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By Roland K. Mar
cured and handled as the compo1
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Every organization is infected to some degree with the Not Invented Here Syndrome. If an idea does not originate with an approved source, it receives an almost automatic kiss of death. Military history is full of opportunities to seize victory or avoid defeat that were lost when new ideas or weapons were ignored because they did not come from orthodox sources. The U. S. Army is currently suffering from this syndrome, missing an opportunity to field a weapon that is cheap, effective, beyond economical enemy countermeasures, and capable of making an individual soldier a match for any tank. Special operations applications would add immensely to the capabilities of Army Rangers, and U. S. Marines and Navy SEALs (sea-air-land forces) as well.
In 1975, at the urging of Professor Stu-
Professor Hoenig’s binary warhead would allow a relatively few groundpounders to render enemy tanks mysteriously silent and still.
But the Army has balked at buying a weapon that doesn’t go bang-bang.
art Hoenig of the University of Arizona, the Army’s Fuels and Lubricants Research Laboratory conducted a series of tests on “engine interferants”— substances that, when ingested into an operating internal combustion engine, would cause it to fail. Professor Hoenig believed that there is more than one way to kill a tank.
As armor-piercing rounds become less and less capable of penetrating tank frontal armor—at least for man-portable weapons—other means must be found. If the traditional hard kill is impossible for the individual infantryman, the next best thing is a “mobility kill.”
Professor Hoening’s research focused on substances that could degrade the performance of tank engine lubricants or damage the engine directly. Using data developed by Hoenig and the Army Fuels and Lubricants Laboratory staff, the laboratory ran a series of tests on both types of substances. Results indicated that lubricant interferants were not feasible, but that several combustion interferants were highly effective. Foremost of these were common acetylene (C2H2) and butane.
Butane was found to be too c^cUver. handle and easy to counter. How acetylene can be easily and cheaply r
cium carbide, which is available in hardware store. . to3l\
Exposing a running diesel eng>ne ^ ambient air concentration of a. so acetylene causes engine preignm ^ severe that the engine has to be shut one or two seconds to avoid self-a^ . ef tion. Concentrations only slightly have the same effect on standard S ^ line-powered internal combustion ^ gines. These tests were conducte -n normal engine air filtration syste place.1 te5ts
Despite the positive results ofthe [Se- and the laboratory’s favorable en^rrny ment of Hoenig’s concepts, the Materials Command declined to °^0. up on the tests. After all, an engif^ r. bility kill would stop a tank, armor® ^ sonnel carrier, or truck, disable a [0 sors, and remove the power nee it
operate the weapons systems, ^
would not make a satisfying bang- the idea came from an outsider■
Although the Army gave UP ° te5t concept, Hoenig did not. In a furt ® .gSei at the University of Arizona, a j jg engine was totally destroyed intern t (0 less than three seconds upon exP° jeSjgfl the gas.2 Hoenig continued with a ^ for a binary warhead containing ^
pound of commercially available ca ,
carbide and 0.28 pounds of a vva sU| compound. Upon impact, the tw°arget- stances mixed and stuck to the ^n, while sufficient gas was produced g(
with enough gas to damage any ^ combustion engine (greater than d volume). Chemical warfare-pro^^ vehicles can filter driving air and protect the crews through p ^uSt pressure measures, but the engm*-- draw on ambient air, which canno c tered finely enough to block out ace molecules. . try^
Our Marine Corps is light in a the world’s finest—and the natl°nce l11 self-contained expeditionary r°rc
Portabl,
j j. . 11 in y vuniv i
lvidual rifleman with a
ProVemen!nCrease 'n rangc, potential im- redesign: S Hight characteristics after lh" g the warhead to accommodate
the
^aped.pu t0 fabricate the original LAW 3 rn‘ninia]Ur^C Would be superfluous. For s°lete we Cost Per round, otherwise ob- P°sed 0f aP|°ns that would have to be dis- r°rist 0reSaely (beyond the reach of ter- 'nvent0p an!zations) could remain in our
atdlo,
a time when sustainability
readv tnIS dl’s m'ssi°n. it must be armor,,,! °PPose Soviet Bloc main force Marine Un,!lS’ ^esP'te the success of the launched ^orPs'developed shoulder- fSMA\V i niu't'Purp°se assault weapon not ston t,ln deal‘ng with tanks, it may Bloc ,P„ e , atest additions to the Soviet
^ arsenal.
titank*2 is replacing the light an-
C°rps: aPon (LAW) in the Marine sive Wa .etUory; l^e LAWs’ small explo- threat c.M,ad can no longer meet the u"its,'nZ* “ SMAWs are issued to nentl’ ny/housands of the light, emi-
in the lyr 3 disposable LAWs remain plus coT£ 'nventory. While the sur-
mujahideen °e v,Sed t0 equip Afghan lhe Law °r NlcaraSuan “contras,” pic adantStC°U'd uPgradcd with a sim-
Marine3 r" °f H°enig\s binary round, aircraft LorPs fixed-wing and rotary sets, arl suPPlemented by Navy air as- thrusts COrnrr,itted to blunting armored ^Ventuall^a'uSt Marine Corps forces, to the inn;’, a°Wever> it may come down
1 t(tOj^ 1,1 ** * 4 •' 111! U 1UUU
If a Mari°ne'S^0t weaPon against a tank, an acetv^ ^orPs'sPonsored version of LAWs jnene rouncl is retrofitted to the c°Uld sto layer>tory, the lone rifleman lank is ^ a ^oviet T-80 tank. A stopped The retS1“lng duck.
denial ch™*'1 a*so add to the opera- LAW-ii afracteristics of the LAW, or high ’ 1 you will. The standard LAW Pounds Th°SiVe Warhead weighs 1.58 dve ran he standard LAW has an effec- 200 meters 3®a'nst stationary targets of 'n8 tarc,e. S) Z 150 meters against mov- 1 -28 pounH LAW-11 warhead weighs
Original reduction from the
to a iQc/ • mough this does not translate
1 y /o f—
°i the Pay!°ad could increase the range Creased staP°n ^y tens °1 yards. The insafety f„ ta"doff distance means greater
The c hC Marine on the line- great exp°nVerS*°n should involve no inv°lves CnSC' new warhead design C°rriPonem,Tllde’ eommercially available carbide a ^over-the-counter calcium S'niple if-,0 Industrial water gel—and Jection fusing- The precision in-
°gy neen °i d*ng and explosives technol- sh., ‘ eded to fakP;—• • , , ,,,, ,ry- At
jhajor \y0 3r reserve munitions stocks ait aundreds opportunity to retain
0 thousands of LAW rounds as
frontline weapons should be a high U. S. priority.
Doubling the Marine Corps’ antiarmor reserves seems well worth the expense of further tests. Testing the rounds against a stationary surplus tank with the engine running and against a moving target should prove the concept’s worth.
The special operations possibilities of the C2H2 binary munition can be described in the following scenario:
It is September 1987. The fanatical dictator of a North African nation dedicated to both revolution and terrorism has been casting covetous eyes on a neighbor to its northwest. Armies have been positioned on the nations’ mutual border and a seaborne flanking attack is part of the dictator’s plans. Fortunately for him, he has a naval force and sealift capacity furnished both by the Soviet Union and oil revenues. In a sheltered bay not far from the dictator’s capital, three Polnocny-C-class and two Ibn Ouf- class landing ships, and a score of C-107-type landing craft are anchored— loaded with troops and tanks—and awaiting orders. Escort is provided by a force of Osa-Il guided-missile patrol boats.
While the attackers wait, the U. S. ballistic missile submarine Sam Houston (SSBN-609) is offshore recovering her swimmer delivery vehicles and members of SEAL Team 6, who had been busy in a certain bay placing timed packages on the bottom near the nests of anchored landing craft.
Shortly after the daily onshore wind begins blowing toward the anchored vessels, valves open to allow water into the packages. A froth of bubbles rises to the surface, bringing the surface to a foaming boil. A slight smell of garlic wafts over the ships. Engines providing onboard power buck and stop. Captains and officers of the deck scream to their engine rooms for full power on all engines as they see the water turn white around them. Fearing attack or mines, they want to get their ships away.
In less than two minutes it is over. The garlic smell is fading. The landing craft drift helplessly without power, fouling each other’s lines. On board, soldiers and sailors are either panicking or congratulating themselves on surviving the unknown peril. As order returns, engineering officers report similar stories: “main engines totally wrecked beyond hope of repair, no power available from any source, we must get to a dockyard.’’ Surprisingly, there are no casualties.
Later, an investigation will find the remains of unmarked, untraceable containers on the seabed. They do not constitute evidence against any specific foe. Most important, there will be no seaborne invasion and no complementary ground push.
This is but one example of how the binary acetylene concept can be used to cripple, without loss of life, any gasoline or diesel engine. The sabotage possibilities are limited only by the inventiveness of our special operations forces. Properly dispensed, the munition is untraceable. Only slightly lighter than air (0.9073 specific gravity of ambient air), it disperses to the upper atmosphere after the few seconds needed to do its work. Its materials are commonplace and inexpensive.
In binary munition form (calcium carbide and water), it can stop not only most land vehicles, but most of the low-end- mix ships used by our adversaries. It is capable of disabling all vessels in service with the Soviet Bloc states of Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria (except for two Riga-class frigates), Cuba, Ethiopia, East Germany (except sail training ships), North Korea, Libya, Nicaragua, Poland (except one Kotlin-SAM and the odd trawler), Romania, Syria, Vietnam, South Yemen, and Yugoslavia (except midget submarines and sail training ships).4 Other Third World states are largely or completely vulnerable. At a time when world opinion and domestic politicians frequently view any U. S. action to defend itself from a rising tide of world terrorism as imperialism at best and genocide at worst, the ability to disarm opponents without loss of life would be a welcome addition to our armory.
In the early days of our Navy, it was considered vital in combat to hold the weather gauge, in order to impose your will on your opponent by limiting his mobility. Now, in our quasi-war/quasi- peace, it may once again be vital to be upwind, and to use the weather gauge.
'E. A. Frame, A. A. Johnson, E. J. Baker, and J. K. Dean, “Development of Engine & Lubricant Inter- ferant Substances,” U. S. Army Fuels and Lubricants Research Laboratory, AFLRL Report #79. 2Stuart A. Hoenig, “New Technology for Disabling Armored Vehicles,” January 1982, unpublished.
366 mm Heat Rocket M72A1, M72A2, and M72, U. S. Army Field Manual 23-33. Also letter from Department of the Army Legislative Liaison Office, 22 January 1986.
JJ. L. Couhat and A. D. Baker III, Combat Fleets of the World 1986/1987 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986).
A previous Proceedings contributor, Mr. Mar is a commissioned peace officer in Colorado and a freelance writer on naval and defense affairs.
Integrated Air Defense for NATO
By Lieutenant Commander J. P. Hampton, U. S. Navy
The new generation of Soviet air- launched cruise missiles and the Fencer, Backfire, and Blackjack bombers have greatly increased the Soviet air threat to NATO’s southern flank.1 From bases on the Crimean peninsula, these Soviet aircraft can reach, at low altitude, any point in the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet air power threatens the ability of the NATO southern region to support the war effort in the eastern Mediterranean basin, the Aegean Sea, and particularly in Turkey.
The Soviet air threat to NATO’s southern flank requires improved NATO air defense systems and tactics reflecting a doctrine of forward air defense plus defense-in-depth. Forward air defense means that enemy aircraft are engaged as far away from their intended targets as possible. Defense-in-depth means that enemy aircraft are engaged repeatedly as they proceed toward their targets.
NATO needs air defense systems that are more capable, and needs to make better use of existing assets (aircraft, ground and airborne radar, weapons systems). The sea-based air defense assets of U. S. Navy carrier battle groups and U. S. Air Force and NATO land-based air defense assets could provide an integrated air defense system which applies the doctrines of forward air defense and defense-indepth.
The Soviet Threat: The air threat to NATO’s southern flank most likely originates along four axes: from the north, across Yugoslavia’s Ljublana Gap; from the central north, through Romanian and Bulgarian Balkan mountains into Greece to split the southern region and isolate Turkey; from the Crimean peninsula, south toward Turkey; and from the extreme eastern flank through Turkey, sweeping westward (see Figure 1).2,3,4 The air threat to Turkey is magnified by its proximity to the Crimean peninsula and a poor low-altitude threat warning capability. Turkey serves as a buffer to Soviet expansion toward the Mediterranean Sea. The current chaos in Iran, the likelihood that post-Khomeini Iran will present an opportunity for Soviet expansionism in the southern region, and the Soviet presence in Syria emphasize Turkey’s essential role in maintaining a stable NATO eastern flank.5
The Soviets enjoy a 7:1 advantage over Turkey in air assets. The threat ratio would be reduced to 4:1 when planned NATO reinforcements arrive.6 The nu
merical advantage is compounded by new Soviet bombers that have greater ranges and air-launched cruise missiles that can reach anywhere in the southern region.
Air defenses in Turkey are anchored by aging Nike Hercules and Ajax surface-to- air missile systems for high- and medium-level threats.7 Currently, there are no air defense systems capable of meeting the low-level threat posed by Fencer and Backfire attack bombers based on the Crimean peninsula. The low-altitude capability of Soviet bombers greatly enhances the enemy’s ability to carry out deep strikes into Turkey or other areas of the southern region with little or no warning (see Figure 2).8
Because of the location of the southern region and the range capability of the Soviet threat, both land and sea targets could be planned. The 1984 NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force Comparison states:
“The range of modem Warsaw Pact aircraft is such that they have the potential to operate anywhere in the Mediterranean, endangering the security of sea lines of communication which are of vital importance to NATO nations in the Southern Flank. The geography of the Mediterranean
emphasizes the inter-action v ^ maritime, land and air situati°n*L .j. NATO naval forces and Soviet ^ terranean Squadron would hav^ face opposing land-based and ^ aviation; naval operations w0U era- turn greatly influence land/air op tions in the three sub-regions- e
nal reinforcements from the 9 could be of crucial importance-
Not enough work is being done ,(S stroy the air-launched missile threa source.10 Updated plans and revise air- tics are needed. Increasingly, * ^ borne threat is armed with siiperto*" „cUjt off weapons which are extremely di to engage. Thus, great emphasis s ^ be placed on intercepting the enerny^ fore he can fire his weapon, which ^ improved defensive tactics and a effective use of existing air defen ^ Current Air Defense Doctrine. 1 ^
fense areas of responsibility are no ( established by geography. By d°c js Allied Air Forces Southern ^ur?jjitieS charged with air defense resp°nsl for NATO’s southern region, inC -0[)a) the Mediterranean Sea. NATO teS^ air defense responsibilities are de e ^ to the appropriate Allied Tactic2
^ePloyin',U 31r defense doctrine suggests bat air aircraft and fighter com-
gage andd°* ^AP) early enough to en- they c destroy enemy attackers before AE\y a n rolease their weapons. The altitude'rcrah can “see” attackers at all their tar ^ Vector airborne fighters to Worir t ^Ct and fighter aircraft also based rad w'lh ground- and ship- intercept 3r WeaP°n systems. The fighter-
the
w;^0und radar site receiving re- Defen6dca^ radar information.11
based commander and thus are
in (L °n 8e°graphy. Since the air threat come fSOudlern re8'on has historically there h tbe northeast and because
Navvc 3 Ways been at least one u- s- MeditpaiTler batde group deployed in the iterranr^30^11’ air defense over the Med- cem „fan ^ ea bas not been a major con- ATaf .. ^AF commander; thus, over „,mantlme air defense capabilities
Tvn n ^ minimaL
has com tbe land-based commander fighters r° °ver tbe land-based radar, ber Pm' and air defense assets. The car- the yu cornrnander, as a member of Southern ,;Stnkln8 and Support Forces fense a tUr°pe, establishes an air debated h3 t0 Protec,; the battle group as strategy /tbe urgency of the threat. This discoura °Sters seParation of control but areas of ^ ^ex'bility in determining and sha resP°ns'bility based on the threat to assets to maximize the ability
Z;inate the threat.
0epth-Tu^‘r Defense and Defense-inky, (L e Soviets’ numerical superior- inched Stand°ff capability of the air- altitude <fUise missile, and the low- gion de vu nerability of the southern reair def71311*^ tbat tbe doctrine of forward adopted6*1!86 and defense-in-depth be be 0Ve ' bow-altitude vulnerability can Navy by employing the U. S.
bome S- Air Force E-3A air-
(A\VAcc,arnin8 ar,d control system early w and/or NATO E-3A, airborne aircraft u01'0® (AEW) platforms. These and tra ]ave the radar capability to detect Crimea Vi *0'v'a*thude threats from the aircraft nCe a ^eat is detected, fighter enem ca5 be vectored to intercept the Set arPP S ar away from the intended tarpon as Possible.
dePloyiard a'r hefens........ ___ DC
bat air aircraft and fighter com- me AEW aircraft w'h be controlled by fernom Platforms or, possibly, by a
' c ground • • • •
tactical
■huititi S6, m’dePth doctrine suggests a There w p aPPr°ach to air defense, fighter-'* be two Primary stations for the AE\y ,nterceptor air defense units. The CAP clIrcraft and accompanying fighter the firs?Sest t0 the enemy threat will be called u tl6r °1 defense. Those units range w P,0n t0 intercept the enemy at 1 support the outer tier, or outer air battle, and are responsible for the early destruction of all enemy targets.
Additional AEW and fighter CAP are stationed closer to the anticipated target area to comprise the inner tier and destroy any enemy aircraft that leak through the outer tier.12
To apply the doctrine of forward defense and defense-in-depth, the designated commander has to have the flexibility to concentrate all available air defense assets at the points of attack. This may require him to employ a mix of Navy, Air Force, and NATO systems. Flexibility is a function of standardized procedures, interoperable equipment (radars, communication radios, etc.), and suitable geography. Former Commander Allied Forces Central Europe, Major
General J. W. Pauly, U. S. Air Force, describes the differences of NATO forces:
“These forces are of mixed character in terms of size, equipment, geographical disposition and function. In addition, tactics, doctrine, and operational procedures have differed historically to some degree within national forces. Because of these differences, recent years have witnessed a growing concern for standardization, interoperability, and rationalization.”13
Integrated Air Defense: The concept of integrated air defense departs from the traditional air defense arrangements that result in the land-based commander being assigned land areas with land-based assets and the sea-based commander being assigned adjacent water areas with sea- based assets. When an air defense threat is identified, the typical response is to position the carrier battle group to provide support and/or show resolve. As the battle group arrives in the area of operations, the area of responsibility for the land-based and sea-based commanders must be determined. The basis for determining the areas of responsibility should be the nature of the threat, available air defense assets, geography, etc., rather than automatically assigning the water area to the sea-based commander and land area to the land commander. Figure 3 shows how integrated air defense could apply to a threat to Turkey from the Crimean peninsula.
While it is likely that the land-based air commander in the region will have an area of responsibility over land and the battle group commander will have an area of responsibility over water, they may agree to modify their areas of responsibility to correspond more closely with their capabilities, e.g., the battle group commander’s area may extend over land. By stationing one combat team of AEW aircraft and fighter CAP as far forward toward the threat as possible, and positioning another similarly configured combat team between the anticipated target and the threat source, a multitiered defense- in-depth capability is created.14 The land- based air commander and naval commander will exercise tactical control (local direction and control of movement necessary to accomplish the mission) of assets in his area of responsibility.15
Once the threat is airborne, the postulated target type (land/maritime) cannot be determined unless the threat is visually identified as carrying bombs or air-to- surface missiles. The range of today’s Soviet air-launched cruise missiles approaches 800 kilometers. So, if the carrier battle group is less than 800 kilometers from land, either land-based or sea-based aircraft will have to intercept and engage the enemy aircraft over land. Therefore, tactics and planning by both land- and sea-based commanders must be coordinated.
A typical Crimean threat scenario for Turkey would have the carrier battle group providing support from Turkey’s southern coast. The E-2C would be stationed in southern Turkey and the NATO E-3A deployed in northern Turkey. Thus, the E-3A’s radar could expand the battle picture to the north along the threat axis to facilitate fighter aircraft intercepting the enemy at maximum range, and the E-2C could transmit the radar link into southern Turkey and back to the battle group to provide total picture coverage throughout the Black Sea, Turkey, and eastern Mediterranean basin (see Figure 3). Because of the E-3A radar range capability, Turkish fighters could be deployed north to the Black Sea to intercept Soviet bombers. Additional fighter-inter-
Professional Notes
Bang-less Tank Killer
By Roland K. Mar
ded
but
Every organization is infected to some degree with the Not Invented Here Syndrome. If an idea does not originate with an approved source, it receives an almost automatic kiss of death. Military history is full of opportunities to seize victory or avoid defeat that were lost when new ideas or weapons were ignored because they did not come from orthodox sources. The U. S. Army is currently suffering from this syndrome, missing an opportunity to field a weapon that is cheap, effective, beyond economical enemy countermeasures, and capable of making an individual soldier a match for any tank. Special operations applications would add immensely to the capabilities of Army Rangers, and U. S. Marines and Navy SEALs (sea-air-land forces) as well.
In 1975, at the urging of Professor Stu-
Professor Hoenig’s binary warhead would allow a relatively few groundpounders to render enemy tanks mysteriously silent and still.
But the Army has balked at buying a weapon that doesn’t go bang-bang.
art Hoenig of the University of Arizona, the Army’s Fuels and Lubricants Research Laboratory conducted a series of tests on “engine interferants”— substances that, when ingested into an operating internal combustion engine, would cause it to fail. Professor Hoenig believed that there is more than one way to kill a tank.
As armor-piercing rounds become less and less capable of penetrating tank frontal armor—at least for man-portable weapons—other means must be found. If the traditional hard kill is impossible for the individual infantryman, the next best thing is a “mobility kill.”
Professor Hoening’s research focused on substances that could degrade the performance of tank engine lubricants or damage the engine directly. Using data developed by Hoenig and the Army Fuels and Lubricants Laboratory staff, the laboratory ran a series of tests on both types of substances. Results indicated that lubricant interferants were not feasible, but that several combustion interferants were highly effective. Foremost of these were common acetylene (C2H2) and butane.
Butane was found to be too difflC“ f, handle and easy to counter. Ho'v acetylene can be easily and cheaply cured and handled as the compoun ^ cium carbide, which is available 1° hardware store. . (Q ap
Exposing a running diesel engine ^ ambient air concentration of abo ^ acetylene causes engine Pre'§nlt!t0ffin severe that the engine has to be shut one or two seconds to avoid se^'dl:e|ier tion. Concentrations only slightly have the same effect on standard S ^ line-powered internal combustion ^ gines. These tests were conducts normal engine air filtration systc place.1 teSts
Despite the positive results of1 jQrSe- and the laboratory’s favorable en ^rrny ment of Hoenig’s concepts, the ^ Materials Command declined to 0 ^g. up on the tests. After all, an eng'na per- bility kill would stop a tank, armory ^
it
operate the weapons systems, would not make a satisfying bang- the idea came from an outsider■
Although the Army gave up ° (eSt concept, Hoenig did not. In a furt ^.gSe| at the University of Arizona, a j jp engine was totally destroyed intern less than three seconds upon exp° jeSjgfl the gas.2 Hoenig continued with a ^ for a binary warhead containing ^ pound of commercially available c ej carbide and 0.28 pounds of a wa compound. Upon impact, the tw°argpt. stances mixed and stuck to the while sufficient gas was produced taminate a sphere 7.07 feet in .jjtejjial with enough gas to damage any 1 ^ j,y combustion engine (greater than 0 volume). Chemical warfaie-p10 eIjt vehicles can filter driving compa air and protect the crews lhrou!js muS‘ pressure measures, but the engm ^ 0. draw on ambient air, which canno ^ tered finely enough to block out ace
molecules. . ntiS^
Our Marine Corps is light inta ^ the world’s finest—and the natl°nce U self-contained expeditionary t°r
tank h °P 3 Soviet T-80 tank. A stopped . The r 5lttlng duck. ti°nal ch H0*"11 w'l* also add to the opera- UW-H afracteristics of the LAW, or high ex’ ! y°u will. The standard LAW Pounds ThS'Ve warhead weighs 1.58
live
The range
?00 meter a®a'nst stationary targets of 'n8 targetS 3an^ meters against mov- 1 28 pQ S, I he LAW-II warhead weighs original aiS 3 reduction from the l° a 19%^ though this does not translate PrQvetTleCn'ncrease in range, potential im- redesigni S 'n flight characteristics after ,h“ the warhead to accommodate
the
uew
ready?1'5*1'11® ^'s m>ssion, it must be armored °PP0se ^oviet Bloc main force Marine Un/!S' ^esP'te the success of the launcher! CorPs'developed shoulder- (SMAW! mult’PurP°se assault weapon not ston ti,ln dealing with tanks, it may Bloc arsenal at£St aclcl*t'ons t0 the Soviet
titank 's replacing the light an-
Corns in 6al50n (LAW) in the Marine s’Ve Warhnt°ry; t*le hAWs’ small explo- threat c,?,ad can no longer meet the units m ’ as sMAWs are issued to nemiy n(;l">'kthousands of the light, emi- in the . e; disposable LAWs remain plus couk|lne inVen‘ory- While the sur- mujahidee„ ^ x?ed t0 ecluiP Afghan the LAW °r N|caraguan “contras,” Pic adant?C°U*d upgraded with a sim- Marin? r" °f Hoenig’s binary round, aircraft ^"orPs fixed-wing and rotary sets, are SUPP^efnented by Navy air as- thrusts Comrn'tted to blunting armored hVentuan"aiuSt Marine Corps forces. to 'he inn-’ h°Wever, it may come down Portable IVldual rifleman with a man- lf a Mar °ne'S*10t WeaP°n against a tank. an acetyl"16 ^orPs~sPonsored version of LAWs jnene round is retrofitted to the c°uld In^entory, the lone rifleman standard LAW has an effec- °f the Pa-Voatl could increase the range Creased staP°n hy tens of yards. The insafety fQ a[tdoff distance means greater The c tlle Marine on the line.
Sreat exp°nVers’on should involve no irivQlvesPCnse ’ The new warhead design Co,T|PoneSlniP*e’ oommercially available c.arh>ide nt^~Tover-the-counter calcium titUple irrinC* ’nclustrial water gel—and Jecti°n Pact fusing. The precision in- °§y need tancl expl°sives technol- ''haped t0 fabricate the original LAW 5 tttinim- ]ar®C w°uld be superfluous. For s°lete Cost Per round, otherwise ob- P°Sed of apons that would have to be dis- torist 0rs,Safely Iheyond the reach of ter- "lventoiranizations) could remain in our and lo\v ./'lt a t'rne when sustainability jhajor tyWar reservc munitions stocks are ^undrC(js0tTfles’ the opportunity to retain ' °t thousands of LAW rounds as frontline weapons should be a high U. S. priority.
Doubling the Marine Corps’ antiarmor reserves seems well worth the expense of further tests. Testing the rounds against a stationary surplus tank with the engine running and against a moving target should prove the concept’s worth.
The special operations possibilities of the C2H2 binary munition can be described in the following scenario:
It is September 1987. The fanatical dictator of a North African nation dedicated to both revolution and terrorism has been casting covetous eyes on a neighbor to its northwest. Armies have been positioned on the nations’ mutual border and a seaborne flanking attack is part of the dictator’s plans. Fortunately for him, he has a naval force and sealift capacity furnished both by the Soviet Union and oil revenues. In a sheltered bay not far from the dictator’s capital, three Polnocny-C-class and two Ibn Ouf- class landing ships, and a score of C-107-type landing craft are anchored— loaded with troops and tanks—and awaiting orders. Escort is provided by a force of Osa-II guided-missile patrol boats.
While the attackers wait, the U. S. ballistic missile submarine Sam Houston (SSBN-609) is offshore recovering her swimmer delivery vehicles and members of SEAL Team 6, who had been busy in a certain bay placing timed packages on the bottom near the nests of anchored landing craft.
Shortly after the daily onshore wind begins blowing toward the anchored vessels, valves open to allow water into the packages. A froth of bubbles rises to the surface, bringing the surface to a foaming boil. A slight smell of garlic wafts over the ships. Engines providing, onboard power buck and stop. Captains and officers of the deck scream to their engine rooms for full power on all engines as they see the water turn white around them. Fearing attack or mines, they want to get their ships away.
In less than two minutes it is over. The garlic smell is fading. The landing craft drift helplessly without power, fouling each other's lines. On board, soldiers and sailors are either panicking or congratulating themselves on surviving the unknown peril. As order returns, engineering officers report similar stories: “main engines totally wrecked beyond hope of repair, no power available from any source, we must get to a dockyard.’’ Surprisingly, there are no casualties.
Later, an investigation will find the remains of unmarked, untraceable containers on the seabed. They do not constitute evidence against any specific foe. Most important, there will be no seaborne invasion and no complementary ground push.
This is but one example of how the binary acetylene concept can be used to cripple, without loss of life, any gasoline or diesel engine. The sabotage possibilities are limited only by the inventiveness of our special operations forces. Properly dispensed, the munition is untraceable. Only slightly lighter than air (0.9073 specific gravity of ambient air), it disperses to the upper atmosphere after the few seconds needed to do its work. Its materials are commonplace and inexpensive.
In binary munition form (calcium carbide and water), it can stop not only most land vehicles, but most of the low-end- mix ships used by our adversaries. It is capable of disabling all vessels in service with the Soviet Bloc states of Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria (except for two Riga-class frigates), Cuba, Ethiopia, East Germany (except sail training ships), North Korea, Libya, Nicaragua, Poland (except one Kotlin-SAM and the odd trawler), Romania, Syria, Vietnam, South Yemen, and Yugoslavia (except midget submarines and sail training ships).4 Other Third World states are largely or completely vulnerable. At a time when world opinion and domestic politicians frequently view any U. S. action to defend itself from a rising tide of world terrorism as imperialism at best and genocide at worst, the ability to disarm opponents without loss of life would be a welcome addition to our armory.
In the early days of our Navy, it was considered vital in combat to hold the weather gauge, in order to impose your will on your opponent by limiting his mobility. Now, in our quasi-war/quasi- peace, it may once again be vital to be upwind, and to use the weather gauge.
'E. A. Frame, A. A. Johnson, E. J. Baker, and J. K. Dean, “Development of Engine & Lubricant Inter- ferant Substances,” U. S. Army Fuels and Lubricants Research Laboratory, AFLRL Report #79. 2Stuart A. Hoenig, "New Technology for Disabling Armored Vehicles,” January 1982, unpublished.
’66 mm Heat Rocket M72A1, M72A2, and M72, U. S. Army Field Manual 23-33. Also letter from Department of the Army Legislative Liaison Office, 22 January 1986.
4J. L. Couhat and A. D. Baker 111, Combat Fleets of the World 198611987 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986).
A previous Proceedings contributor, Mr. Mar is a commissioned peace officer in Colorado and a freelance writer on naval and defense affairs.
Integrated Air Defense for NATO
By Lieutenant Commander J. P. Hampton, U. S. Navy
The new generation of Soviet air- launched cruise missiles and the Fencer, Backfire, and Blackjack bombers have greatly increased the Soviet air threat to NATO’s southern flank.1 From bases on the Crimean peninsula, these Soviet aircraft can reach, at low altitude, any point in the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet air power threatens the ability of the NATO southern region to support the war effort in the eastern Mediterranean basin, the Aegean Sea, and particularly in Turkey.
The Soviet air threat to NATO’s southern flank requires improved NATO air defense systems and tactics reflecting a doctrine of forward air defense plus defense-in-depth. Forward air defense means that enemy aircraft are engaged as far away from their intended targets as possible. Defense-in-depth means that enemy aircraft are engaged repeatedly as they proceed toward their targets.
NATO needs air defense systems that are more capable, and needs to make better use of existing assets (aircraft, ground and airborne radar, weapons systems). The sea-based air defense assets of U. S. Navy carrier battle groups and U. S. Air Force and NATO land-based air defense assets could provide an integrated air defense system which applies the doctrines of forward air defense and defense-indepth.
The Soviet Threat: The air threat to NATO’s southern flank most likely originates along four axes: from the north, across Yugoslavia’s Ljublana Gap; from the central north, through Romanian and Bulgarian Balkan mountains into Greece to split the southern region and isolate Turkey; from the Crimean peninsula, south toward Turkey; and from the extreme eastern flank through Turkey, sweeping westward (see Figure 1).2,3,4 The air threat to Turkey is magnified by its proximity to the Crimean peninsula and a poor low-altitude threat warning capability. Turkey serves as a buffer to Soviet expansion toward the Mediterranean Sea. The current chaos in Iran, the likelihood that post-Khomeini Iran will present an opportunity for Soviet expansionism in the southern region, and the Soviet presence in Syria emphasize Turkey’s essential role in maintaining a stable NATO eastern flank.5
The Soviets enjoy a 7:1 advantage over Turkey in air assets. The threat ratio would be reduced to 4:1 when planned NATO reinforcements arrive.6 The nu-
merical advantage is compounded by new Soviet bombers that have greater ranges and air-launched cruise missiles that can reach anywhere in the southern region.
Air defenses in Turkey are anchored by aging Nike Hercules and Ajax surface-to- air missile systems for high- and medium-level threats.7 Currently, there are no air defense systems capable of meeting the low-level threat posed by Fencer and Backfire attack bombers based on the Crimean peninsula. The low-altitude capability of Soviet bombers greatly enhances the enemy’s ability to carry out deep strikes into Turkey or other areas of the southern region with little or no warning (see Figure 2).8
Because of the location of the southern region and the range capability of the Soviet threat, both land and sea targets could be planned. The 1984 NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force Comparison states:
“The range of modem Warsaw Pact aircraft is such that they have the potential to operate anywhere in the Mediterranean, endangering the security of sea lines of communication which are of vital importance to NATO nations in the Southern Flank. The geography of the Mediterranean
• „ HetWeel1
emphasizes the inter-action u ^ maritime, land and air situations- ._ NATO naval forces and Soviet ^ ^ terranean Squadron would ‘ian£iva] face opposing land-based and ^ ^ aviation; naval operations w° . turn greatly influence land/air °P _ tions in the three sub-regions^ £ nal reinforcements from the A* ,, could be of crucial importance-
Not enough work is being done ,[S stroy the air-launched missile threa ^ source.10 Updated plans and revise air- tics are needed. Increasingly- 1 j, borne threat is armed with superior -cll]| off weapons which are extremely d'^jj to engage. Thus, great emphasis s ^ be placed on intercepting the ene 3^ fore he can fire his weapon, whicn improved defensive tactics and a effective use of existing air delen.
Current Air Defense Doctrine■ |jy fense areas of responsibility are °°ctrjne, established by geography. By d° js Allied Air Forces Southern ^urf||jtjeS charged with air defense responS1jjng
fr»r NJ ATfVc cr\ntV»/a»*r» r^CTlOn.
for NATO’s southern region the Mediterranean Sea. NATO - - ,e0 air defense responsibilities are de ^ to the appropriate Allied Tactic
region1
Nav
Med;
iterram
cern Cfan ‘Sea has not been a major con- /\-pA r° tbe ATAF commander; thus, over u,.n,laritlme air defense capabilities
Typically
the land-based commander
has
p
baserfS commander and thus are
in th °n geograPhy- Since the air threat come6 fS°Ut^ern reglon ^as historically 'here h r°m tbe northeast and because Na as aIways been at least one U. S. carrier battle group deployed in the erranean, air defense over the Med
Wa'er are minimal.
Tighterntro^ over 'he land-based radar, rier „ S’ anb air defense assets. The car- the f/01**? commander, as a member of South?Va c trilc*n® and Support Forces fense 01 ^UroPC’ establishes an air de- dicta( a[?a t0 Pro'ect 'he battle group as stratgr, f t'le urgency of the threat. This discou °Sters separation of control but areas ^ ®6S ^ex*bihty in determining and sh° resP°nsibility based on the threat to assets to maximize the ability
Fo^nate the threat- Depth. Tvf defense and Defense
ity, ,l “e Soviets’ numerical super 'aonclwi Stand°ff capability of the air- altitud6 CPU'se missile, and the low- gi°n j6 vuinerability of the southern reair ^ eaiand that the doctrine of forward adopts .ense and defense-in-depth be be 0v ' how-altitude vulnerability can Navvp^6 by employing the U. S. bom,! Air E°rce E-3A air-
'A\yArc/,arn'ng ar>d control system early and/or NATO E-3A, airborne -AEW) platforms. These and tr 1aVe tbe radar capability to detect CrimeaCp. ^ow'aititude threats from the a*rcraft ^nce a threat is detected, fighter enemy Can be vectored to intercept the get ar as far away from the intended tar- p0r^a as Possible.
deploy'3™ a'r defense doctrine suggests bat apn" AEW aircraft and fighter corn- gage a Patro' (CAP) early enough to en- they nd destroy enemy attackers before AEtyCan re*case their weapons. The altitudaircraTt can “see” attackers at all their ta^ anb vector airborne fighters to Worp t^et and fighter aircraft also baSed °?etber w'th ground- and ship- interC(.radar WcaPon systems. The fighter- the Apyyr a'rcraft will be controlled by remote ^ P'atgorms or, possibly, by a t®yed t grour|d radar site receiving re- p)e^eact'cal radar information.11 rnuititense'ln"depth doctrine suggests a Thereler?d aPProach to air defense, tighter"’'' tW0 PEntary stations for the AE\y !nterceptor air defense units. The Cap lrcraft and accompanying fighter the f; °Sest t° the enemy threat will be cal]ecjrst tler °f defense. Those units tango uP°n to intercept the enemy at ^dl support the outer tier, or outer air battle, and are responsible for the early destruction of all enemy targets.
Additional AEW and fighter CAP are stationed closer to the anticipated target area to comprise the inner tier and destroy any enemy aircraft that leak through the outer tier.12
To apply the doctrine of forward defense and defense-in-depth, the designated commander has to have the flexibility to concentrate all available air defense assets at the points of attack. This may require him to employ a mix of Navy, Air Force, and NATO systems. Flexibility is a function of standardized procedures, interoperable equipment (radars, communication radios, etc.), and suitable geography. Former Commander Allied Forces Central Europe, Major
General J. W. Pauly, U. S. Air Force, describes the differences of NATO forces;
“These forces are of mixed character in terms of size, equipment, geographical disposition and function. In addition, tactics, doctrine, and operational procedures have differed historically to some degree within national forces. Because of these differences, recent years have witnessed a growing concern for standardization, interoperability, and rationalization.”13
Integrated Air Defense: The concept of integrated air defense departs from the traditional air defense arrangements that result in the land-based commander being assigned land areas with land-based assets and the sea-based commander being assigned adjacent water areas with sea- based assets. When an air defense threat is identified, the typical response is to position the carrier battle group to provide support and/or show resolve. As the battle group arrives in the area of operations, the area of responsibility for the land-based and sea-based commanders must be determined. The basis for determining the areas of responsibility should be the nature of the threat, available air defense assets, geography, etc., rather than automatically assigning the water area to the sea-based commander and land area to the land commander. Figure 3 shows how integrated air defense could apply to a threat to Turkey from the Crimean peninsula.
While it is likely that the land-based air commander in the region will have an area of responsibility over land and the battle group commander will have an area of responsibility over water, they may agree to modify their areas of responsibility to correspond more closely with their capabilities, e.g., the battle group commander’s area may extend over land. By stationing one combat team of AEW aircraft and fighter CAP as far forward toward the threat as possible, and positioning another similarly configured combat team between the anticipated target and the threat source, a multitiered defense- in-depth capability is created.14 The land- based air commander and naval commander will exercise tactical control (local direction and control of movement necessary to accomplish the mission) of assets in his area of responsibility.15
Once the threat is airborne, the postulated target type (land/maritime) cannot be determined unless the threat is visually identified as carrying bombs or air-to- surface missiles. The range of today’s Soviet air-launched cruise missiles approaches 800 kilometers. So, if the carrier battle group is less than 800 kilometers from land, either land-based or sea-based aircraft will have to intercept and engage the enemy aircraft over land. Therefore, tactics and planning by both land- and sea-based commanders must be coordinated.
A typical Crimean threat scenario for Turkey would have the carrier battle group providing support from Turkey’s southern coast. The E-2C would be stationed in southern Turkey and the NATO E-3A deployed in northern Turkey. Thus, the E-3A’s radar could expand the battle picture to the north along the threat axis to facilitate fighter aircraft intercepting the enemy at maximum range, and the E-2C could transmit the radar link into southern Turkey and back to the battle group to provide total picture coverage throughout the Black Sea, Turkey, and eastern Mediterranean basin (see Figure 3). Because of the E-3A radar range capability, Turkish fighters could be deployed north to the Black Sea to intercept Soviet bombers. Additional fighter-inter-
Gen
July
. pefens‘
------ —--------- —-------------- — — rnaster 5
the Armed Forces Staff College, and has a u\, J : . Central I*11
ceptor aircraft would be required to provide for the defense of key Turkish mainland targets and the battle group. The E-2C would control many of these assets and pass tactical radar information via the tactical information relay net to various sector controllers at the ground radar sites.16 U. S. Navy F-14 fighters would be available for CAP stationing or alert. If the threat in any one area became too great, or if either battle commander was unable to carry out his air defense functions, he could notify his counterpart commander and seek additional assets.
Although the E-2C normally controls F-14 fighters and the E-3A/NATO E-3A controls land-based aircraft, there is no guarantee that this separation of control will hold true during the course of battle. It is just as likely that the roles of aircraft ^control will be reversed because of the |dynamics of air combat. As a result, the aircrews and battle commanders must be familiar with the capabilities of their counterparts when various tactical aircraft (with different capabilities) and air defense systems are integrated.
Because of the differences among NATO nations and cultures, and the different types of air defense equipment and aircraft these nations employ, incompatibilities between land- and sea-based air defense systems can lead to confusion and frustration, especially for the air controlling agency. One way to achieve greater confidence is to practice and train at every opportunity, using agreed-upon concepts, strategies, and terminologies.
Perhaps most important of all aspects of integrated air defense is command, control, communications, and intelligence. The high-frequency voice communications and low data-rate teletype currently in use will not survive Soviet electronic countermeasures. Command, control, and communications requirements are best filled by a satellite secure voice net similar to the already established narrow band secure voice, which would provide real-time air-battle updates and assessments.
Battle commanders may also use the secure air defense net for coordinating the assignment or transfer of air defense assets between their areas of responsibility, and relaying threat analysis on the expectation of leakers through the tiered defenses.17 Thus, the land-based air commander who needs more fighter support can use this net to request additional assets. Unless supporting communications are available, information which could turn the tide in the heat of battle may never get to those who need it most.18
Intelligence data provides us with the who, what, when, and where of an impending attack. However, the key is not just obtaining intelligence, but acting on that intelligence once it is received.19 The battle commanders must translate the intelligence information, communicate their intentions, and coordinate the tactical use of their assets. Major General J. B. Marks, U. S. Air Force, states that “our challenge is to functionally match intelligence to command and control and its associated communications so that the intelligence support provided meets those decision criteria.”20
The growing Soviet air threat is very
pronounced on NATO’s southern flan^ where aging, low-altitude air de systems cannot match the formidable r mean threat. Integrating U. S. Navy c^ rier battle group assets with land-ba^ air defense assets can help defeat enemy, but only if integrated air defen tactics are incorporated in the train eral J. W. Pauly stated in an article NATO air forces integration: “MoW™ the military forces of the NATO rnejnrce nations into a single, international to . . . has been one of the monumen achievements of our day. The task iss incomplete.”21
Challenge,” Defense Transportation 1984, p. 30.
Frederick Bonnart, “Turkey—the ExK.
Flank,” NATO's FIFTEEN NATIONS, >ane' 1982, p. 39.
’Michael Dunn, “Turkey: Exposed Flank and Foreign Affairs, April 1983, p. 18- 6Bonnart, p. 39.
7Ibid.
8Buckley, p. 56. • ons
9NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comp 1984 Ajf
10Clarence Robinson, “U. S. Plan to Boost Na^ Defense,” Aviation Week and Space Techn°
July 1984, p. 21.
"Norman Friedman, “Naval Airborne Early ing,” Naval Forces, March 1982, p. 80.
,2U. S. Navy, COMCARGRU Two Working r^ Extac/Tacnote: Integrated Air Defense (H)» 1984, p. 10. hthe
13J. W. Pauly, “Nato Air Forces Struggle Rl. Requirement for Integration,” Defense ^ysK'n^'), view and Military Communication, September
p. 32.
14COMCARGRU Two Working Paper, p 4. ^6, "NATO Tactical Air Doctrine ATP 33, March * NATO Unclassified.
"Friedman, p. 81.
"COMCARGRU Two Working Paper, p- l3, Air "John B. Marks, "Intelligence Support 10 * t0(^r Force—Now and in the Future,” Signal,
1983, p. 29.
,9Ibid., p. 28.
20lbid., p. 29.
21Pauly, p. 32.
Commander Hampton is assigned to Fighter ^ aS ron 33 on board the America (CV-66). He sc plans and exercises officer with Commander Group Two Staff (CTF 60/NATO CTF 50Z) ^ 1982-1984, and worked extensively in plannm NATO and national (U. S. only) air defense \($ cises. He planned air defense exercises with ^^pt, Air Force, using the integrated air defense ^ and formulated the plan to incorporate the mte^ ^ air defense concept into NATO’s southern mgi^ the first time in 5ATAF (Italy) and 6ATAF ( during NATO live exercises Distant Hamme ^ ^ and Display Determination 1984. He is a *0 ju- combat maneuvering instructor in the F-4N, ^ 0f
ate of the tactical action officer course, a gra
degree in personnel supervision from gan University.
A National Interdiction Operations School
y L,e“tenant Christopher A. Abel, U. S. Coast Guard
Pati0n ~p- wa,ch bristles with antici- br°ken h ina y< the oppressive silence is check™ ‘he skiPPer’s voice. “Let’s go
,C. , ern Out ” .................. O..J
"’aitinf ‘S lens'on °n the bridge of the tact is Sat[°l ^oai' ^ small radar con-
aPParemir ‘‘S Way in from seawarci. mile awa 'ea<^e^for the shoreline just a miles ciu' , target is less than two bridge \v^'u>Ut Patr°i boat’s silent lights in Can (h’tect no navigational ‘nstrume ' e..^arhness. Only muted red glow QJnt, tights and the eerie green shadowy f S rcu^ar scope illuminate the see thej °rms °f the sailors straining ta Mystery * ^uarry- Moments pass. The beach Jr™ ,v st‘h headed for the 'btough ' Un^t< but now barely visible to be a r '"fht-vision scope. It appears feet lono^TL^ vesseh no more than 30 deck /' here are t°° many people on
The hriJ00 many f°r a fishing trip. . .. ee watch bristles with antici- oppressive silence is
detily^ i), H °Ut' ^ says quietly. Sud- Guris are Warship's decks are alive,
d(trkness >nunned, a searchlight stabs the r°ar t0 ijfUn^ *he boat’s powerful diesels 'hen stop e ^he fishing vessel first slows, in an att' ^'en turns sharply back to sea tQry ernf.y''° etude the powerful mili- t° heave t Car‘n8 down on it. The order t°ud-haiigr 1mmediately is barked over a Ues its fit'll ^ut the fishing vessel contin- sPiits the ■ ^ hurst of machine gun fire acr°ss n^ht and tracer rounds streak chase enJ fishing vessel’s bow. The Patrol bo ' Within minutes the
°n the f^h- an armed boarding party ‘s s°on rf "l^ vessel, where contraband l''c°vered below deck.
c°astal k? er. out °f “Market Time” ?Pisode f °chtKle of South Vietnam? An 'tt the sfr°m Salvador’s naval patrol Fonseca,^e8ica"y significant Gulf of ^Uard ru • 6 story °f still another Coast Florida c.n in with drug smugglers off the 'hat is °ast? One cannot be sure. And 'ain geneCclse|y the point. There is a cer- ,|(1n 0p nc 'duality to maritime interdicted a'10ns which blurs distinctions Srr,u88lin 0I^ .t‘rne or location. Coastal As the8n1S coastal smuggling. arht 0f ftttriary maritime enforcement tp in e i Eral 80vernment’s effort to ^nited e, dnjgs from reaching the Sained a tates> the Coast Guard has erice jn rernendous amount of experi- tges feadng with the unique chal- rerfiarkabl rnaiat'rne interdiction. Yet, ^dized Coast Guard lacks stan-
ar>d tac,j ra‘n'ng in interdiction strategy Cs for its field and headquarters
commanders. The Coast Guard needs a National Interdiction Operations School.
There is no doubt that the Coast Guard is making it difficult for smugglers in this hemisphere. To date. Coast Guard interdictions have led directly to almost 2,000 seizure cases, nearly 10,000 felony arrests, and the interdiction of more than $14 billion worth of illegal drugs. Along the way, the Coast Guard has also become adept at interdicting thousands of foreign nationals who attempt to gain illegal entry to the United States by sea. But this has been possible only because the Coast Guard has amassed a significant body of antismuggling knowledge— most of it learned the hard way.
Standard interdiction theory is taught only by the school of hard knocks. Too many junior officers and senior enlisted personnel in key positions in the field (patrol boat commanders, officers in charge of small boat stations along the coast, etc.) must learn the mechanics of supervising interdiction operations in ad hoc, on-the-job training, under pressure. Also, many senior Coast Guard officers returning to operational billets after tours of duty in administrative posts must go through a similar apprenticeship, either from scratch or through a trial-and-error process validating the knowledge they gained during their last interdiction- related tour. The result is that the interdiction “wheel” gets reinvented daily in the Coast Guard.
This is not to suggest that the Coast Guard’s interdiction-related resident training courses have failed to perform their mission. The Maritime Law Enforcement School’s basic course does a superb job of training Coast Guard boarding officers in the nuts and bolts of performing a safe and professional boarding at sea. Moreover, the school’s semiannual senior officer course does a commendable job of providing students' with a quick refresher in the legal and practical aspects of offshore law enforcement. In fact, the senior officer course curriculum has made a long overdue move toward conflict simulation, allowing course participants to plan a rudimentary interdiction operation and apply it in a gaming format. Such advanced instruction is needed on a much broader scale.
The proposed interdiction training program should not be limited to the Coast Guard’s antismuggling experience. To do so would ignore the equally impressive maritime interdiction credentials of the
U. S. Customs Service and the U. S. Navy. These two services can add to and benefit from a unified interdiction training facility. Such an institution could collect the interdiction expertise of all relevant federal agencies and distill that knowledge to a current “how to” of antismuggling strategy and tactics for prospective and serving interdiction decision makers. This would be an entirely new interdiction operations “super school” with a nationwide professional constituency. For years, the Coast Guard has operated the multiservice National Search and Rescue School at Governor’s Island, New York. Why not a National Interdiction Operations School?
Setting up this school should not be difficult. It should be initially staffed and collectively funded by all of the agencies engaged in interdiction at sea. Because of the Coast Guard’s interdiction experience and central role in new Maritime Defense Zone coastal operations, it should be the lead agency in the cooperative venture.
The school would not further complicate the already jumbled collection of national and international interdiction agencies already at work in the drug war. Instead, the school would serve to make these cooperative ventures even more effective. Centralized curriculum development, refinement, and delivery would mean that, at last, the many agencies involved in interdiction operations might learn common procedures, employ a common professional “language,” and purchase standard, compatible equipment. Moreover, by relieving each of the major agencies and services of the burdens (and risks) of developing its own interdiction curriculum and training facility, substantial financial savings could be realized—savings that could be invested in funding more people and hardware for the interdiction effort.
That the current narcotics interdiction challenge requires an improved response is plain enough. Even the most optimistic estimates of the current maritime interdiction operation’s effectiveness place the amount of drugs intercepted at only about 30%. This is one consequence of the almost limitless resources available to the cash-gorged drug barons. At the same time, today’s harsh fiscal realities make it clear that a massive increase in federal resources for drug interdiction is not likely to be forthcoming. Therefore, becoming more effective with the tools already at hand could well depend on our
Lessons from the USCG’s School of Hard Knocks
By A1 Livingston
juana—an estimated 2.8 tons.
ident
consensual boarding. Examination
K
Ida II revealed concealed compart1110” forward and aft of an otherwise e cargo hold. Opening the compart111 , revealed 400-600 bales of conce marijuana—some 23.5 tons.
Guard’s experience only through a joint operations and informal watch” discussions of strategy an
Interdiction expertise can be gained from a variety of sources. If experiences could be pooled, valuable knowledge could be gathered and shared with personnel involved in interdiction operations. This would go far in aiding the Coast Guard’s efforts to combat the smuggling problem.
What follow here are some typical interdictions, each similar and yet unique— each could provide another lesson for the proposed National Interdiction Operations School.
Seizure of the Apollo III: The 80-foot converted shrimp boat Apollo III was spotted by an HH-3F helicopter from Coast Guard Air Station Cape Cod. The pilot who spotted the boat wondered what a Gulf of Mexico shrimp boat would be doing in the waters off the Cape. Communications with the Washington and Canadian customs offices determined that the vessel, which showed a Canadian home port, was an imposter. Canadian Customs verified that the actual Apollo III was accounted for in port. The imposter was once again located by helicopter. The Coast Guard cutter Tamaroa (WMEC-166) intercepted the bogus Apollo and ordered the converted shrimp boat to heave to. The imposter ignored the commands. The Tamaroa then fired warning shots. Coast Guardsmen boarded the Apollo and seized 14 tons of marijuana and seven Colombians along with the vessel, which was declared stateless. Seizure of the Adina: The Haitian-registered Adina, a 150-foot coastal freighter, was first sighted by a Coast Guard HU-25 helicopter. The cutter Unimak (WHEC- 379) assumed surveillance, waiting for a pickup boat that never arrived. The
Lessons learned from each “bust”— like this boarding of the bogus and marijuana-laden Apollo III—by the sea services and federal agencies could be shared at a national interdiction operations school.
ability to place better-trained people in responsible positions throughout the interdiction hierarchy.
There are other reasons for honing U. S. interdiction expertise. Several recent U. S. military actions have required the securing of a coastal flank from the dangers of enemy infiltration, over an extended period of time. In Vietnam,
Unimak then sought and obtained consensual boarding. Examination of the Adina's cargo hold revealed approximately 1,000 bales of marijuana. A statement of no objection was sought and finally received, but by that time the Adina was steaming seaward jettisoning marijuana. The Unimak fired warning shots, stopped the Adina, arrested the crew, and effected seizure. Only residue of the marijuana cargo remained on board; however, the Unimak pulled 14 bales from the water.
Seizure of the Ocean Overture: The
Ocean Overture, a British vessel, was first sighted by the cutter Hamilton (WHEC-715) 200 miles southeast of Martha’s Vineyard, Cape Cod. Boarding was refused. The Ocean Overture was resighted by the Point Jackson (WPB- 82378) 20 miles southwest of Martha’s Vineyard. The Point Jackson trailed the Ocean Overture for 36 hours toward Newport, Rhode Island, before the suspect vessel turned south. After receiving
Lebanon, and Grenada the need for preventing enemy smuggling from the sea was both real and persistent. Moreover, there are a host of potential scenarios that would involve similar blockading operations. The Navy’s special boat units are the most likely practitioners of any future coastal combat interdiction operations. They currently benefit from the Coast
a statement of no objection under agreement, Coast Guardsmen h°ar the vessel and seized 126 bales of 1,1
Seizure of the Compass Rose: A rest of Cape Cod called the local authority report a strange vessel anchored ofjs The authorities notified the Coast Gu But when a Coast Guard utility m launch approached the Compass R°s ^ board her, she weighed anchor, hea^e toward shore, and was set on fire- j Coast Guard rescued the vessel seized about five tons of marijuana- , Seizure of the Ida II: The . " g. coastal freighter Ida II (Panamanian istry) was first sighted by an HU-27 copter. The Active (WMEC-618) ,n , cepted the freighter and °^tal ^
watcn discussions oi strawy —- (C
tics. While there has recently been a ( lively exchange of information, it ® ^ substitute for a centralized inter^1(iefil training program, which would be the Coast Guard and Navy alike.
Perhaps the most threatening Pe
tetbom» * lct'0n challenge is that of wa- for jn errorists. Sadly, the forecast is home terrorist activity closer to
put off n 6 ^n'tec* States cannot afford to eagcr t preParations to interdict terrorists nerahif. 6nter t*le cour>try along our vul- In h S6a frontier-
iea| reafv °n’ econom'c trends and polit- level of Pred'ct a sharply increased States. -n?mi8ration to the United tian Jvii„ 6 Caadenges of the current Hai- 0perativH!,nt Int,erdiction Operation, co- the im ■ y run hy the Coast Guard and vice, an<^ Naturalization Ser-
°f much I 6 more than a foretaste cadre of ar®er things to come. A trained in Place t lntcrd'ct'on specialists must be 0 meet a potential human deluge.
Finally, an interdiction training facility could also be used to train our allies. They face similar threats to their borders, but lack our experience in combating them. In addition, the enhanced ability of other countries to prolice their own shores could reduce the threat directed toward the United States.
Admittedly, supporting legislation will be needed to overcome legal hurdles impeding the use of such a school to train foreign and domestic civilian law enforcement personnel. Nevertheless, such legislation should be easily passed in light of the current public disgust with international narcotics trafficking.
Better trained interdiction managers and operators cannot but help lead to more successful interdiction operations. Establishing a National Interdiction Operations School can help make that goal a reality.
A frequent contributor to the Proceedings, Lieutenant Abel graduated from the U. S. Coast Guard Academy in 1979. His tours of duty include boarding officer engaged in narcotics interdiction in the USCGC Reliance (WTR-615) and commanding officer of the Point Warde (WPB-82368). He was the senior instructor at the Coast Guard’s Maritime Law Enforcement School. He is currently the commanding officer of the Manitou (WPB-1302), one of the new 110-foot Island-class cutters designed specifically for offshore interdiction operations (see “The Coast Guard’s New Island in the Drug War,” Proceedings, February 1986, pp. 109-110).
Advanced Technology or Mythology?
Hear Ad ■ " " ---------------- —------------------------------------------------------------------
miral W. c. Barnes, U. S. Navy (Retired)
StyATH, C Ttull shape that provides a eads to it • Scaheeping advantage also s major problems, it is well to
l’ (ktober 1973
Vanced” ej.ConcePt in the world of “ad- braced hS ^as ^ecn so warmly em- Waterph,ny t*16 8ud'ble as the small People w IT3 tWin hul1 (SWATH) ship, ship de ■' or no understanding of
lhe Navv^n ave hailed the SWATH as table naV;H S”'P.°f the future. Even repu- a*most ev Hrc*1'tects have extolled it for bom srnnl*|Cry conceivablc application, t0n aircraft SUrve'dance buoys to 90,000- ^kgrnn^ i carr'ers- Regardless of their have one th'S’ N advocates seem to eXa8°erat ^ *n common: a tendency to ^0ssinp C SWATH’s virtues while
T° be sV6r Usfaults- e>ltremeivUre’ 3 "SWATH does one thing hy Waves a6**’ res'sts moti°n caused 'n a seaw S 3 result’d's much steadier ^'atain ^ t*lan a monohull and it can damage ®feater speed without causing ever, t|le°r extreme discomfort. HowS feat/6 1S a widespread notion that 'n additjQre *S 3 Pure windfall—a bonus a convenr t0 t*le usua* characteristics of 6Ver> SWat a* rnono*lud- 'n iact’ how- °T ship de " illustra‘es an old principle ci1aracteriS^n: Undue exaggeration of one ^gfadatin 1C °^ten msnlts in undesirable kCt Put ;?n,°^ others. One naval archi- °uilt t(,at <d,Tferently: “When a ship is exPerienc ^>CS Tar beyond the existing k^inarilv6^ 3Se’ s°mething unexpected had.-* y happens, and ordinarily it is
Sin
1 Marbu .
Iry and a ’ Si null! Prototypes of Ships—
"“&al Example,” Naval Engineers define terms. A SWATH is a ship with two separate, fully submerged hulls connected by narrow, surface-piercing struts to an upper hull that is some distance above the water. The submerged hulls, usually cylindrical, provide most of the buoyancy. Since the struts have very little volume, a passing wave has little effect on a SWATH’s total submerged volume and, hence (by Archimedes’ Principle), on the buoyant force on the ship. Thus, there is a relatively small force causing the ship to heave, roll, or pitch in a seaway—provided, of course, that the lower hulls remain submerged and the upper hull stays above the waves.
What most SWATH enthusiasts seem to ignore is that this type of hull exacts severe penalties in other ship characteristics. A SWATH is in many respects the worst possible way to build a ship. The penalties are such that there should be only one criterion for deciding to build a SWATH: if the ship absolutely must have low motion in order to accomplish its mission, and if that degree of motion can only be achieved by a SWATH, then build it and pay the price.
There are cases where this criterion may be met. For example, if one has to land helicopters on a 200-ton ship making 20 knots in sea state five, a SWATH may be the only answer. It may be attractive for ocean research vessels where low motion and the space between the hulls can greatly facilitate the handling of submerged sensors and manipulators. The same reasons could support SWATH for use as an ocean surveillance ship (T- AGOS), as planned by the Navy. The Coast Guard finds SWATH appealing for a small cutter patrolling in rough seas, a mission which places a premium on personnel comfort, the ability to maintain speed for effective pursuit, and greater ease and safety in coming alongside or boarding another vessel. The offshore oil industry employs semisubmersibles, a form of SWATH, as drilling rigs.
Nevertheless, the SWATH design introduces a host of problems:
- Excessive propulsion power: One of the SWATH myths is the notion that it is inherently fast. Actually, a SWATH requires more power than a monohull at the lower speeds where ships operate most of the time. The reason is that it has a greater wetted surface, subject to friction drag. If a monohull is thought of as a right circular cylinder floating with the waterline through its longitudinal axis, and a SWATH as two fully submerged cylinders of the same length and same total displacement, then a SWATH has approximately twice as much surface area as the monohull. Even though a SWATH has comparatively little wave-making resistance, this advantage is not enough to offset its excessive skin drag except at very high speeds, which ships seldom use. At cruising speed, a SWATH requires more power, uses more fuel, and has a lower cruising range than a monohull.
- Excessive draft: A SWATH inherently draws more water than a monohull. Using the example of the cylindrical hulls, it is obvious that a SWATH could have the same draft if its hulls were barely submerged. However, they must actually be submerged to a depth that will keep them covered in waves of whatever
Pitch'
to heel excessively in a sharp turn-1 . ing in a SWATH is even more of a P ^ lem than rolling, and can even be ind ^ by rapid deceleration, as in a crash The result is that a SWATH tends to . low very sluggishly in a seaway, P311 larly in following seas. 0
This low stability leads to sever^L^fll problems. The first is that a SWA^ needs submerged control surfaces m form of fins or flaps, and an auton1^ control system to provide adequate p namic stability in a seaway. The jt js Kaimalino has such a system; 'v*ien (jer- turned off, the ship’s motion is c°nSi-jj’s ably greater. To be sure, a SWA j characteristics are such that the co ^ surfaces are highly effective and ^
if
less, it should be remembered that
eight-foot seas, the tops of the hulls must be down at least four feet. While this might be only a minor annoyance in small sizes, it could pose a significant navigational problem in bigger ships and an impossible one in aircraft carrier sizes. Obviously, solutions such as loading the ship or taking on ballast after leaving port would pose additional problems. In any event, a SWATH presents a bigger submerged target—simply because it has more hull surface exposed to penetration. ► Excessive hull area: In addition to greater submerged surface area, a SWATH naturally has more total hull area than a monohull. This follows from two facts: first, a sphere has the least surface area per unit volume of all geometrical shapes; second, the smaller the body, the greater its surface area per unit volume. While a monohull is not a sphere, it resembles one more than a SWATH, and it is a single body. By contrast, a SWATH is distributed over a large territory, and it is essentially three smaller bodies, each having more surface area per unit volume, plus struts which approach the maximum possible surface area for the amount of enclosed space. The implications are that a SWATH hull requires more material, costs more, and
presents a bigger target area.
In addition, a SWATH structure is more difficult to design and construct. For a simple example, look at the superstructure. A monohull’s superstructure is distributed over—and supported by—the entire buoyant part of the hull, constituting essentially a continuous structure. A SWATH’s superstructure is a building perched atop two struts at its sides and unsupported in the middle. Furthermore, if the submerged hulls are connected by transverse structures of some kind— probably required for structural or control reasons—a SWATH’s longitudinal form resembles a hollow box, a shape that has poor lateral rigidity. These problems can undoubtedly be overcome. However, the penalties have yet to be fully assessed for a SWATH structure that will be reliable and as survivable as a monohull over a period of 30 years in the hostile sea environment. A potential for problems can be surmised from structural problems that have arisen in more conventional hulls such as the catamaran submarine rescue ships and the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG- 7)-class frigates.
► Extremely poor arrangement: A SWATH spreads out the ship’s functions into three main bodies, with considerable distance and poor access among them. This degrades arrangements in general, but it is particularly hostile to machinery. Because propulsion machinery is heavy and should be near the propulsors, it should be in the lower hulls. However, the narrow struts provide very little room for air intake and gas exhaust, and the problem is compounded by the extra depth of the lower hull, which increases the length and pressure drop of the ducts. In the case of gas turbines, which require large volumes of inducted air and exhaust gas, the problem is probably unsolvable. The SSP (stable semisubmerged platform) Kaimalino, for example, has its gas turbines in the upper hull, connected to
the propeller shafts by a long chain through the struts to the lower hulls- any case, locating propulsion macnin topside is inherently poor from the sta points of weight, the need for a l03’ angled drive train, and the vulnerabi ^ of both the drive train and the prime mo ers. Furthermore, the fuel supply mus piped from the lower hulls, which creases weight and vulnerability- ► Poor stability: Contrary to P°Pa misconception, a SWATH is not m
ently a highly stable platform, e -s
though it is a steady platform. S13*51' the tendency to return to normal ath after being disturbed; steadiness is ^ tendency to maintain a normal attitu ^ the face of disturbing forces. ^lU.pjn SWATH is the opposite of a monohu a seaway, a monohull is highly stablea(jy unsteady, while a SWATH is very s*e but low in stability. . u)|
This happens because the sam.etuft>- configuration that minimizes the dis ing forces on a SWATH also mjninl'uj. the forces which would restore its eq ^ librium after being disturbed. Althon? ^ SWATH tends to roll less than ^ monohull, when it does roll, it ten ^ maintain the heeled attitude and to & very slowly to its upright position-^ effect also manifests itself as a tend .
therefore be relatively small. Neve'
is going to stabilize the ship by tnec ^ cal means, fin stabilizers can a*s0 ijs, employed for this purpose in mono*1 ^ and they have proven very effect1 ,f reducing roll. In any case, a SWA . steadiness in a seaway does not cost-free. .^fl
A second problem is that a Sw ^ inherently suffers excessive change list, trim, or draft because of change the ship’s variable loads (fuel,^ st. [,1- water, ammunition)—an oil king’s njf mare. Ideally, at its full-load disp ment, the ship should float with the
120
Proceedings / SeptenU*’r
Stmjs'SU^!aCe a| about the midpoint of the sipnio ° rna‘ntain that position, every sated fCan‘Wei8ht loss m^t be compen- it Wou?, y a corresponding gain. Since clean h n bC unconscionable to provide lhe fuef aSt t0 match the total fuel load, fuiiv system will probably have to be °f °mpensated. This brings problems fuel contamination both of the
special tae ^a**ast water, together with
vent b(Ph°CpduUrCS and ecluiPment t0 Pre- haVe to . ' 1 “e fresh water tanks will
sated b h *ept or likewise compen- ti°n argy ahast. As stores and ammuni- aPplies ^pended> the same requirement selves • 0t only are the weights them- Critical1IT>.0rtant’ kut their distribution is effects r *0W stability exaggerates the It is Dr?n'lst and trim of any imbalance. ra,e co ,a i t*lat 'n a large ship an elabo- measurn h system would be required to 'hevarfhi amount ant* distribution of changed 6 *°ads’ compute the effects of sures >t’ and Prescribe corrective mea- system t even be necessary for the
Stil" be automat>c.
s *tsr*!* is excessive reac- firefipK.- 00t*'ng, owing to an accident, lng> or battle damage. Flooding
will cause inordinately large changes in list and trim, and compensation will be extremely difficult. For example, if all tanks must be kept full, there would be no way to counterflood. If a machinery space were holed, one might compensate for list by pumping out tanks in that hull, but this would very likely cause longitudinal imbalance and a severe trim problem. The “free surface effect” on reducing transverse and longitudinal stability will also be exaggerated, whether from flooding or from partially empty tanks of any kind. In any case, the SWATH’s hull design seriously compromises its ability to withstand and compensate for flooding, and thus compromises survivability.
Survivability is further compromised by the narrow struts, which severely restrict access to and from the lower hulls for firefighting, damage control, and emergency escape. They also make ammunition handling difficult and the train longer, thus increasing its vulnerability. Also, because of the inherent directional stability of the submerged hulls, a SWATH tends to have poor maneuverability and a large turning diameter. Maneuvering becomes particularly difficult if one shaft is out of commission.
The problems cited here have been briefly sketched. The point to remember is that these are not minor annoyances that can be solved by simple design modifications. They are significant problems that are as inherent in a SWATH as its good seakeeping.
SWATH is a gimmick that is new in concept but as old in principle as Archimedes; it is not advanced technology. Many of its purported virtues, apart from excellent seakeeping, are myths. What SWATH needs is less salesmanship, and more realistic, objective engineering exposition of boths its advantages and drawbacks.
Admiral Barnes graduated from the Naval Academy in 1945 and served in destroyers and minesweepers before becoming an engineering duty officer with the degree of naval engineer from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His ship design and engineering experience includes ten years in the naval nuclear propulsion program, where he was director of advanced development; a naval shipyard command; duty as deputy and fleet maintenance officer; and command of the Naval Ship Engineering Center, from which he retired in 1977. Rear Admiral Barnes is an executive scientist with ORI, Inc.
Th
? Command Master Chief
y C°mmand Master
Chief Robert H. Gooch, U. S. Navy
Th
lively np°mniand master chief is a rela- hist°rjCa|W l'de 'n the Navy. There is no the COm Precedent for one who advises Elating . and'.n8 officer (CO) on matters j°b was ° er,hsted men. In the past, this hianj an^krformed by the chain of com- Ho\vev v chief petty officers (CPOs). chief (Sr’pni1 the rates of senior
Cer (McPn 3nd master chief petty offi- that, (|,e ^.Were established. Before quentiy thSen'°r enhsted man was fre- his rrjg e chief master-at-arms and all
The c matCS were fellow CPOs' s°r Was °necPt °f a senior enlisted advi- tiUe CVojntroduced in the late 1960s. The °f the c Ved l° master chief petty officer •Haster chrtlrnand ar,d then to command C°n'rnantn* 1° addition to these
and f]eet evel titles, the titles of force
Accord'I'aSter c^'ef were created. fication t0 tde Navy enlisted classics Jescripfi°n, the C M/C “per- tiand 0n les as the advisor to the com- sPcciai enhsted matters. Functions as 'n areasSSlStant to t*le executive officer hiiuian °* retention, discipline, and tively tort<TS0Urces- Reports administra- acCess e executive officer with direct ^AVinct 6 cornmanding officer.” OP- 5400.37C further states that
the
The
them-
but show them how a successful CP
an<>
C M/C should not nag or lecture
gets things done. Taking the time
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with
can-
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sor, maintenance and material management c°°r
tor, chief master-at-arms, and has worked m resource management billets.
the C M/C will:
- Be the CO’s senior enlisted advisor
- Foster a better understanding of needs and viewpoints of enlisted members and their families
- Act as advisor to the CO on all matters relating to enlisted policy
- Assist the CO in matters pertaining to the welfare, health, job satisfaction, morale, use, and training of enlisted personnel in order to promote traditional standards of good order and discipline
- Provide a representative enlisted point of view
- Participate in ceremonies and in the reception of visitors
- Represent the command
Besides these duties, the C M/C is expected to participate in the functions of several boards and committees and help with the CPO and petty officer indoctrination courses.
What exactly is the C M/C’s place in the chain of command? Who works for him? And what is his relationship to the CO, the executive officer (XO), his fellow chiefs, and the crew?
The C M/C’s new situation is likely to differ from his experience at past duty stations. He is probably used to having a division of people working for him and a product to show for his efforts: a smoothly running shop, a group of highly motivated people, equipment that works, clean spaces, and well-written evaluations. Now he has no product, no people, no spaces, and no equipment. He has only his leadership ability, the tasks listed in the OPNAVINST, and—ideally—the backing of the CO and XO.
The C M/C takes precedence over all other enlisted members assigned to a particular command. His duties usually include serving as president of the CPO mess, attending many of the same meetings that the department heads and XO attend, and helping the chain of command work. When Master Chief of the Navy William Plackett said he would like to see the need for the C M/C program disappear, he meant that the chain of command is supposed to be the primary means of communication in the Navy— and it is too bad that the chain needs to be helped along with a C M/C program. Although the C M/C represents only the enlisted personnel, he has to work closely with all the officers to accomplish his mission. He is not located within the chain of command; he is off to one side.
Whom does the C M/C actually represent? Is he supposed to represent the sailors and be the command’s representative to the crew at the same time? Is he perceived as a “narc,” or the captain’s toady? Should he adopt an approachable, or authoritarian, manner? He is not a union representative, although many crewmembers may wish that he could be. He works for the CO and the XO, but he owes them a representative enlisted view of command policies—real feedback, not unthinking acquiescence. The C M/C provides an example to the wardroom crew of how a senior enlisted man should conduct himself. He can preach to the crew, provide advice to the CO, help the XO in his duties, and nag the CPO mess; but how he conducts himself will provide a stronger leadership example than all the words he could ever utter. In every situation, he must first ask, “What is best for the ship or station?”
The C M/C is certainly a man caught in the middle; he works for everyone. He may often find himself blamed by everyone for such perceived problems as: inequities, poor retention rates, unpopular policies, and lack of communication. He feels the pressure of the crew when they think they are being ill-used, and a personal sense of failure if the crew is not happy or not reenlisting at a high rate. To be successful, the C M/C must be sensible, sensitive, and able to communicate with all levels in the command. The C M/C has to use every bit of knowledge, sense, wisdom, strength, forebearance, and patience he has developed over the years. He must decide what to push, and when, and to what extent. He must also be a consummate politician.
Being considered a politician is insulting to most Navy people. It is generally thought that politicians seek only personal gain, often by cunning or dishonest means. However, the word “politician” may also mean one who is sagacious, prudent, expedient, and judicious. Thus, “political” can be good, if you want to get things done or make things better. To be equally responsive to all levels, from CO to recruit, takes real political skill.
Even with no one under his direct supervision, the C M/C must set a visible example to those in the command at the CPO indoctrination course (which he should teach) and at the petty officer indoctrination course (which he should supervise). Instruction at command training team activities, such as the Navy rights and responsibilities workshop, is another forum for the C M/C to use. He may also find himself filling in when needed—when an officer is on emergency leave or as a watchstander or division officer. He may have to help out in his technical area of expertise.
Dealing directly with the CO may be a frightening experience at first. The C M/C must know when to knock on the CO’s door, and when not to. A simple
memo to the CO may take care of ar(,u tine problem.
The C M/C and the XO give each other advice and backing, and provide eaj_ other with a sounding board. If ® C M/C is handling things well, the will want to consult him when mak™
policy- f .he
Having a good rapport with each ot department heads also helps with plans and programs the C M/C rmg have in mind. Department heads have power to make quick decisions ab° people and can cut through a great dea red tape for the C M/C. -
The C M/C should help guide and the division officers, and encourage e low CPOs to do the same. If the C M/ reasonable with the junior officers. 1 will support him and learn from him-
The ship can be run from the C ^ mess if a consensus can be reached any particular point of discussion. To CPOs, like junior officers, need gulj ance, but of a different kind. They ^ ready know how to be Navy men; d® they need to know how to be CP Here, more than anywhere else power of example works wonders-
having the patience to sort out every' the chiefs have to say about a Pr0? a(j- will produce the best, most seasoned vice in the ship. e
The first-class petty officers often an untapped reservoir of energy and sire to help. They appreciate being ^ volved, especially in things such as P officer indoctrination training- ^ rules for dealing with petty officer ^
- Pick only the very best example instructors.
- Be approachable and friendly crew, but not familiar.
- Know each of them as well as you
- Do not ever try to replace their ^ chief or anyone else in their chain ^ command. However, keep their h° y informed about what you learn so can be more effective leaders.
- Always listen to a crewmember- ..
This is the focus of the C M/C s J s knowing the moods, needs, and Prot,heI1i of the enlisted men, and handling 1 with knowledge and ability.
""
Master Chief Gooch enlisted in the Navy in ^ has served in the Henderson (DD-785) (CLG-8), Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. (DD-850)»»9). V. Ricketts (DDG-5), and MacDonough (p*: ^ fre He is currently the Command Master Chic Capodanno (FF-1093). Besides his duties as a ^j- technician, he has been an instructor, course •>