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USN Opts for Aircraft Upgrades
Several carrier aircraft are being upgraded in a deliberate attempt to avoid introducing new designs at this time. The official view is that several emerging technologies, including (but not limited to) stealth, will soon become mature enough for incorporation into two new major aircraft, a dual-service Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) and a dual-service advanced attack bomber, or Advanced Technology Aircraft (ATA), the latter to be developed primarily by the Navy. The Navy deliberately chose to upgrade the A-6 (as the A-6F), rather than buy an interim airplane before the ATA became available in the 1990s. Two ATF prototypes are to fly in 1991. Current descriptions of the program suggest that the Air Force, the lead service, will study tradeoffs between stealthiness and performance.
The A-6F is to be powered by the nonafterbuming F404-GE-400D engine, which powers the F/A-18. The A-6F will also have additional underwing hardpoints and a new radar, a combination which will allow it to carry up to six Hughes AIM-120 AMRAAMs (advanced medium- range air-to-air missiles). Although the weapon is intended primarily for self-defense, the combination of long endurance (inherent in the airplane) and a long-range air-to-air weapon suits the A-6F for participation in fleet air defense, perhaps covering distant combat air patrol stations. The A-6F will also enjoy better survivability with the addition of a new fuel tank layout.
The EA-6B Prowler, formerly unarmed, will carry Texas Instruments HARMs (high-speed antiradar missile), formerly carried by A-6s and A-7s. HARMs were used successfully against Libya this spring. If the EA-6B modification involves installation of the current standard digital (universal) data bus, the airplane may also be able to carry air-to-air weapons, for example, for use against jammers or enemy radar aircraft that its passive electronics detects.
Both standard fleet fighters are being modified. As the F-14A Plus, the F-14 is finally receiving the engine upgrade (to the GE FI 10) for which it was originally designed, coupled with several other major improvements. At the same time, it will receive a digital data bus which will make future weapon modifications much easier, and a new Hughes APG- 71 radar in place of the current AWG-9. The F-14A Plus is an interim step to the F-14D, which reportedly will show major improvements in sensor signal processing, allowing it to engage more targets simultaneously. The F-14 is particularly valued for its ability to operate independently of both the carrier and its E-2 command and control center, as in the case of intense jamming.
The A-6 and F-14 upgrade programs were specifically shielded from the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act fiscal year 1986 cuts, although the status of Gramm-Rudman and the fiscal year 1986 budget are now in doubt after the recent Supreme Court action invalidating the Act.
The F/A-18 has had a block upgrade this year (for aircraft to be delivered from October 1987 onward), allowing it to carry two new missiles (the Hughes AIM-120 AMR A AM and the Hughes AGM-65F imaging infrared Maverick), the new ALQ-165 airborne self-protection jammer, and a new reconnaissance pod for the Marine Corps. It will also be fitted with improved built-in monitoring and test equipment. Block-upgraded two-seat trainers will be designated F/A-18B, single-seat fighters F/A-18C, and two-seat all-
weather attack aircraft (for the Marine Corps) F/A-18D. flf fle
McDonnell Douglas is developing a further advanced vetsl0jL a F/A-18, with more fuel, an improved radar, a more powerful e 8 m||
. aS rn°c^
a better-protected fuel system. Current studies envisage
as 3,000 pounds to the 11,000 pounds of fuel currently carriedI in and the new radar would be related to the APG-70 of upgraded e„ts F-15s and to the APG-71 of upgraded F-14s. Engine imP1^ |0ng£t
might include not only more thrust but a better fuel rate- range.
F-15 Undergoes STOL Tests
McDonnell Douglas is developing a short takeoff and landing (STOL) version of its F-15 Eagle Air Force fighter, using moveable exhaust nozzles and canards to achieve a takeoff and landing length of less than 1,500 feet. It is also likely to
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achieve much greater maneuverability; the manufacturer clai A rate improvement of 24%, and a pitch rate improvement ot ,j f]y in model is now being wind tunnel-tested, and the test aircraft sh°
April 1988. Similar devices will probably be tested on Grumm ^d- inverted wing aircraft, which was designed with such ideas g0yjet STOL capability would be a way of countering an exPeCt^man<ier;
jete
attack on NATO air bases. For many years, NATO air force co ^cl have complained that the Soviets might easily put NATO’s ifJrut
runways out of action, whereas NATO attacks on Warsaw Pfc ^0(11 the would be pointless because so many Soviet fighters can fly grass strips adjacent to their runways. Such Soviet grass t>e s0phistl’ mance will presumably decline as Soviet fighters become 1110:6 c]oS£h cated and come to resemble their Western counterparts m° sUrn3'
..................................................................................................................................... • r hie0
(though the new MiG-29 Fulcrum has off-runway capability)' ^ bly, successful STOL design requires fly-by-wire flight con might be more difficult for the Soviets to copy in quantity-
The appearance of a successful STOL version of the
l3*e
hoP off
some important side effects. The Royal Navy is reportedly develop a supersonic replacement for its current vertical/stl‘ and landing (V/STOL) Sea Harrier, but current British fiS*116^ (JjpAj'
ment funds are fully committed to the European Fighter An®
/efa'v°uI
the specifications for which do not call for STOL or
&
V/STO^
the
mance. Moreover, because it is an international program, *=-* ‘' vjnce very difficult for Britain to cancel. One solution would be to c0^j & participating air forces that anything short of a V/STOL wo
participating air lorces tnat anytning snort or a viotu“ hase*- -i viable in the face of expected Soviet air attacks on known 1
The U. S. interest in a future high-performance V/STOL 0 f^uS0 (short take-off/vertical landing) naval fighter would presuma y the air groups of the new Wasp (LHD-l)-class carriers. _«•Ql3
___________________ 1.. „i__________________________________________ a x r on Uorrier *‘D i 10>‘
fl^atV
J0<
be built, which is still a good question), and connected to ancapabil®
The U. S. interest in a future high-performance V/STOL uSi»
ably v - The
Corps already plans to use them to support AV-8B Harrier rol£' tack bombers. The ships are designed for an alternative sf with a Sea Harrier/light airborne multipurpose system group. Operating a really high performance V/STOL (if “
tethered radar, such a ship might have a useful air defense which might be extremely valuable to an amphibious assau^ub-' All of that does not suggest that the United States is the •> tj,e of the funds the Royal Navy feels it needs. However, un eg dec11^ Harrier is massively upgraded or replaced within the next t uCli
- how
the British carrier force will cease to be viable, no matter spent on the ships themselves.
Proceedings
/ (K*°
ibf
Hughes
^ughes
Aircraft is develop-
flying
it; the projects its
system
ntiage i
.'black hot"
^ _....................................................... ..........
tbe Libyan raid> fof example, was FLIR footage in the
white is to (j °r 3 * ‘white hot” image, depending on whether black or • 're closel 6n0te tbe bottest spots. In this way an image corresponding s'°n footaBp "^tb a daylight image can be obtained. Much of the televi-
Short Fat Ship” Affair
.f?He Royai m .
I ect the L V.aV^ ls embroiled in a controversy, echoes of which may l97nJ TiS' Navy—the S.90, or “short fat ship” affair. Since the
16 s-90 d •
virtUe ,,esign drived from wide-beam planing boat ideas, and its
Was that, because it was so beamy, it could carry relatively ^°Pter pa,jSnt,S on 'ts deck. The boats, for example, incorporate a heli- J1 four bo 3 tbough there is some question whether the pad is usable. •In'sh and sftS Were H11'!1 t0 merchant ship standards of hull structural trig by., ^trensth l. 1 —j : v-n.-.., \r
sj’they
reportedly tend to pound in any noticeable sea.
"tte.
restingre^ bu'lt as a British frigate; this campaign is what carries the ^Cr°ft Qj]lrnPlications. The basic argument is that somehow Thor-
^n>ssir, ’0P'Heavy that she capsized in a gale before she had been in This ti for one year.
British2' TH°mycroft Giles is being supported by portions of a hun- i.0ri> ana _ aircraft industry, particularly the British Aerospace Corpora-
^ and thUCF *S be'ng made of the comparison between the proposed sfm j ea C ,Conventi°nal “long thin” ship, typified by the very sue-
a fresh and fully independent inquiry. The President of the
Develops Advanced FLIR
CjaT forwar<i-looking system forfhFcIR* night vision
lhe^clthheF/A-18-BeCaUSe
^ piim has on,yone seat> disPlav be ab'e t0 see its Hughes Whl'e
U'ght as : n ° tbe heads-up display, so that the pilot has the same view at *nstrUment a^H§ht. Other FLIRs generally provide a display on the aging navi Rane* sPecifically for weapon delivery. The new thermal im- ky McDon8atM°n S6t fTINS), for which a contract was recently awarded >al oZt „°Uglas’ is mounted in a pod under the fuselage. Like er m°dern FLIRs, TINS can be adjusted to show either a
Tll\[S • mobe’ and so it did not appear to viewers to be infrared. aitack syS[ 3 s'mP'er equivalent of the Air Force LANTIRN low-level n*ght). em How altitude navigation and targeting infrared system for
Fjyg
^ ProduiM-0t^Hes 316 to be delivered beginning in May 1987, followed tIon sets in 1989.
Th
"K -'/US Tk~ J
nornycrofi\ ’ornycr°ft Giles Associates (not connected with Vosper- Cahed ‘.qs ’ has been marketing a wide-beamed hull form originally j?g boats The Osprey hull was initially proposed for fast fight-
lsheries Ut tbose actually built were the 18-knot, 50-meter Danish 0,1 b°ats at’ tbe Havornen, and three similar Burmese fishery protec-
The '
foain
1 ak r“‘ivut) IC11U IU puuilU
Osp^fJ^O, Thomycroft Giles has campaigned to have an en-
m. ^ ro<> v..
_f_ _________ ___________ __________
mUcHsirnn]eS bas discovered a radically new surface ship hull form, Uch m0reer ®ence cheaper) to build than a conventional ship, and also b°rst PossibieaWOrtH^' T*16 Royal Navy has to operate in some of the suHget. -pb e weather, and the service is badly afflicted by a shrinking ^epinn erefore> any claim which combines lower cost and better a F°rmanymust be “tractive.
ba^ ^ars’ British naval officers, like their counterparts in other f^Pared tQefbaPpily complained about the gross defects of their, as ca‘*ed to 0re'gn, ships. Clearly, the official design group, which has so Cover any miraculous cure for the laws of nature, is at fault; aVe ed tome°ne e*se can d° much better. In the past, such complaints c<) Was sC„°.nSpieuous successes like the early ironclad HMS Captain, $.9o and
j*si mi ____ ^____ ____ ^ ^________ ^___ ^_______
ref611 ar|d the new Type-23. The issue was supposed to have
R i ed to ^ tbe ®lat*sb Government in 1983, but the S.90 supporters J'h-Norto SUrrender- This year they, joined by Admiral of the Fleet ^nded f ^ormer First Sea Lord and Chief of the Defence Staff),
Royal Institution of Naval Architects was appointed to chair the inquiry, but, at the last minute, the S.90 group demanded his removal because of his connection to the naval architectural “establishment,” i.e., to the nationalized (and currently denationalizing) British Shipbuilders or to the Navy’s design organization at Bath.
They wanted a prominent judge or lawyer (Queen’s Counsel) chosen instead. Given the well-known (and very deep) divide in Britain between the arts and sciences, that would almost certainly mean an inquiry headed by a technological illiterate, a man more familiar with political than with scientific arguments. Thomycroft Giles’ objection to any chairman with connections to British Shipbuilders (i.e., to the British shipbuilding industry) or to the official British naval design group would automatically rule out virtually any successful British professional naval architect, because these two organizations are the principal employers of such men in Britain.
The affair is interesting for two reasons. First, the U. S. Navy is also interested in new hull forms, particularly as its Maritime Strategy demands protracted operations in the very rough waters of the Norwegian Sea and Northern Pacific. Certainly the desire for better seakeeping has been an important factor in the growth of U. S. destroyers and cruisers. Thus the U. S. Navy, through its own official design organizations (such as the Naval Ship Research and Development Center at Carderock, Maryland) has investigated such exotica as small waterplane area twin hull (SWATH), Sea Knife, and surface effect ships. It has also worked hard to improve conventional hull forms; the new Arleigh Burke (DDG- 51)-class destroyer will show considerable design changes for what it is hoped will be improvements in seakeeping. Should the S.90 form be included in the menu of future hull designs?
Second, the manner of the Thomycroft Giles challenge is instructive. Though nominally it is a technical challenge to established practices, it is much more a political assault. Early Thomycroft Giles literature made much of supposed failings of Royal Navy-designed warships at least since 1906. Discussions are generally couched in terms of the unequal battle between a brilliant and heroic inventor and a massive (and uninventive) establishment. The technology is sufficiently murky that few can follow its details; they will generally decide, rather, on political grounds.
Inventors with political friends are not new to the United States, either. Sometimes they really are geniuses. Much more often they are unaware of the current state of the art, and of the real requirements their inventions must meet. In theory, the government must depend upon its in-house experts to decide such issues, and it must assume that the inhouse experts are honest. Otherwise it is impossible to make technically rational decisions; political, not factual, arguments will triumph.
If that is indeed what is happening in Britain, then the echoes of Thor- nycroft Giles’ triumph will surely cross the Atlantic. No warship is anything like perfect, and those who must go to sea in the necessarily imperfect ships must also surely dream of something better. Thomycroft Giles’ popular support is, therefore, perfectly understandable. What is much less attractive is the extent to which that support has been translated into real suspicion of the official British warship design process.
As for the broad-beamed ship, the claim is essentially that it achieves high speed by dynamic lift, i.e., by the sort of planing effect used in many small attack craft. A more conventional ship must be relatively long to avoid excessive resistance. Planing effects were observed in model tests, which is natural because the hull form is derived from small attack craft parents. However, planing lift is proportional to the planing area, i.e., to the square of the ship’s dimensions and to the square of her speed. It must overcome a weight proportional to the cube of the ship’s dimensions. As a consequence, the critical planing speed must rise with the size of the ship; a 240-foot frigate can be expected to plane at twice the speed at which a similarly shaped 60-foot boat might plane. Unfortunately, that is well beyond conventional ship speeds, which is why the Thomycroft Giles “ miracle ’ ’ has not quite changed warship design in the past.
Moreover, once the ship began to plane, it would be subject to the sort of pounding which in past years has made small patrol boats thoroughly unpopular, and which led the U. S. Navy to its interest in hydrofoils.
In technology, there is very little new under the sun. In politics, there is even less—but there is very little memory, either.
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