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^aq has
si0ns3V!et tdnion
the Sov';^'^aS emPloyed chemical agents—supplied by
Crei^ical warfare, Marine Corps helo s ^ace a threat that could neutralize d0j °n the beachhead. The Corps is not f0r ^ er>ough to train and equip its aviation 'varfS to fight and survive in a chemical rtare environment.
Except for small-unit operations conducted during eMayaguez incident in mid-1975, the Marine enVjro0r^s ^as not contended w*th a hostile chemical s°on ?„ment s*nce World War I. But we may have to do so - against Iranian forces on several occa- lysts g Ccord*ng to U. S. Department of Defense ana- f°r gfj 0v'et doctrine standardizes battlefield procedures Ports nilca* stacks against airfields, naval bases and sea- soldier^nt* amPh'bious heliborne landing forces. Soviet chemjp! [ece've at least four hours of training each week in cer jna and biological warfare. A three-star general offi- rtlands ■ 6 S°viet Headquarters of Chemical Troops com- force t,an estimated 45,000 specially trained soldiers—a tvar y at analysts estimate would double in the event of tveap ' °hicials calculate that the Soviet chemical 40,ooo" ar?enal exceeds 350,000 tons, compared to de|jVe[?ns 'n the U. S. stockpile. These chemicals can be lately*! by bombs, missiles, and artillery. Approxi- The ij % of Soviet artillery rounds contain poison gas. 5>°viets’ n*te^ ^tates has three options for countering the ^ernic-1 C*lern*ca* lhreat: upgrade the U. S. arsenal of tr°| aa Weapons; rely upon chemical warfare arms con- teements; or develop viable chemical protection equipment. The Congress has effectively laid the first option to rest, and the Soviets have a poor record of compliance with previous arms accords. The only apparent deterrent left to the United States is to establish a comprehensive defensive capability.
But combat favors the prepared defender. And while their chemical doctrine gives them an advantage, Soviet soldiers are not the giants some might suggest. Numerical superiority, maneuver, and integrated fire support are all necessary to dislodge or isolate defensive hard points. Should the Soviets shift into chemical operations, their cumbersome and fatiguing chemical, biological, and radiological equipment would degrade their mobility and communications, thus reducing their chances for a successful operation.
Although U. S. policy advocates avoiding chemically contaminated areas in a conflict, mission planning must anticipate the need to support and resupply Marine infantry and combat service support units in the event of a chemical attack. Ground and aviation units inland will require constant resupply, because nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense garments and mask filters must be changed or replaced every few hours to remain effective. The logical vehicle for these resupply missions will be the helicopter.
Marine helicopter units supporting ground forces must evaluate their chemical-assault support capabilities: Are we training as we should? Is our chemical defense equipment adequate, and does it interfere with an aircrew’s performance? Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) has demonstrated renewed interest in developing a viable helicopter NBC-defense program. However, Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-1 states that nuclear, biological, and chemical defense training is a command responsibility. Therefore, the duty of ensuring NBC-defense proficiency clearly rests with the helicopter squadron commander.
tcdin;
Ss 1 June 1987
73
but
the
when body armor and an SV-2B survival vest are aa- ., it. One Marine helicopter unit resolved questions abon^ ^
particularly noticeable in the CH-46 helicopter, aim- . getting out of CH-53s, UH-lNs, and AH-lTs was
vvn
tested, the mask was the pilots’ greatest concern, bec3 it and the M-7 hood restricted their vision. Especially ing shipboard operations in rough seas, this equipme ^ the proverbial accident waiting for a place to hapP^ji Fortunately, relief is in sight. The AR-5 mask \ greatly enhance the Marines’ ability to operate am ( safely in a chemical environment. Marine Helm f ) Squadron One at Quantico, Virginia, recently comp1.,, testing and evaluating the British-made mask. The L < mander of Operational Test and Evaluation Forces { accepted the evaluation, and the masks are now in
Some commanders have been reluctant to commit training sorties to NBC defense, because it has had little impact on their combat-readiness evaluations. Since HQMC incorporated NBC syllabus flights into the CH-46 and CH-53 Training and Readiness Manual in 1983, the “credit” excuse is no longer legitimate. Squadron commanders must prepare their aircrews for all contingencies—including chemical attack—if they expect the crews to survive and accomplish their missions.
The chance that Marine units may one day work under constant threat of chemical attack increases the likelihood
that aircrews will need to wear protective clothing whenever they are flying or servicing helicopters. NBC gear poses problems for aviation units. It makes it more difficult for the pilot, copilot, crew chief, and mechanic to perform their duties. Mechanics, in particular, will be hampered in tasks such as avionics and hydraulics repairs and engine changes: small, intricate components are difficult to handle in bulky gloves, with visibility impaired by an NBC-protective gas mask. Operational planners will need to take into account that aircrews using NBC gear will need extra time for performing aircraft maintenance, as well as for briefings and even suiting-up.
Over the past few years, Marine Corps helicopter units
have independently tested the C-2300 NBC appare aircrews, both on static aircraft and during actual mg ^ Overall, Marines have found the gear to be functions cumbersome. In some cases, the apparel can affect .f aircrew’s performance to the point of endangering tn lives and the aircraft’s safety. £(j
Helicopter aircrews should be alert to the hazards p ^ by chemical protection gear. Their awareness, c0llP^|i with training, will compensate for inherent hazards11 equipment better adapted to aviation becomes aval* C-2130 Overboot Footwear: Squadron evaluations ^ termined that traction on the footwear soles was def>1j1 ^ making it dangerous for the wearer to climb or wa wet or oil-laden surfaces. This presents a major probie aircrews during preflight operations, particularly on o ship. In addition, pilots reported that the footwear g them uncomfortable traction on rudder pedals during tain flight maneuvers. a|
C-1250 Rubber Gloves: Bulky gloves reduced man^s dexterity, impeding the pilot’s ability to handle svVlt^l£ and other small items. The gloves would be an imme hazard in a fire. . m
C-2300 Permeable Suit: The suit is bulky, esP^jto suit’s flame retardancy by setting one afire: They f°un a characteristics to be satisfactory. The prime safety c° j eration remains the suit’s bulk. It is so restrictive tB precludes safe egress from a disabled aircraft, partic11 in the water. Combat armor seat-plating attachment ^ ther complicate an already difficult procedure. Tht^
;acf '
lenge also. An unexpected benefit of the suit was^ buoyancy it provided the wearer in the water, even body armor still attached and the vest uninflated. ^ M-7 Hood: The hood restricts the wearer’s head 11,0f. ment and noticeably impairs the ability to scan the ^ rounding airspace. Like the rubber gloves, the hood } seriously threaten the aircrew’s survival in the event fire. , ,[,e
Physiological Considerations: One squadron te C-2300 equipment in the high temperatures and hum1 of the Indian Ocean. Wearers lost an average of pounds during a 1.5-hour flight. In the stress of colT1c|i fluid loss would occur more rapidly. (The apparel is11 better suited for cold-weather operations.) Again, the tential for an accident quickly enters the picture. J M-24 Protective Mask: Of the C-2300 series apP 8
flU7
duf
74
Proceedings
/JU»C‘
How Helos Can Poison Ships
mphibious ship commanders re justifiably concerned about
inTrf1 retuming from a contam- uted environment, for they can piously endanger a ship’s ew. Amphibious ships have 'te^ equipment for detecting ani !T)on*t°ring chemical agents, lack a “citadel” design—it s difficult to secure an amphibi- s ship against contaminants.
A World War II incident '^Ustrates the point. On ecember 1943, German
helior^.,f8Ue_bearing mosquitoes, bam <-tCrs cou,d bring back the 0;> chemicals to amphibi- ten,slps whose ventilation sys- PotPn^°Uld exP°se their crews to ""ally murderous vapors.
Luftwaffe pilots bombed Allied ships in Bari Harbor on the coast of Italy. The U. S. Liberty ship John Harvey was hit; she burned and sank. On board this vessel were some 100 tons of mustard gas canisters. Crew members of sinking ships jumped into the contaminated water. The Allied ship Bistera rescued 30 survivors, their clothes permeated with mustard gas. Within five hours, mustard gas vapors entered the ship’s ventilation system and temporarily blinded most of the crew.
Today’s efficient ventilation systems would expose a ship’s crew to lethal contaminants in considerably less time.
G. Johnson
h°0(j system- The AR-5 mask is an under-the-helmet Undjj.j11 mask incorporating a filtered blown-air supply, nigfit v*s>on and compatibility with the ANVIS-6 the iu 'S!()n §°ggles offer tremendous improvements over
But maslc-
'Vegrin^, AR-5 not w'lbout its problems. Individuals Sory j ^ . e mask for prolonged periods will suffer sen- Uiake (]^r'Vat'on that undermines morale and the ability to ^annir)eClS*0ns' ^i°ts will have great difficulty in mission st..: ® and briefino hpraiKP thr* rocnirntnr an
test,- ana briefing, because the respirator apparatus SjnCg ^'r hearing and emits an intolerably loud whine, flight C | 2 ^R-5 mask cannot be donned quickly in eHcou’nPI ?ts must wear it whenever there is a chance of Pr°grering chemical agents. Assault support training Aft. 5 ® thus demand proficiency in using the
■hission aS*C must decide whether initial combat
the ^ ^reqaire air crews to perform all missions wearing to reta. ' this issue is not resolved, it would be prudent Sickly11 ^'^4 mask, so aircrews can “mask up” Pilot and*11 necessary. Testing has shown that a
00dSj wh.-°Pil°t can don the M-24 mask within 20 sec- fliis as1 e maintaining continuous control of the aircraft. CaPacit...Umes’ however, that the aircrew has not been in-
Pr°bie^U^^ the AR-5 mask should not pose significant Serving S t° a'rcrews» commanders responsible for pre- lhe biask31^3^168 understandably question whether a0 opp0W'|* impair flight safety. They might even balk at Aft.5 ] Unity accomplish meaningful training with the rodUcedn mV experience, the mask’s visual distortion and 'eld of vision are minimal; it does not subject pilots and aircrews to significant flight hazards. Command attention to flight safety, coupled with mature aircrew judgment, should be sufficient to protect our assets.
The problems associated with NBC gear are compounded by the lack of a Marine field collective protection capability—a shelter that can provide temporary refuge in a contaminated environment, and a place for changing protective clothing or resting. Without this protection, extended operations are virtually impossible.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has recently expressed concern, and rightly so, that “pilots are fixating on the high threat environment” and developing an overly cautious “war-fighter’s concern for the worst case scenario” at the expense of their missions. Some might suggest that worrying about NBC protection is such a fixation. However, helicopter aircrews will not be able to accomplish their mission—delivering combat Marines to engage the enemy—if they fly unprotected into chemically contaminated environments. Chemical agents alone do not threaten aircraft; but a chemical environment can be difficult to detect in flight, and lethal to unprotected aircrews and troops who cross its path. Helicopter squadrons are entrusted with a special challenge to project Marines into any environment. If we cannot fully support the Marine rifleman on the battlefield, we should ask ourselves if we are seriously committed to doing our job.
Major Johnson graduated from the University of Hawaii and holds a master’s degree in education administration. A CH-46 Sea Knight pilot with more than 4,000 hours’ flight experience, he serves on the staff of the Commanding General, Third Marine Aircraft Wing.
75
’n8s / june