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Seawolf Model Completed
^UniSys recently completed construction of a 100-foot test-model of the se- , ^SN-21 nuclear-powered attack submarine at Southwest Re-
cont *nsb,ute 'n San Antonio, Texas. The battery-propelled, computer- lJSero^ed» free-swimming, large-scale vehicle (LSV) Kokanee will be field t0 s*mulate high-speed maneuvers and measure the expected flow els T°Ver submarine to an accuracy unattainable with tethered mod- ,o lHhe Kokanee is reportedly the largest autonomous submersible in the Navy ’ ant* 's Probab|y tbe *"lrst sucb test veb'c'e t0 be uset* hy the U. S.
As such, it is reminiscent of the Albacore, authorized in 1950 as a
control test vehicle for future high-speed submarines. At that time it appeared that the Navy could build a very fast submarine (using either a nuclear or a closed-cycle power plant), but it was much less evident that such a craft could be rests controlled at high speed.
hU|| at tbe David Taylor Model Basin showed that a short, relatively fat
sub, 0rm ’ ' ’ ' ‘ " ’ ’
3nd°re teSts demonstrated the accuracy of the David Taylor predictions attack0"vmced the Navy to adopt the short fat hull form for production
fe|a|?e SSN-21 represents a reversion to the Albacore’s length-to-beam Cont [lsb'P- Published drawings suggest that it will have unconventional t'l'Ued SUr^aces tbat will require special tests. Moreover, given the con- effj emphasis on silencing, it is important to measure not only the
was most efficient, and was adopted to give a battery-propelled
I1'arine the speed expected of future nuclear craft. Ironically, the Al-
UCacy 0f
control, but also the noise created by control-surface move-
nient - *
preSu^t bigh speed. Similarly, details of the flow over the hull will
Thmably affect the detailed placement of sonars. n'ouAL^V ProSram began early in 1986. It is one of several autono
^ LSV
Naval be bc°ntrolled, or robotic) underwater-vehicle programs. Other rtiea firo§rams reportedly include a remote underwater mine counter- teni J'6 (RUMC) and a torpedo-shaped advanced unmanned search sys- be latter to retrieve objects from depths as great as 18,000 feet. Wh0 effectively duplicates the efforts of mine-clearance divers,
NonP'Vere succee<led by remotely controlled submersibles, such as the adVan, eb m‘ne neutralization vehicle that recently entered service. The of the RUMC over current vehicles is that it can be launched a ^'stance to cover a substantial area. The current generation of fi'ine f must be contro"ed singly by the mine-hunting ship; as a result, clearCIearance is tedious at best. Moreover, because the robot mine- chancCe diver could operate at a considerable distance, it could take in an6S t0 c*ear a field relatively more quickly. That would be important arnPhibious assault or in clearing a port.
IIVF Treaty Affects Naval Balance
Su
iNp ,re^ tbe most significant defense development of late 1987 was the U, ^ reaty. signed in Washington on 7 December. Under the treaty, all r°Pe (p0ntrobed, land-based, intermediate-range missiles in NATO Eu- „„ersb'n8s an(i ground-launched cruise missiles) are scheduled for lon- In return, the Soviets will destroy their SS-20s and earlier
de.
struct,
weapons. The Pershing-2 and ground-launched cruise missiles were emplaced specifically to counter the Soviet SS-20 threat.
The euphoria surrounding the successful negotiation of the treaty, however, suggests that something more is involved. President Ronald Reagan hopes to sign a companion treaty reducing long-range strategic weapons when he meets Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow next year. The Soviets hinted that they are willing to discuss reductions in conventional forces in Europe. Soviet doctrinal pronouncements emphasize that war is no longer a practicable policy option, that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact should reduce their arsenals to a defensive capability only.
This is not a new theme for the Soviets. And it is not clear to what extent the INF treaty has transformed Western European opinion of the Soviets’ credibility.
Although the treaty does not affect any naval systems explicitly, it is likely to have considerable naval implications.
Both sides will still be able to strike European targets, but now the primary strike weapons may well be naval missiles based on surface ships and submarines. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has controlled some Poseidon missiles for some time, and now he may also want direct control of some sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Soviets may consider their Tomahawk-equivalent, the SS-N-21, a theater (European) rather than an anti-U. S. weapon. Because they carry cruise missiles, ships not normally designated for strategic use will take on a strategic task, and may therefore be restricted geographically. That can affect the execution of U. S.-NATO maritime strategy, particularly during the non-nuclear phase of a war. The NATO supreme commander, for example, may object to assigning NATO submarines to the far north because such operations may deprive him of his designated cruise missiles. Yet these operations may be needed to keep Soviet attack submarines in check.
This recalls the situation in the 1950s and 1960s, when carrier-based attack aircraft were part of the overall national strategic nuclear attack plan, and thus carriers had to operate within areas determined by their strategic mission. For example, the Seventh Fleet always included at least three carriers because one was required to strike Soviet targets in the north and another had to be free to deal with Chinese targets further south. In 1960, Secretary of Defense Robert NcNamara decided this was an unacceptable limit on the inherent flexibility of carrier operations, and withdrew the carriers from the national strategic attack plan (the SIOP). Will we now return to that position?
One of the virtues of the naval cruise missile program is its effect on Soviet options. In dealing with pre-emptive attacks on enemy strategic weapons, it appears that the Soviets must concentrate their efforts on such potential cruise missile carriers as submarines and surface combatants, rather than more distant targets such as vital merchant ships. Conversely, because cruise missiles are vital elements of the NATO posture, NATO’s cruise missile platforms must be protected and cannot be risked lightly to concentrate Soviet naval attention away from the sea lines of communication.
Thus, the INF treaty may indirectly bring into conflict the fundamental viewpoints of ground and naval commanders. Ground commanders tend to concentrate on particular geographical areas, and they will want to tie forces to those locations. Naval commanders instinctively see the enemy naval force as the primary target, so they will always try to make their forces as mobile as possible, to confront mobile enemy forces and make the relative immobility of enemy land-based forces as embarrassing as possible (e.g., to threaten attacks along a long coast, so as to tie down enemy land forces). This inherent difference between the ground and naval theaters of operation is rarely considered.
Given submarines’ very limited weapon capacity, it is possible that
r<k*,
cdings / February 1988
119
increased requirements for cruise missiles may have serious operational consequences, i.e., torpedoes may be crowded out. This might apply to recent classes of Soviet attack submarines, which are probably the quietest Soviet missile platform, and primary carriers of the SS-N-21 and the new 65-cm torpedo. The Soviets may also use their cruise missile submarines to threaten land targets. A ground (nuclear) attack version of the SS-N-3 (carried on board Echo-and Juliett-class submarines) has existed for many years. Thus, the treaty may indirectly reduce the threat to U. S. and NATO surface forces.
The other major Soviet theater strategic weapon is the bomber- launched cruise missile, which is large, and, apart from the Tomahawklike AS-15, can be carried only in very small numbers. Again, it is possible that forces assigned to antiship attack may have to be reassigned to a nuclear attack role—a potential advantage to NATO maritime forces.
Eliminating many NATO strategic weapons may have another, less direct, consequence. It should raise the requirement for NATO conventional ground and associated tactical air forces, and thus probably crowd out further investment in naval forces. For example, Soviet doctrine envisages massive attacks on NATO nuclear systems during the nonnuclear phase of a war. It might therefore be argued that, freed of part of the requirement for such attacks, the Soviets could use more of their conventional forces for direct attacks on NATO troops.
Naval historians will observe that the INF treaty is the first between the United States and the Soviet Union to call for the destruction of existing weapons. The last such arms control agreement was the London Treaty of 1930, a follow-on to the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922.
The Washington and London treaties greatly reduced the rate of naval construction, forcing several major British armaments firms to shut down. The U. S. Navy was somewhat less affected because much of its construction was undertaken in Navy yards, which were not subject to such economic forces. Consequently, the United States’s naval rearmament was less difficult than Britain’s.
Now it is the United States that relies heavily on private firms for arms production. The Soviet Union can avoid the economic consequences of a gap in production because its arms industry is government-owned, and thus viable on the basis of government decisions rather than on orders actually secured.
Advanced Maverick Is Tested
Hughes successfully tested the latest version of the Maverick missile, the AGM-65G, early in November. It combines the 300-pound, delayed- action, fuzed warhead of Navy and Marine Corps Mavericks with a modified infrared guidance system, similar to that used in the Air Force AGM-65D. The pilot can now select a specific aim point, such as a factory, in a large target area before launching. Other new features are a lower-cost digital autopilot and pneumatically-actuated controls.
Although the AGM-65G is an Air Force project, it will presumably be carried by naval attack aircraft.
New IFF System Developed
Texas Instruments delivered the advanced development model of the new Mark-XV identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) system in November. It is to become standard in the U. S. and NATO armed forces, and is compatible with the existing Mk-XII, as well as with future civil air traffic control systems, and employs low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) waveforms.
IFF has been a major problem for many years, and new dedicated systems are only one of several potential solutions. Existing systems all combine interrogators with transponders on board potential targets. In theory, the interrogator associated with a weapon system prevents that system from engaging a friendly aircraft or ship. In practice, pilots often fear that an enemy could trigger the transponders of their aircraft, causing signals upon which enemy weapons can home. The use of LPI waveforms should help solve this problem.
There is also fear that when hostilities begin the enemy will obtain sufficient numbers of IFF transponders to equip his own aircraft, which will then be able to slip through defenses. All IFF systems are coded, but
much depends upon how complex the coding is and how frequently codes can be changed.
It is likely that U. S. forces will continue to fight in limited conflic,s' in which they must distinguish hostiles among numerous neutrals, latter unequipped with any form of cooperative (transponder) IFF- J such cases, conventional IFF systems cannot succeed. Hence the avt 1 recent interest in systems that display key characteristics of the intends target, such as its general configuration. For example, some U. S. figW ers are provided with small telescopes for long-range visual identifica tion. Inverse synthetic aperture radar techniques should make longer range, bad-weather identification possible. However, all imaging teen niques require a substantial amount of time. That is why conventions IFF, typified by the Mark-XV, is still essential.
First F-14A(Plus) Is Delivered
The first Grumman F-14A(Plus) Tomcat was accepted by the U. j*' Navy in November. The Plus is an interim step toward the F-14D, 1,1 next version of the standard F-14 fleet fighter. The F-14A(Plus) has nep'
General Electric F110-GE-400 engines, which will provide about a
30#
increase in thrust and better fuel efficiency. The F-l4A(Plus) also inc°r porates improved reliability and maintainability. Thirty-eight ne F-14A(Plus) aircraft will be built and 32 existing aircraft will be reman^ factored to F-14A(Plus) standards by 1990, after which deliveries of t*1 F-14D will begin. The F-14D will add new avionics, including Hughes APG-71 radar, which will replace the AWG-9.
The F-14A-
th«
cub
mination of a vetf long process, initial F-14 planS called for a ne''' more powertu engine (in wW* was then des<S nated the F-l after about 1 first 60 aircratL Without the ne
the F' the
engine,
was considered somewhat underpowered for dogfighting. However cost of the change was high, and naval budgets were strained during 1970s. With the increase in defense spending during the Reagan adnun^ tration, the issue of re-engining was reopened. The F-14D will serve the fleet's fighter through the early years of the 21st century. j Hughes began testing the new APG-71 radar on board a modij> TA-3B in July 1987. It combines some elements of the AWG-9—such its powerful transmitter, power supply, and tactical display—with sign,^ synthesis and processing circuitry derived from the APG-70 installed new Air Force F-15C/D/E fighters. The new radar will also have a ne digital display, a multichannel receiver, and an imaging system for !°n"_ range target identification. Identification has limited the' use of range (beyond-visual-range) missiles such as the F-14’s Phoenix- * example, limits on identification largely neutralized the Sparrow rnisS in Vietnam. Radar imaging, presumably based on inverse synthetic ap ture techniques, is one of several proposed solutions to this ia tification-friend-or-foe problem. The prototype APG-71 is schedule be delivered to Grumman in December 1989. . ,e
Work proceeds on the advanced air-to-air missile (AAAM), to rep the F-14’s Phoenix. Reportedly, it is to have several times the eflec . range of the Phoenix, extending battle-group defenses to about 500 na cal miles. The bidders are Hughes/Raytheon and General DynaI”^ Westinghouse. The Navy hoped to award a development contract in . tober 1987, but that month staff members of the House defense apPr°P ,, ations subcommittee proposed that the Navy be forced to develop weapon with the Air Force. However, the Air Force has no firm req ment on which such a program could be based. The Air Force pres bly requires a very-long-range air-to-air weapon as part of the De Department Air Defense Initiative, a complement to the Strategic fense Initiative concerned with aerodynamic threats. It appears tha|^ AAAM project will proceed, subject to a memorandum of understan with the Air Force.
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