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destroyer authorized before work stud ... a no
on the first of a planned four 6,000+f
ini°e
The last two Hatsushima-class
Despite strategic and force-structure developments in the region, most Far East nations face continuing financial constraints because of depressed commodity prices, particularly for oil, palm oil, and tin. For example, 70% of Indonesia’s foreign-exchange earnings come from oil and gas, but a high proportion of this income is required to service the foreign debt. Within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), only the economies of Brunei and Thailand appear to be relatively unscathed, while Australasia and Oceania have been forced to exercise restraint and make hard decisions.
Japan: The 1987-88 defense budget exceeded 1% of Japan’s gross national product (GNP) for the first time. It is remarkable that Japan spends so little in proportion to GNP and that it has kept defense spending so low for so long. But because the growth in defense spending has been so slight, the step past the 1% mark does not represent a dramatic turn in strategic defense thinking. In fact, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) has sustained a gradual growth in capability. Political restrictions on the JMSDF still exist; the Persian Gulf situation is a good example. Japanese merchant shipping accounts for a'large portion of the ships at risk from the Gulf war, yet it is politically unacceptable for the JMSDF to deploy to the Persian Gulf to protect Japanese-flagged ships.
The JMSDF is considering procurement of a version of the Harrier V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) fighter, possibly using the British Aerospace Skyhook concept to deploy the aircraft from destroyer-sized ships. The JMSDF’s biggest problem is overcoming opposition to the notion of acquiring
such aircraft for seaborne deployment If the V/STOL concept is defeated, the JMSDF would probably follow more tr^ ditional and operationally effective line of development. ,
Every March since 1981, a new sun- marine has entered JMSDF service, nn^ every March since 1983, a commission^ submarine has been stricken. In MaN 1987, the new Yukishio, ninth boat of I Yushio class, was commissioned and t lead boat of the Uzushio class ^ stricken—after only 16 years in coining sion. Few Free World navies can an°. such a replacement, rather than modem1 zation, program. .
This month, the Standard SM-1 nl^j sile-equipped destroyer Shimakaze a the lead ship of the Asagiri-class gllRLj missile frigates are being commission The Shimakaze is the last guided-misSI metric-ton Aegis destroyers, the firsm which should enter service in 1993- Asagiri class will have the later <’ . suyuki-class frigates’ post-Falklands s superstructures, as well as more moo radar and more powerful propulsion sy^ terns. In 1987, construction begun the first of a planned six imPr°vt Yubari-class 1,900-ton frigates. The pair are to be commissioned in Decem 1989.
countermeasures (MCM) ships will ^ completed at the end of 1988. <■
JMSDF has a force of 38 MCM vessels ^ various kinds as well as seven old n copter sweepers. The latter are to be placed by 12 MH-53E heavy MCM "c(e copters, the first four of which authorized in the 1986 budget. This t°r^ will be augmented by a planned clasS six 1,000-ton, deep-sea MCM ships‘t first to be ordered under the 1989 bud? followed by eight 600-ton minehunle Two 490-ton minehunters, glass-m1 forced plastic versions of the Hatsusii design, were included in the 1 budget. 3c
Japan intends to upgrade its ‘ ^ Orion maritime patrol aircraft with , U. S. Navy Update-III program- year 1988 new-production P-3Cs enter service at Update-III standaf older units will be refitted. g,
China: The development of thc^jq)
continues to be an enigma to V/estc^ observers, despite signs of progress m
Modernization process and the announced ^■rteen Year Modernization Program, to .carried out in three stages. lhe PLAN marine corps force was (.CVlved in 1987, ostensibly to improve astal defense capabilities. China’s Pnl 1987 accusation that Vietnam occu- et> Dongsha and Quandao islands sug- . s|s there are other long-term uses for Uch a capability.
ranee is the leading source of PLAN I lstance. China’s export of weapons to an places further U. S. initiatives for io ^IC*'nS technological assistance in
b,Thc plan is rationalizing its order of s. .> officially reporting that 80 older Thlps have been stricken since 1985.
,,,Cre have been extensive logistic and adrnir■
rema
ln'strative reforms, and some of the lit ,ain'n8 veterans of the officer corps yea ^ '13Ve ^een ret'rec* 'n 'he Past two
characteristics of a new conven- „ 3 exP°rt submarine design, desig- •].aeh the E5SG, were disclosed in 1987. bo design resembles the Ming-class lJu|,tS' the first being launched in 1975 -p, only three of which appear to exist. are6 ^"han (E5SFG)-class submarines the n°W operational, with units of $u fC'ass carrying s*x rather than the four r ace-launched C801 surface-to-surface Wyk'CS tSSMs) reported last year. The the b n ^es'§n 's dearly a derivative of P5SG rather than the old Romeo.
Th
a^nerc are indications that the long- L ."cd modernization package for the thata.;Class destroyers is under way and
the
new weapon fit will include the
^ch Crotale surface-to-air missile
,sAM)
tru,
• If the Chinese wish to produce a
dc . Seneral-purpose ship in the revised n,a ®.n> other modifications to the class '"elude the fitting of multiple C801 em .S’ new dual-purpose guns, and mod- (1 ""'isubmarine warfare (ASW) torpe- x °| LI. S. or Italian design. tUrb. e first of at least four LM2500 gas- in /^"Propelled escorts should appear
•V90- ♦ V-* ~ ~ ~ ii i i i: *
CaPable
gUtlc and carry a modern dual-purpose („ow Production of the various types ?UiH Up to ^‘ve^ °* -fianghu-class are et*-rnissile frigate continues; there H,e^u least 27 in service. Production of bec. relatively simple frigates goes on S()rau*e of China’s limited ability to ab- tbe , technological change and because com- s fiexibility is useful in low-level 'agencies.
el^cr ASW developments in 1987 in- ASfy delivery of three helicopter for y systems, including dipping sonars, duCgf>er Frelon helicopters. China pros 'he Super Frelon indigenously as
the “Z-8.” China also bought two Thomson-Sintra SSI 2 variable-depth sonars (VDSs) for its Flainan-class subchasers. Additional VDS purchases will provide a quantum leap in the PLAN’S coastal ASW capability.
Taiwan: The first of the excellent Dutch-built, Hai Lung-class submarines was delivered as deck cargo by sea, leaving Rotterdam in October 1987. Because of a shortage of trained crew, the second is not expected to leave the Netherlands until late 1988, though she was launched two and a half months after her sister. The Netherlands will not allow construction of more units, so Taiwan will have to look to other sources for the four additional submarines it desires.
Reports suggest the United States will cooperate with Taiwan in producing 6-12 Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-type ships, which will replace Taiwan’s aging destroyers and frigates. The precise fit remains to be determined, although there are indications that it will include the Standard SAM. Pressure from China, however, has caused the United States to balk at supplying Taiwan with Harpoon missiles. Taiwan thus began developing an improved Hsiung Feng missile to fill the gap.
Financial restraints pose questions about the future of the large, but very old, Taiwanese amphibious force. Such a force is unnecessary unless Taiwan intends to invade mainland China. The prospects of such an intervention have been negligible for many years, but whether the politics of “face” will allow Taiwan to renounce the capability remains to be seen.
South Korea: This is a crucial year for South Korea and the Republic of Korea
China recently released drawings of its new E5SG antiship missile submarine (top) and Type-EF5 guided- missile frigate (bottom).
Navy (ROKN). The world’s eyes will focus on the Korean Peninsula during the Olympic Games. Despite hopes of reduced tension between the two Koreas, the ROKN must remain vigilant against politically inspired incursions by its rival navy to the north.
Though South Korea has one of the world’s largest shipbuilding industries, one of the world’s most technologically advanced economies, and a readily identifiable threat, much of the ROKN fleet is of World War II vintage. Late in 1987, a contract apparently was signed with West Germany’s HDW for four 1,400-ton submarines—a long-cherished ROKN dream. Licensed Korean construction may follow. Other initiatives include the planned buy of 12 multipurpose helicopters, and possibly a follow-on purchase of 22 more aircraft at the end of the decade. The contenders are the SH-2F Sea Sprite, Dauphin 2, and Super Lynx, the latter two being the favorites. In addition to an active dipping sonar, the helicopter selected will carry ASW weapons and an air-to-surface missile. The AS-15 and the Sea Skua missiles are under consideration, the Penguin having an outside chance. Any of these helicopter-weapon combinations will confer an important tactical ROKN advantage over the North Koreans when the aircraft go to sea.
As many as five of the Korean designed and produced Ulsan-class 1,940- ton frigates are now in service. Despite the apparent success of these ships and
though it is keeping its options open the type and size of any additional M . ships. Prime considerations are cost a
are
with
mcM
which permit far more realistic practice.
in a 1985 landing accident. The five
E"- •-27 l<>st That
F-27s have been or are being convert
leas1
■ • was
six Wasp helicopters from Britain signed in October 1987. Part of motivation must be improved prosp0 for Lynx or Super Lynx helicopter sa The Wasp arrangement, which ind3 a. technical support, suits the RMN’s s'10.
Taiwan’s Dutch-built Hai Lung-class, diesel-electric submarines were delivered as deck cargo in 1987. The lead boat entered service in October and the second, the Hai Hu (above), in December.
the smaller An Yang Ho class, the ROKN is developing both a larger destroyer type and a new frigate; the latter class might include as many as 19 ships. Both designs will use newly ordered, Korean license-built Marconi radars, Ferranti weapon-control systems, Italian Breda 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, and Rademac electro-optical weapon directors.
There has been some controversy regarding the production of the SK5000- type minehunters, which were based on the Lerici design. Italy’s Intermarine contemplated legal action for unauthorized use and adaptation of their design, but have reportedly abandoned the attempt because of the strong probability of unsuccessful litigation.
North Korea: The North Korean Navy (DPRKN) continues to mount covert operations along the South Korean coast, using its substantial patrol and amphibious forces. Indeed, the DPRKN is essentially a brown-water navy; only two of its surface fleet of some 480 ships displace more than 1,000 metric tons—the two Najin-class frigates completed in the mid-1970s, equipped with the obsolescent SS-N-2 antiship missile.
Series production continues on the Soju-class missile patrol combatant, also equipped with a variant of the SS-N-2. It is likely that the new generation of Chinese antiship missiles will soon be introduced, but the DPRKN must begin large- scale modernization of the craft already in service if it is to retain a credible surface capability.
The DPRKN’s submarine force remains its most potent threat, though primarily composed of Romeo-class boats built in China and Korea. Although the production of small, covert-operations units continues, the DPRKN must soon commence production of the Chinese successor to the Romeo.
Vietnam: Mixed signals from Vietnam about its long-term intentions in the region and Vietnam’s domestic problems— particularly financial—put the Vietnamese Navy in an ambiguous position. It has equipment maintenance problems and, like the other armed forces, it suffers from a lack of manpower, particularly skilled technicians. However, despite technical inadequacies, the navy is capable of asserting Vietnamese interests on the mainland and in the outlying islands, as Vietnam’s neighbors are acutely aware. The navy’s future depends on Vietnam’s relations with its neighbors, especially Kampuchea (Cambodia).
Kampuchea: The primary missions of the Kampuchean (Cambodian) naval forces (PRKN) are to support army riverine operations against the various antigovernment groups and to maintain coastal security. Before 1985, this task was almost impossible with its force of ex-U. S. patrol craft. But in 1985 the PRKN received two Soviet Turya-class patrol hydrofoils and five other craft (all of which may belong to Vietnam). These craft will remain in a reasonable operational state while the Soviets maintain their technical support, but in coming years the PRKN will face the same maintenance problems that bedevil the Vietnamese Navy.
Thailand: Although Thailand’s security situation requires the government to sustain significant defense spending levels, the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has been constrained by economic limitations, as well as responsibilities for border security and riverine patrol. The frigate modernization program has not progressed as well as anticipated. Although the Makut
Rajukamarn received a refit in 1984 aft® a serious fire, she has yet to start planned modernization. The srnal Khirirat is still undergoing her hall- > refit. Despite continued Thai interest 1 acquiring a submarine force, there n been little activity.
The new Ratanakosin-class corvette- are a success. Reportedly, the RTN °r dered three 450-ton ASW corvettes^ based on the Vosper Thornycroft Pr0^ ince-class design. Two will be built ; Italhai and the third in the RTN’s Ban? kok Dockyard. .,
The RTN is also satisfied with its_P8 of new wooden-hulled Ltirssen multij0
mine countermeasures (MCM) S"'P '
as10
ifid
the peculiarities of Thai operating con
tions, particularly the extent of riven 1” work required. Contrary to some rep01.' all four of the older Bluebird (ex-U-
MSC-289)-class minesweepers
limited service. The seriousness which the RTN views the mine threat perhaps best indicated by the recent Pu chase of British Versilite exercise min0.1’.
In 1987, a Fokker F-27 Maritime forcer patrol aircraft replaced an F
ted
launch Harpoon antiship missiles- ^ many as 13 Bell 214ST helicopters a also being acquired.
Malaysia: Despite the tight fiscal p° cies of the Malaysian Government-
Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) is d°'^ what it can to improve operational s * dards and is developing base facilit>e* the eastern regions of the country- ( RMN is considering the acquisition' the lowest price possible, of a train * submarine to serve also as the base long-term expansion into new const ^ tion. The most likely source for sue unit would be Britain’s Seaforth Gr°U(j(| which purchased the submarines 0<lC and Walrus from the Royal Navy f°ra and export. If Malaysia obtains sue^_ boat, operational capabilities will be s ondary to training. Besides enhanc - submarine expertise, the boat could ° raise ASW standards within the sur 3 force.
A contract for the transfer of at
term budgetary predicament. None
ofd>e
are
BrfCr'.°d °f considerable expansion as nei looks to enhance its surveillance
itnd
and
MlS’s frigates or offshore patrol vessels **s) has a hangar or extensive heli- ?°Pter support facilities, thus Wasp emotions at sea are likely to be for lim- lted Periods.
The RMN’s new Muystari-class OPVs .e Proving to be very useful, as are the Ur Leria'-class minehunters, which are O Used for patroling. Overall, the is in good shape for the next few ^ars- However, many of its units, nota- y the thoroughly refitted, but elderly, a°sPer Thomycroft 103-foot patrol craft nd the frigates Hang Tuah and Ralimat, „ require modem replacements in the decade.
rune': Royal Brunei Malay Reg-
a ®nt Rotilla (RBMRF) is on the brink of
defense capabilities within its oilgas-rich exclusive economic zone. e RBMRF plans to buy three 75-meter Ul)iStsile boats. The RBMRF’s front-line PatfS t*1C th,cc Waspada-class missile 'Varf' boats, received new electronic gUiiare suites and two twin machine
the °l *nc'uded in the 1987 review was flr 'nauguration of a damage control and I'ghting simulator in 1986. The well- b|y Tpcd Muara Naval Base will probasil ?xPand to support the enlarged mis- boat force.
Nav*«gapore: The Republic of Singapore sjx >(RSN) is preparing for the first of c0l)Urssen missile corvettes; now under dUeStruction in Germany with delivery bjjil,n. 1988. The other five ships will be cej ln Singapore. Singapore also re- W* h,ur E-2C Hawkeye airborne early |g^lng aircraft from the United States in ■ The air force is reportedly examining maritime patrol aircraft designs, including the P-3C Orion, the Fokker-50 (an F-27 derivative), and the DeHavil- land DASH-8.
The Philippines: In 1987, the Aquino government faced continued communist insurgency and disaffection within its own armed services. About 40% of the country’s foreign currency earnings is required to service its international borrowing, so the country’s economic woes are unlikely to lessen.
Under these circumstances, the Philippine Navy (RPN) has been unable to modernize within its force structure. With many of its forces devoted to internal security, the RPN is likely to continue its hand-to-mouth existence for the immediate future. The Philippines’ more modern assets, such as the three Fokker F-27 maritime reconaissance aircraft, are largely occupied with counterinsurgency work.
There are indications, strongly encouraged by the Philippines’ neighbors, that the RPN is interested in bilateral and multilateral exercises. However, a substantial materiel modernization program is imperative.
Indonesia: Despite financial constraints imposed on defense spending by the depressed national economy, the Indonesian Navy has significantly enhanced its fighting capability. It is embarking upon its most ambitious program to date—the construction of as many as 23 2,500-ton frigates at the PT PAL shipyard in Surabaya. The frigate design, designated FSG-90, is in the process of finalization, with a number of foreign consortia in competition.
A third ex-Dutch Van Speijk-class frigate, the Yos Sitclarno, was commissioned in 1987, and a fourth will follow. There are indications that the Indonesians hope to acquire either the remaining pair of this class in Dutch service or two of the soon- to-be-deleted British Batch III Leanders. Although the latter are likely to be cheaper and available sooner, the Van Speijks received half-life modernizations, and the Leanders, carry some obsolescent systems.
Despite Indonesia’s desire for at least ten additional high-performance submarines, it is likely that the current attention to the surface fleet will delay for some time any increase in the size of the submarine force from two Type-209s.
Later in 1988, two modified Tripartite mine countermeasures ships will enter Indonesian service, with two more likely to follow. These ships will be the bare minimum required to clear the approaches to Djakarta and Surabaya if the need arises.
Fiji: One result of the Fijian coups was expansion of all arms of the Fijian Military Forces. The navy created the Second Patrol Boat Squadron with four new units, the first of which were placed in service in 1987. Plans reportedly include expansion of its very limited amphibious and aviation capabilities. Material additions to the force are likely intended to bolster internal security and create a semi-commercial, income-earning transport capability. Because of Fiji’s fragile economic situation, the armed forces will have to help pay their own way.
A potentially significant loss to Fiji was the cessation in 1987 of Australian and New Zealand military assistance. In addition to withdrawing military advisers, Australia is reviewing the Pacific Patrol Boat program, which would have awarded units to Fiji, but which may now be reallocated to another Pacific Forum country.
Papua-New Guinea: Despite the political turmoils of 1987, Papua-New Guinea displayed a robust, but realistic, attitude to defense, moving to define relationships with Indonesia and Australia.
The country’s defense force is scheduled to expand, particularly its long-term naval capabilities. Rather than reduce the base at Manus, as once expected, the government intends to maintain that base and establish additional facilities at Kieta in Bougainville and at Alotau.
The first two boats received from Australia’s Pacific Patrol Boat program, the Tarangau and Dreger, were operational by the end of 1987. If economics permit, Papua-New Guinea may look for more sophisticated craft to replace the older Attack-class boats.
Australia: The 1987 Defence White
New Zealand: In the past couple
Australia plans to build six Kockums Type-471 submarines (below), the first to be delivered in the mid-1990s. The first of 16 S-70B-2 Seahawk helos for the Royal Australian Navy flew in December (right); two were accepted in January 1988.
COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD (KOCKUMS)
Paper, which received wide domestic and international support, eschewed the essentially negative “denial” policy postulated in the 1986 Dibb Report, instead promulgating a policy of “self-reliance.” For recognizing Australia’s commitments to wider regional security matters as well as within its own area of direct military interest, the White Paper has received the support of Australia’s allies, and the disquiet expressed in 1986 has been stilled.
A number of major force structure decisions made in 1987 reflect the directions that Australian defense policy has taken. In June 1987, it was announced that six Swedish Kockums Type-471 submarines, equipped with Rockwell combat systems, will be built in South Australia, the first of which should be delivered in the mid-1990s. Two more Type-47 Is, equipped with closcd-cycle propulsion systems, may follow.
Australia and New Zealand are codeveloping a new surface combatant project. Eight ships will be built in Australia for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and four will be built for New Zealand. The three contenders are: the MEKO-200P, the Dutch M-class, and the British Mini Type-23. Two designs and their associated building consortia will be placed in direct funded competition for the final selection, formally christened the “ANZAC Ship Project.” Twelve ships will probably be built at two Australian yards.
Mine countermeasures projects are receiving considerable attention. Two prototype catamaran inshore minehunters are undergoing trials; if successful, at least four more will be ordered. (Work on one began in advance of the formal order.) The craft of opportunity (COOP) program is showing great promise as an inexpensive, but capable, form of readily mobilized MCM. Sea King helicopters began conducting preliminary minesweeping trials in 1987.
The Fijian coups highlighted the importance of an adequate transportation capability for the army’s operational deployment force. There have been suggestions that Australia should acquire a helicopter-capable logistic support ship to supplement the helicopter landing ship Tobruk and the transport/training ship Jervis Bay.
Four catamaran survey launches for inshore surveying were ordered in 1987, the first to be delivered in 1988. The RAN is considering the acquisition of a second replenishment ship, although simpler and smaller than the Success.
In September 1987, the RAN moved closer to a “two-ocean” basing policy, requested in the White Paper, when the submarine Oxley was base-ported at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. Other units should follow as the infrastructure of the base is expanded.
In addition to tight financial c°n straints, a principal long-term RAN c011, cern is manpower, particularly in view 0 the independent approach to so m"n' major projects on an unprecedent scale.
years, political events in the South'^* Pacific have underlined the import;:"1 of New Zealand’s maritime role. Zealand’s 1987 Defence White Puff’ clearly influenced by the 1986 Austral'" Dibb Report, at least partly reflected emphasis. Of greatest interest to m"J^. Western powers was the reaffirmation the country’s anti-nuclear stance, w"1 is bound by law and appears to be gain"1- broad popular support in New Zeal"11 ' The government’s defense policy eI? phasizes presence and reach in the Sou west Pacific. The new replenishment s" r Endeavour, nearing completion in Son Korea, will extend the range of the R°y New Zealand Navy’s (RNZN) four frl- ates. The RNZN will receive four n" surface combatants in return for its P3" ticipation in the ANZAC Ship Pr°jee with Australia. This project will enh"11^ RNZN capabilities by replacing the 0 Leanders, and bolster Australian-^3
r
Zealand unity. As a hedge, however. October 1987, the New Zealand Gov#® ment contracted with a British dew firm to study a service-life extension the two newest Leanders, to keep m operational well into the next centuO The White Paper also called for a ® gistic-support ship to provide air-cap" transport for the New Zealand Army Rapid Reaction Force. It is likely that t project, which envisages converting^ large merchant ship, will receive P'J, priority. The White Paper also called 1 a mine countermeasures capability- nancial considerations will proba mean that the RNZN will acquire a cf3 of opportunity.
Commander Goldrick is serving as the ASW 0 ' in HMAS Darwin, and Lieutenant Jones is serv'"^ an instructor at the RAN Surface Warfare Sc . ■ Both officers have written extensively for Pr°L[^ js ings and other journals, and Commander Goldn . the author of The King’s Ships Were at Sea, P lished by the Naval Institute in 1984.