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Contents:
Violating the Treaty that Never Was Joining the Lehman-bashers
Mines of August: Revisited What Price Canadian Sovereignty?
Women in Ships: Can We Survive?
Enlisting Words for Victory
Medic! Can the Reserves Answer the Call?
SOF—The Navy’s Perspective
Strategy Demands All Nuclear-Powered Battle Groups
Up or Out: A Financial Disaster
Lessons Learned in the Air War Over Vietnam
Overhaul Planning: Beating the System
In the Wake of Hurricane Toshiba
A Survival Guide for Washington Duty Fitness Reports ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
ComNavForArctic
The Commitment
Blacks in White Hats
Tomorrow’s Fleet
Warriors First
War Games
Pay Tables To the North Pole!
Seabees With Portfolio
Breakfast, Anyone?
“Violating the Treaty that Never Was”
(See R. C. Keller, pp. 34-40, August 1987
Proceedings)
Captain J. A. Nuernberger, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Trident Training Facility, Kings Bay, Georgia— Lieutenant Keller’s essay is especially welcome because it addresses a subject most professional naval officers have long considered to be “political” and therefore inappropriate for our public comments. Although arms control is a political issue, it has profound military implications.
I must disagree, however, with Keller’s assumption that there is an existing strategic balance and his conclusion that, while it lasted, SALT II served U. S. strategic interests by preserving that balance.
Lieutenant Keller considers only offensive strategic forces; from that perspective, a strategic balance appears to exist. The United States and the Soviet Union are at rough parity today in numbers of missiles and bombers, and those numbers are close to the SALT II numerical limits. But to assess strategic forces in terms of total military capability, defensive capabilities must also be considered. The Soviet Union today has massive underground military facilities that are nearly invulnerable to attack by U. S. strategic forces. It has a nationwide air defense system and an antiballistic system around Moscow. The United States has none of these.
Moreover, the Soviet Union has also protected its forces by providing a degree of mobility unmatched by the United States. It has provided mobility to conventional naval, land, and air forces, and to its offensive land-based, nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union has a clear strategic advantage resulting from its defensive efforts.
Lieutenant Keller correctly points out that while SALT II was in effect the Soviet Union modernized its offensive forces to achieve technological parity with the United States. This trend would have continued, leaving the United States at a disadvantage, were it not for Ronald Reagan’s decisions to deploy the MX and Trident II (D-5) missiles and to modernize the bomber fleet.
Comparing the response of the United
States and the Soviet Union to a|S tiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty jjnjted even more alarming trends. The e(j States elected to dismantle its -ve
ABM system and to rely on 0n0 strategic forces alone. There ^
U. S. defensive development u Reagan administration initiated t ,g![i tegic Defense Initiative. By con'ny( je- the Soviets have deployed an A ^ fense, a nationwide air . enjvanced made a massive investment in a , jned ABM technology. Thus the co ^ effects of SALT II and the ABM a have been to put the United State-
“Joining the Lehman-bashef®
(See N. Polmar, p. 94. August 1987. S Tangredi, E. B. Roth, pp. 9-1L ^ct0 Proceedings) L „
rittlS of ^
L. Edgar Prina, editor emerim ^or. Power magazine—I take issue W1 j to
man Polmar for his back-of-the- ^ p, critics of former Navy Secretary ^ aS Lehman, Jr. Polmar, who once se ^ ^ a consultant to Lehman, ac*vanCjse the novel thesis that one should Pra ppt secretary for his accomplishmen • ^ remain silent about the serious ta excesses in his exercise of autho ^ Curiously, neither Polmar nor ^ q were forgiving of Admiral Hy . oUgh Rickover for his shortcomings, a ^aVy the admiral’s contributions to t ^
and nation were enormous
hi.— 1-\C"
played a key role in forcing -jjating retire and then took delight in *1.umacCept' the cantankerous old admiral tor ing gifts from defense contractors-^.^ Polmar upbraids unnamed a jn and Marine generals for engag " eS- “Lehman-bashing,” a pejorative e^ sion suggesting excessive or unta ^.gCt, cism. He accused the officers, m te-
of ingratitude because they had th merity to criticize “some of ^
Lehman;
w.ww— ---------------------- perhaP
actions.” He did not elaborate-^ he had the following “actions former secretary in mind: aS ]•
► The firing of Rear Admiral Th°^e[)| Cassidy, Jr. in the wake of a ProcUljsjaval “horror story” involving Miramar _stj- Air Station and then ordering an 1 jjeg»- gation to determine whether the ^ey tions against the admiral were true- were not.
,9td
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somehow resP^j [N
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more experienced men discoun ^_cUity
Zionist connection, but had
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accepting that the Libyan-flag ferry had laid the mines
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- His attempt to change the results of two officer selection boards after they had made their official reports. In one case, after Lehman dissolved the board, the Defense Department’s Inspector General found he had exceeded his authority and recommended that the board’s original report be approved. In the other, the Senate Armed Services Committee, expressing concern for the integrity of the Navy’s promotion system, found considerable evidence of impropriety and unfairness in his effort to have an additional aviator (by name) selected.
- His refusal, when challenged by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, to identify the person who leaked secret selection board information to the Secretary of the Navy so that person could be court-martialed. He told Trost to “forget it,” according to the Defense Department’s Inspector General’s report.
- His complete personal control, within the Navy, of the selection of three- and four-star officers and the assignment of his favorites to the choice commands.
- His role in pressuring Raytheon Corporation, a Navy contractor, to fire Lawrence Korb, a former assistant secretary of defense, for voicing an opinion on Navy budget priorities that Lehman did not share.
- His intrusion into areas that normally were the responsibility of uniformed officers. Fancying himself as a fleet admiral, he talked of sending carrier battle groups into the teeth of Soviet power near the Kola Peninsula, northeast of Norway, at the start of any war with the Soviet Union.
- His cavalier treatment of three chiefs of naval operations. Because Admiral Thomas B. Hayward disagreed strongly with some of Lehman’s decisions, the secretary forced several outstanding admirals to retire for one simple reason: they were closely associated with Hayward.
- Lehman once told a consultant, “I run naval aviation. 1 run surface warfare and ASW [antisubmarine warfare]. I run naval personnel. I run shipbuilding, procurement, and research and development. I let [Admiral James] Watkins |then CNO] run submarines.”
- His decisions to give special treatment to two U. S. Naval Academy athletic stars upon graduation so they could become professional athletes and earn big money—in one case reducing the normal five-year term of obligated service to two years; in the other, arranging duty assignments so the athlete could play professional football in his “off-duty” hours.
- His monumental arrogance and contempt for those he felt were his tual inferiors.
The vast majority of Lehman even those who have been
— — ------- . _ . anrC ill d*
for the Navy during his six y jntjs fice. But that’s not the point. 1 e jitter that no government official rio ^ ^ how clever or successful, s above criticism. . -ar]y on
It is well to remember, ParjlCU<, £on* the 200th anniversary of the U- • ^ stitution, that critics have rights other folks. An important one >s 1 ^e.
in the First Amendment. It s ca dom of speech.
Mines of August: Revisited
/• v l- B
Lieutenant Commander Sankey a fC- ton, U. S. Naval Reserve-— Dur"^tor at cent tour as a naval science 'nS(, uo0l, 1 the Royal Saudi Naval Forces 5 taught an introduction to mine c]jss and mine countermeasures. As gea motivator, I briefed the 198 ,|0%vcd
Incident. A lively discussion tfith Most younger officers, in keep* ^c0ry
' ' " ibl«!
that Israel was
The motive behind that cur'°^ ques*
tioned from a professional v'eVJjby3h The simplistic explanation of a i[jgeuce “madman” is of little naval 'nte "rpoSe value to ship’s officers. It the ^.^le, was to create havoc, then cheap- ^ in moored mines, produced en-n ;0baS World War II, could have done t L well as the expensive mines. ,9950* The recovered mine device aSa
NG63) told us three things. First-10t
! mine- previously known by the Yv'est
total high-explosive capacity combination of influence trigg® ^ sc been set to very sensitive Pos.ltl|l0t jus* that if a target got close aboard’ at6. under the keel, the mine would jajned- These curiosities can be cejve^ Libya may have asked for and re mines from the Soviets to protect 1 (0
from a feared amphibious attack- learn to use the mines offensive y> ,^\ needed an operational test. Ope ^r(,e o_f tests, however, can be a major s° ^fi intelligence. What Moammar . rea|- desired was a secret, but complete istic test. The solution was to
•ty settinp'-------------------- comoinattons, sensiti
•he tarsefS' etC ’ could he compared Ports, a .Slze’ speed, and damage re •hree went- Cstruct'on mechanism set ft
u,*u ^ w a|* d^ccpidDie ns
neighbors Warnmg t0 Middle E‘
Navy’s
mine countermeasi
* "““v '.uuiltu lllt.cl.'tt
inValuablCe?ability and response timi ,erUiai , C to any naval force, and to rcVea] m’turists. The U. S. press wc The |eC answers to all the questic
LibyaJ °n] 'earned in the Red Sea
being rpUnd l'lus Libya’s allies —are r EvelVl?,teduP0n us.
ents
■ Cu '*ai. auer wmen w
sWeeDpr.]ntTiclass of ocean-going
its
r’Oty n. ■ . lu uwi
Ser? IC^*y We forget. flicte(j0Us m'ne damage was bein rU°nth ln ’he approaches to K
C°ttVov b6f0re the first U- S- rel1: y eutered the Gulf, yet we t
•‘rile,.,.,,;
tinos\nnieXaCt locations’ record the set- vice 1 explosive content of each detestwhen h0^!,'11'"8 devices t0 s,art the For th k Gha' Was wel1 clear- •he minJ5 bCSt and quickest test results, narrow ;!,"ere *a'd 'n a well-traveled, Sea. G,v ruUl0nal.sca lane—the Red Was a safeKhf P°llt,cs of the region, it w°uld ela' C that S0me sPhnter group w°rld nrp lm resPonsihility and that the reducing S,tWould play up that claim. By Creasinn ,hC explosive charge and in- Wotild nrnh'"mtn88er sensitivity, ships Cornpanip. y not sunk. insurance w°uld p J ^0uld pay the bill, and no one
P°rt aurtwJ?; Reports from the press, damage 0r the shipyard on ship
The Py °a <! compnse the test results, charge infiC ocati°n °f each mine, its settinp U6nCe comhinations, sensitiv-
Week f ....................................... “‘ceimmsm set It
Care of a U *er dle arm date would tak
pl°ded nrpy.eV'dence' A mine ’hat e:
•° self.dp.|niature|y ’ or another that faile
teSt sequence' °nly add data t0 th recover ' hat one mine might t
and a go:,0Uld an acceptable ri: -hboi Ther
0perationa|C|r.C °ther. results ’hat only •nine. Hn ]St oP this nature could dett
°f a Potent;.1!06] °ne gauge the resPon •he p0|j,. adversary? What would
uPheres 0fuIf!Cti°n from the vario be ’he nnKiW°dd 'ti^uence? What wot •ary resno 'C react'ong What of the mi nat’onal inSC t0 an ac’ual mining of intt tesisin,erra‘"-;,During normal weapo
mtorial waters, there is no w .. * 6 these important intangibles, hi v . ,and realistic assessment of t
dosed ih m the. Pers'an Gulf have laritini6 essent’al weakness of the l CartlPaipe Strate§y- A determined mi roupstn Can effectively thwart ' WaSc|e.a"d amphibious task forces. •0g the y dernonstrated at Wonson Our corean War, after which we deeper,6ntJ;lass of ocean-going i as Usual laese ships, however, ' Hem, ,, '. allowed to dwindle in num proclaimed ourselves to be “ready for anything.” But even though we had had clear warning three years ago of the form of naval warfare we would encounter in the Gulf, we were still caught flatfooted because of our continued tunnel vision toward exotic and high-tech threats such as the Silkworm missile.
It is time for a completely professional reevaluation of the mission of the U. S. Navy and the current maritime strategy. We must understand the facts.
First, the United States has one of the longest and broadest coastlines in the world—extremely vulnerable in terms of a mining campaign.
Second, every mineral resource and economic asset from overseas must flow through at least two harbors and, on average, one restricted passage to reach U. S. industry.
Third, helicopter MCM is fast, rapidly deployable, and efficient in well-marked channels. But it requires a politically vulnerable advanced base, lacks staying power, is not all-weather, and has limited-area capabilities when compared to the surface MCM.
And finally, the technology and training required to deploy a capable MCM force is no longer something that can be built when needed. The Avenger (MCMI) was two years overdue. We need it; we will need it constantly. It is a high priority!
There are no quick fixes for past inattention to the MCM fleet. There are, fortunately, some administrative steps that we should consider. A primary billet should be on every staff for a mine warfare officer (NOBC 9064), starting at the destroyer squadron level and working upward. I recommend assigning former helicopter and ocean minesweeper squadron commanding officers to these billets. Next, every ship should be required to have at least one officer who has attended the Mine Warfare Familiarization Course (J-2E-0191). These minimum requirements would greatly increase the fleet awareness of mine warfare and might keep Navy spokesmen from making embarrassing statements.
My final recommendation is related to equipment and is therefore expensive and long-term. A high-frequency mine detection and classification sonar does not require a great deal of space or power and is retractable. The controllable-pitch propeller gives an excellent ship control capability. The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG- 7)-class frigates are already overloaded, but mines are more of a threat than submarines in the Third World. A trial installation for a few of the naval reserve force frigates should be considered for a future
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“de
lection
$150 million budget cuts won'
onsider LTv i build or bu-
Maybe the Navy should cons'^o] ping in with some money tojjm ^ °uar(j;
the only U. S. polar icebreakers.
hing Lo» Naval F°rceS
and ope'
ra-
not
just
Marine Corps elements
be called upon to achieve nations fives in the Arctic,” why is * e .jCje? Guard so notably absent in h*ssjnCe Captain LeSchack notes that ^^,63)
has there been major cooperation
the various naval elements on tions.” How would he propose
extn-
the
assistance?
in-
overhaul cycle. Although a frigate is too expensive to be used as an MCM platform, it could search for possible threats and mark a safe channel with dan buoys off the fantail.
The 1982 experience of the British Navy in the Falkland Sound would seem to indicate that with or without a high- frequency search sonar, frigates might be used to find safe channels. Better them than aircraft carriers or troop ships. As they say in the Mine Force, any ship can be a mine sweeper—once!
“What Price Canadian Sovereignty?”
(See T. C. Pullen, pp. 66-72, September 1987 Proceedings)
“ComNavFor Arctic”
(See L. A. LeSchack, pp. 74-80, September
1987 Proceedings)
Commander James C. Clow, U. S. Coast Guard—I was a young Coast Guard ensign assigned to the USCGC Northwind (WAGB-282) during her historic transit of the Northwest Passage, and have fond and exciting memories of the events that transpired on that patrol from 14 May to 3 October 1969. I am somewhat mystified, though, by the caption and the photograph on page 70. A casual reader, unfamiliar with Canadian and U. S. Coast Guard icebreakers, would be led to believe that the plane is a Canadian P-3, and the icebreaker is the USCGC Polar Sea (WAGB-11). In fact, the icebreaker pictured is a Canadian Coast Guard Wind- class breaker, and the photograph was most likely taken from the Polar Sea.
Captain Pullen states that the Northwind withdrew as one of the SS Manhattan's escort vessels. While the Northwind did have machinery problems, she did not withdraw from the project. In fact, the Northwind became the first major ship to make both an east and west transit of the Northwest Passage in one season, as Captain Pullen himself noted in a message to Captain D. J. McCann, the Northwind's commanding officer. Having made the transit in both directions, the eastward transit alone, and the westward transit in the company of both the Manhattan and the Canadian Coast Guard ship J. A. MacDonald, we were relieved off Point Barrow by the USCGC
The Northwind made an epic voyage through the Northwest Passage and hack again in 1969. Here, her helicopter returns from a search for an open lead on the eastern portion of her trek.
Staten Island (WAGB-278) and ordered to return to Seattle for repairs.
Captain Pullen’s remarks regarding the possibility of emergencies arising in the far north are especially cogent; because of the strategic importance of the Arctic, both Canada and the United States should remain capable of providing year-round ice-breaking service. It appears, however, that the United States is rapidly falling behind. U. S. Coast Guard Vice Commandant James C. Irwin noted in the 7 September Navy Times, that:
“About 20 years ago in this country, we had nine Polar icebreakers. Last year we had five, this year we have four and two of them are 43 years old. At the same time, the Soviet Union has 17 Polar-class vessels, Canada has six, and ... is building what will be the biggest icebreaker in the world, and Japan has two very modern ones.”
Let us hope that someone in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reads what Captain Pullen has said and understands the consequences of not listening to the Coast Guard’s request for more icebreakers; thus far, OMB has been less than helpful. Additional delays in procuring them, whether by leasing or building, will only put the country farther behind in this important scientific and defense- related race.
The follow-on article by Captain LeSchack fails to present a complete picture of what should be done to improve our Arctic operational capabilities. I presume he expects icebreakers to be ready when called upon. But given the Coast Guard’s inadequate supply, it is difficult to imagine any significant assistance being rendered until we have more in the arsenal—and it won’t be easy t° velop an effective Navy force Pr°J' >s capability” without them. C°nS ,
tficn_ :ii: 1_ ™itc WOIl t '
several icebreakers for the Coast without them, the only alternatI^e,eSter- the Navy to return to the days o year and redevelop their own ice re capability. Arctic
In his proposal to develop 4 ^
Command, he fails to recognize ^ Coast Guard has expertise >n ^nS weather operations and present y basic motivation establishing
ForArctic [Commander,
Arctic] is to ensure that plans tions are developed and conduc e ^ ,inlJ for submariners, but for all na ay ine Corps elements that toget ^jeC-
Operation Deepfreeze 0^ to cate a U. S. submarine strande fQund Arctic without a substantial year QUard icebreaking capability and Coas
Captain LeSchack recomnie11 eluding in the Arctic Command s ^ ^ ners, pilots, Marines, SEAL l ’the land) teams, and a liaison office^ ,.0(1iy Canadian Navy. But he admits tha ^ those who have served in the P gions understand what can g° . gS it owing to cold weather.” This eleven more curious, then, that ^ [C. pletely ignores the expertise 4^
rvive?
^weuSpnilla,T'tPp- 43~46- July198?;
pp. 14 ,VP_f2’ September 1987; J. D.
' 0ctober 1987 Proceedings)
J°U?'ZlyACl™ Karen B . Clark, last, someone has written an
V. S. /»„ "'■lu wrosj tsaren 11. Clark 39). At uL USS Emory S. Land (AS
c°mine nr ''",wl to rerrain trom De- y^olating dd”3111 Wllde servin§ on ships. I'seiplin;
- ■'ul WoiilH • v
Participate ■ re(luire all sailors wishing to eXamino.;_ln tbe P,rst class advancement
2Cceoas[J°thHtheU-S and the Cana- t-oast guards.
eluded’ rCaptam LeSchack fails to inexercise S1, °aS,1. Guard in his Planning
time Defe 8geallons’ ignoring our Mari- with n,,rnSL onc responsibilities along exPertise ’Cedreali‘n8 and cold weather Th
nent flagT'^i obv‘ous*y needs a perma- P°licv an fVe command to coordinate Problem* • eLnsure that defense-related
attention of th? 3re brought t0 the ment Rm i blgbest levels of govern- ^ateranH^30"8 the way’ the shallow- __ aeeP-water navies need to talk.
Survive1)*11 Ships: Can We
°bjectiVe arf- (--- ““> wruien an
Caused bv M 1C 6 about tbe problems shiPs I NaVy Women serving on board informal ant SPiliane’s article was ble. i sa] e ar|d her research was credi- °f the nr,.Ki 6r’ ^ agree with her analysis agree with vfms' Nevertheless, I cannot Lieuten q ProPosed solutions.
'bat rennirm Spil,ane proposes a contract - es women to refrain from be- h)r diScL|his agreernent would be cause P°sal Wn!,i'!lary acti°n■ Her other pro-
arninati viass auvancement
Second tn°n °r Wanting to reenlist for a °ne tour (T l? duty t0 have completed Ply of Sea . s"'Pboard duty. But the sup- ttieet the ,|Uty b*tiets for women does not atvay with e™and- Entil Congress does catiriot se archaic rule that women 'here wi|jrVe on hoard combatant ships, °f Us never be enough billets for all
tract a female sailor to sign a con-
Miile sta'f *S'n8 not t0 become pregnant ler0Us j, '.°ned on board ship is prepos- c°r>stitut' *S unrealistic and probably un- duting th°na* ^0U cannot tell women, must wa ff- childbearing years, that they lheir ni,', IVe years to have babies while 'he birt,a 6 C0Unterparts are celebrating b°ard ri S tbe'r children during ship- •ted timUtfy Periods. Women have a lim- M°ste rarne in which to bear children, childfe en’ 0n 'he other hand, can father Inste jhronghout a naval career.
Pos6a3 ,of written agreements, I pro- 'vOtnenT* <d 'raining periods for young Carpp . ,and men), beginning in boot StationsT contmuing at their first duty • The training would stress the ser-
Pfoce-j.
vice member’s responsibility to the fleet, to the Navy, and to herself, along with information about birth control. A breakdown of the costs associated with childbirth and child rearing would be made available. The costs could be compared with the income of a seaman (E-3), for example. The training would stress that after the child is six months old the mother would again become eligible for sea duty.
By itself, education may not stop all of the unscheduled pregnancies. It may stop a number of accidental ones. A combination of education and the availability of birth control may be an answer.
“Enlisting Words for Victory”
(See G. C. N. Perry, pp. 38-42, July 1987
Proceedings)
Robert Sherrod, former combat correspondent for Time and Life and author of Tarawa—As one of the 26 participants (and four survivors), I was interested in Glen Perry’s excellent account of Admiral King’s occasional soirees with newsmen between 1942 and 1945. These off- the-record sessions served to humanize the admiral, and to show him that the press could be trusted. They also served as valuable guides for reporters.
One of the sessions I attended took place in the spring of 1943, when Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King dropped a strong hint that we were about to dislodge the Japanese from Attu. I rushed to the North Pacific as quickly as possible— it took about a week—and was able to cover the battle, which culminated in a big banzai charge by the last 1,000 Japanese on Attu. The U. S. 7th Infantry Division lost 600 soldiers in that campaign.
Could such mutual trust be possible nowadays? Maybe. Conditions have improved since the face-off between media and military commanders at Grenada. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger recently assured me that the Department of Defense national news media pool covering the reflagging operation in the Persian Gulf exceeded all expectations and generated a heartwarming response from media executives from across the United States.
“Medic! Can the Reserves Answer the Call?”
(See A. M. Smith, pp. 113-114, September 1987 Proceedings)
Dr. Donald W. Lyddon, Jr.—I am an orthopedic surgeon with previous active duty in the Air Force and Air National Guard service. During the past year, I and several of my colleagues considered reentering the reserves. However, we discovered a major stumbling block that has not been addressed by the military.
As the professional liability crisis in medicine has heightened, most medical malpractice insurers have changed their coverage from traditional occurrence insurance to claims-made insurance. It is now, therefore, virtually impossible to purchase occurrence-type professional liability insurance.
Occurrence insurance covers all claims arising out of treatment rendered during the period that the policy is in effect. Claims-made insurance provides coverage only for claims that are actually made or filed in court during the period the policy is in effect. To provide continuing coverage for claims arising from treatment provided before one leaves the private practice of medicine—such as would occur when one entered military service either voluntarily or for a national emergency—requires the purchase of a reporting endorsement (tail coverage). For an orthopedic surgeon in Illinois, this would cost a minimum of $90,000. There is no way one could afford this reporting endorsement on a military salary.
Although a doctor may be willing to donate his time to the Guard or the Reserves and be willing to serve in case of
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an emergency, there is no reasonable way to deal with the economic disincentive caused by our legal and insurance systems. While a physician is serving in the military, the lawyers back at home will continue to be active. There is no way to ignore this reality.
“SOF—The Navy’s Perspective”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 136-138, August 1987
Proceedings)
Charles W. Bond, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The title of this article intrigues me. Since when did the U. S. Navy have any “perspective” in the field of small combatants? I specifically refer to the grisly history leading up to what Mr. Polmar terms the Sea Viking fiasco.
It reminds one of a gubernatorial candidate in Florida who tried to “be all things to all men,” and ended up “bein’ nuthin' to nobody.” The vehicle last called the Sea Viking began life as the patrol boat, multimission, developmental (PBM-X), and had so many incompatible features stipulated in the craft operational requirements that it was an impossible craft from the start. This should be laid at the door of Naval Sea Systems Command PM-300. The SEAL (sea-air-land) requirements could not be contained sensibly in the craft, as stipulated, if other features were to be preserved.
I hope that the Inspector General’s remark concerning its value as a prototype proves accurate. Proceedings wrote about the small craft gap in the 1970s. Well, we still have the same one.
Please, won’t the Navy create a “skunk works” in Norfolk’s Combatant Craft Engineering Center and keep Washington out of it?
“The Commitment”
(See M. P. Siewart, p. 64, June 1987
Proceedings)
Lieutenant P. D. Eikenberry, U. S. Coast Guard—I enjoyed Ensign Siewart’s essay in the Leadership Forum, but something about it kept nagging at me, and I think it’s the same thing that bothers me about many of the articles I read on leadership. They all seem to treat leadership as only a concept. Leadership is not just being committed to an ideal and knowing the what and why of that ideal. Leadership is much, much more.
Commitment is fine. Knowing what you are committed to and why is fine. But what you do about it and how you show it is just as important as understanding why. In 18 years of service with the Coast Guard, I have known hundreds of committed officers and enlisted professionals. Most were leaders of one sort or another, but damn few were effective
because they didn’t know how to Pu ^ ideals into appropriate action. Y°u ^ as committed to an ideal as you i still end up being a bastard. oUt,
The few really great leaders stan ^ because, whether aware of it or n0J_jiOVV, knew how to put words into action to motivate people. People can aged or people can be motivate • ^ jt only manage, the job may get “on®’oU do will not get done as well as 1 7 (jve both. This is the real secret °' epWjght leadership. People like Genera D. Eisenhower and Admiral EW jn wait knew how to motivate pe<jP spite of what may come out ot 0ne dent with the USS Stark (FFG- ^’eone lesson stands out loud and clear. * ctjVe on that ship knew how to use eQllt- leadership. That is evidenced the
standing job the crew did of sa^e[1) to ship. Someone had motivated ^ learn their jobs and learn them ^
We need more in these articles ^ to put words into action. How do t0 people to do a job they may n° and
do, and to do it with a feeling o* P ung
accomplishment? This is what ou^ ^ey leaders of tomorrow need to kno ^|Ues are taught plenty about ideals an{ and the whys and wherefores o ^oVV to are doing, but little is taught °n^eCtive put all of this rhetoric into e^o|S to action. Let’s give our leaders the work with.
Quick Reference GUIDE
To MILITARY SWITCHES _______ rrrtSlsSSi
Comment and Discussion
vered
aircraft carrier, three nuclear-
Str
^emanc*s All Nuclear- 0wered Battle Groups
Re r
^av}Afy,ral T' A- Mmstedt, Jr., U. S. ^uclenr 'r.ector f°r Operations, Defense ,0°kinp \AgenCy—The Navy’s forward- fensive mfa11?16 Strale8Y carries lhe of- It emnh ■ tensive fight to the enemy. Warfare ,aS'Zes *maginative, aggressive ver, flexVrCS an<^ a strategy of maneu- andexni' It^’ concentrated firepower, To suer0' an enemy’s weakness.
naval fnee *n executing the strategy, *°8*stic rC6S mUSt ke largely free from driVen constraints. In nuclear power- platform '^n’ t*1C Navy combines in one f°r t[,e .5 . the ingredients necessary
^aneuveraK-rl"16 Strategy t0 prevail— ity, a . . '‘by. firepower, survivabil- albeit at S1^n‘^lcant logistic freedom— <stment.SUbStantial increase in initial
Canriot '^0rtance °f logistics in warfare one pro- 6 overemphasized. The farther Monies t ^°Wer’ the more important it c°nsideS ■ *s *s an especially critical 'sland-nratl°n ^or United States, an front : atlon separated by vast oceans ThrotjgL strategic and vital interests. °I)Portu °Ut' hht0Ty’ Important military Wars h nitles have been lost—indeed, craft ,.aVC, h^n lost—when tanks, air- they 'rar sh'Ps halted offensives because The n °Ut ^ue* or ammunition. fuel5m°st limiting logistic constraint is <% ’ c°nstraint that clearly applies to of Ca JjSent and projected naval force Power** hahle groups with nuclear- Son,e Cf suhmarines. To get around this, onsly0 these battle groups should obvi- carrierse ah"nuclear-powered forces of ants i ’ SUrface, and subsurface combat- Po "a distant crisis, only a nuclear- engaea f°rce could respond to a threat, c°ant 3n enemy> or huy time for our ada„ T’ There is much truth in the old depenfrat w'nning battles and wars often Wo S 0n the effectiveness of one’s •p,s jn the limit.
nuC|ee Navy should form three to five all- %t,ar'.P0Wered battle groups. A typical IW - l.t’0n might be one nuclear- powered guided-missile cruisers, one strike cruiser (Kirov!Aegis type or a nuclear-powered Kiev!Aegis type), and two nuclear-powered attack submarines. Each ship should be fitted with the Navy’s most effective weapon systems. Such a force could also be divided into surface or surface and subsurface action groups or any other combination to exploit the firepower of cruise missiles, vertical short take-off and landing aircraft, or other new technologies—including third- generation tactical nuclear weapons.
In the surface forces, the Navy’s current policy is to use nuclear power plants only in aircraft carriers; the past policy was to construct two nuclear cruisers for every nuclear carrier. Both reflect a defensive strategy and internal bickering. It is time the Navy replaces such policies with one that supports our Maritime Strategy and—to answer the question of affordability—limits the number and type of nuclear surface escort ships that we would build.
These battle groups would be like a melded composite of the elements of Napoleon’s cavalry—carabineers and cuirassiers; dragoons and lancers; chasseurs and hussars—all forged into one fighting unit possessing the characteristics of each. In essence, that is what nuclear power has done: each nuclear- powered ship possesses endurance and swiftness, survivability and firepower; combined in an all nuclear-powered battle group, these ships offer a tactical and strategic potential unparalleled in naval warfare.
“Up or Out: A Financial Disaster”
(See E. L. Beach, pp. 54-57, June 1987; P. J. Rooney, pp. 16-18, October 1987 Proceedings)
Whitney Culbertson, Economist, U. S. Navy—In theory, Captain Beach’s proposal would make better use of officers’ talents. However, while reforming the up-or-out system clearly benefits those who would have been “out,” it hurts those who would have been “up.” Since pay would still be tied closely to rank, a slowdown in promotions would reduce the monetary (and nonmonetary) incentives for officers to stay in the Navy. The officers who would leave in the greatest proportional numbers would be the fast risers who are making difficult decisions between staying in or leaving the Navy. Without an offsetting increase in compensation or other incentives, these officers would have less reason to make the Navy a career.
A better way to successfully accomplish the reform that Beach suggests is to separate pay from rank. This would involve a two-track career system for Navy officers: one track would be for those who aspire to command jobs—ultimately that of the Chief of Naval Operations. These officers would be evaluated on their leadership ability. The other track would be for officers who choose to specialize in technical fields. They would be rewarded with targeted pays, rather than promotions, for their proficiency. The creation of specialist careers would allow the Navy to offer rewards and retention incentives to more experienced, skilled officers, without having to promote them and crowd the upper rank structure. Within the command track, the Navy would still have room to quickly promote the fast-rising leaders who must choose between the service and their excellent civilian opportunities.
The two-track system offers a greater scope and choice in officer careers because it encourages and rewards officers for doing what they do best. The current system forces officers who would choose to be specialists to compete as generalists, and forces those who would choose to be generalists and managers to acquire a greater degree of technical specialty than they might otherwise prefer. By offering more career choices to satisfy officers’ own preferences, the two-track system would represent a strong incentive to stay in the Navy.
The concept of separating pay from rank is not new. It has always met with strong resistance, however, because of the possible pay inversions that it im-
plies—more junior specalists receiving higher pay than their higher-ranking commanding officers. But pay inversion already exists in the Navy and causes no apparent ill effects. The special continuation pay that the Navy offers to aviation and nuclear officers often raises the pay of junior officers above that of their commanders. Also, the Navy has taken steps to create career paths that go part way toward a two-track system: the aviation duty officer program, the material professional specialists, and the health care professionals are all examples of this trend away from the “CNO-track” philosophy in the Navy.
Reform of the up-or-out system implies the end of the generalist as the ideal of a naval officer. This is because maintaining the officer generalist under the up-or-out system involves large investments in training for new skills and billets, retraining to hone old skills for a return to the fleet, and, finally, the wasteful disposal of all of these valuable skills and experience, since most officers leave after a relatively brief (by civilian standards) naval career. The up-or-out system is obviously wasteful of officer abilities, Navy resources, and morale, as Captain Beach argues.
The technological demands of the modem Navy require highly educated officers who often do not serve in traditional officer leadership roles. The Navy pays a high price for deliberately disposing of these officers simply because there are not enough leadership billets in the command pyramid. Retaining officer specialists can demonstrate to Congress the Navy’s sincerity in keeping down its personnel numbers, minimizing manpower budgets, and getting the most value from the officer corps. A two-track career system is tailor-made to the requirements of the modern Navy.
“Blacks in White Hats”
(See P. Vahsen, pp. 65-70, April 1987
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander P. Kem Siddons, U. S. Naval Reserve—I read Ms. Vah- sen’s article with great interest, having served at a historically black university— Florida A & M—as an NROTC instructor under the command of Captain Kenneth Johnson, U. S. Navy, whom she mentioned. I witnessed firsthand some of the problems she cited. I had had little prior experience with the plight of minorities in the sea services, so this tour was enlightening.
During my tenure at the college, I saw a complete academic spectrum of mid
shipmen, both minority and nonminority.
I witnessed a general easing of admission standards, aimed at giving minority students an opportunity they normally would not have had. At first I was skeptical, as I saw this as a threat to our primary objective—producing a high-quality officer for the fleet. According to the traditional benchmarks of standardized test scores and high school grades, many of our minority midshipmen had little chance of success. Had we held the line on admissions standards with these applicants, the demographics of our unit would have reversed dramatically. Over time, though, better than 50% of these students proved to be solid midshipmen and commissioned officers. On our part, the keys were patience, understanding, and a willingness to help our students overcome their difficulties.
Blacks are quite capable of competing effectively in today’s Navy, given the opportunity. In my experience, the minority student is at a disadvantage because of poor secondary education and the cultural dissonance of being a black person in a white world. These problems can be remedied by a society and a Navy willing to be patient and support such programs as Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training and the Naval Academy Preparatory School— both gateways to naval commissions for minorities. Blacks in such programs are proving themselves daily at the Naval Academy, at NROTC units nationwide, and in the fleet. If we are truly to have a
we mfsl
naval service “of the peopi > £rams maintain the momentum sue P have already achieved.
‘Tomorrow’s Fleet”
(See J. D. Aldcn, pp. 177-186, May Proceedings)
Naval Forces Southern the “Battleships” section 0 ^
Alden states, “The Panama an,a- been closed to battleships by t ^ ratin% nian Government’s Canal mnljs- Agency.” The Panama Cana ^ pas sion, which operates the ^at(]eShips placed no such restriction on a „
Warriors First ^
Shephard W. Hill—Recent eve^dqUeS' Persian Gulf have once again raletence°* tions about the operational comP tN our military forces. The in'r’|['-g 5tgfr Bridgeton, the attack on the [farin'-’ (FFG-31), the bombing of ttie0ft*° compound in Beirut, and the osstartlin^ planes over Lebanon represent a ^0$ string of unsuccessful uses o
.(/.S'
1987
Captain R.E. Allsopp,
Commaf'
of
The only restriction for any ship size. Specifically, the ship IllU?’ ^ fh£ the canal’s 1,000-by-110 f°ot ^ with'11 Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships a ^ those dimensions. Within the P g.62f years, the Iowa, the New Jersey ^ suc- and the Missouri (BB-63) have cessfully transited the canal-
irinry tU X . finical UUJCLUVC.
ship w ® 6 Vietr>am War, this relation- directlv' P?rverted to the extent that it effort, in .v, adverse*y affected the war , 16 tame of policy, military
’ Were subordinated, resulting in e ive and extremely costly appli- °f the ar1™ P°wer' Maty members
s°tie ^orces have argued with
tost on fltlCatlon ‘hat the war was not r°°msofih atdebield. but in the back and the v,C Lotgress, the White House, fairness UtC Department. Regrettably, list severa,res that we must add to this her of iin-f enta§on civilians and a num- Pr°tnotif,n10rmed officers who felt that they snK S Were based on how quickly
CD0?/ved t0 their civilian bosses
erals fthe t , oelnam Pohcies cited by lib- foree a ' ^ should never use military Servative<;WMre for an7 reason), and con- Hy of adon 1 let politics get in the feet on y 8°0d War) have also had an ef- trtany 0r . ’ m>»tary leaders. As a result, Use force ° a‘' S °fficers are reluctant to 'ary failure311^ 3re wdbnS t0 blame mil
°me t0 mind:
• __________ ____________________ A
s°mewhat hff6 these events have been L>bva an i by successfuI actions in confide ■ renada’ they do not engender ThereCC *n °Ur ab'bty t0 prevail, stratepv *S a direct relationship between
'beory states ^.?bcy' The strategy/policy must h S tbe use °L military force goals m- S(yncbronized with political Used with'' 3ry ^°rce sb°uld never be during1!!!1 avreIated Political objective.
e.°n policy. Several exampk
Af - mind:
^arrac'ks6 trucL-bombing of the Marir Gained th'n bc'rut’ many officers con fer a Dre Ut tbe ^ar*nes were not suite gross laDSe,nCe m>ss>orl- The fact is that "'eapon ,ln military security, not poi Sulted i6td^n by civilian leaders, ri cident j. e *oss °f lives. The Beirut ii Poors.. Particularly troubling becaus p. s ' !tary judgment resulted in tf !ncidem i 'drawal from Lebanon. Tf lactivf,. 3 so damaged U. S. political ol The ‘n the re8ion-
Pears to SS <d ^ sailors on the Stark a| corps r,reSldt Pnom timidity in our offici dangeraced with a possible threat in her qefUS area> the Stark did not brin tediy ensive weapons to bear. Admi tancc' ter^action critiques from a di:
ally • >5,000 miles are easy and usi revea]sniP>istic, but the Stark incidei Hen • 3 Predisposition to do nothin On rnaln doubt. The Phalanx system w; airCra|-aua> t0 avoid engaging “friendly crripio 3nd °ffensive systems were ru shoo, because no one wanted I the w 0Wn an “innocent.” In defense ( the ir . ,s officers, had they shot dow C°ngraCll.det before he fired his missile: essional panels, military expert:
and world opinion (as reported by Sam Donaldson) would have been outraged. However, outrage disappears more quickly than the grief of 37 families—or, for that matter, the adverse policy implications of a U. S. naval combatant’s failure to defend herself.
While Congress and the administration fight over foreign policy prerogatives, procurement reform, and defense reorganization. little attention is being paid to the mindset of our fighting men and women. We should be asking ourselves if our uniformed officers have become a reflection of their contemporaries in the business world, where mediocrity is the standard. Or, have they assumed the stance of our elected officials who shrink from making decisions while blaming others for lack of action or for action gone awry. If such a transformation has taken place, the political and military consequences will be staggering.
We must hope that the “do nothing/ blame the policy” mentality is neither deepseated nor widespread. The U. S. armed forces are the best in the world, but at one time so was our steel industry. Our military academies and war colleges should spend more time on military tactics and less on business administration— a simplistic and overused solution, but one with merit. Our officers must realize they are warriors first, and politicians, diplomats, and administrators second.
“Lessons Learned in the Air War Over Vietnam”
(See “Seminar Report," pp. 8-10, August 1987 Proceedings)
Captain Robert W. Sherer, U. S. Navy— I am disappointed to read quotes from our senior naval leaders of the Vietnam era griping about how the administration does not accept the military’s advice. Rear Admiral Grant A. Sharp did no better in his Strategy for Defeat. No admiral was willing to resign his post to protest the excessive White House meddling that cost our aviators their lives. Should the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff compromise his principles in order to be a “team player” in the administration?
The seminar’s failure to address these issues condemns us to Admiral Thomas Moorer’s self-proclaimed fate, “I didn’t feel that I learned anything.”
Attributing antipatriotic motives to the press begs the deeper question—how could senior officials lead public opinion, instead of following it?
In future seminars, I suggest a more balanced approach.
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Pictured USS NEW JERSEY BB 62, ln 1945.
Meeting the challenge for severe environment shipboard electronic enclosures
he’s
and I’ll bet
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so
“Overhaul Planning: Beating the
System”
(See K. M. Klein, pp. 74-79, August 1987
Proceedings)
Commander N. C. Walton, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Changes in the overhaul planning process are necessary. I enjoyed Captain Klein’s article and wish him well with his suggested changes to the system. I am afraid, however, that unless things have changed greatly in “foggy bottom’’ since my time, all attempts at change are still doomed to failure.
In the mid-1960s, I was commanding officer (CO) of a landing ship, dock, scheduled for overhaul. Having had two previous commands, and having been CO for three previous overhauls, I figured I had all the dope on planning and would have a really good overhaul. Fate intervened on the ship’s behalf, and we had a superb overhaul, saved the type commander (TyCom) money, and recommended changes to the system.
Everything was done on time and accepted up to the point of the “resolution conference.” The yard rep, who was a captain I had known since he was an ensign, said, “Walton, your TyCom has given us $750,000 and the yard’s estimate is $1,250,000. What do you intend to cut?”
I replied, “All work, in my opinion, is essential to the maintenance of the ship and the morale of my personnel. Perhaps the TyCom’s rep can make some suggestions. I consider the separators for the crew’s showers as important as rousing and tumbling the anchors.”
The TyCom’s maintenance rep, a grizzled old lieutenant commander who liked me not, looked sort of staffy and said, “It’s your ship, do what you please.” “Let’s skip the drydocking and propel- lor repair,” I said for starters.
The yard rep looked at the TyCom rep and said, “Okay?” and the TyCom rep replied, “Yep—Sir.”
Well, to make a long story short, four hours later we ended up with a $750,000 work list that excluded checking the reduction gears, drydocking, propellor repair, evaporator work, and ordnance overhaul. But it did include piping to the long-since installed wash basins in the officers’ staterooms, lockers for the chief petty officer’s quarters, dividers to separate head stools and shower stalls, and a call bell system for the sound-powered phones.
In closing, the yard rep said, “Walton, I do not believe this, but the TyCom’s rep has signed it off, and we are done. My advice to you is to buff up your blues because you are gonna be in front of your
TyCom tomorrow, mad!” „ mes-
The next morning, there wa ^ sage, “Come see me ASflr your engineer.” _f„i0iV-
We were ushered into a group a
ering captains and commanders ej smiling three-star admiral, who with, “Good morning, Walton, w to have a problem about your ship haul. What do you suggest? fflajnte- Before I answered, the TyCom ... nance officer said, “Get a new ^ That outburst really chilled me, ^ admiral replied, “No! Maintemm^^ better dig up $500,000 Pron° get said? Walton, you stay; all ot
with it.” . hut three
Well, I did get a prat-burner. on months later we completed °^eroVet- schedule, every job done 100%, 0f time, and no frantic air-freig ^ parts—and the bill was an as o $625,000! etiine
We were probably the first p (eS, overhaul fully funded to yard ea ^aS and no last minute money juS? ^from needed because funds were move , ^
goodies.
This “miracle” pleased evcy"everal much that the TyCom awarde ^ nle letters of commendation and dire to suggest a change in the overh ing procedure. jevel
The official reply from the bme^^ to was, “It is an impractical Pr°2 implement!”
Good luck, Captain Klein!
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“War Games” g7
(.See T. B. Hayward, p. 123, August l9 Proceedings) i
Tf 5. Ma'
Major General Fred-Haynes, u- ^ rine Corps (Retired)—War Gam*’ Secret World of the Creators, y]0rl) and Policy Makers Rehearsing (o War III Today is a sound introduc the significance of gaming in P°sr(fs War II America. Admiral Hay ^ok
sharply focused review of to
F1 -niti°n
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Admiral Hayward criticizes in -nv0lve for concentrating on games that te<) teams of players dealing with sinl.jjtary international crises. Political-119 crisis games are obviously drania .ers- hold the interest of Mr. Allen s re^0pg However, they also deserve top ^eh because they are important. Eve11test played by middle-level officials, t
---------------------------------------- mber1,87
tary f0].e Combat between opposing mi tary fF-es- The purpose is to enable mi deSjg1Cers and civilian engineers
Th
u)ied 6 c°mputerized combat simulati Catcd'n rn'ss'on analysis also can be re fo- Played avain and avain with
tioiKti* °f 20vcrnnicnt to resolve situa- Thev f 3 cou*^ have dire consequences.
sitUation^r^^'F™15 t0 think throuSh sponH •. Certamly, the way leaders re-
Whi'e information1! ^ iS W°rth'
°nd dgues!,!!a^Ward says Mr- Allen scc" Sampc o j • tbe Participants in crisis
ficatirm nf 'mP*’es tbat tbe book’s identi- "chillin'“ „me past P'ayers could have a in futll ® 6 kect on others’ participation founded Neither criticism is well
not on th ° kls credd> Mr- Allen focuses °n how H miStakeS of any one Player, but t0 resn^ ?C'S10n "takers in general tend In fa d ln Certain situat>ons. few nlav*’ Aden l135 identified very him und6rS r°m the records released to Act, I tAC Preedom of Information
Pears discomf-tWhat he haS gleaned aP- l'cipated ■ *ltlng' As one who has par- doubt thJnu/POlF!Cal‘military games, I effect nr, r ar Barnes will have much
a!" «““•
Cn l*ayward also maintains that
the Outcomp^Hf “the r'Sk °f believing that the ,, of the games and forgets the uSe fa *3enefit is in the playing—in some tn tifames as training aids. There is viewer n '° ^*S assertion, but the re- qitotes ptS t0° ^’ne a po‘nt on't when he
"isbestiKer)Pcrla as saying war gaming lo cale, i 'ed t0 investigate processes, not The ate outc°mes.”
°utcomtrUt^ 'S *30tk tbe Paying anc^ the stand h S UrC dnPortant. We must undertime TW' Var'ous factors drive the out- 'hings Lain‘ng *s not just practicing to do Pinal] Ut 'earn’ng to do them well. mentl0ny: Adn'iral Hayward fails to War „an . most output-oriented form of **,*'"8 mission analysis. Mission svar.g.S stands at the opposite end of the the oth1"1^ sPectrum and crisis games at PutersEr' employs powerful com- sin„,| ’ father than human players,
» U1ate i_ •
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tlefieij at W'H function better on the t Ofjent ’ Mission analysis is outp qnant r because it is designed to ansv range* fl*Ve Huestions: What is the b given °r a battlefield missile with •Pone Payl°ad? Is it better to sp< \vey 0n new tanks or on antit; eaPons‘>
Tl ’ used _
f^playcd again and again with Unj, assumptions—until the pla; fect^'and not only how each factor of p lae °utcome, but what combina R *‘°rs tends to produce better rest ■cability does not make mis:
analysis infallible. It remains a judgment process, subject to human error. However, it does increase the probability of getting a good answer, or learning at least in what direction that answer may lie.
The “risk of believing the outcome” is lower in mission analysis than in some historical accounts of war itself. Replicability enables the analyst to try out new concepts and systems. In a war, there is only one outcome and one way to achieve it. How many militaries have lost the next war because they believed too much in the outcome of the last?
In fact, Tom Allen’s book fails to do justice to mission analysis and modem combat simulation when it implies that they are marketing tools for industry. They are much more serious than that. Developers of advanced combat simulations, men like Seth Bonder of Vector Research in Michigan, deserve more than passing reference. They have given the military services, industry, and key decision makers powerful tools to assist in making important choices. There is every reason to believe these tools will grow even more useful in the future.
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electronic equipment and weapons.
Fleet Marine Force.
Supporting the text are several hundred photographs and drawings, many published here for the first time, that give general identification views of ships and aircraft and show close-ups of
This highly regarded guide presents a comprehensive description of the Reagan administration’s 600-ship Navy of the late 1980s.
It includes not only the Navy’s ships, submarines, and aircraft, but its people, organizations, weapons, and electronics as well.
This newly revised edition examines the four Iowa-class battleships added to the fleet, along with the new 95,000-ton nuclear carriers and a flotilla of amphibious, mine, and auxiliary ships still on the building ways. The book also examines the Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyer and the Seawolf-class attack submarines, and the heated controversies surrounding these designs and their building programs. Other unique features include full descriptions of administrative and operational organizations as well as the Navy’s new sealift programs and
By Norman Polmar
The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet
Fourteenth Edition
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rain, and currents, in order to
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into
fast sub prototype
should commence on a super should not push such a pro^v ■ .a.
development, but we cannot be co cent either.
iiarineS
more vulnerable. But instead of J133 ^
our subs more easily detectable- ^ breakthrough has made Soviet su
bloc counts
In the Wake of Hurricane Toshiba
Larry Schweikart, co-author o/Trident— In 1981, the Toshiba Machine Company and C. Itoh & Company of Japan sold four MBP-110 milling machines to Tech- mashimport, a Soviet machine tool importing agency. To control the intricate cutting and milling heads on these huge machines, specifically designed to shape propeller blades for ships and submarines, Techmashimport also contracted with Norway’s Kongsberg Trade Company to purchase four new NC2000 computer controllers.
The balance of power in undersea warfare was radically changed when the Soviets acquired this technology. The machinery provides the Soviets with the capability to quiet the noisiest part of a submarine, the propeller, or screw.1
Douglas Dalgleish and I have compared the U. S. Ohio (SSBN-726)-class Trident-missile submarine, the world’s quietest, mass-produced sub, to the Soviet’s Typhoon class. We noticed how much noise was generated by the Typhoon’s dual screw design propeller. The U. S. Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class attack submarines are not as fast or deep diving as some of the more modern Soviet subs. One of their SSN-688s major advantages is their ability to run silent. The potential successor to the Los Angeles-class sub, is the Seawolf (SSN-21), designed to be quieter, not faster or deeper diving. Clearly there has been a “quietness gap” between U. S. and Soviet submarines. The United States was holding the lead until Toshiba entered the picture.2
All of a sudden U. S. submarines, patrolling where they had never been detected before, have been “pinged” by the new, quieter Soviet boats. In the past, our submariners could always hear the Soviets approaching and escaped. The Soviets obviously put the new technology to use quickly. Now our Navy must decide what to do.3
Tridents must be moved further out to sea: The O/u'o-class submarines were designed to carry the yet-undeveloped Trident II (D-5) missiles. The C-4 was merely an interim weapon intended to be used only through 1989, when the D-5 was to be deployed. The D-5 was designed with a maximum range of 6,000- plus nautical miles, because the Navy anticipated that the Soviets would make advances in antisubmarine warfare (ASW). As the D-5 deployment grew closer, the Soviets had not made many advances, so the range of the D-5 was reduced. Heavier, larger kiloton warheads were added to the missile. As of
early 1987, Trident missile engineers planned on the shorter-range missile.
Now, however, the presence of extremely quiet Soviet hunter-killer submarines has forced the U. S. SSBN force to use additional sea space, in order to avoid detection and to escape attacks. The D-5s’ range therefore, must be upgraded back to the original 6,000-plus nautical miles. As a result, continuing the MX Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile program becomes difficult to justify because the D-5 missile has similar capabilities.4
Soviet submarine designs will change to accommodate the new technology: It would be foolish for the Soviets to continue running propellers in tandem, as they do on the Typhoon class. Two screws will always generate noise from the overlap wash. The Soviets may abandon the Typhoon twin-screw design and build a new series of single-screw boats.
Duality has been a standard feature in Soviet design as a result of their boats’ high failure rates. The short-lived, single-screw Alpha boats, for example, could achieve incredible speeds for short bursts, but broke down when they attempted to maintain those speeds for long periods. One way to assure reliability is through redundancy, with backup systems. However, for the Soviets to take advantage of their new quieting technology, they will have to do without much of their backup equipment. The Soviets will be forced to choose between quieter boats and more reliable boats.
Quieter subs will mean new Soviet and U. S. tactics: For years, the Soviet submariners knew their boats could be located relatively easily. Now, the Soviets will have to be quiet. No longer can they afford to make noise. We will find out just how good the Soviet submariners really are.
They will have to use ambush tactics more often, sneak up on our subs more, and, in general, stop using high-powered, noisy bursts to move to a particular battle spot. This will mean that Soviet sub tenders will grow in importance, for at-sea maintenance and resupply will become an integral part of operations.
The United States will also have to make tactical adjustments: In areas where the Soviets have clusters of subs, the U. S. Navy could drop several slow search torpedoes and watch the action. U. S. subs will have to be more surviv- able against Soviet attacks. U. S. submariners, no longer relying solely on their technological advantage, will have to hone their evasion skills. Our submarines will perfect the use of thermal layers, natural undersea contours and ter
1111, tlllU LUI ICIllo, m u LS"
There is a need for new U. S. 5 ^ fast and deep diving: Electric B°' ^ long had a design for a sailless it is again time to examine sue r designs.6 Research and deve op
We have feared that an ASW ^ through would render our su 111
detectable. It is only a matter of tin ^ fore the Soviets learn how to us ^ gathered from quieting methods >°r(ef against the United States. We ha prepare a response. Our allies a ^ have to take responsibility for alTjng of the Free World, either by 1 tankers in the Persian Gulf with . ^^ri- flags, lowering the level of antl” cjinol- can rhetoric abroad, or watching 1 ogy sales to the Eastern more carefully.
‘“An Illegal Deal’s Noisy Repercussions.^,.^. News and World Report. 15 June 1987. P- come to Moscow on the Ginza.” ibid-- P' frittf1 2D. Douglas Dalgleish and Larry Schweika ■ (Carbondale, IL.: Southern Illinois Univers 1984), pp. 18, 24, 227-228.
’Richard Pariseau, “Unconventional jott
Against Quieter Soviet Subs,” Armed Fl’’“ nal International, April 1987, pp- 66-9 • --Trr 4Larry Schweikart and D. Douglas Dalgw'3 p;jexi' dent and the TRIAD: Systems Durability a jul> bility,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceeding •
1985, pp. 73-81.
’Pariseau, p. 67. 163'^
’Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident. PP- 394-395.
To the North Pole!
(See D. C. Allard, pp. 56-65, September 1987 Proceedings)
Deam Given—I would like to offer some additional information about the submarine Nautilus (SS-168) that attempted to sail under the Arctic ice pack to the North Pole in 1931. Three years ago, scientists working for the Norwegian Underwater Technology Center (NUTEC) found her on the bottom of Bergen Bay Fjprd in 350 meters (1,148 feet) of water. She was scuttled there on 20 November 1931. From a rough idea of her position, NUTEC located the submarine and provided firm identification by means of an underwater remotely operated vehicle.
The Nautilus began life as 0-12 (SS- 73), a U. S. Navy O-class submarine. George Hupert Wilkins, who had become convinced that a submarine could go anywhere in the polar sea during the summer season, contacted Simon Lake, the builder of the 0-12. Both wanted to build a special purpose submarine to try to go under the polar ice, but Wilkins did not have sufficient financial backing. He asked the Navy if the 0-12 would be available for his Arctic expedition, arranged to lease the 0-12 for $ 1 per year, and promised to return the submarine to the Navy after the expedition.
An extensive reconstruction took place, including a new superstructure with a dorsal sail for easier navigation below the ice, a new periscope, hull strengthening to resist ice pressure, a new gyrocompass and echo sounder, a winch for hydrographic tests, and one large and two small ice drills to get access to fresh air and to pop up an antenna for sending and receiving radio signals. The torpedo room became an oceanographic laboratory. The modifications were financed through press contacts such as William Randolph Hearst, as well as by private sponsors such as Lincoln Ellsworth. The Nautilus was christened in the presence of Jules Verne’s grandson.
Planned tests off the coast of Labrador were not carried out because of delays. Problems with the main machinery during the Atlantic crossing resulted in extra work at European shipyards, causing further delays.
Finally, on 15 August 1931, the Nautilus reached Spitsbergen, Norway, which was supposed to be the starting point of the polar expedition. But now Wilkins decided to abandon his original plan of crossing the Arctic Sea under the ice and prepared instead to use the situation to attract interest for subsequent financing of an “ideal” under-ice submarine. When compact ice was reached at 81°25' north latitude and submerging under the ice was first tested, both vertical rudders were destroyed and further operations below the ice became impossible.
The Nautilus returned to Bergen for repairs, but damage was so extensive that returning her to the U. S. Navy was out of the question. The decision was made, therefore, to sink the Nautilus in deep water in the Bergen Bay Fjprd.
While there are no plans to raise this historic vessel, NUTEC will offer the facilities at its disposal to any group that wants to salvage the Nautilus. Until then, the ill-fated submarine will remain in its watery grave outside Bergen, Norway. It’s possible that the U. S. Navy will waive the $56 owed for its lease.
“Seabees With Portfolio”
(.See J. A. McConnell, pp. 107-108, August
1987 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) James R. Van De Voorde, U. S. Navy—Commander McConnell’s recommendation to use Seabees in the Third World to accomplish foreign policy objectives is right on target. As a former officer in charge (OIC) of the civic action team (CAT) in the Republic of Palau, I can personally attest to the outstanding accomplishments of the Seabee Teams.
Deploying three Seabee Teams to Honduras, instead of the Army airborne troops already there, would provide a stabilizing, low-cost, nonthreatening U. S. military presence. Such a move would have bipartisan support at home and certainly with the Organization of American States and the United Nations. It would further defuse propaganda coming out of Nicaragua that the United States intends to invade that country. The departments of State and Defense could share the costs. Start-up costs of outfitting the three teams with construction equipment and tools would be approximately $4 million. The teams could operate under the direction of local State Department officials and be resupplied monthly via C-130 flight into Palermo Air Force Base.
From a practical standpoint, implementing such a program would improve the training and readiness of the Naval Construction Force. Typical work would include pioneering roads, installing water catchments and distribution systems, constructing small buildings, and providing medical assistance—by the team’s hospital corpsman—to the local populace. These are valuable contingency skills that are not always developed during peacetime deployments.
1 would like to correct the author’s as-
sertion that few foreign policy ^ 0f are accrued from the current Prcs^^ 0f CATs in Micronesia. While I was u CAT Palau (July 1985 to March ^ the United States was negotiating a pact of Free Association with the lie of Palau. This Compact inclu visions for U. S. military basins’ eSSl within Palau, including airfields _j one deep-water harbor, and s j jungle/amphibious training areas. ^ lieve that the fine work performs ^ Seabees and the warm acceptan pressed by the Palauans made a - ^
cant contribution, furthering Sh:eve of the Compact in 1986. This *c ment will result in a continuing team presence in Palau and, more ^ tant to U. S. foreign policy, denia area to Soviet influence.
“Breakfast, Anyone?” [9g7
(See H. A. Kamman, p. 120, Septem!*5 Proceedings)
Chief Aviation Electrician s Matt j
W. Joenks, U. S. Navy couldn’t help but smile, a lim® aI)ec- cally I might add, when I read t 1a[1J dote. Coffee, Bacon, Oldham- Belch, indeed! gear
But then my memory snapped t
t i
OAVlO
“Coffee, Bacon, Oldham, and Belch!”
and I recalled our flight sur8e^n’pye Butcher, and his corpsman, H- N•
So when we of Patron Fifty carne,cethe with some malady, we went off to s Butcher and Dye.
be
generals and admirals. ,gfio
I propose radical surgery. ^ away with the fitness report and P^ ut tion board system altogether, an ^£| promotion authority down at the _ that has to live with the results- ‘T^[ien tion by central boards, reviewing ^ ^_ records, was fine during the last ce^iern- The services were smaller and the ^ bers of the officer corps knew each ^ but it no longer works. Instead, let^ culate the overall promotion rate req ^ to give the desired rank structur^0iil<i instance, if average time as an 0-5 ^
be seven years, then every year ^vefy would be one promotion to 0-4 f°rg. seven 0-3s. Then, let’s allocate tions down to the lowest level at there are at least ten officers from * ^ to choose. An 0-6 might be told t ^
__________________ o : told that
could promote one of his 13 0-3s e 234 days, for instance. , aps,
If an officer spent ten years, Per ^ as an 0-3 without being promote > would be separated. I’m sure mos moters would consider seniority an f
the hign"
woU‘‘
“A Survival Guide for Washington Duty”
(See J. D. Taylor, pp. 41-45, August 1987, Proceedings)
Commander Peter B. Mersky, U. S. Naval Reserve—After 13—an unlucky number?—years of living and working in the Washington area, and another four on a peripheral, close-by gridiron, much of what the admiral said struck real close to home. I consider myself a battle-scarred veteran of both the civilian and military arenas, not the least of which are the traffic-choked highways of D.C. Shirley Highway may be the oldest asphalt maneuvering board, but it is neither the only nor the most combative one, as travelers of the infamous Beltway (Route 495), Columbia Pike, Routes 1 and 7, and the George Washington Parkway can attest.
1 will contest the admiral’s choice of music, however. Wagner’s music is too lethargic, punctuated by momentary bursts of energy. Now, for the real modem air warrior, one who considers himself more youthful, the soundtrack to Top Gun—yes! the much-heard “Danger Zone”—has few au courant equals. Blasting down the highway in your version of a four-wheeled F-14 is incomplete without this high-tech rock audio augmentation input. (I, myself, have a black Firebird, bought in a moment of understandable weakness, and the two go together in a nearly maniacal fashion.)
If you insist on the more classical, try the lesser-known overtures of such stalwarts as Tchaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsa- kov, and the other Russian composers. Egad! The enemy! It’s a Soviet plot! Wagner is just too heavy, too Germanic to fit the necessarily light-hearted, but purposeful spirit of highway combat. It also helps to be able to visualize flights of aircraft lifting off from the carrier deck on a 40-plane alpha strike, forming up, and calling “feet dry” as they head inland toward the target, looking for MiGs. If you can imagine yourself out of your close-cropped, gasoline- or diesel-fumed existence on the Beltway, in company with a solid piece of pumping music, well, that part of your Washington tour might be manageable.
While what Admiral Taylor says about keeping a smiley face, seeking tough jobs from tough bosses, and producing is true, there is also the problem of what happens to properly dedicated mid-rank officers who come prepared to play, but get lost in the shuffle and the luck-propulsion of Washington’s play-for-keeps politics. Many knowledgeable, well-intended folks lose their careers because of a wrongly timed input, or an improperly related objection. You only get one chance, baby!
Then there are those unfortunate individuals—capable, dedicated, smart, tough players—who are victims of an apparent bad throw of the dice: wrong place (billet), wrong time (in their careers). Their long-cultivated careers are destroyed through no fault of their own. Perhaps these are few and far between, but this category does exist. A few friends of mine fall into it.
Nonetheless, I was glad to see, and well entertained by, the admiral’s article. And I hope that many career counselors— officer and enlisted alike—copy this piece for wide dissemination. No career- minded military member of any service can hope to advance without at least one productive Washington tour—right in the Pentagon, not in an outlying office in McLean or Arlington. Rear Admiral Taylor’s effort should be much appreciated by young officers—and enlisted— seeking hard-won, yet light-hearted advice from an achiever.
“Fitness Reports”
(See C. C. Swensen, pp. 112-113; J. L. Sams, pp. 114-117; J. A. Tomeo, pp. 117-118; T. P. Scott, pp. 119-121, August 1987; D. S. Egli, pp. 121-123, September 1987; R. W. Kiefer, p. 9, October 1987 Proceedings)
Captain Roger C. Burk, U. S. Air Force— The special section on fitness reports is the best set of comments I have seen on officer rating systems. Things are no better, and possibly worse, in the Air Force.
None of the writers mention the moral effect on the report writer. Resorting to gross exaggerations and outright lies to justify the “top one percent” rating is required in order to give the ratee a fair chance of promotion. A system that forces supervisors to make official lies to be fair to their officers is broken and needs fixing.
Lieutenant Commander Swensen’s suggestion that medal recommendations be required to accompany top-block reports will not work. The medals will become debased as supervisors start to recommend all their ratees for them. Mr. Swensen observes that such a debasement has taken place in the Army.
Commander Sams is correct that in the Air Force the rank of the endorser becomes the “code” by which one judges the true strength of inflated reports. I have also heard that this encourages Air Force officers to favor staff jobs over operational positions, but I have not observed this personally.
Commander Sams’s proposed fitness
report adopts the Air Force s b oc ^ specific examples of performance- 0f those blocks are as inflated as the r ^ the Air Force’s officer’s effictenjo^ ports. His suggestion that ratees u ^ blocks yviH reward braggarts. ^
other hand, allowing peers to do.^(o rating is a marvelous idea. I woul see how it would work out in Pra^ Distinguishing the top 10% w' ne
help the board select below-t e promotees. Promotion rates to eac g ^ through 0-6 are over 40%, so the 1 ^
to be drawn in the middle of the P^_ Lieutenant Tomeo’s suggestion to ^ lish quotas would not be accepte > ^ officers. Brutally frank ratings c accepted more easily in a trainings ronment than in professional life- D jn were established for top-block rati the Air Force in the 1970s and were ^ abandoned. The common °P'nl°nerai's the top ratings went only to the ge favorites. . poaj-d
The fitness report and promotion system can only be changed by g and admirals, who understandab; (e that the current system does an a job of selecting the proper people person’s ability to perform in t grade most heavily when selecting ^ for promotion. Undoubtedly, there w^u|(j be favoritism. But nonfavorites W ^ soon ask for a transfer, to the bene all concerned.
The individual who decides on P1^^)- tions would have direct, personal k (0 edge of the promotee and would ha live with the result of his decision-