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Soviet naval literature and operational ercises indicate that modern nuclear- t <>Wered ballistic and guided-missile sub- carines are considered to be the Soviets’ ^P>tal ships. Having a healthy respect 0r L. S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ^Pabilities, the Soviets can be expected (i|. Pr°tect their submarines with a variety surface, subsurface, and air assets.
forms remain capable of performing their missions during hostilities. Currently, our maritime patrol aviation (MPA) units do not have the necessary defensive systems to remain effective in a hostile air environment. Fortunately, there are several simple, cost-effective improvements in hardware, training, and tactics that would greatly enhance the P-3 Orion’s
group support and protect sea lines of communication during wartime.
Current air defense tactics for the MPA force depend primarily on completely avoiding any chance of an encounter with hostile antiair forces. It is generally assumed that the P-3 has no possibility of survival in an air combat engagement because of its large size, slow speed, and lack of maneuverability. However, such a defeatist attitude seriously limits the employment of this highly effective ASW and antisurface warfare (ASUW) platform. Further, the migration of patrol areas toward defended airspace and Soviet carrier development have made purely defensive tactics obsolete.
Certainly, it will never be desirable to project unescorted MPA assets into a concentration of enemy fighter aircraft, regardless of the type of internal defensive capability. Lacking self-sealing fuel tanks, protective armor, and the speed to
The P-3’s run-and-hide defensive tactic may not always facilitate mission accomplishment. Defensive air combat maneuvering skills, though, may keep the “hapless, lumbering grape” from being swallowed by opposing fighters, as it demonstrated in a recent exercise with this F-4.
disengage at will, a P-3 is not likely to survive repeated or sustained attacks. Even if the attrition rate was acceptable, the patrol aircraft’s inability to perform its assigned mission in such an environment makes the risks unwise. The P-3 is not an effective ASW or ASUW platform while constantly maneuvering to dodge incoming missiles and cannon fire. Yet, enhancing electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems, establishing aircrew defensive air combat maneuvering (DACM) training, and adding an offensive air-to- air capability could allow P-3s to survive short or infrequent encounters with hostile aircraft.
Early detection of approaching bogies is crucial for survival in an air combat situation. Fighters generally have relatively limited range and short low-altitude endurance. If their approach is detected early, it may be possible to escape or limit the duration of the engagement. Suppose that a P-3 is alerted that 600- knot bogies are inbound at a range of 100 nautical miles. With the P-3 heading directly outbound at 400 knots from the fighters, the intercept will occur 30 minutes later at a distance of at least 300 nautical miles from the fighters’ base. Thus, the distance the fighters must travel will be tripled, and the time available for engagement will be considerably reduced. At that range, if the fighters are outside ground-controlled intercept radar coverage, they will have difficulty finding the P-3 unless equipped with advanced “look-down” air-to-air intercept (AAI) radar. If an intercept does occur, it will be at or near the limit of the fighter’s combat radius. An ESM system capable of quickly and accurately detecting hostile air search and AAI radars is necessary to allow a P-3 the opportunity to retreat temporarily and avoid or at least delay intercept. (ESM upgrades such as the ALR-66 will greatly improve radar detection capabilities, but are not yet available throughout the fleet.) With its vastly greater endurance, the P-3 is able to run and hide for a short while, return when the adversaries retire owing to fuel exhaustion, and perform its mission. Avoiding threats in this manner is the most desirable tactic, but it may not always be consistent with mission accomplishment. Additional defensive systems are required.
The greatest threat to a P-3 operating near a hostile coast or fleet is an interceptor armed with missiles, which can be employed from beyond visual range (BVR). No aircraft—fighter, attack, or patrol—is likely to survive an undetected missile shot taken within valid parameters. An effective ESM system will help avoid this situation, but mission requirements may prevent escape. Depending on the enemy’s weapon capabilities, operating at low altitude may deny a BVR shot. If not, ECM and chaff are required to deny a long-range, radar-guided missile acquisition and kill. (Such defensive systems will also enhance survivability against surface-to-air missiles.)
Assuming that the patrol aircraft can effectively combat a BVR missile shot, there is still a threat from short-range infrared and radar missiles, as well as guns. A low-contrast paint scheme will help, but expendable decoys (flares and chaff)
are essential to defeat the short-range missile threat. In addition, DACM train' ing is necessary because a non-maneuvering aircraft cannot effectively use flares and chaff, and remains susceptible to gun attacks.
Properly flown, the P-3 can be a diffi' cult target at low altitude. Its excellent lookout field-of-view allows the crew to keep a tally on the bogies while its out' standing sustained turn capabilities can be used to frustrate an attacker or d£' crease his ability to reach an optimum fit' ing position. For example, suppose that a P-3, which is capable of a sustained three-g turn at 200 knots, is maneuvering against a fighter with a six-g turn capabil' ity at 400 knots. The P-3 will have a slight deficit in turn-rate but a major advantage in tum-radius (roughly one-han that of the bogey). Assuming further tha* the fight takes place at a very low altitude, most attacks must be made in 3 roughly horizontal plane because the fighter will be denied steep, nose-down weapon solutions. Note that the greatest probability of kill (Pk) is achieved from a position astern of the target. In addition' depending on the weapon system, a head- on shot against a very-low-altitude, aggressively maneuvering aircraft may n0t be possible.
Beginning the engagement with a neutral head-on pass, assume that the bogey begins a level or slightly oblique (UP' ward) turn, while the P-3 turns in the opposite direction to meet the fighter head-on again. (See Figure 1.) With its turn-radius advantage, the P-3 should be able to remain inside the fighter’s turn and avoid being shot. Because the P'3
Can deny a solution indefinitely in this Case, the best tactic for the bogey is to eMend for turning room and initiate an- °ther pass. As the bogey maneuvers, the '3 can turn to place the fighter on the a°$e and once again force a high-angle, 'gh-closure gun or missile attack, greatly limiting the Pk. Note also that the tlrnc required to reposition will reduce the number of attacks available to the fighter.
This example assumes that the bogey Maneuvers only in the horizontal. Even ns most inexperienced fighter pilot will quickly realize that level, nose-to-nose Urns with a P-3 are not productive if a Weap°n cannot be employed at the head- °n pass. If the bogey chooses to pull up SteePly, the desired P-3 tactic is to maneuver to a position underneath the Snter and require it to make a very steeP, nose-low attack. Proximity to the Water will likely cause the fighter to neak off the attack early for fear of over- p °oting into the drink and solving the . s problems. Sea return also degrades nnssile seeker effectiveness and may pre- . e missile use. Guns will be only mar- gtnally effective owing to the excessive ange at which the attack run must be ter- ■nated. Provided its crew can maintain _§m of the adversary, and recognize and p nperly defend against gun attacks, the can execute a very credible close- ran§e defense.
b^ Tc result is that most level attacks can I met head-on and vertical attacks are Mr8c,y ineffective owing to low altitude.
any current fighter-weapon system • nminations cannot achieve a firing so- IQn under these conditions. The latest uerations of missiles, however, are Jcdited with an all-aspect capability that p1 utake them a head-on threat to the ■ In this situation, the best defense is a •°°d offense, that is, a missile with a Sumiar capability.
pappose the P-3 is armed with an all- Pect missile. The forward-firing aCaP°n will enable the P-3 to defend uf‘nst the front-quarter attacks that it is liable to avoid. Also, following the the p0 Ilass 'n the level turn example, fi k ^ may reach a firing solution on the 0£ ter across the circle after about 135° ins‘arn- (See Figure 2.) The P-3 may be tirn 6 ni'n*rnuni missile range at that v c. but might reach a solution by re- an|j"n8’ holding its nose on the fighter, ate a^°Wm8 the speed disparity to gener- lau seParation required for weapon in ^h- If the fighter maneuvers steeply ac.. e vertical, the P-3 is unlikely to 'eve a solution owing to insufficient if l° 'ts nose h'S*1 enough. Even Sae T-3 is unable to destroy the adverT’ a missile in flight will certainly attract the bogey’s attention and force him to react defensively. In addition, the fighter’s respect for the P-3’s weapon envelope may limit his aggressiveness and available tactics to the point that he is unable to make an effective attack in a short engagement. In any case, it would buy time until help arrives or the fighter must bingo home.
These are very simplified examples and ignore other possible fighter tactics and the most likely case of multiple bogies. However, they do show that the P-3 is not the “hapless, lumbering grape” that most assume it to be. If properly equipped and expertly handled, a patrol aircraft has a reasonable chance of survival in a hostile air environment.
Certainly, every fighter pilot reading this is saying, “No way a P-3 can get away from me.” That’s probably true for two F-14s with a full bag of gas using expertly coordinated two-versus-one tactics. By forcing the P-3 to make predictable defensive turns, one fighter can set up his wingman for an optimum shot. Two F-14s would probably get a single F-15 or F/A-18, under the same circumstances. Consider, instead, an engagement with a less capable aircraft and weapon system, manned by less experienced and competent pilots, at the limit of their combat radius with only three or four minutes of fighting fuel available. Expecting an easy kill, perhaps only one bogey engages initially. After a few frustrated attacks, the wingman also engages, but by now their fuel has been depleted considerably. Their two-versus-one tactics will be hampered by lack of training against an aircraft with such unusual maneuvering characteristics at low altitude. By the time they figure it out they are down to bingo fuel and must disengage. Or, if having an especially good day, the P-3 may be lucky enough to splash a bogey with a missile or “dust off” one in the ocean owing to the adversary’s overzealous attempt to get a shot. Such a scenario is not impossible, particularly against poorly trained, nonSoviet aggressors who are a threat to P-3s throughout the world.
Obviously, the fighters have considerably more options at their command, but further examination of P-3 capabilities will reveal appropriate countermeasures and tactics. Consider, for example, a flight of two P-3s providing mutual surveillance, targeting, and defensive support. In addition to the increased offensive ASW and ASUW firepower, they would be able to protect vulnerable areas and employ the same type of coordinated air combat techniques as the fighters. With more than 300 aircraft in the operational inventory, this tactic would be useful in areas where fighter coverage is not possible. Or, if equipped with a longer- range weapon like the advanced medium- range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) currently under development, the P-3 at low altitude would have an excellent “lookup” shot and might be able to engage the fighters beyond the range of their weapons. These are just a few examples of possible follow-on tactics; however, aircrew training is a more important priority for the present.
Because few, if any, P-3 crews have any experience in DACM tactics, training in this area is a must. Owing to the limited flight station visibility, the crew at the bubble windows in the back must have the same expertise as the pilots because they will play an essential part in an engagement. Their ability to recognize those situations in which the fighter is a threat and direct the plots to maneuver the aircraft appropriately is critical to survival. Although the fighter’s tactics are numerous, the basic defensive maneuvering principles are few and fairly simple.
“Keep the fighter out in front” is an example of such basic principles. By doing so, the P-3 remains out of the bogey’s optimum weapon envelope, denies turning room, and forces steep nose- down attacks. Thus, an easily learned concept—always turn toward the attacker’s predicted position—will greatly reduce the adversary’s ability to reach a firing solution. This and other basic defensive techniques can be readily acquired by patrol crews as has been demonstrated in P-3-versus-fighter engagements flown at the Navy Fighter Weapons School (Topgun).
Training for two-versus-one engagements will be more difficult. Crew coordination and communication problems are multiplied, and there is little room for error. It is essential to recognize which aircraft is an immediate threat and react accordingly while keeping a tally on the second bogey. A threatening position is easily recognized. However, the critical moment to ignore one fighter and defeat the other is not so readily apparent, especially when a single crew member may not have them both in sight. Initial training sorties flown with California Air National Guard F-4 Phantoms have produced encouraging results and demonstrate that teaching DACM to P-3 crews is a profitable goal, attainable within current training limitations.
Achieving a reliable defensive capability will not occur overnight; but we need to begin a measured approach to training and procurement now. Two or three crews per at-home cycle could be trained
to serve as a squadron training nucleus. These crews would present the lessons learned to their squadron, much like the Topgun concept. After several cycles, most crews would have received DACM training.
Proper defensive maneuvering combined with weapon countermeasures and an air-to-air offensive capability will increase the P-3’s survivability enormously. The cost is small compared to the unacceptable alternatives: withdrawal from forward deployment areas or rapid depletion of our maritime patrol aircraft.
Lieutenant Ackerman graduated from the University of Santa Clara in 1976 with a B.S. degree in mathematics and was commissioned in 1978 through the Aviation Officer Candidate School. He was designated a naval aviator in 1979 and served as a T-34C instructor pilot through 1980. In 1981-84, he flew the P-3 in Patrol Squadron 40, operating from deployment sites throughout the Western Pacific and Indian oceans. He served as a P-3 instructor in the West Coast Fleet Readiness Squadron (VP-31) fronl 1984 until May 1987, when he was assigned to Patrol Squadron Special Projects Unit Two at NAS Barbers Point. His duties with VP-31 included developing the defensive air combat maneuvering training program for fleet P-3 aircrews, which included flying P-3s in engagements with fighter aircraft of the Naval Fighter Weapons School (Topgun), VF-126, and the California Air National Guard’s 144th Fighter Interceptor Wing.
From Buttons to Battleships
By Victor Haagen
The armed forces operate on the leading edge of military technology, continually improving and replacing obsolete or worn weapons and equipment, to meet global defense mission requirements. Unavoidably, this commitment creates surpluses that can’t be kept in inventories. Where docs all the surplus go?
Obsolete electronic equipment, removed from a Pacific fleet carrier, is turned into the Subic Bay field facility of the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS). Half a world away, DRMS personnel on naval bases at Norfolk, San Diego, and Charleston collect excess furniture, clothing, and office equipment. At the same time, across the country and overseas, military screeners— working in concert with DRMS specialists—periodically inspect huge warehouses in search of usable equipment and materials for their commands. Meanwhile, data on worldwide DRMS inventories is transmitted to the supply and procurement centers of all service branches. Adding to the property information flow, personnel from regional and field levels maintain daily telephone contact with “clients,” learning who needs what and letting clients know what property is available.
As a result, gyroscopes—acquired at $1 million—are picked up by Navy Ships Parts Control Center in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, from the listings of a DRMS field office in Indianapolis; $58,000 in circulating pumps and motors removed from the USS Independence (CV-62) go to the Pacific fleet for spare parts; $42,450 worth of camera lenses are shipped from Norfolk to Naval Air Systems Command to help equip base photo labs; breathing apparatus worth more than $500,000 is transferred to U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington; NAS San Diego receives circuit boards valued at $336,000 for electronic training; a Norfolk base school is supplied with tools and equipment worth $14 million; eleven 2,000-watt gas turbine generators that had cost $3.2 million move via military sealift to Pearl Harbor; and Naval Surface Group, Western Pacific, gets a $450,000 barge from a Subic Bay DRMS facility.
Sometimes, the DRMS answers a complex problem with an unexpectedly simple solution. For example, carrier crew members needed help safeguarding their vehicles during a transit from a major overhaul center to their home port. DRMS personnel in Philadelphia responded with more than 15,000 pounds of scrap tires to serve as protective cushions. In Washington state, park service rangers converted 500 fiberglass buoy containers into 2,000 feet of emergency culvert material to help control trail flooding in Mount Rainier National Park.
Even surplus anchors and chain are subject to DRMS scrutiny: $262,300 worth were shipped from Norfolk to Bethesda’s Navy Ship Research and Development Center. In San Diego, a Coast Guard station received a “facelift” that included a sentry station, a massive ship’s propeller and anchor chain, and metal link fencing for the base-—3'* minus new purchase costs.
How the Service Works: The DRMS- established in 1972 as a modem succeS' sor to the World War II-era War Assets Administration and Foreign Liquidation Commission, has evolved into a unique revenue-earning arm of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) that processes more than $2.6 billion worth of property each year. From its headquarters in Battle Creek, Michigan, DRMS monitors the reutilization, transfer, donation, sale, and disposal of surplus Department of De' fense (DoD) personnel property under five regional headquarters in Columbus- Ohio; Memphis, Tennessee; Ogden- Utah; Wiesbaden, Germany; and Honolulu, Hawaii. In turn, the regions (DRMRs) oversee the operations of 1 3?