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fo
°f the
- itnDS'Ze l^e ^ov‘et submarine force has become a Suf>rUarin °rtant ^eterminant *n the outcome of a future Hile r
^^'Pfriotb^6 eros*on °k the U. S. technology edge, the
ar°Unri^ SU^S fr°m above, below, and all
different'8 the way to win at ASW- But the ti°n. Platforms cannot work in isolathe inn ^„must P°°l their efforts to achieve s from existing resources.
chalI°V,et su^mar*ne force in 1987 presents a major -v speCfenge t0 S' i131-'1*1116 superiority across the lrtr|idab| T °f naval warlare- The key elements of this ’^Ptovinsf, a**en§e are s’ze °f ^e force, its rapidly jn c° echnology, and the expansion of its capabili- SU^niarin n<TUct*n8 submarine missions. Today’s Soviet jStegy e tareat strikes at the heart of the U. S. Maritime 'nchnin anc makes success in the submarine war the
. The sov tHat Strategy-
r'°r subtn ICtS ^ave ma‘nta*ne<l a numerically supe- Jt*ree t0ar,ne force. Their advantage is currently almost . (edSrt12 t*le Soviets with 385 submarines and the s'Ve jn (|i‘1 es with 135. This advantage has not been deci- Soviet^aSt’ ^n>ted States, choosing not to match Either D ,.sukmarine construction rate—an alternative lechn0i0 ° 'tlCally or fiscally achievable—has relied on n0'0§ica| \ aS a/orce multiplier. The overwhelming tech- f°rriPensatSUper*0r't^ ki- S. submarines has more than k^ited St *°r t*le'r kewer numbers and has enabled the ^ality 0fatfS to dominate the undersea dimension. The Pr°ved dr- 6 ^ovlet submarine force, however, has im- yances jnarnatically in the past decade or so. Soviet ad- tkVe reduSU^mar*ne 9uiet'ng> sensors, and survivability aan (j ^ ce^ ihe technological gap much more rapidly resWt 0j- ^,nteHigence and planners had anticipated. As a —- Piore
' maintaining a numerically superior force, Soviet
strategists have also expanded the submarine’s role in naval warfare. From a force whose mission was to defend the seaward approaches to Soviet and Warsaw Pact territories and coastal waters, submarines have emerged as a force designed to neutralize allied naval forces that could threaten the success of Soviet military operations anywhere in the world. To support this concept of operations, Soviet submarines have become major and credible players in a variety of naval mission areas. The Victor III-, Akula-, Mike-, and Sierra-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are front-line and highly effective antisubmarine platforms. The Oscar cruise-missile attack submarine (SSGN) carries 24 SS-N-19 long-range antiship cruise missiles, and is a significant threat to carrier battle and surface action groups. The 1,600-mile SS-NX-21 land- attack cruise missile, surprisingly similar to the U. S. Tomahawk, can be carried on a number of different submarines, giving it a role in strike warfare. The modern and highly capable Tango- and Kilo-class diesel-powered attack submarines provide a significant coastal or choke point defense capability. And the Typhoon is the world’s largest strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a major asset in the Soviet strategic arsenal.
Clearly, in terms of size and capability, the submarine force is the centerpiece of modern Soviet naval strategy. Soviet submarine construction rates confirm that they are driving to achieve and maintain undersea superiority. Submarines comprised 53% of major warship procurement in the Soviet Union from 1977 to 1986. During that ten year period, Soviet shipyards delivered 90 submarines, compared to 43 delivered in the United States.1 Perhaps the most important indicator of the Soviet strategy was expressed by Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, Commander-inChief of the Soviet Navy, when he stated, “The role [of our chief strike force] is played by nuclear submarines.”2 From a U. S. perspective, therefore, if the Maritime Strategy is to be successful, its first priority is to defeat, or at least neutralize, the Soviet submarine threat. Thus, it is not surprising that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Carlisle Trost, ranked antisubmarine warfare
0c**di
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October 1987
(ASW) as his “central warfighting concern” in his report to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1987.3
The magnitude and quality of the Soviet submarine threat require a near-term enhancement of U. S. ASW capabilities and a modification of the traditional submarine-on-submarine approach to ASW. The United States cannot count on winning the ASW battle through independent SSN operations alone, as it has in the past. Technological improvements by the Soviets have altered the theoretical “exchange ratio” by reducing the projected number of Soviet submarines destroyed for each U. S. submarine lost. In addition, the evolving U. S. concept of submarine operations is producing the effect of a Soviet force multiplier, since pressing the attack against Soviet SSBNs operating in defended bastions and against Soviet submarines operating in consort with other forces will undoubtedly increase U. S. submarine losses. It is entirely possible in the current environment that, on average, a U. S. SSN will not be able to deliver all of her weapons against Soviet submarines before being sunk herself. If so, the United States is in a position to lose a one-dimensional war of attrition against Soviet submarines because of the
ture statement to the House Armed Services Cornnu February 1987. Then-Secretary Lehman said, ..|,nce, must integrate submarines, ships, airplanes, survei _
: in isl
and space systems. These platforms do not operate u lation; rather, their individual efforts are interrelate ^
interdependent. We must optimize the capabilities
ASW‘system’ . . . rather than optimizing only ind'vl
unit capabilities.”
What is needed is the leverage of a “holistic” ASW team—a team . . . that exploits the strengths of each platform and finesses the weaknesses.
numerical imbalance. The collapse of the Maritime Strategy would surely follow the defeat of the U. S. submarine force.
The Semvo//(SSN-21)-class submarines may ultimately restore overwhelming undersea superiority to the United States, but they will not be available in significant numbers until the 21st century. A near-term fix is needed. Since a major expansion in the size of the U. S. submarine force is not expected, one solution to this unfavorable correlation of forces is to bring to bear air and surface assets and their substantial capabilities—along with submarines— in a coordinated, aggressive approach to ASW. What is needed is the leverage of a “holistic” ASW team—a team where the total capability is greater than the simple sum of the capabilities of the individual ships, aircraft, and submarines. What is needed is a team that exploits the strengths of each platform and finesses the weaknesses.
This near-term fix should have two objectives. One should be to achieve the most from existing resources. An example might be using a submarine to detect and classify hostile submarine contacts and, where possible, using air or surface units to localize and deliver weapons on the target. Removing the submarine from the weapons delivery business would go a long way toward improving submarine survivability and the U. S.-Soviet submarine exchange ratio. The other objective should be to procure systems and platforms to maximize total ASW team capability. The need for this holistic approach was expressed by former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in his pos
116
, ASW anj
There is concern that the current approach to ^
11
United States practices ASW poorly or that U. S-^ .fl
10 v^wnv^v_-i li ii icr i inv^ v/uuvin _ ,
the Soviet submarine threat is compartmentalize
perhaps, less than optimal. That is not to say
that
the
plat-
v_y i mvu uiuivii 1 uvuvvj i iu i i p/V'V/I IJ w• .
forms and systems are substandard. The U. S. .„'sUe
J ‘ The 1
fact, has superior ASW platforms and systems. 1
centers around their integrated and coordinated use^ ^ There are structural barriers inherent in the Navy e]0p- rent organization that impede the procurement^ t,;).
ivm ui uiui uupv/uv my np
ment, and employment of the best possible ASW c " ^ within resource constraints. These barriers
is '*
ity
because the Navy, from top to bottom, is ^f^jna-
around platform types rather than missions. An exa
officer
tion of the budget process, fleet organization, an development illustrate this platform orientation.
The CNO has deputy chiefs (DCNOs) for $u . Warfare (Op-02), Surface Warfare (Op-03), and ^’eSp0n-
'I z 7 \ 1 '
fare (Op-05). They are platform sponsors and are
,lat-
sible for funding and procuring both the respectN® P.^5
forms and the systems they carry. The deputy , j,
‘has mu
sponsor platforms, not missions. Each platform 1 eJCj pie missions. Thus, in a world of finite resources< js. sponsor must make trade-offs in funding the Van°lt^c
5Tu 7h strata
sion areas. For example, Op-02 must fund bom ^
and tactical submarine programs. Strategic program top national priority, with strong presidential and c0Z^ sional support year after year. Tactical programs the ASW mission. In general, $1 billion that Op*1 pj)- marks for strategic submarine programs removes
lion from tactical programs. The DCNO, then.
is force
rather
that1
make trade-offs between dissimilar missions
making trade-offs to optimize a single mission area' nlonf
larly, Op-03 must apportion his fixed resources antisurface warfare (ASUW), antiair warfare ( j0n
fV ), dlllldll wax****
amphibious warfare, mine warfare, and ASW ^3r- areas. And Op-05 must fund AAW, ASUW, strl. g warfare, early warning, strategic communications, mi fare, and ASW mission areas.
The position of Director of Naval Warfare ( was created several years ago to focus on the NavT^ pro- all warfare mission capabilities and to recomme (yp- curement strategies. The platform sponsors, howev \ py ically cannot afford all of the programs recommen^ Op-095 and have to give up programs in one miss* ^
to fund priority programs in another mission area-
VW 1 tmu pi 1V71 llj pi V' w, 1 Cl 111.1 111 U11UU1V1 , #/>C
each DCNO has established his platform pri°rltl^ made the requisite trade-offs, the warfare missm11 0j
are pieced together from the Op-02, Op-03, j^^pjliO
programs. Using this process, the Navy’s total cap’
in each mission area will probably not be °Ppn^J^f fleet
The platform approach to ASW also exists m It is inherent to the fleet’s structure. The platf°r
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organized under type commanders for submarine, surface, and aircraft, with subsets of groups and squadrons of similar platforms. The concept of holistic ASW implies a team effort, but the fleet organization makes training as a team in combined arms or coordinated operations very difficult. For example, to train a surface, air, submarine (SAS) element would require coordination among aviation, destroyer, and submarine squadrons—each with different operational commitments, schedules, funding limitations, and superiors in the chain-of-command. As a result, not enough coordinated ASW training occurs. It is just too hard. The coordinated training that does occur is usually on an ad hoc basis as arranged by aggressive local commanders. Even then the training often misses the point, because the different ASW elements typically operate in opposition to each other rather than as a team. The current level of experience and expertise in combined-arms ASW operations is low.
Officer career development is a third exampleflI Navy’s orientation to platform type. At the begin11 their careers, naval line officers select a wartar ^ ciality—i.e., surface, air, or submarines. In genera , ^
the selection has been made, the officer’s prole ^ experiences are limited to the chosen platform ytC’eIe least until the completion of initial command at sea- _ is little or no opportunity to cross-deck and learn tn acteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the ot ments of the ASW team from another perspective. ^ the officers who will fight on the ships and planeSajr. ASW team have ever ridden another type of ship ^ craft while engaged in ASW operations and therefore no significant appreciation for how a platform ot ^ v£fy their own approaches the ASW problem. There eI)t limited interchange of ideas among officers from d ^ platforms to achieve a cooperation of the team. The training seagoing naval officers to be effective mem ^ the ASW team is difficult when they are isolated fr° largely uneducated about the rest of the team. ^)jty
What is the prescription to improve the U. S- cap jtep for countering the Soviet submarine threat? The priority is to form a consensus that ASW is the current top P ^0 warfare mission. The Secretary of the Navy an have clearly established that priority. The second shT expand the perspective of ASW from one that f°c ^ u,„ individual units and their individual capabilities to focuses on the capabilities of the whole integrate . team. The third step is to break down the arbitrary 0of; ries of platform type to facilitate the developmen holistic ASW team.
If given the opportunity to rebuild the Navy or& ^js- tion from the ground up, organizing around wart , jn sions instead of platforms would have to be consid -slltr such a navy, there would be Deputy Chiefs for n})- marine Warfare (Op-02), Antisurface Warfare ( P q7). Antiair Warfare (Op-05), and Strategic Warfare ( P gj0p The DCNO would procure the best team for each ^e- area within resource constraints. Certainly difticu ^ offs would still be required, but the architecture 0
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howev" 3rea Wou^ more likely be optimized. Obviously, PoliticT SUC*1 an aPProach faces too many practical and design3 °^stac'es t0 be implemented. Besides, platform and nl W0U'^ t*ien become deemphasized and the ships remai ar*hS Wou*^ probably look funny. But, the point ble t0r,that l^ere *s a real neec*t0 achieve the best possi- threat 3 team capability to respond to the Soviet
The •
niay p So^ut*on to this platform-versus-mission dilemma investXlSt *n *^e ^orm °f Op-095’s ASW master plan and stfategy that is designed to “provide the tain ou a Pr*or'bes f°r an integrated effort to main- °fthjsr , ^ margin of superiority.”5 But the existence Pdate ,rna.Ster P^an begs the question of whether the appro- CaPabil'1ta e °^s are ultimately made to maximize ASW Sequen' ^ ^°r Sa^e discussion, what would be the con- elimjj. CfCS ^ 'nvestmcnt strategy were to recommend lng funding for a surface ship’s active sonar system (Op-03-sponsored) and, at the same time, support new funding for a developmental submarine sonar (Op-OZ- sponsored)? Would the total obligational authority (TOA) or budget be lowered for Op-03 to reflect the savings from the project cancellation and raised for Op-02 in order to fund the new project? That is not the likely result. Typically, the sponsor’s TOAs would remain the same, forcing Op-02 to either take money from another submarine project to fund the new sonar, or not fund the new sonar at all. On the other hand, by cancelling the active sonar project,
Few ASW officers have ridden on a ship, aircraft, or sub, other than their own community’s, while engaged in ASW. A Standing ASW Squadron (STASRON) would allow the officers in these platforms—a Spruance-class destroyer, below; a P-3, far left; and an SSN—to rotate positions and thus gain expertise in combined-arms operations.
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A STASRON would also enhance officer career
some additional expenses associated with the supP ^ STASRON staff, but these should be small enoug ^ supported by existing fleet resources. On the other ^ the potential benefits to be derived from year-roun .. ing in combined-arms ASW are enormous. Only D^uiti' ticing coordinated ASW can its potential as a f°rce plier be exploited. -sting
The challenge of ASW is to fight smarter using ® egy resources. The ultimate success of the Maritime depends on meeting this challenge.
Op-03 would have windfall funds available to allocate to another project, perhaps not even in the ASW area.
In this hypothetical example, what would be the net effect on overall ASW capability? The answer depends on which project Op-02 sacrificed to fund the new sonar and where Op-03 allocated the windfall from project cancellation. One possibility is that total ASW capability has declined. This example is obviously oversimplified. Plat-
The different ASW elements typically operate in opposition to each other rather than as a team. The current level of experience and expertise in combined-arms ASW operations is low.
form sponsors face thousands of such trade-offs each budget cycle. The current state of readiness and capability of the Navy make a convincing argument in favor of the platform-oriented procurement process. The lingering rhetorical question is whether the investment strategy for total Navy ASW capability is as good as it could be, or at least “good enough” to defeat the Soviet submarine threat.
The fleet organization by platform types that acts as a barrier to an effective, integrated ASW team is more easily overcome. The root of the current problem is a lack of training opportunities. This could be rectified with the formation of a Standing ASW Squadron (STASRON) in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The concept is similar to the Standing Naval Force in the Atlantic Fleet that is composed of ships from various NATO countries. The STASRON would be a squadron composed, for example, of at least two SSNs, two ASW-capable surface ships with attached helicopters, and several P-3 fixed-wing ASW crews. The units would be assigned to the STASRON for a period of three months and then replaced by new units. The commander of STASRON would be a major command billet, equivalent to a squadron command. Assignment would rotate among submarine, surface, and air warfare captains.
The purpose of creating a STASRON would be to put all of the elements of the ASW team together under a common commander with the primary objective of maximizing training of combined ASW arms. During the period of its assignment to the STASRON, each unit would be dedicated solely to ASW training. Since the assignment of units would be rotational, significant integrated ASW experience would eventually spread throughout the fleet. The STASRON would also be available to participate in large fleet exercises as a combined arms team. A secondary objective would be to function as a tactical development squadron for coordinated ASW. The best laboratory for testing new tactics is at sea with real ships, planes, and submarines. In the Atlantic Fleet there is a submarine development squadron and a surface development squadron engaged in developing tactics for their respective platforms. The STASRON is a logical extension of this concept to combined-arms ASW operations.
devel
opment. It would provide an ideal opportunity to cr^ deck officers among platform types. During a three-1*1 ^ assignment to the STASRON, it should be possi ^ have every officer ride on a different platform tyPe^flS port periods would be used for classroom training se and seminars to exchange ideas and foster a sense o ^ work between the warfare communities. Personne signed to the staff of STASRON would have a career experience. The squadron commander wou ^ the opportunity to command a “mini-fleet” and {a become an expert in coordinated at-sea operations ^ relatively early stage in his career. Other staff 0 ^gS. would benefit from early career exposure to and pr sional interaction with other platforms and warfare cialties. The result would be a cadre of officers wit , nificant experience and expertise in combined-arms tions—a valuable asset to have in reserve. S1A vj0g would also provide an additional classroom and Pr^g\V ground for the Atlantic Fleet’s recently establish^ ^ University, a one-week coordinated ASW master s gr emphasizing combined arms. There could be n° j^as- training to reinforce the principles taught in its Ah $ ters Course than on ASW platforms at sea in coor i operations. , ■j'jie
A STASRON would be a high-payoff initiative^.^ expenses associated with its establishment and °P would be low. Units would continue to be funded ^ ent squadrons and type commanders. There wo ^ 0f
hand
1Soviet Military Power, Government Printing Office. 1987.
^Moscow News, No. 7, 23 February 1986, p. 12. . opera1'1’!1
3"A Report by Admiral C. A. H. Trost, U. S. Navy, Chief of NaV, year l9®8' before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture and Fisc 1989 Budget of the United States Navy,” 5 February 1987, P- ^ to1 ’ 4“A Report by The Honorable John F. Lehman, Jr., Secretary of the jjgg,l9 House Armed Services Committee on the Posture and Fiscal Year ^ ^ 8 - Budget of the United States Navy and Marine Corps,” February 5lbid.. p. 85.
Commander Hearding graduated from the U. S. Naval AcadenW jn Ne", and immediately afterward attended the Naval Submarine Sc ° gf jpd London, Connecticut. After a tour of duty as communications 0pef electronics material officer on the USS Lapon (SSN-661), inC lUasSacl111’ ations during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, he reported to the setts Institute of Technology. There, Commander Hearding reC ^ thefl advanced degrees: in nuclear engineering and in energy P° lC^oons on)' attended Nuclear Power School. His billets have included eh?1
cer and reactor controls officer on the USS Sturgeon (SSN- clltive neer officer on the USS John C. Calhoun (SSBN-630), an! office0 officer on the USS Goto (SSN-615). He has also worked in fortl>e Program Appraisal of the Secretary of the Navy. He was se ec nence ^ Charles A. Lockwood Award for submarine professional exc the Naval Submarine League in 1986.
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