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A Submarine Force Emphasis
In honor of this year’s Soviet Navy Day—traditionally the fourth Sunday in July—Fleet Admiral Vladimir N. Cher- navin, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, was interviewed for Izvestiya, the official Soviet Government newspaper.' The admiral, a submariner, gave special attention to the submarine force.
“I have read on a number of occasions in Western sources that the Soviet Union leads the world in terms of submarines,” the interviewer said. “Why are such claims made?” Chemavin responded:
“The Soviet Union does indeed have more submarines than the United States. However, the West’s concern about the [Soviet] advantage is unfounded. It is merely kicking up a fuss over an alleged ‘imbalance’ in the arms sphere to justify the unprecedented military programs planned by the [U. S.] administration.
“The point is that the correlation of submarine forces quoted is not a true picture of the state of the fleets. First, it would be wrong to view questions of military-strategic parity only in terms of individual countries rather than opposing coalitions. Second, submarines should not be isolated from other general purpose naval forces. This is fair and right, especially since the U. S. political-military leadership considers its capital surface ships and naval aviation [forces] to be the most important components of its naval strike forces designed to ensure supremacy in regions of ‘vital interest’ to America.”
When asked, “To what do we give priority?” Chemavin answered:
“As before, to nuclear submarine construction. This includes ships equipped with ballistic and cruise missiles of various ranges capable of hitting any target at sea or on land. In the future, we have no intention of increasing the quantity of nuclear submarines but we do envision taking all the necessary measures to substantially enhance their tactical and technical characteristics and quality.”
In talking about the demands and rewards of naval service, Admiral Cher- navin used the Soviet submarine force as an example.
“. . . Nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines are the main component of the navy’s firepower. . . . It is perfectly understandable that high demands are made on the military skill and ideological and moral tempering of the personnel of such submarines. It is intolerable for even a single crew member to be unprepared or careless here; this could have grave consequences. Long underwater voyages lasting several months and the actual living conditions require people who are strong and physically and psychologically resilient. That is why increased requirements are placed on recruiting for service in missile submarines.
“The conditions of service and everyday life have been improved. Submarines are relatively spacious and the ideal temperature and gaseous composition of the ships atmosphere is maintained throughout the voyage. Good living conditions enable the personnel to relax before their watch. The time between watches is filled with combat study, equipment maintenance, and cultural activities. This environment helps reduce fatigue and lessens the sense of being far from home.
“However, constant training and exercises to keep every crew member in good condition mean that this service is far from simple or easy. After voyages, crews are given leisure time to recover. To that end, a network of rest homes, tourist centers, and sana-
toriums has been created where
sub-
-------- — _ live
mariners follow a special recup ^ • and training regime under nie . |eS supervision. Such a method en s the cardiovascular system an .
to return to normal after a J 2th.
. a large
improves their efficiency. nn
amount of capital investrnen j. amount considerably exceeding P^n ous spending in this regard has ^ planned for the 12th five-year p improve and further develop 1 ,, sure system for Navy personne •
iluiuiu tu iiicii
restores submariners’ strengt .
and
Responding to the Maritime Stra^S}^
The Maritime Strategy, the suppl®®;. to the January 1986 Proceedings, ^ ously caught the Soviet party-rn^ propaganda organs unprepared. 1 ^
parent that the press was not pr0 ^ with official guidance on how to resP ^
then1'
selves how to report the publication o ( strategy without describing or *nteT.jiJe ing it in a way that might not coi with future official views. c0in-
Izvestiya approached the task by a missioning the Soviets’ most exPeryaien- and highest ranking propagandist, tin Falin, director of Novosti ^resS’gpr Soviet Union’s overseas news and p ganda distribution service. Falin 0 ^
trated the Soviets’ public response ^ strategy, attacking its appearance an tiquing its contents out of context n “The Soviet View: The Soviet ^ Reacts,” Proceedings, April 1986-) magazine Foreign Military Systetns^
Soviet editors had to decide f°r
s,Pu
lished by the Main Intelligence D^e j ate of the General Staff to provide a Soviet military readership with osteniJ1ili- unclassified information on Western ^ tary developments allegedly drawn Western press reports, took an opp approach. long
In the November 1986 issue, af. article by Captain First Rank V. , tanov entitled, “The U. S. ^arl^|j. Strategy,” neither mentioned the P . cation of the strategy in the Proce?l‘^ ^ nor referred to its contents. Rather, j lied on hackneyed Soviet propaganda ^ out-of-date U. S. policy documen describe U. S. naval strategy and
oped anr. , r'-uitu, more luny aevei- dorSe(j shown to be an officially en- NaVy Vj 0sit'on not just a Smirnov or a”: • W *n a major 28 June Red Star
ft 1 r\ m — 1 f v , i ■ . .
h'Peated Tu "'Y'‘'vv> al '~iiciuavm
pubj.ne description and gave the
*4 ......
ion*6' 'dn‘on *s accused of naval ex-
The% lc resP°nse. fated nilrnov intervie 1 estern statements
nb0utea asked “What can you tell us egy>> so-called ‘new maritime strat- ' Smirnov replied:
c°ncems-!!n?S °f ten-year-°ld strategic 'he strata ,e wb‘cb were replaced by SUre that^ Indeed, almost as if to en- heard -ih,-. readers who might have lime Strata 'he publication °f the Mari- Chertannv ^ W0ldd continue to ignore it, ParaSranh SUmmed UP his article with a
^S^^^P^forO-mg-
said “Th r Maritime Strategy.” He mining the Undamental principles deter- time Strate essentlal contents of the mari- view are ^ ■ m military experts’
remained Uruversally known and have
the quantir.?,nstant for many years- 0n>y
°f the fie . *Ve and clualitative structure
kccentlv ,h ' 1'lSUbject t0 change.” military i/h “^ugh, the Soviet party- lated ;he ,.a ership has apparently formu- lo descrih bnc which will be used ^"elonerf e Maritime Strategy and has This flrs|3 Plan for responding to it. Red stDecame apparent in a 16 May first Dem !nt"View with the long-time Soviet N y C°mmander-in-Chief of the "'ho dev,,3^’ Admiral N. I. Smirnov, khzation11 ^tbe strategy. That charac- °ped, an if rePeated> more fully develartic]e hv r>~ln 3 rnaj°r 28 June Red Sta recentiv' ^(donel General V. Lobov, a •he Sovi aPrPOmted p‘rst Deputy Chief of in the So • en®ral Staff. Lobov’s article lrnduc(')Vl u1 military newspaper also in- lic” panWbat *s likely to be the “pub- Marjtj °f the Soviet response to the Navy (yC Strategy. Later, in his 26 July tenp,._ ,ay mterview. Admiral Chemavin
The s ,w‘,UIlse' iw;r"ov. interview primarily re in which
Pansion •' Union's accused of naval ex- and “yyln 'he Pacific and Indian oceans” is a o esteni propaganda . . . that there kepuhiVlet naval base on SRV [Socialist
^miraU01- Vietnam] territory. ...” .. ,i Smirnov stated, “In recent years Asian6 activity of the U. S. Navy in the c0nst Pacific region has increased C°ncreit ’ ’ asserting that this is “. . .a ■hilita 6 exPressi°n °f the aggressive Wai ™ strategic concept of ‘forward
. ^ Dr^CAnnn »»»
“The ‘new maritime strategy’ of the United States is a component of its military doctrine of ‘direct confrontation’ with the Soviet Union. What it seeks to do is to increase considerably the offensive potential of the U. S. Navy within the overall system of military operations; to ensure its superiority at sea through a quantitative and qualitative growth in its strike capabilities; and, ultimately, to establish control in all ‘vitally important’ regions of the world—the North Atlantic, the Pacific and Indian oceans, and the Norwegian and Mediterranean seas. . . .
“What is most important according to one of the originators of this strategy, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, is that U. S. naval forces should be prepared to wage offensive operations against the Soviet Union in its own territorial waters and to strike targets located deep within Soviet territory. To this end, the U. S. Navy together with its allies, is intensively rehearsing the provisions of this maritime strategy in exercises and maneuvers both in Europe and in the Atlantic, as well as in the Far East and has concentrated strike forces commensurate with wartime dispositions in close proximity to the Soviet Union’s territory.”
Next, Admiral Smirnov volunteered his own question and answered it.
“What is the danger in this U. S. strategy? The danger is that it leads to the further intensification of the aggressiveness of the U. S. Navy, a growth in the level of . . . military confrontation in various regions of the world, and an increase in the potential for military conflict in those regions.”
The Lobov article, entitled “For the Oceans of the World: Peace and Stability,” presented the Soviet view of the context of the Maritime Strategy in more detail. General Lobov started from the premise that “. . . U. S. ruling circles, in pursuit of military superiority over the Soviet Union and of their neoglobalist aspirations, allot a prominent place to military activity on the spacious world oceans.” He then repeated some of the
Admiral Chernavin recently shared the Soviet view on Western concerns about the large numbers of submarines in his navy.
quotes from the speeches of President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and former Secretary of the Navy Lehman that the Soviets have been using for the last several years to convince their public of the “aggressive,” “anti-Soviet” nature of a U. S. maritime strategy that they never specifically mentioned or discussed.
“‘Turning the Soviet Union into an isolated island’ . . . ‘ensuring undivided U. S. control of the rest of the world’ is the creed of the Washington hawks. . . . ‘Superiority at sea is a necessity for us,’ President R. Reagan said at the commissioning ceremony for the battleship New Jersey [BB- 62], ‘We must be able to control the air,’ he continued, ‘and above and below the surface in order to ensure access to all the world’s oceans.’”
General Lobov then drew a direct link between those views and the development of the Maritime Strategy.
“The U. S. so-called ‘new maritime strategy’ whose main provisions were formulated in the first half of the 1980s and have formed the basis of the development and practical activity of U. S. naval forces since then, is designed to realize those political aims.”
He then characterized the strategy in essentially the same terms as Admiral Smirnov.
“It is a component of the ‘direct confrontation’ doctrine—the overall U. S. military doctrine aimed, as is well known, at achieving ‘total and indisputable U. S. superiority’ and ‘actively opposing the Soviet Union in any and all areas of the world,’ including the high seas.
“The main idea of the U. S. maritime strategy consists of foreseeing a military conflict to implement ‘global and immediate deployment in forward areas’ with the aim of ‘containing the Soviet fleet’ in its bases. And for this, it will be necessary to increase considerably the offensive potential of the U. S. Navy, to ensure its superiority at sea through quantitative and qualitative growth in its strike capabilities and establish control in all ‘vital important’ parts of the world—the North Atlantic, the Pacific and Indian oceans, and the Norwegian and Medi-
%
THE STANDARD IN SHIPBOARD AIR DEFENSE
■ A U-
terranean seas. In this reS|’ con- naval forces must be prepare duct offensive operations again .s Soviet Navy in the Soviet ^ own territorial waters and stn .. gets located deep within its tern
General Lobov then cited the injjP^g tions of the Maritime Strategy in1 terms volunteered earlier by Suin'
“Everything
described _ ^
IjVVIJ'UUllg , *
makes it easier to conclude new maritime strategy of the _ States will inevitably lead to an ^
sification of the aggressiveness ^
U. S. Navy, a growth in the e .
and
an
in-
military confrontation, «“■- con- creased likelihood of military flicts.” .
" \p
The second quarter of the artie ^ <, devoted to a description of the ^ ^ naval threat that contained little ne^ the Soviet reader. The final ha ^a|lt article was probably the most imp^ ^ from the Soviet point of view- g0. portion, General Lobov detailed atjc viet Union’s propaganda and dtp j.jl. response to the Maritime Strategy emphasized the Soviet Union s ^ far-reaching proposals . . • aimed iting naval activity and naval arms- ^ described them in detail, starting^ a* those “. . .set out by the S°viet S£0ai- the United Nation’s Disarmanien ^ ^ mission session held last May- jei noted, however, that “. . .earlier >•
[out
initiatives are still on the agenua, ^ such as “the proposals put oqii Mikhail S. Gorbachev in Vladivos ^ 28 July 1986 and in Delhi on 27 N°Sovi- ber 1986. . . .’’He also noted ets’ . . extensive plan to derm f
h.m it ir\tO & ^ -
wide'1
ing ideas on the question of turn'|nJ(jn Mediterranean into a zone of 1 peace and cooperation.” , 0
General Lobov then complain® (C. “. . . the United States has ett s. jected a discussion of the Soviet P .0 als, has pretended that it has not n j. them, or has delayed talks in every P ^ He concluded with a
the Indian Ocean and turn it into a i ^g, peace ...” and their “. • - the
ble way. warning: . . . questions—like other questions o guarding international security an „ venting nuclear war—will have resolved.” u j>jo'
'll these
sooner or later a f^e.
In his Navy Day interview
with
an1
vosti published in Moscow ^pa- distributed to various foreign ne , ((l pers, Admiral Chemavin respon the first question asked with the description of the Maritime Strategy .y, several months earlier by his
Lob ,*r? ^mjrnov- Further, in line with clud^'isearlier response, Chernavin con- “D ^'S 'nterv'ew reviewing Soviet activh°Sa'’S ^°r mutua* limitation of naval S.J ’He dePlored that “the United Cep. .an, *tS allies have not ac-
build th°Se ProPosa's and continue to arms arms—including naval
^sequences/’ * fraU§ht Wkh fatal
Corn
^Responsibility
Th
on "rpn,eW emPhasis in the Soviet Union
ment ba«CtUnn®” the Party and g°vern- 'ary-__naucracies—including the mili-
be esnrW.,requires that 'leader]si must areeen^D y accountable,” according to
anuXfof <fmr editorial- °n tha^ basis,
have b Fernet naval officers recently after l en removed from their positions
safe nr Vm® c°llisi°ns or permitting un- 12 Practices at sea.
MariMn^'n® t0 Press reports of Japanese
ti^ntune SeifDefense Force
strovL ashin-class guided-missile de- thn y rammed a
.............................................. ..
Were pan1 1986. The two ships
eastward
a Kara-class cruiser on while executing a ma-
■“■'iwarri ,uf 3 Soviet formation steaming the Sea (hrouSb I*10 Soya Straits, exiting - ■ °t Japan. The first Soviet public
aekno
tn a 9 p'edgement of this collision came
Cc t,
basizing “positive trends
I p. ° ,,vui uns collision came ’ho Co CCember 1986 Red Star article by Fleet '^'I'aadcr-in-Chief of the Pacific CrnPhas' ■rn'ra* y7- V. Siderov. While niain aIZln® ‘positive trends ... in the lamented^ fleets work,” Siderov cesses6 e- "■ • ■ along with the suc- a slit)r.aC‘11?ved by some, there has been others® -'nt0 t*le ranks of laggards by tisubmWhlch occurred with the large an- anne warfare ships Nikolayev As a rC 3SS^ andStrogiy [Kashin class].”
(Kara
result, Siderov announced that:
aptain Second Rank V. Ionov and be(ftain Third Rank V. Fadeyev have en relieved of their duties as com- g nders of the ships Nikolayev and jysiy. . . . [T]hese were extreme to course’ hut we were forced [th i2 d'em. They demonstrate . . . |jeatJ restructuring has essentially s C°me a matter of the personal re- of°nsibility and discipline of military
ary after writing that article, in Janu- transr Admiral Siderov himself was ChjejCrred to Deputy Commander-in- What °1 the Navy for Rear Services. WasCVer the reason for the transfer, it 'he J101."1 Promotion or an indication that heruJ>V'et Navy continues to have confi- tesi
sn 6 'n d's capabilities as a commander usible for operations and training.
KEEPS RISING.
Standard Missile, a combat-proven shipboard air defense system, has continually evolved to meet increasingly sophisticated threats.
To date, more than 14,000 have been deployed aboard 156 ships in the U.S.
Navy and eight allied fleets. Now, Standard Missile is a key component in the Navy’s advanced Aegis weapon system.
Which takes the standard in shipboard air defense to new heights.
GENERAL DYNAMICS
- * **,«*■«. 'SLiZjBBk M r'",