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In a U. S.-Soviet conflict, U. S. attack submarines, such as the USS Boston (SSN-703), will be hunting for Soviet SSBNs. How many kills will it take to push the Soviets across the threshold of nuclear warfare?
Many defense specialists believe that nuclear warfare will be initiated at sea or confined to the oceans. Others believe that maritime nuclear war
will occur and will escalate to nuclear use ashore. More re-
cently, the premise has been advanced that nuclear weapons use ashore will lead to their use at sea.
In addition to considering the unique problems of maritime nuclear war, navies need to examine thoroughly the relationship of nonnuclear warfare to nuclear operations and deterrence. Failure to understand these relationships might lead to planning for nuclear and conventional operations with totally separate staffs and differing approaches, resulting in incongruous war plans and tactics.
Nonnuclear and nuclear warfare are related and even symbiotic. This relationship encompasses the areas of war-fighting, intra-war deterrence, and the use of conventional naval forces for crisis response.
War-fighting: Some argue that the actual targets in a nuclear war will (or should) be enemy cities. Others argue that all weapons should be used primarily against military forces or associated targets. Despite declaratory policy that serves to deter war, the military objective—once a war starts—is to “win” it, denying the enemy victory.
Direct targeting of enemy nuclear forces by U. S. nuclear forces may preclude their use against us and might contribute to a more satisfactory postwar balance of forces. Conventional military forces, such as land armies, air and naval forces, and supporting infrastructure (e.g., command, control, communications, and intelligence [C3I] facilities) are also logical targets for nuclear weapons. A national leadership, such as the Politburo, that relies upon military force to retain political control and to attain international status, should expect to have those military forces attacked—by nuclear or nonnuclear means—during a war, no matter where they are located.
Nonnuclear military forces can be used to degrade the employment of enemy nuclear weapons.
For example, conventional ballistic missile defenses (BMDs) can reduce the impact of an incoming nuclear strike. Similarly, nonnuclear defenses can degrade attacks by air-breathing systems (bombers and cruise missiles, including the Tomahawk). Nonnuclear defenses may be employed by an on-scene commander without National Command Authority (NCA) approval.
The NCA must make the decision to initiate nuclear war, but decisions to dilute nuclear attacks are easily delegated.
Defense against an enemy’s nuclear missiles can be achieved by attacking the weapon carriers themselves or by destroying storage casernes. Casernes and carriers of nuclear warheads are highly lucrative targets during the conventional phase of a war. A naval ballistic or cruise missile carrier can be targeted at its base, in transit, on patrol, or returning to base. The potential payoff if a weapon carrier or caserne is destroyed is quite high. Attempts to do so are similar to the BMDs’ efforts to destroy the missile before individual warheads are dispensed.
Many Western critics of prospective offensive operations against nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) believe that conventional war-fighting against strategic forces at sea threatens the deterrence of nuclear war. However, despite what Western critics think, such a policy is the Soviet Union’s actual declaratory policy. The Soviets apparently recognize some sound military reasoning for attacking Western SSBNs (damage limitation, prevention of reuse, and to restrain nuclear use by the West).
The nations that have a problem with the potential for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations against their SSBNs are not so much the superpowers, but the nations that can afford to field only a few submarines (e.g., China, France, and the United Kingdom). The limited number of SSBNs these nations deploy makes them magnets for ASW action in time of war. Given the relative vulnerability of land and air-breathing systems, submarine forces ensure a nuclear response capability. If Chinese, French, or British SSBNs are subject to destruction during a war, or Soviet defenses against the missiles are strong enough, then the independent nuclear deterrent strategy of those nations is bankrupt, and they may be denied significant participation in the politics of war termination.
This situation may be viewed differently if one assumes a future environment where defense dominates offense. The net worth of an anti-SSBN ASW campaign might be significantly less if defenses were able to degrade the employment of ballistic missiles. On the other hand, one can argue that anti-SSBN operations would enhance other defenses by making them more likely to cope with “leaked” missiles that escape. Navies have always recognized the value of layered defenses as the best way to cope with any offensive threat.
Unconventional nonnuclear military actions can also be taken to degrade rather than destroy enemy nuclear forces. The actions might frustrate intelligence gathering or retargeting efforts enough to make effective nuclear use impossible. The outcome of war in space, for example, might be crucial. Soviet^ declaratory policy is to preempt NATO first use by a wide variety of means, many of which are nonnuclear. Perhaps if the West took conventional nonnuclear actions it could hasten satisfactory war termination and preclude a general nuclear exchange. Time is a major factor in such a situation. Can conventional actions be taken fast enough or will vertical escalation/war termination occur so rapidly that they will become irrelevant?
Conventional forces can also be used to enhance the employment of our own nuclear forces. Conventional attacks on intelligence and warning sites might aid bombers and cruise missiles in their attempt to penetrate defenses. The Soviets appear to use conventional defenses to ensure the survivability of some of their SSBNs.1 This defense allows conventional Soviet naval forces simultaneously to ensure their SSBNs’ combat stability and also to defend the sea approaches from cruise missiles, shorter range ballistic missile carriers, and other naval forces, along with bombers. Conversely, nuclear weapons can enhance the employment of our own conventional forces (e.g., nuclear weapons can be used to open up channels for conventional force break-through).
As we become more sophisticated in our recognition of how nuclear and nonnuclear operations affect each other, we need to expand our analysis accordingly. For example, the attrition of dual-capable naval, air, and ground forces during the initial conventional phase of a war will probably have a great impact on the availability of forces to fight if the war were to become nuclear. As air-breathing systems proliferate and navies assume more of a role in continental air defense, planners will require a more integrated picture of the war. Dynamic assessments must be provided to inform the decision makers exactly how many of what type of offensive and defensive forces are available for combat at the varying stages of a war.
During a war, all parties will continue to measure the overall correlation of forces and the ever-changing strategic nuclear balance. Decisions to engage in nonnuclear lateral excursions, vertical escalation, or war termination will be partly influenced by each nation’s perception of the current strategic nuclear balance. For example, if the West were losing territory in Europe, but still retaining a favorable strategic nuclear balance, we might be more likely to engage in a lateral excursion or theater nuclear use than we would if we did not dominate the escalation decision.
On the other hand, if, after engaging in combat, NATO faced an unfavorable military balance of forces in the Central Region—but the allies were unwilling actually to escalate to nuclear warfare—then the West would be presented with the prospects of losing quickly, losing slowly, or seeking war termination by other means. In this situation, perhaps there are other actions that can be taken by NATO or unilaterally by the United States to make continuing war a less attractive option to the Soviet Union.
Intra-war Deterrence: Given that each superpower now concedes the possibility of a protracted conventional phase of war, it is not enough to think of deterrence in its more familiar peacetime context. We must also plan for the deterrence of vertical escalation during a prolonged conventional phase of war. As conventional forces are upgraded and improved, partly because of an effort to rely less on nuclear escalation, military staffs will automatically plan for nonnuclear operations that could, even inadvertently, have an impact on vertical escalation.
Recognizing this possibility, military staffs need to assess the impact of nonnuclear actions on vertical escalation. We must make a concerted effort not to blunder into nuclear war. On the other hand, staffs should analyze the types of nonnuclear operations that would make nuclear escalation as unattractive to the enemy as possible.
The answer is to take actions that will alter an enemy’s perceptions and his cost-benefit calculations. Destruction or degradation of critical forces, C31 systems, and leadership by nonnuclear actions may change the enemy’s perceptions of possible benefits to be gained by escalating to nuclear warfare.
The risk remains that certain types of actions taken in a war’s conventional phase may be considered escalatory in themselves and might end up precipitating nuclear war. On the other hand, nations that cannot sustain prolonged conventional combat may be faced with the dilemma of choosing between nuclear escalation or defeat. NATO has a declaratory policy to escalate to nuclear warfare; it has postured forces to do that, and it exercises forces in this manner. The Soviet Union is justified in assuming that nuclear escalation will probably occur. Therefore, if vertical escalation is “inevitable” then taking “risky” actions may be the preferred choice.
Perhaps the single most important interrelationship between nonnuclear and nuclear war is that the initiation of nuclear operations is generally thought to grow out of the prospect of nonnuclear success. If a nation can achieve its objectives without using nuclear weapons, it will probably attempt to do so. Hence, nonnuclear operations can and should be taken to ensure that nuclear warfare remains deterred even if nations are engaged in conventional warfighting.
The West’s politico-military objectives in peacetime include the maintenance of an existing, stable, international balance-of-power system with low-level competition while simultaneously deterring major confrontation with the Soviet Union. Once war breaks out, however, Western political objectives should change to favorable (or at least not adverse) war termination and escalation control. Since the West underfunds preparations for conventional war, it must maintain a credible threat and be prepared for rapid vertical escalation as an alternative.
One of the many actions we can expect a nuclear power to perform in a conventional phase of a war is to posture its nuclear and supporting offensive and defensive forces. Such actions can send a message of political resolve to an opponent, while immediately improving the correlation of forces. During the conventional phase of a war between superpowers, both sides would probably send all seaworthy ships (including SSBNs) to sea, modify planned Preventive maintenance for missiles and other systems, or
these situations be manipulated by the other side?
When a nation postures to send a political signal during the conventional phase, will it make forces more vulnerable? For example, a nation attempting to signal political resolve may posture nuclear forces that are readily observable to an adversary. This might include dispersing bombers to bases that are not as secure from sabotage attacks or placing naval forces in more advanced, and, therefore, more vulnerable positions on the high seas. Similarly, nuclear flexing might place conventional forces at greater risk to preemptive attack.
Military actions, such as an anti-SSBN ASW campaign, can be used during conventional war to alter the correlation of forces. The objective would be to change the correlation so that an enemy cannot assure himself of “victory” or can no longer calculate the degree of likely success, thus controlling vertical escalation. Nonnuclear actions taken against an enemy to enhance one’s own nuclear offensive or degrade an expected incoming strike do not need to be 100% successful to be useful.
Nonnuclear actions need only downgrade an enemy’s expectations of possible success in a mission that he considers important. The object is to create a situation in which there can be no benefit from going nuclear. For example, any single defensive system does not need to be leak-proof. Multiple defensive layers—even “leaky” ones—may combine enough synergistic features to destroy enemy confidence. As an example, the combination of anti-SSBN ASW actions, BMD, and passive defenses might be enough to undermine the targeting strategies of China or other lesser nuclear powers.
By deploying systems with a credible capability of altering the correlation of forces and means during a conventional phase of a war, a nation readies forces that are
disperse bombers and mobile missiles.
If the conventional phase of a war or crisis is prolonged, We need to examine all of the impacts of higher alert rates °n nuclear and conventional forces.2 For example, what 'v*ll be the impact of sustained domestic pressures to de- escalate? Will the tying up of Single-Integrated Opera- honal Plan (SlOP)-committed tankers preclude effective ^deployment of other forces? Can the Soviet Navy sustain astion-supporting deployments for months? Can any of
useful if deterrence fails while sending a signal of political resolve. Deployment of defensive systems requires the commitment of resources for that purpose; therefore, it is a direct indicator of national will. Having a credible capability and the declaratory policy to change the correlation of forces and means during the conventional phase of a war will force any opponent to plan, at least, for that possibility. It is a way to manipulate the enemy.
That nonnuclear actions during the conventional phase of a war might influence nuclear deterrence is a fact of life. If one accepts the potential for a conventional phase that can last for even a few days or weeks then military planners and commanders on both sides will most likely undertake operations that will influence nuclear deterrence, even if they do so inadvertently. Such actions must be assessed in light of global national goals. We must then assess those actions that are seen as desirable—both for feasibility and promptness. Time is a variable that cannot be overlooked. Most important, we need to factor in the Soviet perspective, with a thorough understanding of how they view deterrence—not how we in the West would like them to view it.
Crisis Response: Navies generally view peacetime crisis response as their most likely future employment and one that portrays them in a more favorable light. A widely cited Brookings Institution study discovered that naval forces were used in the vast majority of cases (four out of five) when the United States chose to employ military force for political gain from 1946 to 1975.3 The aircraft carrier battle group was used in 60% of all cases in which naval forces were involved, or in roughly half of all the incidents recorded.
Brookings’s findings of the political value of the use of military force are less well known. When the United States used a major naval combat force (aircraft carrier, battleship, or major amphibious ship), the short-term (six months) political success rate was 64%, and the long-term (three years) rate was 39%. When land-based air forces were used in a crisis, the U. S. political success rate was higher than with naval forces only. In such cases, the short-term success rate was 83% and the long-term was 48%. When the United States “flexed” nuclear units to back up the employment of major conventional forces, short-term success was nearly 100% and long-term success resulted in 75% of the crises. The fact that naval forces are used more often does not have anything to do with relative success in achieving objectives.
Obviously, no nation can back up all of its political- military maneuvering during a crisis—or even during a limited war—with nuclear posturing. Nor would nuclear signals necessarily be a benefit in attaining political objectives. The nuclear card has been successfully played by
In war, the Soviets expect to lose some SSBNs—here, the Yankee which went down last fall—before they feel pressed to go nuclear because of their large inventory of ballistic missile submarines.
the United States to influence the behavior of other nations, including the Soviet Union, in the past.
Soviet spokesmen appear to recognize that the presence of nuclear weapons can influence political decisions. Every edition of Whence the Threat to Peace (Military Publishing House, 1982) discusses the Brookings findings of past use of nuclear weapons as a means of influencing Soviet political behavior. The new Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff noted that the attainment of “military equilibrium” made the West recognize the Soviet Union’s might.4 Not all Western observers of the Soviet Union agree with such Soviet statements.
The last deliberate U. S. use of strategic nuclear forces to express a political message in a crisis was in 1973, during the Arab-Israeli War. Since 1975, the United States has not backed up its conventional forces, deployed for peacetime political gain, with any deliberate nuclear posturing. Does this mean that all crises since 1975 have been of a lesser order, or is the international environment changing? Can it all be blamed on the legacy of Vietnam?
y
Nuclear
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War planning that does not constantly address the nuclear question is incomplete. Staffs that consider nuclear employment as an adjunct to be brought into the mainstream only “when required” are probably not addressing the full spectrum of conflict at every stage of the war.
It may be proper to conclude that, because of the shift in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism, U. S. willingness to use its military forces for successful political gain has been undermined.
A cause-and-effect study is warranted, but we can already conclude that, since 1973, the United States has been unwilling or unable to use those instruments that have yielded political success in the past. Therefore, military planners must no longer assume that their government will back up the employment of conventional forces during a crisis response with deliberate nuclear posturing. This conclusion has grave implications for military commanders and for any nation that would expect to benefit from the employment of U. S. conventional forces in its behalf.
In the 19th century, Britain used vulnerable Royal Navy gunboats to achieve political objectives without resorting to war. An implied but credible threat existed that a theater-deployed cruiser, or, if necessary, battleships of the home fleet, could arrive within a few days to back up the gunboat. Today, the insertion of U. S. conventional forces >n response to a crisis, or to achieve a political objective without resorting to war, appears to be less likely to succeed and less credible because of the change in the overall correlation of forces, including the reluctance of the American people to support such actions.
Conclusions: During a war, we should expect nonnuclear forces to be used to degrade or enhance the employment of nuclear weapons. We should also plan for the Possibility that nuclear weapons will be used against conventional forces and vice versa.
We can draw at least six inferences from this discussion: ^ In preparation of threat and net assessments, tabulations °f offensive nuclear forces are simply not enough. Serious analyses must include dynamic measures and the interrelationship of nuclear and nonnuclear forces, and must include time as a variable. This in turn requires more robust calculations and obligates analysts to find easily understood and valid measures that correctly describe the balance, e.g., who is likely to achieve their objectives and at what cost? Such an approach involves a major shift in thinking to use output rather than input as the appropriate measure of effectiveness and places a heavy burden on the 'vargaming community. New measures should then be introduced to the media and the public.
* Warfare must not be split into two general categories with a separate role for nuclear forces. If this were to happen, conventionally oriented experts might not consider the impact of their operations on the continued deterrence of nuclear war. Similarly, nuclear war experts might n°t be involved with the overall formation of the politico- military objectives, and fail to achieve a satisfactory war
termination.
Nuclear war must be taken seriously if nations desire to ^ter nuclear war while they are engaged in conventional conflict. Nuclear operations are neither the end of war nor fhe end of politics. Nonnuclear operations taken in the lnitial conventional phase of a war may make enough strategic difference to enhance the deterrence of nuclear war.
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Such operations need to be contemplated, for both short and long wars.
We will need to anticipate the responses to any changes in our declaratory policy or capabilities. If, for example, the United States publicly announced that it intended to attack Soviet SSBNs on the high seas during the conventional phase of a war, what logical countermoves should we expect the Soviet Union to make in response to such a threat? Do the Soviets plan for this eventuality anyway? If so, their bastion defense must be considered the countermove. Might not Soviet submarines deploy in wartime in their territorial or internal waters, making attacks more problematic for the West?
In order to avoid a split into general and nuclear warfare, the West will need to preclude the semantic infiltration of arms control terms into strategic thought and staff bureaucracy. The Soviet Union does not limit the term “strategic” to describe military weapons or operations that involve only intercontinental exchanges. For them, “strategic” refers to a set of missions that have influence on the situations in vital sectors or theaters, and a set of goals that have an impact on either the war as a whole or a theater of operations. We must think “Red” and understand their use of terms, their measures of effectiveness, and their way of assessing the correlation of forces. The Soviets appear to regard aircraft carriers that are capable of either nuclear or conventional attacks on the Soviet Union as part of our strategic nuclear reserve. Even though we have withdrawn U. S. carriers from the SIOP. the Soviets still perceive these as nuclear assets—and we should expect to hear them referred to this way in the arms control environment. Similarly, carriers will undoubtedly remain high on the Soviet military’s targeting priority list for attack.
► From analysis of our own desired actions to be taken during the initial stages of a war, we can derive a similar list of the most likely actions by our opponent. From such lists, national arms control positions and objectives and future force procurement goals can be determined. Deterrence is not simply based upon the threat to punish. Deterrence is also based on the ability to deny an opponent any perceived benefit. It may prove possible, through a combination of arms control, force deployment, and declaratory policy, to influence an opponent so that he will commit resources in a manner that is more satisfactory and less destabilizing. For example, credible Western cruise missile and bomber forces might persuade the Soviet Union to maintain large and expensive air defense systems. By their very nature, air defense forces lack the range to strike an intercontinental opponent; therefore, their build-up is less threatening.
- Wargaming and crisis simulation will increase in complexity as games are forced to deal with nuclear and nonnuclear issues simultaneously. Games and simulations can be used to explore deterrence of nuclear war during a conventional phase. Games can assist in a much-needed examination of the impact of varying correlations of forces on the use of conventional forces for peacetime political gain. Wargames need to continue through the initial use of nuclear weapons. Above all, gaming should not terminate late on Friday afternoon with a spasm nuclear exchange.
- We need to research thoroughly the question of regional warfare and the use of military force for crisis response. The impact of the overall correlation of forces and means (especially the strategic nuclear balance) on the use of nonnuclear forces for contingencies needs a healthy examination. Do current Western plans reflect the days when the United States had strategic nuclear superiority and the ability to dominate the escalation decision? Does the West anticipate Soviet plans based on strategic nuclear parity or Soviet superiority? Can any superpower make meaningful plans to use forces if it knows that it cannot dominate the decision to escalate?
- Finally, war termination should be thought through and the politico-military objectives of warfare identified. Nuclear war is undesirable but cannot be ignored by the professional. War planners need to identify the results that will make the postwar era more palatable, intra-war nuclear escalation unlikely, and negotiating peace easier. Perhaps the best view is that in today’s environment, all wars between superpowers are nuclear; but in some, the nuclear weapons have not yet been used.
'RAdm John L. Butts, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, statement to U. S. House of Representatives, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Defense Department Authorization, Hearings, Part 3 of 7 (HASC No. 9834), p. 3.
2Scott Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, Spring 1985, p. 137.
’Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978). Although dated, the Brookings study is still cited today and often referred to by those attempting to support the utility of naval forces in crisis response. Generally, the nuclear context and the period studied are almost always overlooked. The study period ended almost ten years ago, and the most dramatic use of U. S. military force was from 1956 to 1965. The United States lost strategic nuclear superiority sometime after 1965 and with that loss, the ability to dominate clearly the escalation decision.
“Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev circles in the “On Guard Over Peace and Socialism,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 February 1985, 2nd ed., p. 2.
Commander Tritten received a bachelor of arts degree from the School of International Service at the American University, a master’s degree from Florida State University, and another master’s degree and a Ph.D. from the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. He is a naval aviator with primary experience in carrier-based antisubmarine warfare. In addition to his operational duty assignments, Commander Tritten has been selected three times for educational duties at civilian universities. He has also worked for the Rand Corporation and served in the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division of the OpNav staff. He served as Assistant Director, Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is currently the Acting Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the recipient of last year’s Alfred Thayer Mahan author of the year award sponsored by the Navy League. He received First Honorable Mention in the Arleigh Burke Essay Contest for “Ideology: The Bear’s Carrot’’ (July 1986).
______________________________ Ask a Silly Question---------------------------------------
A new ensign assigned to a heavy cruiser during World War II was doing his best to act important despite his inexperience. One day he was given the assignment to clear up some trouble in the engine room. After calling down to the men through the speaking tube, and receiving little satisfaction from their feedback, he shouted angrily into the tube, “Is there a blundering idiot at the end of this tube?”
The reply: “Not at this end, sir.”
Herm Albright
______________________________ Where the Girls Are.------------------------------------
On a typically hot, humid day in San Diego, the bus was packed to bulging with passengers, the Navy predominating. Everyone on board was tired and irritated. Then a resigned voice boomed out loud and clear, “Will some pretty girl please get off at the next stop so about 50 of these sailors will
leave?”
John B. Klein