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“ . . . I can see the possibility we might be able to live without the Army, without the Navy. We might be able to live without the Air Force, but this country can never live without a Corps of lean, mean Marines.” Former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard
military to shed
help the U. S.
mid nave to iook wiui jaundic <u acquisitions of heavy, hard'10 _ tain, unduly complicated, or har transport equipment. We woU d, se-
The country’s needs supersede of the Marines—no matter "Tat^ ^
of V0'
Give your dirty little wars to the U. S. Marines . . .
The love affair the people of the United States have with their Corps of Marines continues to breathe life into this unique force. But love alone cannot guarantee the Corps a future. If the country comes no longer to need the Marines’ services or finds them duplicated elsewhere, beloved or not, the Marine Corps will die. To survive, the Marines need a new mission. The best option now for the country and the
Corps is for the Marines to become the lead force for special operations.
This will not be the first time the Marine Corps has had to redefine its role. After World War 1, the visionary General John A. Lejeune understood that the Corps was in danger of being regarded as a less-powerful clone of the Army—something the country did not need. He thus began transforming the Marines from an “expeditionary army” to the amphibious Corps of World War II fame. But those glory days of large amphibious assaults against heavily fortified positions are gone—banished by the worldwide proliferation of guided and “smart” weapons that will make such operations all but impossible. This places the Marine Corps as an institution in a potentially vulnerable position. In a further complication, after Vietnam we were criticized for our perceived inability to slug it out with heavier-armed Soviet forces, and so we bulked up the Corps to an unwieldy size. Now the Marine Corps is being asked to be both heavy enough to battle the Soviet Army in Norway and light enough to combat terrorists in the Mediterranean.
But the special operations role could rejuvenate the Corps as General Lejeune’s revolution rejuvenated it after
World War I. Special operations would make full use of the Corps’s distinctive combination of weapons and capabilities. And it would allow the Marines to continue as the nation’s primary instrument of forceful foreign policy.
The Corps is currently the only military service not participating officially in the special operations mission that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated as a joint operation. Yet realistically, the Marines are the “special operations command” of the United States. After all, the Marines have engaged in dirty little wars for more than 200 years. From raiding the British fort at Whitehaven (on the Irish Sea) in 1778 to restoring order in Grenada in 1983, the Marine Corps has rescued hostages, conducted evacuations, and protected American interests throughout its history.
There are numerous routes the Marines could take to restructure the Corps into a special operations force. We could completely reorganize, dissolving divisions and wings and reforming into fighting units of light infantry, mechanized, and special operations brigades with integral combat and combat service support (including aviation). We might reduce our strength to one division and one wing—a large Ranger force. (This drastic measure would severely restrict our flexibility for special operations.) Some have suggested reestablishing raider battalion units. The best alternative may be simply to absorb the administrative (wing/ division/Force Service Support Group) commands into the task-organized units in which Marines will fight (Marine amphibious units, brigades, and forces), and to concentrate our training on special operations.
Electing the Marine Corps as the patriarch of special operations might
ah
batross of interservice bickering ^ duplicated effort that threatens o ._ tion’s ability to act rapidly and ^ bly. For example, if the CorPs jr lead in special operations, the Force would give up its air com, nning dos, as well as the V-22s it is P to purchase. The Army and would similarly reduce or e''ml£aSj;s their special operations forces, dropped by other services won cUf. picked up by the Corps. Missing rently assigned to the Corps bu realistically assigned to other set vices—such as defending norths Norway—would be transferred-
Though the Marine Corps is * suited for special operations, ass that role would alter the service would have to look with jai at training most Marines—rather t lected units—for special °Peratl°train We would intensify our effort to and equip toward combat at the . s enemy’s weaknesses, not his str We would reduce staffs.
What should not change is tA^arjne of the Marine Corps to land a M ^ amphibious force virtually any"' the world. The global threat the j5 presents to the country’s adversar^ a priceless tool—in diplomacy a deterrence.
thoSe
“costs” may be to the Corps 0d- traditional roles. The realities o ^ em warfare and geopolitics deina^ that one military force—trained __
spond quickly and ably to uncon ^ tional threats—become the maste^ <, the special operations trade. The Marine Corps is that force.
Major Fetzer is a helicopter pilot curren 1 ^
signed to Headquarters Marine Corps. * has served with the Requirements and r j(t- Research and Development, and Aviation ments of the headquarters staff.
102
Proceedings / Vo i’[ia>t
Nobody asked me either, but...
Uig pe . “ ‘“ecnanic learns in his train ron depends on what his squad time. F]
S- .............................. -
some ’e^ternal loads (EXT), and may pr! . Familiarization (NFAM). H ing fhi^C,tlCC some mountain-area land intemai , ’ cross-country flying (XC) Pop (Tr'>atbn8 (INI), and troop trans ship), Probably will not train i
visj0nard derations (CQ), use of nigl (TEF>pf°S8les (NVG), terrain flight aerial !’,CVas've maneuvering (EVM), (AG) ,? 'very (AD), or aerial gunner) expCct ut qualified crew chiefs can miSsionto ,ashed with any of these
K ■ *
is aseeping crew chiefs on flight status their f11UCb a Problem as standardizing piete ,'1ainm8- Most crew chiefs com- beCo . e*r service requirement before ln8 proficient in all tactical tran
anvoel 'ke clearing the air, but can’t find oUr rne to listen? Why don’t you speak to to readers? Send your written comment butUs For the “Nobody asked me, Wg'n* • ” column. If we publish it, Feel ^0U $60.00. If we don’t, you’ll chest Cr ^or havin8 gotten it off your ljs(e ' At least you will know that we
Hel
should h* C>liefs aren t what they
job (J1/6 tbe Marine Corps does a good tainin„S7sffmat*ca^y training and re- heliccf. ellC0Pter pilots, we train our keen ? er crew chiefs haphazardly and could °i° CW tbem 'n the Corps. We crew ch° f !°l better by modeling the giVe j,le s training on the kind we
to enrl°tS’ anb bV ad°Pting new tactics reenlistUra^C crew chiefs to
“honlg6 CUrreJtt system crew chiefs are ics wh ®rown” by squadrons. Mechan- leave .? Vo*Ur|teer for aircrew duty ^andid jlr^uadrons to attend Aircrew returnim>e ^Cbo°' ’n Pensacola. After for theY serve as first mechanics F^rvisir6 t0 *0ur nionths under the su- ThCy ., n qualified crew chiefs. selvesCa become crew chiefs them- trainin<fnC^L.ma^ 'immediately begin Wh t °t ler mechanics.
a a mechanic learns in his train-
' ha ^fenus on what his squat tirne o'360510 he practicing at the 'arizati 6 W'" Probat,ly train in famil- - on (FAM), confined-area landin
By Captain J.
port operations. If they reenlist, they probably will not continue to fly as a primary duty. They are more likely to become recruiters, or drill instructors, or to serve in other positions as noncommissioned officers-in-charge.
Potential crew chiefs should be identified early in their careers, ideally while they are at the Fleet Replacement Aviation Maintenance Program school. Their training thereafter should follow a standard course, beginning with Aircrew Candidate School and continuing with assignment to the Fleet Replacement Squadron. Training at this squadron should include FAM, NFAM,
CAL, MAL, INT, EXT, and XC—all conducted under the tutelage of a senior crew chief who has completed a tour with a tactical squadron. Graduates of this training would earn aircrew wings and be designated co-crew chiefs.
The next round of training would occur in a tactical squadron, where the Marines would learn TT, CQ, NVG, TERF, EVM, AD, and AG, and emerge as crew chiefs. Qualified crew chiefs should conduct the training, just as qualified pilots work with copilots training to become helicopter aircraft commanders. Experienced crew chiefs should also attend Weapons and Tactics Instructor School at the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, and then serve as the weapons and tactics instructors for the crew chiefs in their squadrons.
Five changes would help the Marine Corps to retain what would now be highly trained crew chiefs.
- Mechanics who volunteer for aircrew training should be required to remain on active duty for at least four years after they become co-crew chiefs.
- Newly designated crew chiefs who are not already noncommissioned officers should be meritoriously promoted to corporal. The position of crew chief demands enough ability and maturity to deserve the rank, and is important enough to require it.
- Crew chiefs should be on permanent flight status and receive aviation career incentive pay, just as pilots do. They train and work as hard as pilots, take the same risks, and are just as essential to the mission. Why should they not
Captain Kreinbring is a helicopter pilot flying CH-53ES with Squadron 465, based in Thstin, California.
L. Kreinbring, U. S. Marine Corps
draw the same flight pay?
- Every squadron should have an average of at least 1.3 crew chiefs per aircraft, in ranks from corporal through master sergeant. This would be enough to assign a crew chief to each aircraft and provide substitutes, while avoiding the burnout that shortages often cause now.
- The Marine Corps should assign an aircraft-specific military occupational specialty (MOS) number to crew chiefs, and a different one to co-crew chiefs. (Pilots need the same change in their MOS.) Headquarters staffs need these MOS numbers to better manage the Corps’s aircrew assets.
If we expect our helo crews to be ready to execute any mission safely on the first day of the next conflict, we must upgrade their training.
Go against the grain. Cut down on salt.
Adding salt to your food could subtract years from your life. Because in some people salt contributes to high blood pressures condition that increases your risk of heart disease.
m8s / November 1987