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^fending the 100 -Fathom Curve
By Richard A. Worth
ey did
Navy haaWay- In spite of this, the U. S. locate anr|n0t devcdoPe(J the capability to shall0vv w mterd'ct hostile submarines in curve ater inside the hundred-fathom Tlie
s°rs to f. V? *acRs the weapons and sen- the early ?Qr,Ahallow‘Water ASW. Since keen the • S’ tde Mark-46 torpedo has a'rcraft aPr,mary ASW weapon for the charge surface ships, while the depth ?‘SaPPeama cdSeh°g rocket projector had
Mu ^ DV tliA in^A„ n..i
'46 is
fissile,. Perati°ns; cruise and ballistic E>efen’,and terrorism.
^iiovy-w'11^ tbe G- S. coast against ^ c°ntn] 3ter submarine threats need not ex or costly. The Navy can deha
pQ
Ues^n tu“b!narine-versus-submarine bat- ready R„t ,?C^ oceans» the U. S. Navy is si]e SU[,m . e tflreat °f Soviet cruise mis- off the yarines funning in shallow waters inland tar V COast t0 threaten ports and h°pe j. ?®ts 1S ignored—perhaps in the
ialh
episode "in'Hf.tbe Whiskey-on-the-Rocks
°niet
,. -FFearpH k , b piujkkiui nau
^ark-46 ■ by the mid-1960s. But the i'ecansg u'S useless in shallow waters, C°nfuse it °ftom a°d surface reflections and ass0(S- acoustic homer. Navy sonars ?eared f0r *ated Plutforms are similarly Carrier batuPen 0cean ASW in support of "Pen-ocea ef.®rouPs. The most effective 4ttack SIJ, n tighter is the modern nuclear 4°es andm?T'ne 'ts Mark-48 torpe-
tVeap0r)s_ submarine rockets. New
"eight tn SUCb as the advanced light- fipe stanH^ff ° (ALWT) and the subma- ^t>Ce the ?/ weapon—will further en- k * q, avy’s deep-water capability. Navy c N estion remains: Why does the >vts’ and Centrate hs ASW planning, as- ■ °Pen research and development on least iji,C,eans’ where the enemy threat k e ttost 6 y.’ and completely ignore the °attles off Sfr'ous threat—antisubmarine a|td i,sthe coasts of the United States , okeles> ar>d in shallow strategic il *Pd Ir*ntS such as the Greenland- heStrait(.nitfed Kingdom (G-I-UK) Gap, 11(1 the y G'braltar, the Persian Gulf, It is6 S°uth China Sea? f fivef^fj1*16 G- S. Navy recognized 0rces ar °d .'hreat its antisubmarine ,aPced j- acing in shallow waters: ad- ^ the .Jesel~P°wered submarines such C°Vp” , an^°, and Kilo classes; mines' velop a shallow water tactical doctrine that uses existing assets and readily developed new systems.
The keystone of the doctrine would be an undersea defense zone (UDZ)—a subsea zone within which the United States would prohibit unauthorized submarine activity. In air defense zones, unidentified aircraft must declare themselves and, in some cases, land; in an undersea de-
Despite frequent Soviet penetration of allied shallow waters (inset, Whis- key-on-the-Rocks episode in Sweden, 1981), the U. S. Navy still lacks weapons and sensors for ASW inside the 100-fathom curve.
">gs/
October 1987
173
One manufacturer has answered your call for communications reliability at sea! We’ve listened to your demands and can provide you with the answers:
- Ship to Ship/Ship to Shore (Hail Mode)
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- All Page/Selective Page
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reducing our ASW capatnmy ' ^ip*
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riet
merchant ships a safe anchorage
fense zone unidentified submarines would be required to surface and identify themselves. The hundred-fathom curve would be the logical choice for the zone’s outer limit.
Helicopters with active dipping sonars could locate and detain the unauthorized subs. Sound surveillance systems (SOSUS) barriers and maritime patrol aircraft would aid in detecting intruders. The P-3 could exchange its broad ocean area coverage for a picket-patrol mission.
The United States does not have a nonlethal means of forcing an unidentified submarine to surface. The warhead of the Mark-46 torpedo with Neartip improvements could be reduced to nonlethal proportions, but at more than a quarter- million dollars per torpedo, it is not cost- effective for simple harassment. Neither are the costly antisubmarine rocket, the Captor mine, or the advanced lightweight torpedo suitable for use in shallow water.
We need cheap and unsophisticated ASW weapons that can be launched from several different platforms. There is no
need for sophisticated guidance sys ' long-endurance propulsion, and co cated arming and fuzing devices. ^ In the Falklands Conflict, the W protected their carriers from su tna^ ^ by attacking every sonar contact wi |( Mark-lO Limbo ASW mortar syste - worked. Argentinian submarines no successful attacks on British s ^ The Navy has been working system that would be ideal for en an underwater defense zone, var ^ called the urgent attack weapon a -„n terminally guided depth bomb. I(susa. criteria call for it to be inexpensive. ^ ble in shallow water and with sever, |e of face and air platforms, and capa ^ fire-and-forget guidance. ^oW^Vyy pol' program is so mired in internal Na ^ itics that it is several years away entering the fleet. (0 use
A near-term solution would ^ systems developed by our allies. ^0y- priority is to obtain a hard-kill s water weapon, such as the Britis ,, 11 depth charge. This helicopter c ^jon ible device uses the same weapon® ftie attachments as the Mark-46 toTe j seV- U. S. Navy has recently purcha® eral from British Aerospace l°r ^ tion. By buying the Mark-11 ' quantities and developing taCajrcraft’ using them with patrol and rotary tet cv the Navy would get a shall°vv'vV|‘o ^en1 pability without massive <JeVL costs. weap"
The Swedes have producedtw ^
ons that readily apply to the U■ ^ is
for shallow-water harassment. incid^ the helicopter-launched TP-4- noPe torpedo, which homes on prope jL;irn;1gt. and—with a small warhead--- |0 the propellers, forcing the sUJJLa mil12 the surface. The second is the jn s^'
depth charge. Ships can fire 1 -n clu®tet vos. Helicopters can fire them weapons containers, such as a stiaPc Rockeye. Upon contact, a SlTl[TiariiieS charge punches a hole in the su hull, forcing her to surface. tas
We must face the submarine ^ritb0' exists, not as we wish it existe •
our carrier battle groups ana 0
in the open oceans, the Dep Defense must give those ca^
to return.
Canada MADE IN THE USA
GAI-TRONICS CORPORATION
P. O. BOX 31 • READING. PA 19603 U S.A.
PHONE: (215)777-1374 " TELEX: 836-458
„ nrau
Mr. Worth has an M.B.A. from the " from jn
ate School and an undergraduate a padne, 3
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. c an
XTE Associates, a defense consult! g previous contributor to Proceedings.
176
Proceedings
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