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wise, it is hard to say what made Shelkov put himself into the risky crossfire of military criticism. But one thing is clear, his overreaction does not make him a journalist. He painfully resembles a copy boy building himself up to be a news hound.
Chernavin on Readiness and Training
In the Soviet Naval Digest for January 1987, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir N. Chernavin continued to write about the need for increased readiness and the improvements to training required to achieve it. When writing for political officers and party members in October 1986, the admiral stressed the aspects of training for which they are responsible: organization and scheduling; assuring command attention and personnel attendance; improving training methods and facilities. (See “The Soviet View: Chernavin on Readiness and Training,” April 1987 Proceedings.) Now, writing for operators, he entitled his article, “Teach Them What They Need for War” and emphasized . . the basic features of contemporary war at sea and the way to bring training conditions close to real battle conditions.”
Addressing contemporary war at sea, Admiral Chernavin said, “There have been radical qualitative changes in the naval weapons of all the major sea powers . . and spent a paragraph discussing each: missiles, nuclear weapons, electronics, computer technology, radioelectronic combat (a Soviet concept somewhat broader than U. S. electronic warfare), and space. He concluded that:
“All of these features of modem military assets make it possible for the forces of the West, with their large naval groups constantly close to the borders of one state or another as they conduct their maneuvers and exercises, to make a sudden transition into actual combat operations and inflict appreciable losses on their armed forces and economy. Surprise was and still is the principal method the imperialist aggressors use to start combat operations, and we must never forget this fact.”
Based on this background. Admiral Chernavin stressed:
. . Tactics are worthwhile only if they consider the military assets and operating methods of the probable enemy. The failure to react to everything new that the enemy shows, whether it be weapons or tactics, will certainly reduce the capabilities of our side.”
The development and execution of Soviet naval tactics are guided by officially established and promulgated “Principles of the Military Art.” Admiral Chernavin reminded readers that they must focus their training on three of the most important: coordinating the employment of combined arms forces, ensuring surprise through methods the enemy does not expect, and concentrating forces on the most important axis at the decisive time.
“During the course of military training we must learn to oppose the enemy’s tactics and weapons with effective measures that will allow us to not only disrupt his plans but also defeat him. We should consider the combat capabilities of all forces, set up clearly organized mutual support, use tactical methods that are unexpected and mass weapons suddenly at the time and place that is least expected.”
He then emphasized that, while there have been changes in modem warfare, the principles remain valid and there are ways to adhere to them. With respect to surprise, for example:
“It is well known that technical reconnaissance assets are making it very difficult to hide operations at sea. Therefore the skillful use of military stratagem that can also provide a surprise combat effect on the enemy is an important factor for success in battle.
. . . The most effective method for achieving surprise is to confuse the enemy during combat . . . about your intentions by using camouflage, disinformation, simulations, demonstrations, and false operations.
. . The long ranges of weapons
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carried • natlona' newspaper Pravda spend ‘m ltem Bled by its special corre- The\nm!n 0ttawa' Canada, V. Shelkov. GenJstarting with its title, “The Written s /^‘Jmiral-like Incitement,” was nautical^'-*1 sarcasm ancl word play on
' reported that “the Head of the
“Today it is said in the fleet
ond place in the formation, yte1 only to the traditional lead
Idinf
destroy^
fulfill
Otchayannyy. All firings are as outstanding or good and, toge1
and their increased accuracy on target will create a difficult mission for commanders at the tactical level. . . . They have to stop an enemy who is attacking and . . . destroy him with the first volley at optimum ranges. Otherwise, the enemy may be able to employ his own weapons and put our forces at a disadvantage. The ability to resolve this mission favorably will depend to a large degree on the timeliness of target detection and the guaranteed target designation, that is on well-organized and redundant tactical reconnaissance.”
The one aspect of modern naval warfare that seems to concern Admiral Cher- navin most and for which he cites no established guiding principles is radioelectronic combat against command, control, and communications.
. . Under combat conditions, extreme time constraints will become a daily event and radio-electronic combat assets will be a serious hindrance to transmitting command signals to subordinates. ... It is not possible to think about a battle without losses, and these losses may well include the flagship command post.
. . . These truths are not new, but attention must be focused on them. As the logic of battle shows, enemies always strive to first knock command and control systems out of action. And the increased weapon capabilities make this threat even more real.
"During a battle that includes massive radio-electronic combat, the commander as never before may find himself in a situation where communications with his senior commander are unreliable, and the situation demands a change in the plan of action. Only an officer who has been schooled ... to become independent and have initiative and who is able to make bold decisions and take all the responsibility for them will be able to accomplish the assigned mission in accordance with the senior commander’s concept under those conditions. ... It is certainly impossible to provide incentives for deviating from the plan on the off-chance that it may work out. But if there is a creative approach that is supported by well- thought out conclusions that were verified ahead of time in training, then we must study the method and possibly change the documents because of it.”
Thus, when command and control from above are cut and in the absence of guiding principles, Admiral Chernavin calls upon his commanders to exercise “initiative” and be “creative.” But, as indicated by Chernavin’s qualifying statement, initiative to the Soviets is something that must be taught and learned, as opposed to being a natural attribute of a good commander, and creativity something that must occur in advance. Basically, Chernavin’s call for initiative and creativity is an exhortation for Soviet commanders to develop, plan, exercise, and have approved in advance alternatives to the textbook courses of action officially prescribed to carry out their assigned missions in the event command and control are cut. In essence, preplanned flexibility is desired, not on-the- spot innovative tactical decision making.
A New Kind of Example
the “vicious circle” in which he caught. After two years, he was tra ferred to head a department on boar ^ larger ship, the destroyer Svetlyy• Aga^j after two years he was transferred to same duty on board the Sovremennyy- All Soviet destroyers have favora ^ inspirational adjectives as their Sovremennyy means “Modern. Batochenko found that the Sovremenn despite being the “last word in scie and technology,” had a crew that di “get along” together. Consequently* competition she occupied one of the places in the formation. On board Sovremennyy in his years as a heu ant, Batochenko “drove himself ' “learned much” until his seniors rec°- nized his “command inclinations.
In September 1985, “by the time ^ was entrusted with the Sovremennyy- ^ knew clearly what he wanted and did ^ want to see on his ship.” At his first ^ ference with officers and warrants declared: “All that is due from eac you, I will demand completely. All tna due to each of you, will be given wit o strings.” When asked if that ind[1] leave, he replied affirmatively. 1° wardroom that was met with skeptic|S At that time, the ship had been waib ^ for one inspection after another and preparing for an important gunnfc' shoot. For various reasons, the opera was continually delayed month to mo and, each time, officers’ leave also been put off. The leave situation w “difficult” and people’s moods vve “absolutely cheerless.” f
Captain Batochenko took the risk ^ , granting leave, relying on the cr° specialty qualifications which officers expected to have to cover for absenc When the long-awaited gunnery s'10 j was finally scheduled, the navigat°r’ department head, and one battery c° mander were on leave. Nevertheie ’ despite mistakes and with luck, the ex<- cise was completed.
that
Sovremennyy is improving. R lifted itself from a lagging ship to sC
tber
with the Otchayannyy, it received t ® Navy prize. There still remain, ll .j true, problems with discipline. But the present situation is compared w1^ that of two to three years ago, there - improvement.
“Improving ship—that niea.v honor for the commander. It ' things were so straightforward in 1*‘ ’
cialm 6 cret*'t s't*e> the number of spe- Wavs S 011 *X>art* Sovremennyy, al- the 3n lrnPor*ant quantitative factor in On ,?nnua* cornPet'ti°n, has increased. expJ.othe' hand, Batochenko found his whom'u6 °^lcer> a veteran of the ship jntn . 6 aPP°‘ntcd and trusted, “in an
himc^ftEC^ State'” While Batochenko stron 1 Puhhcized that incident and tion r n Pena*'zed the officer, the situate- . ected badly on him. On another imnr,rt°n’ w^en his crew was engaged in nieht 3nt duty and had been working all sisted Wltflout liberty, Batochenko re- Panv 0rt*er to send a large working sUbm »S ,?re to clean UP an area. He only Catego ' W^en t*le order was repeated
0 Commander of Sovremen- liyy~~how it sounds. Earlier he would if Vd ”CCn Presented as quite a person- le symbol of our powerful oceanic eet’ 9u*te a brilliant intellectual "arching in step with the times in erything and always. . . . But atochenko has a complicated biogra- P y and his service record is not bril- *ant. He makes mistakes and not • Vepdhing he likes, thinks, and does _ always irrefutable. But that is why ls genuine Batochenko seems . . . °re interesting and attractive than ny imaginary one.”
^^dy Asked Us, But .. ._____________
ending to the 18 April Red Star, the nav°f S *nterview with Admiral Cher- son*n °" ^he Status of Seagoing Per- “ThC'’ ' Pabhshed on 21 March (see jUne Soviet View: The Last Word,” tvirf6 Proceedings), generated a
s, e response among readers. “They ,0*7 their thoughts in letters, in per- den3 ^'scuss'ons with our correspon- vy-,s> and in telephone conversations the editors.” Adhering to the new spirit of “openness” prevailing in the Soviet Union, personnel from warrant officer to rear admiral submitted their views, both pro and con, to Red Star.
Some senior officers indicated that the problems now being addressed were nothing new.
- Rear Admiral G. Gurinov: “The issues set forth in the interview . . . didn’t arise today. I remember we talked of them in the fleet in my lieutenant years.”
- Rear Admiral Yu. Shumanin: “The problem of raising the prestige of seagoing personnel has engaged me for many years.”
Other senior officers were positive.
- Rear Admiral Ribak, Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet: “. . . now after the publication of the interview with the Commander in Chief, everyone is getting busy.”
But others were more cautious.
- Rear Admiral V. Poroshin, chief of staff of a submarine group: “... any measures from above will be insufficient if we on the spot don’t turn ourselves personally to the problem.”
Junior officers were pessimistic.
- Captain-Lieutenant P. Kolesov, executive officer of a large landing ship: “After reading the interview, I personally was left with a feeling of some dissatisfaction. . . . We are not yet feeling any effects of the directives that have been sent to the fleet.”
- Captain-Lieutenant V. Azanov, head of a group on a submarine: “I am glad that the problem of increasing the status of seagoing personnel is being decided at such a high level. Yet somehow I am uncertain that everything will be changed after this publication. At any rate, not right away.”
A number of officers complained about the quantity and quality of shore staff personnel.
- Rear Admiral A. Petrov, Chief of the Personnel Department of the Baltic Fleet: “It seems to me . . .it is important to put an end to the ‘swelling’ of shore staffs, command apparatus and the ‘shrinking’ of shipboard staffs.”
- Captain First Rank M. Zhandalinov:
New Soviet “openness” reveals that everything hasn’t been ship-shape on the modern guided missile destroyer Sovremennyy.
“I was transferred recently to a fleet staff from a seagoing force and found out that here, there are officers—even senior ones—who have not served a day on a ship.”
Various other officers decried the lack of incentives for seagoing versus shore duty officers.
- Captain Second Rank N. Sergeyev, commanding officer of a ship: “Certainly our loyalty to the fleet is not determined by the size of our daily allowance. But, nevertheless, it is not necessary to restrict talk of the material side of things, especially when, on the face of it, there is inequality in the pay between shipboard and shore staff work.”
- Senior Warrant Officer V. Duk- hovskiy, a command senior chief: “1 will not speak of the material side of affairs, we receive good money. But from the point of view of morale stimulus. . . . For example, Warrant Officer V. Kondratenko recently retired after having served on board navy ships for 27 calendar years, more than 20 of them in submarines. And what did he have different from warrant officers who served ashore? Indeed, nothing—neither on the uniform nor in decorations: the same anniversary medals, indeed the same service longevity for retirement purposes. Kondratenko did not receive any extra credit for sea duty.”
The editors indicate that Red Star will continue to publish articles discussing the practical resolution of the problem of increasing the prestige of seagoing personnel. Naval Digest also has started addressing the status of seagoing personnel with the publication of first person discussions on “Shipboard Service: Problems, Anxieties, Considerations” in the February 1987 issue. These articles will provide a Soviet view of the personal and professional concerns of Soviet seagoing naval officers that affect their morale, readiness, and operational capabilities.
11'faction of a Novice
rt i^PrB’ 'n a column headed "Re- dat'cal terminology
Can dlk0V rCported th......................................
Genera?p M‘!ltary College, Brigadier- tirpe . eter Taggart, has recently found reader° .an art‘Ge • • • not for local
the Mar nUt f°r eXport ’ ' ' Published in ceedi ,1SSUe of ‘he U. S. Naval Pro
SPot * S'C^'' ^ee “Canada’s Blind
Gana’dianp 3dier General R J' TaSeart' F°rces, March 1987 Proceed-
°f Writ' C'^0V accused General Taggart beCau .'n\on tbe “Soviet military threat” cuStonf „ nlet tbe demands of the corned ^ and wou'd be “warmly wel- 8ans ” lT /"'lITler'can military press or- Tag ' ,, e described the thrust of General a p. *, s art'cle, “. . . that Canada needs coast,ern navy there [°n the Pacific detect'^ Wed aS systems Por submarine iisow'00' 'ncreased naval aviation, and is l a submarines,” and concluded: “It 'hrown '0 Say what made the general anti-v hl.mseB int0 the stormy waves of Gear ''u-6'. labr'cation. But one thing is adm ’.i S recirement does not make him Cat).lrrtl-like. He painfully seems like a d0'n, oy building himself up to be a sea
O'
^Gkov’s article, on the other hand, Wri'c datelined Ottawa, was certainly not re ,en lor local Canadian or Proceedings den CfS ^Ut’ rather, because it met the Co Unds oP bis editors who warmly welded it for publication in Pravda. Like
On 7 February, the Soviet military newspaper Red Star carried an article entitled, “On the Bridge of Sovremennyy. Ship Commander—Duty and Personality.” It described the career and command service of Captain Second Rank Vladimir Batochenko, the commanding officer of the lead unit of the Soviet Union’s latest class of destroyer. In keeping with the new spirit of “openness” about the problems and difficulties encountered throughout the Soviet system, this is a new kind of inspirational propaganda article. It does not hold Captain Batochenko up as an example of the “New Soviet Man,” the perfect communist, and ideal commander, long expected to result from the influences of living under the Soviet system. Rather, he is portrayed as a dedicated and caring but imperfect human being, striving to make a career and succeed at command despite bad luck and mistakes in an imperfect system.
Captain Batochenko attended the Black Sea Fleet Higher Naval School in Sevastopol and, upon graduation, ended up “by distribution” on the “most backward ship” in one of the Offshore Defense Force formations of the Baltic Fleet. On that ship, he did not have the opportunity to qualify in a specialty as every young officer is expected to do because the commanding officer kept moving him from job to job. Those years stand out as a dark period in Batochenko’s memory.
Then, he was offered the position as head of the radio-technical service division on another ship. Five other candidates had already declined that offer, because it entailed extensive responsibilities without the rank to match. Batochenko accepted that “disadvantageous position” as a way to break out of