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tack on'thpriidcma8e inflicted in the at‘ Stark (FF-r tn?' guided missile frigate With Pv . - an *ratl> aircraft armed Kuwait °Cet m*ssdes and the mining of a escortSUpertanker while under U. S. U. s. M6re,the latest manifestation of the
Went t aV'' s Pr°blems when this edition 11 t0 press.
tity ln a case °f mistaken iden-
in the • missile attack was,
cial, a°Plnion °f one senior U. S. offi- Cannot . SUrPr‘se”—something that one to Unc[ e end against. But it is difficult steaminrStanC* ^0W an attack on a warship War , ® at n'8ht in the Persian Gulf, in a been st116 ,W^ere s°me 200 tankers had "t"w«ai!TCk ™ssdes and gunfire in the past few years, could be a surprise. The Stark was fitted with weapons and electronic systems that should have enabled the ship to detect and intercept Exocet- type missiles. The ship failed to do so.
On the positive side, the officers and sailors of the Stark did a truly remarkable job of saving their ship after two Exocet hits. Only one missile detonated (with a warhead of some 350 pounds), but both rocket motors continued to bum while embedded in the ship. A single Exocet that did not explode caused the fires that led to the abandonment and subsequent loss of the larger British destroyer Sheffield in the 1982 Falklands War.
The attack on the Stark was followed in July 1987 by the mining of the tanker
Bridgeton, after which there were several mine incidents in the area and warnings that Iran might employ sea mines. No mine countermeasure helicopters or surface mine craft were in the area, although helicopters could have been prepositioned in Israel or Egypt, or at Diego Garcia when the decision was being made to escort Kuwaiti tankers into the Persian Gulf.1 The tanker, under the close escort of three U. S. warships, steamed through
The amphibious assault ship Wasp (LHD-1) is the largest combatant ship built for the U. S. Navy since World War II, except for aircraft carriers.
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The newest addition to the U. S. mine warfare force is the USS Avenger (MCM-1) which was commissioned on 12 September 1987. Design problems delayed the ship’s completion for nearly two years.
a minefield whose existence was not known by the U. S. Navy, despite extensive U. S. surface ship and air operations in the area.
Four years before, in Beirut, 241 U. S. Marines and sailors were killed in another “surprise” attack. A Shi’ite fanatic drove an explosive-laden truck past Marine guards with unloaded rifles and smashed into their barracks building. Within the previous few months, there had been two car bomb attacks on the nearby U. S. Embassy, one heavily damaging the building and killing 50 persons. The Navy-Marine team was taken by surprise in a combat area.
Also in 1983, during the U. S. invasion of the Caribbean island state of Grenada, which was defended by armed Cuban construction forces, the Navy- Marine team made a successful unopposed landing (although Army troops participating in the assault encountered heavy resistance). The Navy, however, did lose four SEAL swimmers in heavy surf, in what should have been a textbook exercise.
The 1985 interception of the Achille Lauro highjackers by U. S. carrier-based aircraft over the Mediterranean and the 1986 carrier attacks against Libya are generally cited as examples of fleet excellence. The former, however, was conducted in a total peacetime environment, without opposition of any kind and without the need for radio silence—a highly artificial environment from a wartime perspective. The Libyan strikes were successful, although the initial strikes in April 1986 were delayed until the Navy could assemble three carriers for the operation, a delay that promoted one Soviet naval officer to ask the author, “How many carriers would you have to assemble to strike us?”
These operational failures must be examined in the light of two other sets of problems confronting the U. S. Navy. First, as the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost. has told Congress, the United States is facing a severe challenge from the Soviet Navy in the field of submarine warfare. Similar public warnings came from Mr. Melvyn Paisley, at the time Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, who warned Congress of a “crisis in our antisubmarine warfare capability.”
An astute observation of this situation
150
is provided by a junior submarine officer who wrote:
The U. S. submarine force no longer holds any significant acoustic advantage over a growing number of frontline Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Further, the funding necessary to regain any past advantage is simply not available. These are realities that the United States must come to grips with today, before tomorrow’s war finds us fighting with yesterday’s equipment and tactics.[1] [2]
These comments and similar remarks by officials and knowledgeable persons outside of the government make it clear that the longtime U. S. leadership in undersea warfare has dissipated.
The question is not whether the United States or Soviet Union is ahead today, but what are the trends. They appear to be ominous for the United States in this vital area. Soviet submarines are improving at a prodigious rate, with indications that there have been several developments that are not yet fully understood in the West.
These factors combine to make a significant challenge for the U. S. Navy’s leaders in the submarine/antisubmarine area. At the same time one must also look at several other technical failings of the Navy during the past few years. These include, for example, the massive stability problems that followed installation of blisters in the aircraft carrier Midway (CV-41), the failure of the design for the Sea Viking (SWCM) small combatant, and a series of problems with the mine countermeasure and mine hunter craft, the latter having to be cancelled. Similarly, the problems encountered with the new Seawolf (SSN-21) submarine design and with its AN/BSY-series sonar/ weapon control system (formerly called SUBACS) demonstrate that major shortcomings exist in even new, first-line systems.
The root causes of these problems appear to be (1) classic bureaucratic behav-
of an
ronment that accords Prorn0tl°eration commendations to successful °V of complex machinery under Pe -0(j conditions. Unfortunately, this *sa^js of of violent peace, with various ^ conflict in several areas of the wo ^ are of interest to the United ^tat^nCipal Navy is unquestionably the P U. S. foreign policy instrument0{ crisis areas beyond the Central r Europe and, accordingly, must ^jie
tained at a high state of reaciinesSera- conducting what are often mundane^^ tions in forward areas. And, P worst of all, this environment f°ssQrlle development of officers who lac' of the key characteristics that are
From a technical viewpoint' ^.jyle reaucracy has stifled innovation preventing the application of rea- -ng solutions to commonplace eng> problems. (hat
These conditions exist in a perl will see the reduction of defense sp ^ 0li as well as other constraints imp0^.^. the Navy and the other military ser j,. This situation will create even m°reute lems for the Navy’s leaders. The leadership of Admiral Trost, Secre j
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subordinates can enable the Navy ♦Reprint of preface of forthcoming
The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet' j p^sS.
Pol mar. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institu
1987)
‘The prepositioned helicopters could then ^jps |n flown to U. S. aircraft carriers or helicopk ^jps) the Arabian Sea or (in the case of the smal er g^di the Persian Gulf, or to land bases in Kuwai Arabia, if available. “AcOuStlC
[2]Lieutenant P. Kevin Peppe, U. S. Navy. ,teprO' Showdown for the SSNs,” U. S. Naval I°s 1 peppe* ceedings, July 1987, pp. 33-37. Lieutenan engineer officer on board the USS La . * jn tb° 701), was awarded second honorable niejltlntest f°r Naval Institute’s Arleigh Burke Essay 0 this article.
Proceedings / Noveifl*,e