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crufrCements anc* resuPP'y wou*d be
in a conventional war in Europe—
NA^e total merchant fleet of the core ^ c°untries has shrunk to roughly the Ion ^aPan s fleet alone. How much the^ Can planners operate under
assumption that the downward trend n°t continue, and fail to take action?
T^e recent international political situation, particu- arly in the Mediterranean and North Africa, has ess^f y\°wn the world—especially us Europeans—how ters <!a h is to take a fresh critical look at security mat- that se-mCe m°St wor*(i trade is carried by sea, it is vital even ,aways be kept open for the free passage of shipping, Ttyf)1 t'mes crisis-
enCe t. Worid wars have demonstrated the enormous influ- o„ at svvift access to efficient merchant fleets can have etnarn °Perational abilities of antagonists. During the Vi-
'ver(
nt War,
more than 90% of the supplies for U. S. units
chant atT’ec* by sea- In the Falklands Conflict, more mer- TheVeSSe*S Were deployed than warships.
'■Vould Prcser|ee of U. S. and Canadian troops in Europe fricnt nfC.lU^ 'n instantaneous and unequivocal involve-
°f those
two countries in any NATO-Warsaw Pact
forcemUnbke World War II. The significance of rein- b|y. prents and resupply for Europe has grown considera- ^eisiy6^111^^’ eonventional forces would clash in the °f SUc|^ lrst phase of any conflict. From the opening day etled? a c°nflict, how could these troops be strength- Popu|atind how could a war economy and the civilian hie rnat|an !^e suPplied quickly, effectively, and in a credi-
T'here i . _
a*so has recently been much consideration of
whether and how to develop a forward maritime strategy for northern Europe, which implies a strengthening of the alliance’s maritime arm. This strategy would underline the dependence on efficient sea transport links.
Controlling the sea lines of communication, the efficiency of the alliance’s naval forces, and the availability of merchant ships are aspects that cannot be separated. A key element of planning for future conflicts is the ability to deploy merchant vessels without restriction. It would be impossible to achieve a credible deterrence without this maritime element. Every deterrent strategy must take into account the signilicance of the alliance’s merchant fleets.
Where do we stand regarding the development of the merchant fleets of the NATO states? Where do we stand if we then ask what the development of merchant shipping can contribute to the concept of deterrence?
During the past five years, there has been a considerable decline in the number of vessels and of the national flag of almost all the NATO member countries. Particularly in the past few years, there has been a drastic reduction in the tonnage under the national flags of the core European NATO countries—Greece, Britain, Norway, France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, U. S. vessels under the national flag have developed noticeably, and there has been a slight increase in Belgian, Turkish, and Portuguese merchant fleet tonnage because of special factors.
Looking at the total merchant fleet of the NATO countries, the drop in tonnage is on the order of almost 40 million gross registered tons. This tonnage corresponds to the merchant fleet of the third largest shipping nation in the world, industrialized Japan. And this reduction in shipping has occurred within a period of only five years.
This decline in tonnage has been achieved not only by scrapping, but by disposing of tonnage of non-NATO states and “outflagging” (operating ships under flags of convenience to save money and keep losses at a reasonable level), to remain viable against the competition from
flings / i
**' June 1987
1'1 |
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| - * ' |
111 |
| i* |
| Eff iM |
among NATO countries. Within Comecon, the state i ences the merchant fleet’s makeup, ensuring that the t is able to meet commercial and defense requireme Immediately after World War II, Comecon’s *ntew. tional trade was mainly by chartered-in tonnage, but ing the past few years there has been a noticeable 1 buildup. Between 1975 and 1985, the Comecon mercn3^ fleet has expanded from 24 million gross registered tons 35 million. „ ^
The Comecon states have increased their merchant t in all sectors of shipping. There is a large number of g ,
eral cargo ships, and not too many containerships. M°st
countries with lower labor costs.
In 1985, shipping companies within NATO managed about 320 million deadweight tons of shipping. Only 210 million deadweight tons steamed under the flags of the 16 NATO countries, however, and 110 million deadweight tons were being operated under flags of convenience. Therefore, the ratio of NATO flag tonnage to outflagged tonnage was 2 to 1.
Further, there has been a reduction in tanker capacity of 36% during the past six years. Important reductions in tanker tonnage were recorded by the British, the Norwegian, and Greek flags. These three countries held leading positions in tanker shipping at one time.
Bulker shipping is the second sector that experienced a considerable drop in tonnage. The bulk cargo ship tonnage available has dropped almost 20% during the past six years. This means that the capacities of NATO’s merchant shipping to carry raw materials, grain, bauxite, and other important supplies has shrunk by 32 million gross registered tons.
In other shipping sectors, the development has been partly in the opposite direction—particularly modern con- tainerships. The NATO partners’ containership fleet was about six million gross registered tons in 1980 and increased to about nine million gross registered tons by 1986.
In the last few years, the shipping industry has tended toward highly productive, technically sophisticated vessels, whose efficient cargo-handling facilities and increased capacities outstrip traditional general cargo freighters. Generally, the capacities of the medium-sized containership can replace the carrying capacity of from five to seven conventional freighters.
Any discussion of the NATO merchant fleet would not be complete without a quick look at the development of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) merchant fleet.
Among the communist countries, fleet policies much more geared to specific aims than are pol if
the fleet consists of ship types that are suitable for requirements. The Soviet Union has built up its mere fleet so that the fleet can handle the country’s °verS(jeS trade while deploying many liner vessels in cross-tm worldwide. ..
In the West, during peacetime, the replacement °fc ventional freighters with modem containerships has be ^ fitted international trade considerably. From the p°in ^ view of world tension, however, this change cannot ( regarded as wholly positive. Not all goods—certainly all military supplies—can be containerized. Experts the view that only about a third of military suppbeS suitable for container transportation, because most eq .5 ment, such as tanks, trucks, helicopters, and artilleOAa either too large or too heavy to be packed into a box- containership does not have its own cargo-handling eCl ^ ment, it has limited use in time of tension, because ^ vessel is dependent on loading and unloading cargo the facilities offered by specific seaports. ^
Not surprisingly, then, complaints are made in civil military emergency planning quarters that an increa number of traditional conventional freighters are 1( flagged by the merchant fleets of the NATO rnen^ countries. Most of these ships are no longer useful c ^ mercially. From a military logistics point of view. 11 ever, conventional cargo vessels have the advantagf^ possessing holds suitable for almost all categories of tary equipment, as well as offering greater loading offloading flexibility in different ports and harbors.
How will the situation develop in the future?
42
Proceedings / Jl,,lC
situ'CVC'0^mCntS are su^Ject t0 the international shipping fact 10n as they have been for several years. Despite satis- and°th traC^'n" among most of the Western industrialized t0nnresh°ld countries, there has been severe over- has 'n certa'n shipping routes. This over-tonnaging to rr,eSUlted *n a fo°P 'n freight rates, forcing shipowners ja 10nahze and make adjustments to their fleets.
^iff lner shipping, these adjustments have been made ^ff reatly than the reduction in tramping, because of the pinu 1 economic situation in world shipping. Liner ship- tain t0nna8c has changed decisively as a result of con- jn Ration. The traditional twin-decker, formerly used In t^r shipping, has been replaced by the containership. 't'ode C°Urse °h rationalization measures, sophisticated ities ^Vessels were ordered with far greater cargo capac- crew hey could be operated with increasingly fewer ^ips^611 ^ecause °f their technical sophistication. These aslsPensed with their own cargo-handling equipment P°rts h WCre main|y deployed between countries whose To aC* a highly developed infrastructure.
remain competitive, many Western shipowners had
to reduce their tanker and bulker fleets considerably by outflagging. To show the extent of this development, I will use as an example my home country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
In 1978, the West German merchant fleet was about 19 million deadweight tons. At the beginning of this year, the fleet was about 12 million deadweight tons, a reduction of 37%. Of the 12 million deadweight tons, about six million are under the Federal Republic flag and six million are under foreign flags. At the beginning of the 1970s, the total West German merchant fleet was under the national flag. Today, only about 50% flies the national flag. Similar structural changes have taken place in the merchant fleets of most of the other NATO countries.
This trend will probably persist in the future. In the past, maritime policies of the European NATO partners were directed at maintaining and fostering shipping under the flags of the individual NATO countries. Nevertheless, these policies were not vigorous enough to stop the drift into non-NATO flags. Despite the efforts made in many shipping policy sectors of our parliaments and govern-
The Merchant Fleet’s History
the r°*essor E. B. Potter defines expression “maritime “M ' Allowing way: th ^aiat'me power includes all e'ements that put a nation ita 6 i50^1'00 to deploy its mil- itP°wer on the sea, to move
ani°rCes fr°m ^ sea t0 land-
eiema'ntafo them there. The Hom60* 'maritime power is "nited to warships, weap-
or trained personnel, but
ons
jjj I ~ uw“*tu JJC1SU11I1C1, L
w ,.udes *and facilities and shi ?*ace(i bases, merchant Pptng, and satisfactory internal relations.” tstorically, this doctrine de- dCvnd after the discovery and g ■ ^opment of a new continent. v:. trade in goods and ser- ^ developed between the Ses r°^°ds and the overseas pos- eXnSl0n- The colonial powers Cuanded their own fleets to se- f] e foese trade routes. These ten-S *lad to be suitable for strati'2 Purposes as well as for poking goods. Maritime the Cr Considerations dominated \ye Maritime policies of the 0U(Ltern world almost up to the 'freak of World War II.
When the colonial period ended after the war, maritime policies changed worldwide. The doctrine lost its meaning when overseas possessions were granted independence. The young, independent countries built up their own merchant fleets and grew to compete with the former colonial maritime nations.
Since the postwar period, the shipping companies in the NATO member states have been mainly in private hands.
“Freedom of the seas” and “free competition” are fundamental shipping concepts among Western industrialized countries. Shipowners in the West invest for profit. The main objective seems to be able to pay shareholders an appropriate dividend at the end of the year. Basically, this is also the case in companies in which Western states have an interest—either directly or indirectly. European governments exercise no influence on shipowners’ decisions on the organization of the trade routes they serve and in the structure of their fleets.
U. S. shipping policies are slightly different from those of European NATO countries. This difference stems from the end of World War II, when the United States was obliged to maintain a major fleet in order to supply its bases and servicemen abroad because of its worldwide military commitments. To keep pace with these commitments, the United States endeavored to support the buildup and maintenance of its merchant fleet with subsidies. U. S. shipping companies can call on Operation Differential Subsidies and Construction Differential Subsidies.
In 1986, subsidies in shipping companies in the United States amounted to approximately $271 million.
U. S. shipping policies are in the hands of the Maritime Administration (MarAd), a division of the Department of Transportation. MarAd is also responsible for the U. S. reserve fleet, totalling 2.9 million gross registered tons and available in crises.
John Henry de La Trobe
43
ln8s / June j9g7
ments, there has been no discernible fundamental change in this trend.
If this slide of ships to flags of third states outside the Atlantic alliance continues, will it have any effect on the economic and political influence of the alliance nations on the world oceans? Will the alliance’s political and strategic qualities be put in question if only a fraction of the hold space required is unequivocally under the control of NATO states—because only this tonnage would operate under the flag of a NATO partner?
Does a NATO state have the right to requisition a ship that flies the flag of a non-alliance country?
From which countries are seamen available to man such a ship? The crews of flag of convenience ships are today made up of seamen from many countries, particularly from the Far Eastern countries. But there are also Eastern- Bloc seamen on board these ships—Polish officers and engineers, for example, who are supposed to be good sailors, and whole crews of Yugoslavs. Could Britain’s useful experience in recruiting professional British seamen for the Falklands Conflict be repeated in the event of a NATO-wide conflict?
The appropriate NATO planning committee must analyze these questions urgently and thoroughly. The U. S. doctrine called “Effective Controlled Fleet” could be a starting point. The Federal Republic of Germany has developed a similar solution or arrangement by close cooperation between the federal government and the West German Shipowners Association. The Norwegians are moving in the same direction, too.
We must proceed from the principle that the availability of the merchant fleet, the maintenance of efficient sea links under the control of NATO partners, and the demonstration of the efficiency of these links—even in times of peace—are decisive factors for defense, credibility, and for the alliance’s political and strategic power. We should not allow anything to oppose this power.
These factors are matters of considerable political significance. Politicians must ask themselves if a decline in NATO countries’ fleets in times of peace for the transportation of national raw material requirements is acceptable. Increasingly, these supplies are being carried in non-alliance vessels.
The maritime interests on both sides of the North Atlantic are identical. They cannot be separated. Both sides, however, must intensify their awareness of this factor. The recognition that both the United States and Europe share a mutual security interest in maintaining efficient sea links between the two continents should be underlined by corresponding political initiatives.
This awareness should inspire both sides of the Atlantic to pursue policies aimed at strengthening the alliance in the shipping sector. Such policies should have the declared aim of creating conditions for the ships to remain under the flag of NATO partners and to maintain their ability to compete commercially.
Further, the security factor should occasionally play a much more important part in the advocacy of joint shipping policies at international discussions. Inadequate attention is given to the security factor revolving around
foreign flag or own flag for the vessels of the merch‘l!! fleets of the NATO partners. ,
Another point to consider is that if the NATO fleet ^ |
dines further, our shipyards will suffer, too, and there
many implications for naval contracts if the shipy: capacities drop substantially.
ar#
The economic exploitation of space has been set in
mo
tion from the United States, demanding considerable ' vestment. The use of space for military purposes will a require further considerable expenditure. The U. S. Str;“ gic Defense Initiative has stirred up considerable politlC discussion in Europe.
Perhaps we are concentrating too much on space
whil£
on earth and on the seas capital assets are crumbling 3
that are urgently required for our own defense, vial
avw
bil'1?'
and credibility of deterrence. The funds required to i tain these assets are a small fraction of what is neede
defend the alliance via SDI in space.
The fundamental intent behind deterrence is that ^ risks an aggressor would run are so great that the Potet\e, gains are fewer than the possible losses. This inC^^ civil defense capability. Military and civil elements closely linked; they form the Western defense concep1 preventing war. The merchant fleets of the NATO pad" j contribute to the total defense capability as an aspeCt this scenario.
These commercial merchant fleets ensure the
the
allianceJ
• c I
ability to bring to bear reinforcements from overseas . 1/ ensure supplies in a crisis. Potential adversaries are ^ aware that NATO will increase its military capabiW) the European theater of war swiftly, ensuring suppl'eSj the civil population. Potential adversaries are also VY. aware that the alliance is in a position to accomplish 1
increase.
Hitherto, the NATO Planning Board for Ocean
sh'P;
ping has been able to provide the North Atlantic and the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee plans for the deployment of an available civil shipP ’ space, so that an adequate basis existed for NATO dep1 j() ment planning. The board has quickly reacted to adjes ^ the changes in military requirements and development |
shipping. The shipping defense authorities’ organizat'011
and structural plans are constantly kept up to date, j
presupposes, however, that the number of ships wm
decline, that the downward trend will not continue.
ienr
that ships can be operated under the flags of NATO ,r"^, ber states. Also, a compelling case can be made for111 •), ing the foreign-flag ships of NATO member states av ^ able for NATO planning without restriction. This mll!,t done swiftly and with conviction.
‘ 'fit
■edtf
Dr. de La Trobe was bom in Berlin and educated in Japan. He German Army in 1942 and served in various assignments with the|.y Corps. In 1945, he was promoted to second lieutenant. His last m> y assignment was as aide de camp to a commanding general ol ji
Tank Division. In 1949, Dr. de La Trobe received a law degree ff0 Jr ;<< ^
,*p|-
Rheinisch Westfaelische Friedrich Wilhelms Universitaet Meuns1^ joined the German business group Dr. August Oetker, Bielefeld- •
1981, he has been the managing partner of the Oetker Group- ‘‘jjjifj also elected Chairman of the German Shipowners Association, j •
burg, and Chairman of the U. S. Affairs Committee of CENSA. l-°n'
44
Proceedings / June