
inadvertent engagements with the Gulf.
„ c
the <>n>^ex chain of command: Faults in ttijp^hjcture of the hierarchy that com-
^tructuri ^
b|ani_e^ the Marine force in Beirut were the security lapses that in
-to,11"”"
'5M for . .
deStroa**°wed a suicide truck bomber to later ^ **le Marine barracks. Five years iCs ’ *^e chain of command, from the ships operating in the Persian Cq^ ’ls heavily layered and indirect. This ated ex organization undoubtedly cre- Un<j lnc°nsistencies between the orders Opgr* which Middle East Force ships
the
*ated and the real-world conditions in
Gulf.
acing the blame squarely on the
“The Surface Navy is Not Ready”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 34-40, December 1987;
R. R. Nebickcr, pp. 16-20, January 1988; J. G. Stavridis, G. D. Pash, and R. O'Neill, pp. 2830, February 1988; J. M. Rodgers and D. W. Meadows, pp. 20-24, March 1988; M. B. Sturgis, C. Johnson, and L. R. Brown, pp. 2223, April 1988; W. G. Carson, p. 18; J. K. Kuhn, D. G. Clark, M. Miller, R. R. Harris,
D. M. Norton, W. D. Sullivan, R. B. Shields, and J. L. Byron, pp. 80-93. May 1988 Proceedings)
Lieutenant W. P. Holland, U. S. Naval Reserve—The furor over Captain Byron’s article seems unlikely to disappear. He was more right than wrong, but his reasoned opposition seems to have a case of “doth protest too much.”
I spent two years flying in the fleet, three years as first lieutenant and administration officer on board a guided-missile cruiser, and recently returned to naval aviation. I offer the following points: Standardization: It is true that current written guidance goes well beyond engineering operational sequencing system (EOSS). Well beyond. The surface community has failed to winnow that guidance down to usable form. Most copies of battle orders and other tactical guidance seem to be written with a view toward an eventual board of inquiry rather than actual use in combat.
I never carried anything on board an aircraft that I could not fit into my pocket. While comparing complex ships to relatively simple aircraft is often a case of apples and oranges; naval air training and operating procedures standardization (NATOPS manual) is distilled, usable knowledge that pilots trust and, most importantly, use. I have worked with battle orders, the tactical action officer (TAO) handbook, the class tactical manual, EOSS, the tactical aid (TacAid) series, and NATOPS in the course of my career. For quick use in a pressure- packed situation, NATOPS is the type of
Contents:
The Stark Report
The Surface Navy is Not Ready
Crossing the Beach . . . And Bringing ’em Back
Maverick Marine
The Link to the Boomers
Double-Duty Tankers
Memo to Carrier COs
Remotely Piloted Vehicles
No Right to Fight
Respect the Enlisted
Revolution at Sea
The Triad After INF and START
The Navy in 1987
The Saudi Navy: Out of Harm’s Way
Part-timers or Trainees?
No More Bandaids
Countering Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles
We Need A Little Dash and Daring Fiddling While the Ice Grinds The Soviet Non-navai Force Multiplier Mine Warfare Focus
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
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►Institute a real administration ^ tion campaign. Review the 5215 wi . goal in mind—if something does no ordnance on target, it is not neede ■
Captain Byron’s thesis is not ten^0n
offer lessons to the surface comm1
old. It is as contemporary as the al
iners
five-i
there is enough room for a
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publication to choose; none of the others even comes close. The surface community has lessons to learn here.
Training: Lieutenant Commander
Stavridis is proud of the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) School Command’s effort to change the historical practice of throwing officers at the fleet to sink or swim. But these gains do not render SWO division officer course graduates the equivalent of their peers graduating from the nuclear power pipeline or the Naval Air Training Command. While their contemporaries learn to operate real reactors and fly real aircraft, prospective SWOs are huddled in classrooms absorbing endless lectures.
The preference for canned, predictable training continues in the fleet. Quite simply, the surface community doesn’t train the way it will fight.
The SWO community grossly underuses the advantages available in contemporary simulator technology, crying poverty. The 20B4 simulator (and its frigate contemporary, the 20B5) is not cheap, but neither is it prohibitively expensive.
The most valuable, intensive, and, hopefully, true-to-life training 1 received in two-and-one-half years on board ship was one week spent connected to a 20B4 van on the pier. The van allowed a number of officers to practice tactical decision making in a stress-filled, high-tempo environment, relying on their instincts, knowledge, and whatever quick-reference publications were available.
Finally, Captain Byron rightly points to the USS Stark (FFG-31) as an example of what may be the most vexing problem within our entire service, regardless of community. But the surface community seems to suffer the most from what my Aviation Officer Candidate School drill instructor would call a lack of proper mental attitude.
Lack of Proper Mental Attitude: Surface warfare officers work hard, often too hard. They burn up and burn out their officers and sailors by failing, as an institution, to set priorities.
The community seems to have lost sight of its reason for being—to sail in harm’s way. For many officers, the route to success appears to be paved with 100% scores on canned exercises; perfection in rote inspections concentrating on minutiae, to the exclusion of the big picture; and an antiseptic vision of the Navy as “The U. S. Navy, Inc.”
Despite the constant invocation of the words “surface warrior,” too much of a surface officer’s time and energy is dissipated with assist visits that are not war related. Too much time is spent on repeated inspections by arcane shore agen
cies, and a numbing grind of papers left untouched by an ineffective adnnn^ trative reduction program that was aim primarily at aviators, anyway. ,
There is rarely time to read the tacti ^ manual, much less tactical memoran and the like. There is little incentive ^ read tactics when the driving f°rce ^ daily officers’ calls is the complet,on various pieces of bureaucratic trivia- Here are some solutions that w give the SWO the time necessary 10 vote to his profession: ^
► Slash the number of inspections^
ship should undergo no more than ^ inspections each year (one per quarte. Naval Technical Proficiency Inspect1^ an Operational Propulsion Plant E*a ^ nation, and two at the type comman discretion. teC(
► Readiness squadrons should Pr°, f their ships rather than acting as Su'“f^nSt shore agencies. Submarine squadf (e(j which ensure boats are left undistr. by concerns not central to opera - the Stark. There is much the subnwt^ and aviators can learn from the slj g( warfare community at the °Pctf ot[on level. Careful examination and aci°jners of some of the practices of subm ^ ^ and aviators will assist the continum- juvenation of the surface Navy-
“Crossing the Beach . . • An Bringing ’em Back”
(See M. J. McCartin, p. 109, February 19 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Joe U. S. Navy, LAMPS-Ill pilot— ant McCartin gave some brilliant 1e into the Navy’s combat search and ■_ (CSAR) mission, but I believe u^pS- estimated the capabilities of the LA ^ III aircraft. The SH-60B is by *^vy’S most capable helicopter in the arsenal today. LAMPS-Ill does have ^.| legs, at least four hours, and the caP .. ity to carry auxiliary tanks. Only tw° g senger seats are available, but, ace ^)S, to briefs with sea-air-land (SEAL) ^
team and, if necessary, four res- aircrewmen. Threat countermea- currently are employed on several
rward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) on B LAMPS-III would improve the
isavy s CSAR capability. And the FLIR already compatible because the fames share a common bomb rack. A nt-gun anci Kevlar seats for protection, |j|^Scnt features on the Army H-60 . ckhawk, would be necessary. Train- l ls the only requirement left in order to ino63 v'ahle CSAR platform. That train- ^ ts already in place at both LAMPS-III ^ readiness squadrons.
could exist without much difficulty. ere is one other advantage. Because HI already is deployed in the
n,
Vje°,,,ai R. Butler, Esquire—The re- the 6r’ ^*r' Barrow, referred to my fa- ^ r’ General Smedley D. Butler, as “a beh' sh>ning integrity.” The reasoning V|e^nd this surely is known to the re-
thc
and
eL but he contradicts it repeatedly in review. I refer to certain statements
t|,er?^cr to him, nor does any passage in ^ook justify any such description.
SEAL cued %es
E-AMPS-III aircraft. A global positioning Jstem might not be required because of e navigation provided by a data linkable platform and because the SH- can fly faster than 150 knots. v- ^AMPS-IH lacks certain combat sur. Matures that would be necessary if q ls to become a viable CSAR platform.
bain off-the-shelf purchases could ^eatly enhance LAMPS in this area, j nout the added cost of designing a var- f s°fely for CSAR. Putting the F/A-18
the
N;
atrfr.
0r^l of the capabilities listed above exist
nr-'
Umps
the^f 8rouP or, more often than not, on and r°nt '‘nes’ could respond quickly decisively tomorrow, if necessary.
Derick Marine”
(S
p£e C' R. Barrow, pp. 123-124, January 1988 Pro^dings) *
conclusions reached by Mr. Barrow: ter f Barrow’s use of uncomplimentary era)S to describe certain facets of Gen- (w Butler’s character simply are not f0rnc °M in the text of the book. To state, for examPfe> that my father was a “re- veed drunk” can be attributed only to a t0hasty reading of the pages devoted me6 So'calfed “Williams incident.” No eye ”Cr °f his family or any associate to f ^ould have used the term “drunk”
NiPn“ regard to treatment of tj0ra8Uans during the Marine occupant Grenada, the review does not Ses".tl0n the gold medal (still in the pos- fim/°n °f his family) awarded to General cr in 1912 by the citizens of Grenada to thank him for his “correct conduct” during the occupation. General Butler also was awarded two Chinese ceremonial “umbrellas of 10,000 blessings” by two different Chinese communities in gratitude for services rendered during his assignment in China from 1927-1928.
The review does not mention General Butler’s own book, War is a Racket (Torrance, California: The Noontide Press). His book and his many lectures against war and in favor of keeping the United States out of foreign entanglement during the last years of his life would negate the reviewer’s inference that General Butler was a militaristic Rambo.
I hope Mr. Barrow will read again the splendid work of Hans Schmidt and perhaps modify some of his opinions.
Ben Fuller Fordney—Clay Barrow’s favorable review of Hans Schmidt s book, Maverick Marine, states that it was “exquisitely documented.” But it, and subsequent reviews, contain grossly unfair comments about my grandfather, Major General Ben H. Fuller, the 15th Commandant of the Marine Corps, who served the Corps with honor and distinction for almost 49 years on active duty.
My purpose is not to denigrate the distinguished record of Major General Butler, whose service to the Marine Corps speaks for itself. However, recent accounts of the circumstances surrounding my grandfather’s appointment as Commandant in July 1930 are misleading.
It is common knowledge that General Butler and my grandfather were less than friendly competitors. However, what disturbs me and my family is Mr. Schmidt’s assertion that my grandfather’s appointment “was also characteristic of a trend to appoint what sociologist Morris Jano- witz called ‘almost’ completely unknown organizational men as service chiefs during the peacetime era of the late 1920s and 1930s.’” Mr. Schmidt goes on to refer to C. S. Forrester’s observation of the British military politics, to wit: “The pliant, subservient boot-licking type of General who always wins promotion under civilian control.” Mr. Schmidt implies that this is an apt description of the rationale behind my grandfather’s appointment as Commandant.
This slur on General Fuller’s career is consistent with an equally unfair comment in Lieutenant Colonel Merrill Bartlett’s Proceedings article (November 1986, p. 72) that refers to my grandfather as a “Naval Academy graduate with few powder bums on his uniform. Fuller appeared as the incarnation of Butler’s most despised officer—a headquarters toady
and an Annapolis Marine to boot.”
My grandfather spent nearly seven years at sea on a dozen different vessels, including the USS Atlanta in 1894 and the USS Columbia (CL-12). During the Spanish-American War, he participated in the battle of Novaleta in the Philippines. In fact, we have a copy of a dispatch written by his commanding officer warning him of an impending attack.
As a captain, he took part in the siege and capture of Tientsin during the Boxer Rebellion. He was commended in Navy General Orders for this “Gallant, Meritorious and Courageous Conduct” in battle. The man with “few powder burns on his uniform” came out of Tientsin with a bullet hole in his hat. My grandfather also served as Assistant Commandant prior to his appointment as Commandant.
This is hardly the record of an unknown headquarters “toady.”
In his book, Mr. Schmidt thanks the Butler family for their cooperation during his research. My family certainly would have been equally cooperative had we been approached. If we had, perhaps our contribution and a more scholarly approach to my grandfather’s papers would have helped Mr. Schmidt avoid some egregious errors and misrepresentations about my grandfather’s career.
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officers, is an article by Michael Palnj in the winter 1988 issue of the Naval & |
College Review. To those who expect t a mankind will somehow get through crises with technology alone, he says:
“The successful commander in chic will be he who, like Nelson, has r mained the leader, the inspirer, organizer, and the indoctrinator, w . . . expects his communications
fail him at a critical juncture but * ^ has forged his subordinates in*®
‘Band of Brothers,’ who will fee' 0 find, and destroy the enemy-
“The Link to the Boomers”
(See R. B. Kelley and W. J. Holland, pp. 4151, January 1988; J. L. Kelleher, and G. T.
Hayward, pp. 168-169, March 1988; A. F.
Campbell, p. 139, April 1988 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Jerry Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired)—It is interesting that the participants in this forum so far have been an academic (Kelley) and an Air Force officer (Kelleher) on one side, with two retired admirals—a submariner (Holland) and an aviator (Hayward)—and an active-duty admiral (Campbell) on the other. That lineup is fairly representative; over the years some academics and the Air Force have been concerned about the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems, while many in the Navy have contended that we should put “all our strategic systems at sea.” Both sides have always had merit.
This debate over the reliability of communications with the boomers is part of a long contest among various factions over the role of the SLBM in nuclear weapons affairs. The contest between the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Navy was intense in the late 1950s, with the SAC pushing hard for the creation of a strategic command, which would have given the Air Force operational control of the emerging SLBM systems. The resulting compromise was the creation of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at SAC headquarters. Having lost the contest to gain control of the SLBM, SAC headquarters tried to degrade the obvious high survivability of the launching submarine. But the SLBM system was and continues to be accepted as a significant addition to the so-called strategic arsenal.
As one studies the evolving strategies for nuclear warfare or the prevention thereof, one has to give considerable credibility to Admiral Hayward’s prediction that the “fixed-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is going to become obsolete.” That prediction could have been made by SAC leaders in the early 1960s, some of whom worked hard on a "mobile Minuteman” concept, the idea of putting the ICBM on railroad trains to improve its survivability. Although the Minuteman ICBM has long been considered the best strategic weapon in the stockpile, its increasing vulnerability lends credence to Hayward’s prediction, particularly since the accuracy of the sea-based systems continues to improve. Captain Kelleher’s defense of his service is commendable, just as Admiral Hayward’s predictions have validity.
Kelley’s discourse on the inability of communications to support a nuclear war-fighting strategy is most appropriate. The most valid criticism that can be made of our nuclear warfare policy makers and strategists over the years has been their insistence on establishing strategies before the technology necessary to support them has been developed. As a result, regardless of the distaste that many have for “assured destruction,” that strategy has turned out to be the only viable one for a policy of “deterrence.”
The SLBM system added greatly to the feasibility of this assured retaliatory strategy, but we have never had the capability to counter many enemy nuclear forces and, until some major breakthrough is made in antisubmarine warfare, never will. A flexible, limited-options, warfighting strategy probably will require outstanding command-and-control systems as Kelley suggests, but it will also require weapon systems of a nature different than those either Kelley or Holland discusses.
If I remember correctly, from a nuclear weapons targeting point of view, the SLBM is the best weapon for assured destruction of the urban/industrial target system. In the strategic arsenal, the best counterforce weapon, providing the target remains fixed in its location, has been the Minuteman. For warfighting, the best weapons have been those that are forward based, especially the Pershing-II and strip alert tactical aircraft. Because the arms control community negotiated away the best weapon, the Pershing-II, we are back to assured destruction as the only real strategy for deterrence.
Kelley’s concern about the interactions of strategy and technology is probably the best lesson in the entire discourse. I hope that some of our leaders, both military and civilian, take it to heart.
Finally, I was particularly fond of Holland’s discourse on “one-way” communications. The concept of communicating on the basis of “special trust and confidence” is not understood or appreciated by many, particularly the academic who has never been in a tight military situation, especially one involving combat. “Zip lip” operations in carrier air warfare, routine tight electronic emission procedures,' and communication principles of the “silent service” are foreign terms and concepts.
One of the goals of a SAC crew was to plan a mission so well that they could take off, conduct a couple of nighttime inflight refuelings, and complete a lengthy mission without any voice transmissions, just trust and confidence in the others to be where they were supposed to be when they were supposed to be there.
One of the best discussions recently of the “trust and confidence” principle of communications, particularly for naval
“Double-Duty Tankers”
(See B. Fullenkamp, pp. 103-105, February 1988; S. A. Kunkle, pp. 18-21, April 19®» Proceedings)
Major A. P. Avery, U. S. Marine Corps In September 1982, the Navy and the ^ Force signed a memorandum of a| ment that has since been the basis o Air Force’s support for all the NavY s ® a refueling requests. At that time, I **e > Marine KC-130 tactical tanker, sUPP ing the strategic deployment of A ^ Harrier aircraft, to Norway for aj°'nteI-e combined military exercise. There j also Marine A-6 Intruder squadrons ' F-4 Phantom squadrons crossing the lantic with U. S. Air Force KC-13- KC-10 strategic tanker support.
The F-4s positioned to Gander, ^ foundland, as their jumping-off Poin the transatlantic (TransLant) flight- ^ aircraft scheduled to refuel and gui^ ^ F-4 squadron was an Air Force K Inclement weather over the North A tic delayed the departure. .j,e
The KC-10 was not available °a next clear day because it was sche to refuel an Air Force fighter squa ^ and would not be able to get back to Marine Corps squadron for several ' That would be too late for the M® e squadron and the exercise. A subs tanker was not available. . . ^a,
After completing the Harrier re^uented the Marines positioned my augrn q tanker squadron, composed of R n<j
tactical tankers, in Canada, Iceland. ^ England to conduct the aerial refuc - for the F-4 squadron TransLant. s
In Global Demands: Limited Si
(National Defense University ^
1984, p. 47), Stuart L. Perkins quot®^ Washington Post and the New York 1 and states:
• fji c
“The 615 KC-135 tankers m fleet were procured for the Stra Air Command (SAC) and not for ^ tegic deployment of other forces- any crisis with the USSR, [he
24
Proceedings
ofob'
servation—that is, from the perspech' of the surface ship skipper working v/ an aircraft carrier. Never take the car for granted. Check and double check movement. Despite the care that caw^ officers take to keep escort and supP
muth from Admiral Dunn’s point
an"
Ide
ally
m°ve.
ments and intentions, situations can do arise where this may not be possl Watchstanders must be continu‘
o*'n'
tions. But this applies for more than
mander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), should have first call on these resources to support the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Yet, the entire fleet is insufficient to meet all SAC requirements, which amount to about 1,000 tankers. The proliferation of refuelable resources and the expanding need to use tankers for strategic deployments and tactical operations exacerbate this shortfall. In a crisis, the national command authorities will be faced with a serious problem, choosing between supporting the SIOP and rapidly deploying a force overseas for deterrence.”
Adding 60 KC-lOs to the Air Force’s strategic tanker inventory does make a positive contribution to our strategic tanker resource. But it does not solve the tanker shortfall, and that is an increasing problem with the now-completed Air Force C-141B program making all Air Force strategic transport aircraft (C-141B and C-5A/B) aerial refuelable.
The United States recently also agreed to withdraw 72 F-16 fighters from Spain. If these aircraft are repositioned to the U. S. continent, they too will lengthen the queue for strategic tankers’ support when it is required beyond our shores.
Major M. R. Cobb, a concepts analyst at the Airpower Research Institute, states in a Cadre Paper report (Number AU- ARI-CP-87-3 on Aerial Refueling [July 1987, p. 29]) that “competing requirements among the services and Air Force commands have created a distinct shortfall of tanker assets.”
In any crisis where military force is positioned for potential use there will be claims on the Air Force strategic tanker assets. The first priority for the tanker force is the SIOP support. When the number for that is designated, and some are always required, the remainder of the tanker force will support the various unified commands in numbers approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The commander-in-chief of each unified command will decide what forces he wants supported by the tankers. Different scenarios will put the Navy in different positions in the queue for Air Force tanker support.
The increased off-load capacity, while important, is not a substitute for numbers of airframes. The problem is not the amount of fuel to be off-loaded but having to air-refuel at different places over a wide area in a limited time.
The Cadre Paper (p. 31) cites an article entitled “Modernizing the Aerial Tanker Fleet: Prospects for Capacity, Timing, and Cost” (Congressional Budget Office, September 1985, pp. 23-28) that says, “by 1984 the tanker shortfall problem reached a critical stage but was momentarily reduced by adding the KC- 10. . . . The combined KC-10 and KC- 130R programs, however, will not satisfy the tanker shortfall forecast for the next 15 years.”
There does seem to be a tanker shortfall. The Air Force Tactical Air Command seems to be concerned, as are the Military Airlift Command, the Navy, and the Marines, who are training and planning to fight as task-organized Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). In most cases, the MAGTFs will require strategic air refueling for deployment of their fixed-wing assets.
The size and tempo of peacetime, crisis, or war deployments will affect the supply and demand for the Air Force tankers. The added mission of refueling Navy combat aircraft in a theater of operations may be one more critical straw on over-burdened camels’ backs. Former Navy Secretary John Lehman’s request for land-based tankers does not seem unreasonable, nor does the current Navy request for dedicated tanker support, if they are being asked to build tactics or strategy for world-wide implementation that requires land-based tanker support.
“Memo to Carrier COs”
(See R. F. Dunn, pp. 96-99, December 1987
Proceedings)
Captain Robert W. Bruce, U. S. Navy (Retired)—With minimal adaptation, Admiral Dunn’s pointed “memo” could and should be required reading for every prospective ship commanding officer (CO). In fact, I’ll go a step further and state that the article should be clipped, underlined, and highlighted for key points, annotated by the reader where applicable—and saved. The officer should then take out the article at least once a month and reread it, so that he will not lose sight of the important points. During the day-to-day turmoil that every commanding officer faces, it is all too easy to lose sight of the forest for all the trees that must be dealt with.
Nothing that Admiral Dunn says hasn’t been said or written before, nor do I believe he claims to be original in his observations. What he has done is to cull the more important lessons—not only from courses for prospective commanding officers and textbooks, but from his own hard-earned experience—and to succinctly and emphatically express them in an easy-to-read article. He has done what I am sure many former commanding officers, myself included, have wanted to do—take the time to write out the rnan' commanding-officer “lessons learned and to pass them on to their successor*- There are two thoughts I wish to add to the admiral’s excellent article. The fir*1*1 the importance of ensuring that y°u watch stations, both in port and esp" dally under way, communicate and e° operate with each other. Unfortunate};’ the archives are replete with the desenp tions of incidents where one of the prinCf pal causes was a breakdown in comm1®1 cation between the bridge and the com information center, the lookouts, ore' , the main propulsion watch, in which persons involved failed to inform the c"P tain that a discrepancy existed. The > that any two watch stations are compe^-" with each other, rather than working 1 the same team, must be averted. • My second addition is on a back a.
ships informed of the carrier’s
drilled on how to anticipate carrier rn° ments and how to react when they de an unexpected movement. This un scores Admiral Dunn’s emphasis alertness during replenishment .
i by
ship’s teams; it should be discussed^ the two commanding officers bridge-to-bridge phones, as well- ^
Since the skippers cannot talk over ‘ | operations on a bridge-to-bridge phone;( encourage “cross-decking” or ship ^
ing between escort/support ship °* js
and carrier underway watchstanders- , amazing how much better an under*'" ing each can develop of the other’s op tions from such visits. And the c ,e manding officers should set the exan r^ by getting to know each other as we, |P possible. They may not have as muc common as their subordinates, s‘^ew|1o carrier skipper is a “brown shoe, r may not be as familiar with his 0 ^ shoe” counterparts, and vice-versa- . the point is that all opportunities to s ^ on the other fellow’s bridge shorn encouraged and taken. ,e(.
The only other point I wish to u|J score is that you constantly show . mind yourself of what your ship’s prlgf pal mission is (write it at the botto* the admiral’s article when you sa.v6(ed and ensure all other efforts are dire toward accomplishing that mission-
banned
aircraft to remotely piloted vehi-
^emotely Piloted Vehicles
p
c01 Steele—The inevitable shift from
es (RPVs) can be a big military step ^ard, allowing the United States to v-e lts electronic advantage over the So- ets- Or it can be just another procure- ij(ent nightmare in which the United ates gets caught up in the more money/ tj re complexity cycle in which we con- ously add costly protective systems to ^original design.
5. .e let this mistake happen with the sj n*ce system in the Vietnam War. The P'e devices were supposed to be ta[ab'e in quantities sufficient to satu- ^ the enemy’s defenses, but they be- ■ • P'e Propeller-driven, expendable dees that the Israelis have used, ours Po\v ^°0rnet*t0 end UP as expensive, jet- °perated by people. vertisements for Beech’s 995 RPV
Collects >ern It’i
°n tt,ern can be, because it depends batt, e electronic environment around the kpve|‘eld. But after you’ve flown the back to your side of the lines, and Wat~l=ed it with a net or fished it out of the £6r> the information is dated, anyway, fe^inly there is a place today for a tr0ni> high-tech RPVs, carrying elects C Countermeasures and exotic cam- su ‘ ;’°meday they will overtake the air taker,0rity role, but for now we should Rpy advantage of the fact that simple and S Can built in sufficient numbers „erUsed to darken the skies over the bat- Cf • Perhap s very simple prop-driven CS’ c°ntrolled by hand-held panels e0u,;-d as near to the front as possible, to t • used when the main intention is r;,dar ot*ler s'de into turning on its aCpu.’0r t0 confuse the enemy’s target dr0nSltl°n capability by sending decoy rtiai(Cs to drop chaff and flares. It doesn’t Cr the battlefield ends up littered
with hundreds of cheap toy-quality drones. If the other side can be suckered into shooting an expensive surface-to-air missile at an inexpensive drone, that is fine. That is called economic leverage.
Our best approach now is to build expendable Recce-RPVs and disposable drones, and to continue research.
more and more complicated and
l^ns've so they were not available in aJe numbers. The same problem may ec| the U. S. RPV program. Unlike the
vices !eetndo
rered machines that will have to be °vered from the battlefield with de-
vices
Ad'
show
C|0a recovery ship that is venturing frSer to the target area than the carrier C which the RPV was launched. at),ud we infer that the recovery ship 1’rn CrCW are as exPendable as the RPV? it sn°t questioning anyone’s motive, but VaneterTls that one of the RPV’s main ad- lages is that a human will not have to
go in u ,
tjenarm s way. Why throw that advan- ite® aWay? RPVs should be throw-away s- Of course, the data a Recce RPV
can be lost in transmission, and
lo<
crC(jl)Cr'Tlanently if the RPV is not recov- Ptohi ^ S ^ard t0 predict how much of a
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“No Right to Fight”
(See N. G. Golightly, pp. 46-49, December 1987; R. M. Hixson, pp. 26-28, January 1988; M. A. Walker, G. A. Bleyle, H. Sage, D. I. Hewitt, L. Melling, and J. R. Gentry, February 1988; J. Perez, pp. 17-19, March 1988; N. F. Caldwell, J. J. Kennedy, B. A. Bell, and A. A. Balunek, pp. 31-32, April 1988; J. Stevens,
C. M. Butler, J. T. Broglio, C. L. Reeves,
D. B. Streich, V. L. Starzy, T. B. Schlax,
L. A. Shimer, R. E. Bryan, pp. 134-139, May 1988 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Jack Gleason, U. S. Navy—The diatribes about women
in the Navy smack of the rhetoric of the Navy’s erstwhile institutionalized racism that kept black, brown, and Oriental sailors in the ranks of galley, mess deck, and cleaning officers. A new prejudice now keeps most women officers in the general unrestricted line (the acronym for this is GURL, pronounced “girl”), and promises to keep career enlisted women at disadvantaged duty stations for most of their careers.
All of the emotional, illogical arguments for denying women equal opportu-
the
nity in the Navy seem to stem from statutory prohibition against women 1 combat. Where will we be when that pr° hibition is put aside? The United State
will finally realize the prohibition actually an attempt by the group in P1
was
ioWer
to
fn&ermarf/m
monTEOison
world leader in GRP technology
to secure that power by denying access perceived inferiors. The following reC ommendations are aimed at elimina11 that institutional sexism. .
First, the Navy should eliminate general unrestricted line. The worne11^ corps of officers keeps women in J., where they cannot gain access to speC1, ized training and billets. Senior Gv officers should be given viable opti°nS. transfer to other line and staff conun11 ties, or the Navy may be liable for 111 sive discrimination litigation. ^
Second, the Navy ought to open nuclear power ratings and submarine d to women. Since the mission of the t ^ ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN)
deterrence, not combat, this move !
put-
consistent with the existing statute thermore, if we believe present rep° ^ there is no place less susceptible to atta than an SSBN on patrol. „
Finally, all officers, including Navy officers, should be recruited j cording to the same ratio of science engineering degrees to nontechnical grees as the men. Failure to do so res in an institutionalized formula for fa*1 . Those officers who do not have the ground to succeed in the Navy’s techn environment will fail.
‘Respect the Enlisted”
(.See M C. Jones, p. 32, April 1988 Proceedings)
Commander I. L. McNally, U- S
Sttfl
Jones’5
selected by the Italian Navy and other Foreign Navies
INTERMARINE's M1NEHUNTERS or MINESWEEPERS
SURPASS ALL NATO's REQUIREMENTS RANGE FROM 350 TO 1000 TONS
(Retired)—As I read Midshipman J- ^ letter, I said to myself, what a percep^ young man! His suggestions were so When I reached the second half of ^lSung ter, I discovered the reason for this y° i man’s insight: he was a former em1 man. ^
1 know I was a better officer m a ^ spects for having been an enlisted }
rather than coming on board ship j,
commissioned officer fresh out ot lege. The criteria for officer cam
,dida^
- jgvri
must be maintained at the highest
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and it is indeed good that opporn1111.^. for enlisted personnel to receive aP^lCef ments to the Naval Academy and 0 , ^ Candidate School have increased s* ^ World War II. And what is wrong making the criteria for selection as a®'s ficer candidate include at least two Y 9 prior experience as an enlisted Per ^
(Continued on paSe
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 28)
redesign its war plans and con-
nveiw1
- - . • voW61
forces. Voters in the countries in
increasingly reluctant to invest ^ fense, would certainly not welcome^ a decision. U. S. voters, for eX jnade- have often complained about the quate defense spending of ^ J countries, which transfers most ^ weight of the NATO war effort 1 United States. the
Deeply embedded in the piiipo^®^ Intermediate Nuclear Forces (iNr ) ^ is the assumption that if there
long, drawn-out, conventional ^ From a naval point of view, sue would force NATO to maintain aj^ prove its current ability to control ^ |(1. But this competes with the nee ja(1d crease land and air forces. Becau-^(bac^ and air services would have to t>£ the first attack coming from t e
eas1. Id UP
“Revolution at Sea”
(See J. Metcalf, pp. 34-39, January 1988; J. V.
Noel and A. Jones, p. 13, March 1988; E. H.
Batcheller, p. 12, April 1988 Proceedings)
Captain Victor A. Meyer, U. S. Naval Reserve—Having just completed nine months of temporary active duty as the Revolution at Sea program director in Op-03, I would add several comments to Admiral Metcalf’s cogent analysis. For the revolution at sea to succeed, the Navy and the surface warfare officer community must be willing to assume a level of risk that comes with promoting change. This is the inherent responsibility of leadership and is particularly important in bringing advanced technology to maturity in naval applications—a process that can be costly and take many years. There are ways to accomplish this in a shorter time and at lesser cost, but this will require the Navy to be more flexible and willing to work with industry. A teaming arrangement, as Admiral Metcalf suggests, with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) and the fleets determining the operational requirements and performance characteristics and the systems commands (SysComs), naval labs, universities, and industry providing the advanced concepts and technology would create the synergistic balance in the “technology push-requirements pull” process that Admiral Metcalf seeks. Such an arrangement would broaden and refine the base of technology applications, thereby improving their quality and reducing the risk.
Industry participation in the early conceptual stages of the revolution at sea can bring diversity, innovation, and valuable feedback to the ship acquisition process before designs are frozen. Thereafter, cost would be the primary basis for competition. What is needed is a full competition of ideas, innovations, and technology applied to a totally integrated ship design process set in the framework of battle force operations. Advances like the Aegis combat system, gas turbine propulsion, and modular construction were largely the result of industry being permitted and paid to participate in the concept formulation stage of the ship design process. The Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer was an example of early industry involvement, and although the ship was criticized for her lack of weapons (a factor largely outside the control of the shipbuilder), it has proved to be a remarkably capable and flexible ship that today is being upgraded with the latest vertical launch system and integrated AN/SQQ-89 antisubmarine warfare suite. The shipbuilding industry’s ideas, together with its estimates of cost and experience in producibility, derived in an environment of competition, are too important to be left as an afterthought of the revolution.
The industries I am referring to are the manufacturers of the ships, aircraft, and equipment that form the hardware and software systems of the fleet. The engineering, manufacturing, and conceptual talent available should be given a greater role in the design of our ships. Despite some promising efforts in programs such as advanced technology demonstrations and nondevelopmental items, the Navy has not been willing to fund advanced prototyping as a means of developing the hardware and software technology needed for our warships. Instead, more and more of the cost of our ships and aircraft is absorbed in an endless stream of studies, reports, and briefings produced by “support contractors” who promote as a virtue the fact that they produce no product. These studies, designed to reduce risk, are in fact simply another opinion, usually not a very informed one, and biased by whoever is paying the bill. These nuisances might be barely tolerable if their cost were not so outrageous, but they invariably extend and delay the development program and can add as much as one-third to the cost. It will take courage on the part of Navy leaders to reverse this trend and fund more technology prototyping, but the long-term gains will likely be the basis for Admiral Metcalf’s revolution.
The risk of a more open, wider ranging ship design process is that the design process will become too politicized. I believe we already run that risk with our current system, which, in frustration, forces shipbuilders, aerospace companies, and equipment manufacturers to circumvent a system that does not offer
them a meaningful, full-partnership _ Even if the open process were more p ically risky, however, I believe it cal\ controlled by strong and able leaders
“The Triad After INF and START”
(See J. L. George, pp. 112-122, May >988 Proceedings)
Cof]'
Admiral Jose T. Merino Castro, mander-in-Chief, Chilean Navy’j' ^ ^ agreement that magnifies the ett Warsaw Pact conventional forces ir' .flt rope will only decrease possibility ^.|| the NATO navies to develop, anse free Soviet resources to further mc the power of its navy. . i)-
It is obvious that the great S°viy^,. vantage in conventional forces, (0 dally land and air, will compel NA {
" ' • pal
strengthening its own conve„iv,ed.
is a
between the superpowers, it
NATO countries have elected to these forces at the expense of na sets. Remember, for instance, h° -j rp- cult it was for the Royal Navy, u.^ cent years the most powerful 0f world, to resolve the Falklands in the South Atlantic. fmilita^
Navies are the only element ot ^jp- power capable of projecting an taining influence beyond the state^el- tiers without provoking antagonis
J5 or dependence. Therefore, this loss , Western naval power, creating an in- 'Jence vacuum that the U. S. Navy, in ?‘te of all its efforts, has been unable to ’'s particularly worrisome.
/he Soviet Union has never forgotten i humiliation it suffered in Cuba; it has //fore persistently increased its naval
S %
er to a degree inconsistent with its ls as a continental empire. It is feasi- ’hat the flag with the hammer and the
Ve the Soviet economy, enabling him ac‘ indirectly to secure Soviet influ- u. trt the Third World, the arena in > lch the East-West conflict will be fi-
However, it is a dangerous
>io
‘“ced
knc
in numbers, even to nothing, but
ttin . wledge to build them again will nain.
tli;i(Oreover, it has been nuclear balance s° far has helped to preclude a direct
%
s
s
. ^^Huclcarization of Europe certainly - s ‘he specter of imbalance in conven-
v>c have today.
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e could take possession of the seas of , "'orld, hoisted atop warships, mer- /t and fishing vessels, and scientific t research ships. At the same time, l v'et naval bases and support points Proliferated in areas where, until / only Western navies had normal routine access.
j( he Soviets maintain an ever-increas- f Presence in Latin America. The es- /hment of Fidel Castro’s regime in i;. a Was just the first step. Then came , aragua, the uprisings in Central [. erica, the attempt to establish another d/rnunist regime in Grenada, and the support of terrorism in South
,Je freeing of resources associated Ujll an arms control agreement in Europe allow Mikhail Gorbachev to carry *he internal changes needed to im-
C
t{ ^ settled. Many think that war in Eu- to, ,s highly unlikely, but it is important l?r/eP in mind that the European prob- ls Just one aspect of the confrontation l}’,’'Cen the Soviet Union and the West, f]: ‘Evasion of Afghanistan, the con- ;,cs *n Central America, and terrorism b|jtni|nor aspects of this confrontation ’ °n the whole, the most destabilizing.
L* ’s undeniable that, from a moral lot view, nuclear weapons should e*ist and every effort to control them Arable.
l01,On to believe that the clock of his- fk Can be reset, forever eliminating the °f nuclear weapons. They could be
Station between the superpowers - the end of World War II, there have Hore than 140 nonnuclear wars that 1\L,]CaUscd a totai °f million deaths, hi,
iioDj],, »
_ Iofces, leading to greater instability
An arms control agreement for Europe will dramatically increase Soviet freedom of action. In Latin America, the Soviets have taken advantage of every chance to increase their presence and influence, because the area is politically sensitive for the United States. Even in the South Cone—the political importance of which would only become evident if the Panama Canal were blocked—the Soviets have shown great interest in establishing closer links. That is the only explanation for their building a fishing port in 1973 in the south of Chile, under Salvador Allende’s Marxist government. The presence of large communist-bloc fishing fleets off the coasts of Chile, Peru, and Argentina is another indication of Soviet interest. (The activities carried out by those fleets go well beyond fishing, as can be proved by the arsenals delivered in the north of Chile.) There also has been an increase in Soviet activity in the Antarctic, plus a variety of diplomatic and cultural overtures, all of which unmistakably pursue the consolidation of Soviet influence.
Indeed, the power vacuum caused by the lack of U. S. interest and influence has not been the only cause of Latin America’s gradual drift away from its powerful North American neighbor. Among the significant factors are;
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For Heading and Attitude:
• RPV’s/Drones • Towed Arrays
• Air and Sea Missiles • Torpedoes
For Detection:
• Magnetic Anomalies in Equipment
• Magnetic Signature of Equipment
• Underwater Ranges to Profile Ships
• Data buoys • Sonobuoys
i FinE SHO0DN6.
According to my information.
What is most disconcerting
entire affair is the picture of four ^ warships circling around trying 10 ' *
down a chicken-wire fence with a caliber rifle. Our naval officers aPPe^ng
questions later. There was no sign
The second, 18 April attack on ^ nian oil platforms at the Sirri and
the
i that
lessons learned last October. The still assigned at least three ships to ^
signment of a Marine demolition tea^le
P*‘
with current nonmilitary demoliti011
tices.
as
signed to the mission was warrant ^
cause of the possibility of a reta*Lfire
number of rounds expended in th . 0\
nsteao
Sid1 |a
:tiCS
:<i
► Foreign debt, which places a heavy burden on regional development and creates a poor atmosphere for understanding
► The loss of force of the Treaty of Rio after the United States supported Great Britain in the Falklands Conflict
► U. S. meddling in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries, arbitrarily demanding compliance with regulations on human rights and other matters
► The increasingly independent attitude of Latin America toward the rest of the world, resulting from its social and economic development and its natural political evolution
There is no way to eliminate the Soviet threat in Europe without combining the removal of Euromissiles with other measures that would provide for parity of conventional forces. Deterrence exclusively based on short-range missiles would be a mistake.
Beyond arms control, it is essential for superpowers to sign agreements that will solve the real problems—the political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. We often forget that it is not weapons that provoke wars, but the political differences that induce one to use them. It is therefore important to find a formula to solve some key political aspects, such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; weapon deliveries to Nicaragua; and Soviet support of subversion and terrorism in the Caribbean and Central and South America. Indeed, Gorbachev has started some domestic reforms in his country, but he has done nothing to change the expansionary and aggressive Soviet foreign policy.
Finally, there is an essential difference between the way the Western democracies and the Soviet Union evaluate time. Democratic systems normally seek those solutions that may provide an immediate political dividend; anything that will yield short-term results gets preferential attention. Soviet communism on the other hand, free from the pressures that distort long-term planning, easily accepts some situations that might seem to favor the enemy, but may advance long-term Soviet strategy. When dealing with European agreements, which will also affect the rest of the world, we must be particularly concerned with world stability and the prevention of Soviet expansion, either now or in the future.
“The Navy in 1987”
(See F. Elliott, pp. 146-159, May 1988 Proceedings)
Robert C. Wyckoff—The report, with accompanying photograph, of four U. S.
MTSONETOSAW
H)6WUM Five inch Rmjnds Fired at close WGEjAR&TSbRTOf DESTROYED,S)R!
warships using more than 1,000 rounds of five-inch projectiles to destroy several Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf on 19 October is painful for the Navy and is one the Navy would like to see forgotten quickly.
First, the operation was economically unsound. I do not propose to research the production cost of a single five-inch round; I estimate it to be $500. Adding the cost of the propellant container and the delivery cost, the total figure could climb to $1,000 per round, Let us take the mean of these two figures—$750. For starters, therefore, the United States spent three-quarters-of-a-million dollars just for the naval gunfire. To this, we add the operating cost for four destroyer-size warships. (I will let the Navy supply this figure.) I estimate the entire cost of the operation to be at least $2 million.
If the operation had been well planned, only one ship would have been employed and the scenario would be as follows:
The ship would move in and give the Iranians sufficient time to abandon the platforms. Then she would open fire and destroy any platform structure capable of housing weapons that might return fire. Since the target would be at point-blank range and stationary, 10 or 12 rounds should be sufficient. The ship would then move in and put a demolition team on the platform. The team would sever the structural supports to bring the rig to the bottom within 30 minutes. If a demolition team was not available immediately, the operation would wait for one. The people at the California Institute of Technology who design such oil platforms (and, upon necessity, demolish them), use this method routinely, and can destroy a platform in no more than 30 minutes.
If, however, time was of the essence and the operation had to be accomplished immediately, but no demolition team was available, then a second scenerio could easily be initiated. The ship would silence all means of returning fire as before, and then nose up to a platform. One end of a cable length of three-inch, 6x37 or 6x61 steel rope then would be attached to several vertical structures on the plat- to the bow anchor handling gear the ship would go full astern. ^ steel rope has a breaking strength - than one million pounds. According ^ the ship acceleration curves f°ua <■ Naval Shiphandling by Captain • ^ Crenshaw, Jr., (Annapolis, MD- j Institute Press, 1975) starting ^r°nleiing in the water, the ship would be tra ^ some six to eight knots after a ^ length. At the time the strain came 0 cable, one of two things would hapr
1. The platform would fall
2. The cable would part
My money would be on number • .,
abom 1
u.s-
.22
-.................................................... ......
be wedded to shooting first ana y : i .... -m cion oi <* inventiveness, ingenuity, or profit-'®
- i tne»
locations support the conclusion ^ U. S. Navy has not benefited Pf0 jqavy tralize a single target. However the other target appears to be covnpa .
In all fairness, the number of sh^P
: a) eum1
Iranian naval response. The nava ? ^ly also appears to have been used pr0f against platform structures capa^ fiO1 shielding returning gunfire, a jt- against the platform support struc ^ self, which would result in the
tion of the platform. 0f the
No official mention was made rtacK-
i the atia .f but apparently three vessels, one, directed gunfire against the ^ cation. It appears that overki aj0 have not, as yet, been entirely eraeCjures from our standard operating pr°c
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come from high-status thereby would present a members of this social status groUP^ose
senior petty officers who, by
Wester”
these
volve ourselves. We must learn
ies
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“The Saudi Navy: Out of Harm’s Way”
(See S. Blanton, pp. 145-147, March 1988 Proceedings)
James P. Lynch, University of Connecticut—The problems in the Saudi Navy that Commander Blanton refers to are culturally based, generated by new concepts coming into conflict with traditional Saudi values. In addressing some particular problem areas, we can see the probable social implications of some of Commander Blanton’s suggestions to increase the “effectiveness” of the Royal Saudi Naval Force (RSNF).
First, the seafaring experience of Saudis has been of a secondary nature, both in actual experience and in social status. In the past, seafaring was associated with trade (of secondary status), conducted by sedentary town or city dwellers (also traditionally held to be of secondary status). Both were looked down upon by the dominant Bedu’ (Beduoin) clans and tribes of the Arabian desert. The male’s ideal role model was the warrior whose exploits were spoken of in verse and whose voice was respected in council.
Changes in Arabia during this past century have both preserved and altered this role. The warrior status is now associated with service in the Saudi National Guard (which protects Saudi families). Political status is associated with the coveted position of sheik.
The newness and the low status of seafaring affect the ships and crews of the RSNF. That the older the ship is, the older the crew is is one of the navy’s problems. Yet by Saudi ranking, both receive higher respect and status than newer crews and units. This would be a major problem in implementing crew rotation. To move an officer, petty officer, or deck rating from a high-status ship to a new one would lower the individual’s status. This would be an affront to family esteem and family members would have to take action to remove this disgrace. We can imagine the effects that the onset of large-scale crew rotations would have upon the tightly knit Saudi society.
Maintenance—that is, motivating the Saudi crews to undertake some of the upkeep—is another problem. For a Bedu’ or a member of a family that claims a Bedu’ heritage, the performance of culturally defined low-status tasks would be an insult, not only to the individual, but also to his family honor. As Commander Blanton notes, the function of yard maintenance (light bulb changing, etc.) falls upon non-Arabs. As in the oil-producing section of the Saudi econ
omy, such tasks traditionally fa" ^ lower-status groups—Shiites and 1 ported contract labor. c.
Specialization is a hallmark of the ^ cess of contemporary Saudi society- is reflected in the organizational max
of the RSNF’s schools. To conirn. n such a school is a high-status P°s.* ^ (somewhat analogous to that of a P0*1 ,
sheik). To remove an officer’s conljcra prerogative by placing his school un chief of naval education would, ° ^ again, reduce the status and estee.oUid both the individual and family- (K * be remembered that most Saudi o ' ^ families-) threat to
The same situation applies
standards, should be teaching m -gp schools instead of the contracted to ^ 3 nationals now doing so. But to ren, i^r senior petty officer from his ship t 3 ship, older crew) and to place hn11 ^j. lesser status role (new school, new ^ ^ ors) would create major problem-* .( area where the RSNF can least at 0 ^ Care of female dependents an dren is, perhaps, the most sensitive jS The role of women in Saudi s0,C' n0r. linked closely to family status and The care of dependents is a PalT>jare to sponsibility. No outside entity can ^ intercede without running the risk ^ e%- honoring the male members 0 . .sthc tended family. Obviously, this af‘e length of RSNF deployments. jo
Therefore, we must not atte r^, impose systems and concepts tl>a_^ to perfectly logical to us upon a soc .£S whom they are not. This principle ap^j not only to Saudi Arabia, but also to^ -p- regions where we, as a nation, 11 ^s.
voive ourselves, we iiiusi Inea
fer new ideas, concepts, andtec ,,oXvin- peacefully to other cultures by a the accepting culture to frame °rta„ce the parameters and content of accep .j Only then can a truly effective Saudi Naval Force emerge.
“Part-timers or Trainees?
(See R. J. Feeny, pp. 75-77, February
Proceedings)
Commander Fred Gaebler, V- ti Reserve (Retired)—If the regular^^ a active forces feel the reservist is a -st is trainee, they are wrong. The re Sval> usually a person with a lot ot U$U' experience and skills. The resery1 ^ ^ ally is a stable individual who lSoUntef' years older than his active-duty sef' part and possesses a great pride m vice and is loyal to his country-
|jall the duty by whatever name you *> but training will always be foremost
lth reservists.
More
Bandaids”
A. M. Smith, pp. 69-74, February 1988 feedings)
^shiptnan John Sprengler, U. S. I am concerned about the lack of Ponsiveness in providing quality Navy lcal care to active-duty, dependent,
and
%ei
Pity
for this article would have been “We Need a Lot of ‘Dash and Daring.’ ”
The most common barrier to any “dash and daring” is the leadership view of “I got mine, you get yours.” Those who aspire to such audaciousness must be aware that venturing beyond the barriers posed by superiors may get them into trouble when these risks bring other than total success. But there is no substitute for the moral courage that true leadership requires, just as there is no substitute for the experience of being part of a well-led
organization. The article clearly enunciates the direct relationship between both.
Robert A. Grimes—On page 94, Proceedings states the USS Hornet (CV-12) was the carrier that took Jimmy Doolittle and his B-25 to Tokyo in April 1942. However, that carrier was the USS Hornet (CV-8), because the CV-12 was not built yet.
Thank you for the correction, because I was there that stormy morning.
retired communities. The current otype of the Navy medical commu-
is that it is “one big, unconcerned *aucracy.” Because there are few . 'bed naval medical doctors and many
jents, such a view seems quite erstandable. v n's excessive workload imposed upon <r°ctors means that patients may not So^lve the care they deserve, leading I e active-duty personnel to choose to hav6 *be Navy sooner than they might t,.,. ' Overworked physicians, also frus- Ijj. | w>th existing conditions, are more nj( y to leave the naval medical commu- | and enter private practice.
Kav° truW bake care of its own,” the fu ,. must receive increased medical Me i'n® S0 Ibat itcan add personnel to the prio1Cal Corps. This must be a top Navy
“id.
ff
°untering Coastal Defense ruise Missiles”
I E. Rogers, pp. 49-55, September 1987;
A New Modular
Ste
P« pp. 13-17, March 1988 Proceedings)
{) ^eflc*nt Commander R. J. Gajan, Jr., 'I'm ij ^av>’—Commander Inskip stated to , bMS Glamorgan is the only warship *** survived a direct hit from an The «that exploded. But this is not true. tw0p ^ Stark (FFG-31) was struck by lot X°cets- The warhead of the first did T^^Plode, but the second warhead did. hoc,arC like the Glamorgan, survived
siv„ rSe °f good damage control, aggres- c tirr" *
lighting, and a well-trained crew.
“We
Need
Little ‘Dash and
pp. 94-97, April 1988
y'riief it
'hu/,uU Maintenance Technician Ar- Sjesias, U. S. Naval Reserve—It the to read an article that covered spectrum of what leadership e"ces ^e- Given my leadership experi- ’ ^ Can only suggest that a better title
bring’
£*C. A. r°Ceedings)
Abel,
Key features in this newest system provide: Full simultaneous active/passive operation in hull mounted and/or VDS, high and low frequency options, advanced modular signal processing, compact size 7KHz VDS, coherent linear FM signal processing, improved detection/range/relia bility/maintainability, and autotrack.
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Where Technological Innovation Becomes Reality
“Fiddling While the Ice Grinds”
(See N. C. Venzke, pp. 114-117, December 1987 Proceedings)
“The Soviet Non-naval Force
Multiplier”
(See N. Polmar and R. Robinson, pp. 66-69,
December 1987 Proceedings)
Captain V. R. Milano, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Although I support Admiral Venzke’s position concerning the need for new icebreakers, I believe that he fails to stress adequately that the Navy needs these vessels to support our national strategy, and that recent advances in icebreaker design increase the icebreakers’ capability to fulfill this mission.
It has always been difficult for me to reconcile the operational requirements dictated by the maritime strategy with the almost complete inability of our surface naval forces to operate in oceans that are frozen over for most of the year. While we stress our ability to operate below the Arctic ice and to fly above it, it should be obvious to those within our planning councils that there will be times when— to support these submarine and air operations, as well as selected missions—we must be able to operate successfully on the surface. Such a capability requires that we have appropriate ships and experienced personnel.
The high Arctic and many ocean areas significant to maritime strategy are the exclusive operating regime of the Soviets. They not only have well-designed surface ships for such operations, but experienced personnel, a supporting technology base, and a very capable industrial support base. In my judgment, the United States cannot even come close to matching this broad operational capability. Icebreakers could help.
I also take issue with the way in which Admiral Venzke dismisses some new developments in icebreaker technology as “just confusing the issue” of the U. S. Coast Guard’s need for new icebreakers. His reference to the West German THYSSEN/WAAS bow form as an “appealing but unproven design” is unfortunate and shortsighted.
It is probably true, as he suggests, that the Germans are not considering converting their Antarctic research ship, the Polarstern, to incorporate the THYSSEN/WAAS bow form. But the point is irrelevant, at best. The Polarstern is basically a research ship that was designed to have limited icebreaking capability. She is not, nor was she ever intended to be, a polar icebreaker. Since she was designed before
86
After the Soviet icebreaker Mudyug received her THYSSEN/WAAS bows s*lt performed better than the designers and owners expected.
the THYSSEN/WAAS hull form was fully developed and tested, use of that type of hull in her design was never an issue. To date, the ship has proven herself to be an excellent design, and she has successfully completed many Arctic and Antarctic research deployments. Her icebreaking capability was never a major factor and, therefore, there is no real motivation to modify her to enhance this capability.
The THYSSEN/WAAS icebreaking hull form is a development that does merit attention, especially in the context discussed by Admiral Venzke. I have been associated with the Thyssen Nordseewerke and the Hamburg Ship Model Basin for a number of years, and have participated in the development and analysis of this hull form. I can assure Admiral Venzke, and others interested in our icebreaking capability, that this hull configuration has long ago ceased to be an “unproven design.” It has undergone extensive analysis and model tests in ships of all sizes, in all types of ice, and in all sea-state conditions. These analyses and tests continue to show that the THYSSEN/WAAS icebreaker hull form is superior in every way to the conventional icebreaker designs that Admiral Venzke discusses.
The enhanced icebreaking and ice transit performance of the THYSSEN/WAAS hull was impressive enough to convince the German government in 1980 to incorporate this type of forebody on the Baltic icebreaker Max Waldeck for full-scale testing in ice. The converted ship was very successfully tested in the Baltic during the 1981-1982 operating season and her performance corroborated previous test results. Her success with the THYSSEN/WAAS bow led the Soviet Government to convert its icebreaker, the Mudyug, to incorporate such a bow. The
Mudyug, delivered to the S°viets j 1982, was designed and built in Finflf
and, at the time, represented
the best <
Ch6
the icebreaker state of the art.
converted in West Germany
during
fall of 1986. After conversion THYSSEN/WAAS icebreaker,
the
the
Mudyug was tested extensively 1 ^
fjords of Spitsbergen and in the adjacent to Franz Josef Land. wt. exception, her performance waS^ standing, satisfying all contract P1
erfof
the
mance requirements and exceeding
lers and »
predictions of the German desig
expectations of the Soviet owners *
jnerS'
■for"1
Today, the Mudyug continues to P® ^ effectively as a convoy escort ice in the White Sea area of the Union. eap
Experience over the past severJ^,jtj1 a has shown that an icebreaker
THYSSEN/WAAS hull can move <■ ■ j£e
uously through ice that is more than
-'Anal ct
as thick as ice that a convention*" * and equal *
breaker of equal size horsepower can overcome.
In
oth«r
with
words, a THYSSEN/WAAS ship ^ only half the required install^
horsepower can operate
in
thickness ice as a conventional icebre ^ of similar size. This provides is such 60% savings in operating fuelcost • ac- performance can mean that a ne z j0„ quired ship, despite its specified requirement envelope, may be smaller and less expensive. ^ when appropriation dollars for .aC^lVings new ships are at a premium, this is especially attractive. s $
Advanced icebreaking hull i°rl1niake now the state of the art. We need to every effort to examine these nc^ ^
nologies, to understand how
improve our ability to operate in a ; ^ of environment, and to take
advantage
these benefits in our new icebrea
Proceedings
ikers-
^line Warfare Focus’
Sarr>e. The only “exciting” news is
We now have more recent examples
q enant Paul FI. Crissy, U. S. Coast
Hd - Ha
^ast
X
Th,
Guard mission within the naval re arena.
Xhe,
ate a',a Goast Guard be prepared to oper-
^ ^mver’ R- DeStefano, M. R.
.gg ey» and J. F. Tarpey, pp. 31-47, February J- Babcock, p. 25, March 1988; J. M.
^y. pp. 28-31, April 1988 Proceedings)
Q
f!J>nrnctnder S. P. Chepenik, U. S. Navy, f0rn»landing Officer, USS Julius A. fer (FFG-6)—My first reaction to the c*es on mine warfare was that the t^re things change, the more they stay
that
Of u. -
and16 P°wer °f the low-technology mine c0l^e appalling lack of a credible mine “"'ertneasures (MCM) force in an ^twise first-rate Navy.
^ ideas presented in these articles t0e.reievant when I was first introduced ^ttine warfare in 1974. They remained !M^en j commanded the USS Esteem 0-438) from 1974-1977 and served q0ae staff of Commander Mine Warfare i inland immediately after that. Per- °Ur Navy’s outlook and funding for ter d an<^ tttines will change for the bet- sU “ut I doubt it. We may have to lose a Nav l° t*le nciari°us mine before we as a j,, y ar>d a nation take this vital warfare
a seriously.
Li
Y sl -
11 '■‘■—Each article recommends that "’arf Place greater emphasis on mine the pre’ None, however, proposes that Hv j”°ast Guard become more actively inVed in mine warfare through its lead ore Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) th^ pZati°n- Placing mine warfare under dev j"°ast Guard’s auspices within the topping MDZ framework could lead tn0re'ne'tuning of MDZ responsibilities, the .Elective program management of CQa^lnc warfare mission, and a specific p^Coast Guard has a long history of Tit|e Tor national defense. Through tl'attu TT- S. Code, Congress mandated dorj"” a specialized service in the Navy Hh Wart’me or when directed by the Vt fnt' Goast Guard cutters have con- itwa SUch important wartime assigned ■ as convoy escort, blockade, search •ions'ntercliction, and quarantine opera- %;^Utters were outfitted with the fttis . ent necessary to carry out these <j. °ns and counter projected threats, itt aCe the Coast Guard last participated fare j*aj°r conflict, however, naval war, evolved significantly. High- traiSe° °gy weapons, such as antiship to^'ssiles, enable hostile naval units Ke from greater distances and wreak greater destruction. There is neither margin for error nor opportunity for on-the- job training in modern naval combat. Proper equipment and training are essential. U. S. naval forces, including the Coast Guard, must be prepared to operate in this evolving warfare arena. But many Coast Guard platforms are not equipped and many personnel are not trained for these modern naval warfare operations. And the budget cuts make it unlikely that equipment or training will improve anytime soon.
The Coast Guard performs a wide range of warfare missions—anti
submarine warfare, antiair warfare (selfdefense), antisurface warfare, mine warfare, and amphibious warfare (naval gunfire support)—in addition to its traditional missions of law enforcement, search and rescue, marine and environmental protection, merchant vessel inspection, marine licensing, and port safety and security. This range of duties is not beyond the capabilities of a single organization, if that organization is provided adequate resources. But the Coast Guard’s force of approximately 38,500 active-duty personnel and 13,000 reservists is shrinking.
This combination of increasingly complex missions, withering personnel resources, and less money for equipment acquisition, maintenance, and training could seriously degrade the Coast Guard’s ability to do any one job really well, much less be a jack of all trades. Although contrary to the Coast Guard’s “can do” attitude, it may be prudent to reassess commitments and determine what naval warfare mission the Coast Guard can accomplish effectively. In preparing for naval warfare operations, no compromise of excellence is acceptable.
The Coast Guard should, therefore, concentrate on one naval warfare mission and become the Navy’s program director for mine warfare. The Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, who holds the same rank as the Navy’s program directors for surface, submarine, and air warfare, could boost the image of mine warfare. He would become actively involved in the Navy budget process and could better coordinate program requirements. The Vice Commandant would be responsible for coordinating the mine warfare efforts of the other three warfare communities and developing minelaying capabilities. All Coast Guard units would concentrate on mine warfare as their primary naval warfare mission.
This arrangement would yield significant benefits. It would improve the visibility of the mine warfare program and more closely align the Coast Guard with a specialized naval warfare mission. A coherent plan for using Coast Guard forces would increase their professionalism and expertise in conducting naval warfare operations. Several Coast Guard assets could be outfitted as platforms for mine countermeasures and mine laying: C-130s could be configured for defensive minelaying, for example, and patrol boats and newly constructed cutters could be designed and outfitted to conduct mine countermeasures. As fully operational units, each would be logistically supportable and would not have to be towed to any area of operations. Since the Coast Guard operates mainly in the southeastern United States, resources would be immediately on scene if this sea line of communication were threatened.
The costs associated with this proposal must be considered. The Navy would have to provide greater fiscal support for the mine warfare program. Simply transferring an unwanted and underfunded program to the Coast Guard will not solve the problem. The Coast Guard’s responsibility for mine warfare, with its resulting need for more extensive training, would force it to reevaluate and significantly pare down its other commitments.
Too often the Coast Guard has been saddled with new responsibilities but not with the additional resources to fulfill them. The service has grown from within about as much as it can, and cannot take on such an important mission out of hide. Additional personnel and fiscal resources are essential. There must be an orderly transfer of responsibility and resources.. The civilian and military infrastructure of the mine warfare community must be maintained, key personnel transferred to the Coast Guard, and additional Coast Guard billets created using Navy billets as offsetting resources. The Coast Guard must control the program and have the opportunity to make it succeed.
The Coast Guard has the opportunity to focus on the most serious MDZ threat and simultaneously cast off responsibilities that it does not have the resources to meet—as well as missions that will not yield worthwhile benefits in the MDZ. Clearing routes or protecting sea lines of communication is more useful than attempting to seek out and destroy all of the potential mine-laying platforms.
If the administration, the Congress, and the Navy give the Coast Guard the necessary support, a Coast Guard-headed mine warfare program could yield significant benefits.