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ball * ta^CS a very long time to get Cinderella dressed for the l ; A lot’s been done in the last four years, and we’re just for ""I08 t0 see some °f d come into the [mine warfare]
(fom,' ' Th'S comment by moderator R. James Woolsey rnin^rier ^nc*er Secretary of the Navy during the Carter ad- tile IStrat'on) reflected the burst of optimism that accompanied ^ c°mmissioning of the USS Avenger (MCM-1)—the first ^angoing minesweeper built since 1958—just nine days RaviT September Naval Institute seminar, held in the
y Urn Building of the House of Representatives, for ri118 ^te Past seven years, $1.3 billion has been allocated ^instruction of 11 Avenger-class ships, but the program Offered delays and cost overruns. According to Vice
Other panelists took a less sanguine view. Former Representative (1980-86) Thomas F. Hartnett (R-SC) observed that the same types of mines that caused the U. S. Navy problems in World War II are just as threatening to Navy ships today. He warned of budget constraints to be faced in the years ahead, reminding the audience of the low priority minesweeper construction has traditionally held in Navy shipbuilding programs. He did not offer much hope that the Navy will be able to meet the mining threat and saw little prospect for improvement during the next five years.
Dr. Scott C. Truver, head of Information Spectrum’s naval and maritime policy department and author of “The Mines of August: An International Whodunit” (Proceedings, May
VADM
R. James Woolsey
Hon.
Thomas Hartnett
James R. Hogg USN
\y ra'ral James R. Hogg, U. S. Navy, Director of Naval tare (OP-095), the Navy will not reach an optimum mine
Ad,
(juare force level until 1997, although the Avenger intro- e .s "naine sensor and mine countermeasure capabilities rcstlvalem to or better than mine warfare capabilities in the 0f -°f the world.” The new ships will join an existing force •he l 0ceang°*ng minesweepers, wooden-hull ships built in cUrr 5°S and uPSracietI during the 1960s. Four of these are C0ent|y deployed in the Persian Gulf. An airborne mine "'ermeasures capability is provided by 23 RH-53D heli- . ers dedicated to this task.
0f n time, a variant of the powerful CH-53E will be capable il),,ri1'rie countermeasures work, and a current study is explor- Pto P°ss'hility of using air cushion vehicles—which iC(),T'lse some of the speed and relative invulnerability of hel- for CrS comhined with the staying power of surface ships— detection and sweeping. “The Navy is very serious 0|,c1 'he mine warfare program,” said Admiral Hogg, who feServed as the executive officer of the minesweeper USS to Ur ess (MSO-442). “We’re focusing on the technology . . . eet the mine warfare threat of the mid-1990s.” 1985), cited the mine force’s image problem within the U. S. Navy, unlike other navies which rely more heavily on such forces. He quoted a British mine countermeasures specialist: “Don’t you Yanks understand what the Soviets could do to you in war?” Nevertheless, mine warfare in our Navy continues to be regarded as a low-tech vocation in a high-tech environment, and a lengthy association with the mine force is not career-enhancing, Truver concluded.
But even though they lack the glamour of aircraft carriers, mine warfare ships can serve as inexpensive force multipliers, especially in offensive mining roles. Dr. Norman Friedman, naval analyst, Proceedings columnist, and former deputy director for national security studies at the Hudson Institute, commented that future minelayers needed to be neither large nor expensive to provide offensive capability. He said future minesweepers must be relatively small and cheap (but powerful enough to pull heavy sleds) because some will inevitably be sunk.
Admiral Hogg outlined the four main aspects of the U. S. Navy’s mine countermeasures mission:
► At the outset of major conflict, rapid clearance to permit
Contact mines on deck of the Iranian Ajr in the Persian Gulf on 22 September.
the breakout of ships from U. S. ports ► Clearing sea lines of communication to permit forward
movement of forces and uninterrupted logistical support
- Minesweeping in support of amphibious operations
- Mine detection and sweeping in Third World contingent situations (e.g., the Persian Gulf)
The mine countermeasures would be accomplished sequefl tially, beginning with harbor breakout. Allies would initi®. have to handle mining situations in their own waters, with U. S. minesweepers joining them later in the course of the conflict.
Although the U. S. Navy still has a long way to go jn e veloping its mine warfare capability to meet the threat imposed by major conflict with the Soviet Union, the units c rently on hand are performing effectively in the Persian u and steady improvement is foreseen. “The challenge is to maintain our momentum,” said Admiral Hogg. “The Nav> committed to getting it done—to get the ships delivered on time and to improve (our) capability.”
An audience of approximately 250 Naval Institute mem and congressional staffers had the opportunity to broaden discussion during a question-and-answer session and at the reception that followed the speakers’ presentation.
Margaret Ran
Seminar Report
Power Projection: the Future of the Corps
ted
through specialized task organization, months of integral training with carrier battle groups and specialized training (e.g., hostage rescue) with other government agencies. ^ early months of travel about the Corps since becoming U mandant, General Gray has given his Marines high mark-s^ though he still sees room for improvement. Above all he j pects Marines to be warriors—to be ready to mount out.
:haire'
A full day’s activities at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California, on 7 October provided attendees a close-up look at the revolutionary air cushion landing craft (LCAC), followed by intense but upbeat discussion about the uses of such new technology by the Marine Corps through the 1990s. The day was highlighted by two appearances by General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Approximately 150 attendees gathered in the base theater for a preliminary LCAC briefing by Assault Craft Unit 5 (ACU-5), before boarding buses for the half-hour ride to Red Beach, on the Pacific Ocean. An early morning fog masked the approach of two LCACs until they were 500 yards or less offshore, still noiseless at that range while traveling at 40 knots or better. Moments after being spotted from the beach, they crossed a moderate surf line and roared inland to disgorge light armored vehicles. Then, after embarking some of the spectators, the LCACs flew back over the plunging surf and out to sea, disappearing into the fog bank as quietly as they had appeared once they were a few yards from the beach. They returned to ACU-5’s ramp and hangar complex a few minutes later. Six of the Navy’s ten LCACs are based there now. In time, that number will grow to more than 40—matched by LCACs at Little Creek, Virginia.
By noon, an audience of roughly 450 had filled the San Luis Rey Officers’ Club to hear General Gray’s luncheon speech. The Commandant arrived in camouflaged utilities, fresh from a visit to the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, in the California high desert. In his half-hour speech, he outlined the power projection capabilities of the Marine Corps needed to further a global maritime strategy: one that would protect sea lines of communication with amphibious operations at key choke points; one that
would call for forcible entry from the sea and sustained of6 tions along the world’s littorals, where necessary; and °nes that would rely on Marines as deterrent and stabilizing f°r in Third World situations. f.
He cited the LCAC as one of the cornerstones of the o'* the-horizon (OTH) assault capability now being developed, a counter to the threat posed to amphibious forces by PreC sion-guided munitions. Marines may still have to “bust up the middle” at times, but they must also learn to operatc f against the flanks, in the seams, against the enemy’s lineS communication, or in his rear, against C3 and logistics fa|0 ties. Through training exercises, he is pushing command6 discard old “ten-kilometer-small-island” thinking, and beg to plan heliborne assaults of 50-100 kilometers, and to tni of force beachheads that extend 200-300 kilometers 'n'an^var-
Marines and amphibious forces are also homing in on j fare at the lower end of the spectrum, because unconven warfare and special operations forces “can’t do it alldeploying Marine amphibious units (special operations cap ble) have greatly expanded capabilities that are developed
his
to win when they arrive.
The seminar that followed, in the base theater, was cl by Major General Fred Haynes, U. S. Marine Corps (Re^ef. tired), Vice President for Planning and Analysis at LfV ospace and Defense Company. General Haynes likened to
CorPs'
warfare). General Caulfield sees a bright future for the but also a need for a new breed of multi-dimensional otn
day’s organizational climate to that of the mid-1970s, when a number of studies generated by Congress and think tanks led to force structure changes in the Marine Corps. There is still a need to re-examine force structure in terms of: geographic orientation, the need for amphibious capability, the relative “heaviness” or “lightness” of forces required, the degree of involvement in special operations, and the percentage of the budget the Marines can expect to receive.
The co-author of one of those mid-1970s studies (which, incidentally, led to the creation of the Haynes Board within the Corps) was the next panelist to speak. Dr. Jeffrey Record of the Hudson Institute served as Legislative Assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), after earlier work with the Brookings Institution and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He spoke of a shift of thinking within the Reagan administration away from the “Europe first” (or Europe only”) mindset of the 1970s. The requirements of a NATO war are still a major determinant of force structure, but growing dissatisfaction with the extent of the NATO commitment is tending to broaden the focus. The U. S. Army, still heavily NATO-oriented, has reacted to this unsettled situation by experimenting with light infantry divisions and other mobile units, but these are no substitute for Marine air-ground task forces. Since much of the Army’s combat support and combat service support capability now resides in its reserve, it is likely that the Marines will get tapped first for lower intensity conflicts under conditions short of mobilization, in Dr. Record's opinion.
The next panelist was Mr. Peter Wilson of the RAND Corporation, a veteran of service with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. He outlined a central dilemma: the need to balance near-term investments against long-term ones, under increasing budgetary pressures—in light of a shift from nuclear deterrence and toward a need for widespread conventional capability in Europe and Asia (and even in the Arctic), while simultaneously dealing with low- intensity revolutionary warfare in the Third World. He foresees a series of hard choices ahead—choices that will ental degree of risk-taking.
Brigadier General Matthew P. Caulfield, U. S. Marine ^ Corps, spoke as the Commanding General of the 4th Mah Amphibious Brigade, headquartered at Little Creek. Speat;l " from an operational perspective, he traced the massive junT in Marine Corps capabilities within the past decade, both ^ terms of equipment (“Nothing is older than eight years, a everything works.”) and operations and training (where, example, the Marines have become “world class” in Arc to provide the leadership and cope with the challenges coming years, when even more newness will be introduce ■ Having slipped his schedule long enough to hear the oy ing statements of the panelists, General Gray joined the o cussion. In general, he expects the “aggregate utility” 0 Marine Corps forces across the spectrum to be their strong point, but the Marines must “listen to others, remain ^eX('ary and remain warriors, prepared to win.” He and the Secre ^ of the Navy fully endorse the requirement for the LCAC a the MV-22 Osprey to support an OTH capability in the 1990s, and agree on the need to upgrade the amphibious level. He wants to streamline the research and developmf and acquisition processes, to become more active in get11° the hardware (even creating it in Marine Corps “skunk works,” if need be) the Marines actually need, rather than settling for hand-me-downs from the larger services. .
The Commandant’s concluding thought was philosophlC^fl “I believe that the nation loves the Marine Corps. But it demands that the Corps be the best-led, best-trained, and best-disciplined force on earth. I’m not sure we’re all the there today, but that’s where our sailors and Marines arc going to take us.”
A lively question period followed General Gray’s depar ture. But the Commandant had delivered the final wort^ ,ji|er
John G- M