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must be supported in the area by the U. S. Atlantic Fl^ carrier force. European navies cannot hope to deploy s far north without this support.
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Before NATO’s Northern Flank naval forces can or will get in line with the U. S. Maritime Strategy, the U. S. carrier forces must be committed to northern waters in peacetime. If this means a Mediterranean denuded of carriers or fewer carrier battle groups in the Pacific—so be it.
The Maritime Strategy does not introduce a new concept of naval-air operations at sea, but Admiral James Watkins’s article “The Maritime Strategy” (Supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings, pp. 2-17) does state some aspects not previously presented so clearly or so publicly. Perhaps the most controversial area is the matter of anti-Soviet nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operations.
For the maritime commander, Admiral Watkins’s article is a published raison d’etre not just for U. S. forces but for those of the United Kingdom and other European navies committed to operating in the Norwegian Sea and eastern Atlantic. After our contributions to strategic deterrence, our role within NATO is primarily related to the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) battle. This involves nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in tracking and attacking Soviet submarines (including SSBNs), surface ships in forward area operations and direct support ASW, and maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters supporting both the submarines and surface ships or operating independently. We do not, however, have the capability to conduct these operations in more than one or two theaters, e.g., the Northern Flank and the South West Approaches (SWAPP). In these areas we could support a U. S. global strategy, but not horizontal escalation.
The United States is probably the only world power that could pursue a global strategy. The Soviet Union is strategically landlocked in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk/Sea of Japan. An effective forward Maritime Strategy into the North Norwegian and Barents seas could forcibly contain the Soviet Northern Fleet so that it would be effectively landlocked. This then is the area in which we need to be most powerful.
Warning time will be critical, both for establishing a blockade of landlocked exits and positioning credible forces far enough forward, between the Greenland-Iceland' United Kingdom (G-I-UK) Gap and the polar regi°n' Warning time is particularly crucial for the deployed West' em SSNs. Any delay behind Soviet deployments coul leave our SSNs facing a hostile transit north. Thus, °ur SSNs would be delayed some 10 to 14 days.
Therefore, unless the Western SSNs are already in tf1® area, realistically at least 14 days advance notice of Sovte SSN and SSBN deployments is required to achieve sa'e and timely positioning of our SSNs. Western surf*1^ forces would also need to tread warily, though they coin be in area within four days. Without SSN support, ho'v ever, the surface ships’ vulnerability would increase; they would lack an in-depth defense, and it would be alm°s impossible for the West to seize the initiative in the ear) days of the campaign.
This scenario, of course, supposes that we have less ot forward policy in peace. To be so committed in war, thef fore, we must be so committed in peace since the warnin'- time cannot be guaranteed. Seven days may be the m3*! mum, and our peacetime deployments, especially in PeI^ ods of tension, need to account for this. This commitm1
One effect of the Maritime Strategy will be a neg3t|0^ of the “swing policy.” Once the carrier battle gr°^j!| (CVBGs) are committed to the Northern Flank it is di cult to see how they could be “swung” to, say, the Son I em Flank, assuming there are no carriers stationed in ^ Mediterranean. Following this line, it is likely that CVp air power will be needed to support the Central Fr°nt' | projected policy of “winning deep,” attacking the fob0 ^ on operational groups, will demand high levels of b° fighter and attack air forces. With counter-air, grounds (j port, and airfield self-defense, the allied tactical air t°rCj in Europe will be severely stretched, both on the Ceh Front and possibly in Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark- preme Allied Commander Europe (SACEur) may n the CVBG air groups in these areas. They can only, taken from the Northern and Southern flanks. Accep1 the importance of maritime operations in the north
seems logical that the Mediterranean will be denuded of carriers—-contrary to horizontal escalation.
Removing the CVBGs from the Mediterranean may impact on the cohesion of NATO. As the southern member nations perceive a greater emphasis on the Northern Flank, they may question their current financial and military commitment to the alliance. In this situation, NATO could possibly even face a split structure, with the Southern Flank countries following a separate alliance and considerably reducing their current financial and military support to NATO. Indeed, the CVBGs may have to be kept in the Mediterranean to emphasize the global commitment, certainly within the NATO area. CVBGs for the Northern Flank would need to be taken from other sources, perhaps from the U. S. Pacific Fleet.
How important is the Northern Flank? The Soviet Union is primarily a land power, and the Soviets’ intention in war and in peace is the expulsion of U. S. power from Europe and the political domination of the Eurasian land- mass. Their major thrust, then, will, logically and historically, come across the plains of Central Europe. A close connection exists between the Northern Flank and the Central Front, in a military sense; success on the Northern Flank would have a direct impact on the Warsaw Pact and i NATO. The same cannot be said for the Southern Flank- The Soviet Northern Fleet is required to conduct offensive | operations against NATO, including interdiction of the Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and disrup- | tion of sea communications within the European theater- Consequently, U. K. maritime priorities mainly relate to . the capability and intentions of the Soviet Northern Flee1 in the Atlantic, and in the Norwegian, Barents, and Nat" j row seas, both in peace and in war.
If Soviet forces are able to deploy early and establish a large maritime presence and defense in-depth from the G-I-UK Gap to the Kola Peninsula, it is difficult to conceive how we could fight our way back to control the North Norwegian Sea, especially if NATO also lost the Norwegian airfields and bases.
A maritime dimension will affect the ability of the
the Soviet Northern Fleet are strategic offense together with forces protecting them against NATO A-
si
if
and strategic defense (the layered defense of the home1 ^ against U. S., U. K., and French SSBNs; the ^ ^ CVBGs; and cruise missiles). If successfully comp'e f. these tasks would also provide security for Soviet SL
artlPhib an^ effective'y will require dedicated specialist Sr, tr!°Us dipping supported later by ships taken up ■ a c' There will not be time to convert merchant
shi
support the advanced forces at sea by denying the
dlnss 1 April 1987
a °ng the coast near Murmansk, and the environment necessary for conducting amphibious operations in support of ground forces in the northern region.
To counter this type of Soviet strategy, NATO— assuming a short warning time—must have sufficient 0rces in the area to hold and contain hostile forces until reinforcements arrive. This initial containment tradition- y has been the task of the European navies, especially the Royal Navy.
Indeed, this is part of our current perceived concept of operations (ConOps) to provide ASW support to the Strik- ag Fleet Atlantic and to control the SWAPPs to protect e reinforcement shipping. A key aspect of more forward operations will undoubtedly be ASW, but we will also ^quire good air defense. Also, the case for improving the ter ^ arnPhibious lift capability is strong. Taking the lat- Cr first, early reinforcement of northern Norway will be cessary to counter a push through either Norway, Fin- aniJ’ or northern Sweden.
he fastest reinforcement available will be from the
'Stbpk’ nor wouW merchant ships be as effective; it Ij. K fea fiuiek-reaction and credible force. Thus, the first ships ,oecIUlrernent must be the procurement of at least two SloynrC^*ace l^1c aguig Fearless and Intrepid. This early s3ry to ®nt °I a credible amphibious force will be neces- lhey „ rcngthen ground forces in northern Norway so
Warsaw Pact the use of Norwegian bases, especially airfields.
Moving seaward to the ASW situation, the current Con- Ops is for U. K. forces, as Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Forces Atlantic, to provide ASW protection for the Striking Fleet and the Marine amphibious force. This is currently conducted by direct and area operations from the continental United States into the Norwegian Sea and throughout the transit. It involves surface forces with active sonar and towed arrays supported by SSNs, shipboard helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). In addition to these forces, ASW operations are also conducted in focal areas, such as the vicinity of the Azores, the Rockall Bank, and the G-I-UK Gap; they are primarily defensive.
To conduct the operations outlined in the Maritime Strategy, these ASW forces will need to conduct primarily offensive ASW tasks from the G-I-UK Gap north to the ice edge and perhaps beyond with SSNs. A new concept of operations to support this strategy will be necessary. It might take the following broad direction.
The U. S. carriers make an independent fast transit from the United States supported by Aegis cruisers to reach the Norwegian Sea as soon as possible. On occasion, one CVBG may be operating in this area already, but a second and third would certainly be needed. This fast transit would be supported by a frigate with a helicopter and critical angle array (FFCH)/MPA combinations in area operations centered on focal points. It is a risky endeavor, but with the use of speed, sensible, well-considered tactical routing, and decoy groups, the Soviet ocean satellite system can be defeated. A safe fast transit is feasible and possibly less hazardous than the current practice of making slower CVBG transits.
Consequently, the ASW Striking Force’s assets, released from providing direct support to the Striking Fleet, will be available to conduct ASW search and attack operations in and north of the G-I-UK Gap. They may be supported in this task by elements of the Canadian and Dutch navies. Advanced picket units will operate covertly toward the Barents Sea and cover the exit routes of the Soviet Northern Fleet’s nuclear submarines and monitor Soviet Naval Air Force activity. Active sonar-fitted ships can conduct area search in the vicinity of amphibious objective areas (AOAs), in the shallow water areas, and in the G-I- UK Gap to counter a deployed Soviet diesel submarine barrier. In this area, Canadian variable-depth sonars will be most useful.
This circumstance of active ASW offensive operations enforces the need for a force ASW weapon system to follow the Ikara ASW missile. The availability of large helicopters to support ships operating active sonars is not guaranteed; the passive effort may require all available assets. Apart from the arguments on helo capability against the need for a follow-on Ikara system, ships conducting active sonar operations in critical areas, such as the G-I-UK Gap and AOAs, must be given a force weapon to utilize their longer range detections. Indeed, modern sonars are half naked without such a weapon. It is an obvious requirement in support of such forward, active, and offensive ASW operations.
fighter squadrons in northern Norway is the space ava
able. Most of the available hard-stands and hang' (mainly of soft construction) are likely to be taken up
The fastest Northern Flank reinforcement available will come from the U.K.-Netherlands amphibious force. In a recent exercise, after landing as part of this combined force, Royal Netherlands Marines load equipment on a British Sea King helicopter, which also flies in support of its own Royal Marines.
If Western forces are in place or deployments are made early enough, they may achieve sufficient containment to prevent Soviet deployments as far south as the G-I-UK Gap. Adequate and credible deterrence on the Northern Flank could have important repercussions on Warsaw Pact Central Front plans. Deterrence has several ingredients:
- The perceived possession of sufficient military capability to threaten unacceptable cost upon an aggressor
- The evident ability to deploy and to sustain that capability and to win the battle
- The recognized will to do so
Having established this credible force, principally ASW, a large Soviet air threat will need to be countered to ensure our survivability. This force will need to fulfill the first ingredient of deterrence.
The Soviet Northern Fleet Air Arm consists of about 430 aircraft, including Badger C and support surveillance and electronic countermeasures aircraft. They operate mainly from airfields on the Kola Peninsula. The Soviet Baltic Fleet Air Arm has 40 Backfire Bs, 40 Badgers, 20 Blinders, and about 40 Fitter Cs. These forces are trained and equipped for attacks on ships and ground targets in support of amphibious operations. Occasionally, they operate from airfields on the Kola Peninsula and could be deployed there to support an operation against northern Norway and to make maritime attacks. Most important, there are 16 military airfields on the Kola Peninsula with sufficient capacity and infrastructure to receive substantial reinforcements from other parts of the Soviet Union. It is estimated that the numbers of aircraft on the Kola could be doubled at very short notice.
At this stage, if there were no CVBGs in area, the ait threat to forward forces would be extensive. The AS?1 flagship (an ASW carrier [CVS]) would have to be pos1' tioned among the fjords. Air defense of the northern <Je' ployed forces would be vested in shore-based aircraft fty" ing from Norway and Iceland together with aircrat operating from the one or two CVSs. In view of air de' fense requirements, two CVSs would be needed to provide 24-hour coverage.
The disposition of the U.K.-NL amphibious force in ;1 similar time frame may need a third CVS and a third a'r group to cover the amphibious landing and possibly carO troops and equipment. One CVS could be “swung” wheIJ a CVBG arrives in the area, but we would be putting a‘ our eggs in one basket, and the risks would be enormous Positioning one CVS or two within the fjords would l11 undesirable particularly for a command with degrade communications and sensors or that needs special facility to combat the blanking problems. It does, however, see'1’ far too risky an endeavor to venture so far north witho11 the protection of the CVBG air groups. Assuming fordid cussion that a carrier battle group is not present, can afford to wait and give the Soviets freedom to deploy l>ot 1 on land and at sea?
If we waited, we would probably be faced with 011 CVBGs and amphibious forces having to fight their 'va-. into a strengthened area. We may also lose the use 0 Norwegian bases, and links with NATO air defenS ground equipment and the sonar surveillance system stl1 tions. The initiative must be taken early. To support o air defense, the U. K. maritime fighter squadrons must % deployed to northern Norway. There are five military 111 fields in the north, soon to be defended by Hawk missdfj There are two squadrons of F-16 fighters, which could supplemented by additional F-16s and F-5s from souths Norway. This will depend on Warsaw Pact activity in 1 Baltic and Jutland regions. ,
A major problem with positioning U. K. marih
maritime patrol aircraft and Norwegian Air Force aircfa Thus, the deployment of two more squadrons, with u1^ support elements, may not be feasible. In any event- ^ support peacetime operations in the area, the present |j U. K. maritime squadrons on Norwegian territory '■vt,l![i have serious political implications and upset the Nt>r
alance. A much firmer political commitment seems to be fr°m Norway if the Maritime Strategy is to be fully ective. It is not going to be an easy road, but surely it is Reasonable t0 expect the same political attitude as that of est Germany in supporting forward defense. For air de- ®nse, if space permits (some redeployment of Norwegian A may be necessary), such action is needed if we are to °w a strategy of more forward maritime operations. q 1 would be folly to deploy so far north of the G-I-UK aP without adequate and credible air defense forces. Ice- ?n is more than 600 miles from the likely operating area. ^lr assistance from Iceland, together with support from in n a'r ^ases’ most usefully be employed in provid- FFru ^ suPPort t0 active units in the G-I-UK Gap and id i *n tbe North Norwegian Sea. FFCH support would eally f,e pj-Qyjjg^ by Link-11-fitted MPA, thus con- ®rat,ly enhancing the NATO command and control arrangements.
ass *t^out tbe CVBG air assets and in view of the air surftS to be available, the forward deployment of
Liii ace sb*Ps of the ASW Striking Force has poor surviva- Wo u anC^’ tberef°re> lacks credibility. In this case, it q U be foolhardy to deploy them north of the G-I-UK f°rw thCy Wou^ be unable to fulfill their role in support of Sarj,ar^ defense. Of course, this opinion may not neces- We ^ be reflected in the eyes of the Soviets. However, if qUjrare to follow the Maritime Strategy, then a prime re- rier.ment's the near-permanent stationing of a U. S. car- of _group in the Norwegian Sea under the same type
flgetjRerat*nS cycle as elements of the Sixth and Seventh other Ki cons'der this a precondition before U. K. and ti0n . O maritime forces adopt such a forward posi- lcad' tpartlcularly in an area of tension with potential to Yyjt? a major conflict.
be1) q out CVBG support, how vulnerable will our forces p,0ymncc 'be SSNs have completed their dangerous de- Vance 6nt nortb and are on station, their technological ad- giVe ., ents> and superior equipment and training should ble . eiT1 the advantage. Surface ships are more detecta- vehioiUt 'S tbe risk of forward deployment that high? All
Is ? War are vulnerable-
major r ^°v'et Northern Fleet commander likely to push fense ()|.>rces against the ASW Striking Force? After de- the ne° . SSBN force and protection of the homeland, Cruise-Xt. Pr'°r't'es f°r Soviet attack are the CVBGs and arriva] Ca,Pab'e units. It seems logical that, knowing the Win Le° tbese units is imminent, the Soviet commanders thejr air^ft*16 majority °f their attack forces, especially certain^ /)rces’ t0 combat this prime threat. We would °Ur0pt ^ ■6 ahle t° tear off some arms and legs. Despite tic^iy ^nilSrn’ some portion of the Soviet threat will realis- sUffgre ranged against our forward forces, and we could
Sta8es ;naccePtable losses. CVBG support in the earliest Jes Is vital.
the carrier battle group is in place, with the eh hFCR111 °* a *ar®e Striking Force, including cov- ^articul i i Un'ts’ tbe logistical problem will be immense, "'ll! be f ^ ln suPporting FFCH operations. This problem Passivg sXacerhated by the requirement for dipping and °nar helicopters (some from the support ships) to support ASW localizations and attacks. However, in view of the possible disposition of the CVS units and the need to search thoroughly AOAs and coastal waters, large ship- borne helicopters may be better employed on active operations in support of the surface escorts on area search operations. In this case, MPA and FFCH-embarked helicopters would conduct passive support operations. MPA will be vulnerable until we have control of the air.
With the current concept of the Type 23 frigate’s aviation facilities, some replenishment oiler (AOR) commitment in air support will be required. This might take the form of a surface tanker towline between FFCH barriers, but the risk is obvious. For this type of operation, some enhancement of the Type 23’s air facilities seems to be essential. They must—as far as is possible—be largely independent in air operations. Fueling arrangements will be less critical and probably can be more safely achieved in this geographical area by relieving on station, obviating the need for the AORs and tankers to be put at risk.
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary force will be stretched. The fleet is largely being replaced by the AORs; in the short term with 6, and in the longer term, 11. They are, however, very expensive, and in the current financial climate, the long-term prospects do not look good. It will be difficult for the task force commander to accept the loss of one. The AOR also, because of her “one-stop” capability and a limited capacity for fuel, will require bunkering at frequent intervals.
It may be that if the aviation aspects of the Type 23s cannot be upgraded then the procurement of much cheaper oilers with some aviation support would be feasible to assist the Type 23s. Conversely, if this is not considered a viable alternative, then a second, perhaps better, option would be to provide the area ASW surveillance from a cheaper, less-capable platform than the Type 23 frigate, which would not be as dependent on such a valuable fleet asset as the proposed AOR.
In this theater, the concept of operations for the AOR, available in small numbers, so critical to all aspects of fleet support, will tax the future operational planners. This will lead to heavy decisions on employment in high-risk areas, against the implications of loss to current and future operations.
Together with logistics, communications will have an important bearing on our ability to operate successfully in northern waters. At present and for the foreseeable future, our satellites are geographically stationed on the equator; the next series of Skynet is also planned to follow this pattern. This generally means that in far northern latitudes we will be subjected to outage periods with super high frequency (SHF) communications and other satellite- related systems. The fitting of a third satellite communications terminal in the CVS would help overcome the blind arc problems, and some software modifications could cope with outage difficulties from intelligence and command and control systems.
The Soviets use a satellite network that is not fully tied to geostationary equatorial satellites for Soviet Northern Fleet communications and support. It is most critical to their pattern of maritime operations and centralized com-
87
8S 1 April 1987
may have to be established around designated high units and a radius given, e.g., in tension, 20 mile^
crete and covert threat, which lends itself to
mand and control. They use orbits centered around 60° N with several phased orbits to achieve full coverage in the desired area. Ideally, we should develop a similar system for regular deployments in northern latitudes, although it would be very costly.
The problems are not insurmountable but will probably require a large financial commitment and further satellite coverage in northern latitudes. Ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellites have wider footprints and are not so affected (though they are subject to direction finding), but our intelligence and command and control systems are in SHF. Follow-on satellites are also mainly SHF, with a small UHF component. With our current and projected equipment, real-time systems of command and control, intelligence, and rules of engagement (ROEs) exchange may be subject to interruption which could have important ramifications—particularly in the tension and transition to war phases.
The political dimension is another important consideration. Apart from the greater commitment from Norway, particularly in peace, to support deployments, both nationally and within NATO, a firm and agreed-upon line is
required on ROEs. There are indications that the U. • carrier force in the Atlantic is now more likely to opera under national rather than NATO ROEs. Not surprising >_j Americans are keen to ensure their force survivability a are not convinced by either NATO’s ROEs or polity will. Recent changes in the U. S. carrier force comman^ and control structure leaves the Carrier Striking F°r^. totally composed of U. S. assets—another possible *n cator for the use of national ROEs? (e
Whatever ROEs are adopted, all forces must °PctV f under the same ROEs, including those theoretically . the control of SACEur in Norwegian coastal areas- may need to be changed. Perhaps it should only be e tive during amphibious operations or when mar' ^ forces are in direct support of land forces. Part of the • skepticism of the ROEs hinges on the definition of b°s^ act and hostile intent. Intent is especially important ASW in tension and in transition to war phases. does a submarine commit hostile intent? Exclusion z°^e
in
transition to war, 30 miles, perhaps more for nU5^ult powered guided missile submarines. It will be a o' . a|| area, but it must be correct to ensure survivability 1 phases of military alert.
Another contentious area, anti-SSBN operations ,y the SSN, needs to be discussed. The SSN is an extre [I effective asset in the concept of the Maritime Strateg is hard-hitting, has good survivability, and presents
errone
Multiplications and demands substantial and expensive countermeasures. Perhaps Admiral Watkins’s statements ^ere designed to achieve the latter—a con. This is un- °ubtedly a sound policy in peacetime, con or not, but in ension and transition to war, how should we use our SSN °rces? The forward deployment will not be easy and the Numbers available to deploy would be relatively few.
ropping the requirement for SSNs to provide direct support for the transiting CVBGs may release a couple more,
1 not needed in area ASW, but we will still be short of Equate numbers of SSNs.
Our SSNs must block the exit routes as close to the Kola et as possible, to mark and destroy on detection. In a nod of tension, prolonged investigation by our subs ay reveal a Soviet SSBN. Our subsequent response l97n neec* carefu' consideration with reference to the Sh ^ political guidelines on escalation control,
ould we withdraw from such a target to seek a less sitive foe? Of course not, but a chance encounter is far oioved from a dedicated anti-SSBN policy, sea ° ^ov'et SSBNs, of which some 20 will be at
fie \ not be,as easy as some recent articles have sug- diff' ^ they are under the ice, it will be even more cert ■ l’ anc^ our weaPon success against them is far from t0ain- Such a policy will also commit our SSNs mainly rna°ne t3S*C’ *eavtng a *ar8e Part °f the Soviet attack sub- gre f16 ^°rCe an<^ other important Soviet surface units with a er freedom to break out and attack the NATO CVBGs andThAeSW forces.
ally Cre couid be as many as 60 nuclear- and convention- lh°u„P<>Wered submarines available for deployment, inevL,a direct threat to the Soviet SSBN force would Protect- y de up the prime Soviet SSN assets in SSBN K>n' ^ 'n Peace, Western SSNs are tasked with anti- atltishi0^erat'ons’ transitioning to ASW against attack and War ryilssi*e submarines during tension and transition feached t ^‘^lcu't to achieve. Before an alert stage is and ant.’ udvocate assigning our SSNs primarily to ASW stages drlace shipping missions, particularly in the early strategj fe a'm f°r a conventional war with the use of "'in theCth°rCeS 3S 3 *ast resort- Therefore, we must try to ^°pe (0 . eater battle first. In any event, we could never 'pfce. u estroy the whole Soviet Northern Fleet’s SSBN a°Viets °Wever, to destroy even a third could cause the poliCy naccoptable damage. But on the global scale, the orizontal escalation seems unrealistic, which will still leave the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s SSBN force a very powerful threat.
The Maritime Strategy, as Admiral Watkins so cogently outlined it, is viable and has much merit. Some caution is needed regarding anti-SSBN operations, though this could have much deterrent value, and the U. S. Navy needs to show genuine commitment on the peacetime deployment of its CVBGs in northern waters. There are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime Strategy is the way ahead for U. S. maritime forces and not solely to support the cause for a 600-ship Navy, although obviously it helps. The supporting maritime nations in NATO must follow the lead and assess where we can best employ our forces, and arrange them accordingly, both in procurement and in training. In U. K. procurement, the questions lie with amphibious lift ships, and cheaper support tankers for FFCHs and perhaps cheaper FFCH units; in war, the loss of an AOR and the Type 23s will be bitter pills to swallow. Procurement must of course also reflect our national needs in support of foreign policy outside the NATO area.
Training needs development. To be effective in the likely operating area, we must be familiar with the local environment. If a U. S. carrier is to be more frequently stationed in northern waters, then our maritime forces must participate as often as possible to establish procedures and tactics and to develop an environmental data base, which is very important for ASW operations. We will need to establish a joint advanced maritime training program (JAMTP). This will probably cause the cancellation of the Joint Military Course (JMC) as it stands today, substituted by a JAMTP period in the North Norwegian Sea for durations of four to six weeks two to three times a year.
As in JMC exercises, we should be joined by NATO forces and, ideally, be supported from Norway, which again suggests a need for some political change.
There is little doubt that successful and meaningful application of the Maritime Strategy is going to pose some difficult political problems within NATO, especially for the Norwegians, and could affect the whole Nordic balance. Finland, too, may suffer from consequent Soviet pressure, and this must be weighed against our maritime and deterrent gains.
There is no point in the Royal Navy or all the European navies trying to execute a forward defense on their own. We need U. S. commitment in the form of carrier battle groups to support the European contribution to the Maritime Strategy. We in Europe must be sure that the Maritime Strategy is a genuine U. S. policy for the future and not just a product of the current administration. Will our commitment be justified, and is it worth preparing for?
Commander Mackay graduated from Dartmouth and specialized in air defense which included two years on board HMS Eagle. In 1976, he joined the Principal Warfare Officers, leading to a specialization in antisubmarine warfare. Since then, he has served at sea on frigates, most recently HMS Broadsword, completed two years of exchange duty with the Royal Australian Navy, and served on the staff of Flag Officer Sea Training. He will soon take command of a frigate.
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lnSs / April 1987