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Can the Coast Guard save itself?
Why is the Coast Guard always in danger of being scuttled? Perhaps it’s because the Coast Guard is small, and therefore an easy target for budget reductions and funding freezes; or, because Coast Guard missions are too numerous and complex to define easily; or, because the Department of Transportation (DoT) does not support the Coast Guard as the Department of Defense (DoD) supports the other services. For whatever reasons, the Coast Guard spends an inordinate amount of time and energy trying to retain and sustain already inadequate resources. Thus, the Coast Guard can’t devote enough time to show the nation that it provides many tangible and unique benefits to our country—providing more services to the public than its $2 billion budget suggests.
This difficulty is exacerbated by the Coast Guard’s public affairs manual, which states that all promotional news is suspect and must be avoided; and that the Coast Guard should not devote itself to improving its image. If the Coast Guard provides balanced information to the media—so the theory goes—the image takes care of itself. Considering the intense competition for agency survival generated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Remember David Stockman’s attempt to dismantle the Coast Guard?), DoT (the Secretary’s office has made noises about “civilianizing” the Coast Guard), and the congressional enactment of Gramm-Rudman, it is crystal clear that the Coast Guard must revamp this passive approach.
The Coast Guard budget is miniscule when compared with the other armed services’, and our public affairs budget is barely large enough to buy even 30 seconds of TV commercial time during the Super Bowl. However, the media already cover some at-sea rescues, especially those in dangerous weather; oil spill cleanups; drug interdictions; and helicopter medical evacuations. Recently, it received invaluable coverage during Liberty Weekend at New York harbor. And of course, the Coast Guard was covered widely during the search
for pieces of the space shuttle.
During the Challenger search, the nation watched the Coast Guard recover much of the shuttle, demonstrating its recovery capability and its rapid, expert response to an emergency situation. The armed service with the smallest budget and the least amount of resources once again demonstrated its “can do” spirit. But, with the cut in resources resulting from Gramm- Rudman, and those proposed by certain OMB initiatives, the Coast Guard “can do” spirit is now in danger of being extinguished.
The current administration and the public still haven’t received the message: The Coast Guard is an armed service, with significant wartime and peacetime defense missions and impressive drug interdiction credentials. With the new Maritime Defense Zone role for the Coast Guard come even more defense responsibilities—other vital programs will probably be cut to accommodate the necessary budget increases for this. So why aren’t we included in the Reagan defense buildup?
If the Coast Guard is to survive, it must campaign now to tell the public, lawmakers, and purse-string holders who and what it is, and what it does. The Coast Guard can’t afford to wait for national disasters to give it press coverage, with little control over how the press handles its story and in what light they show it. The Coast Guard must run a better public affairs program, and not be driven aground by the winds of chance.
There is a terrific television commercial (that I have seen only twice, regrettably) showing a Coast Guard helo medevac—it’s a good start in the right direction. The Coast Guard must reverse the lack of serious push crippling its public affairs program. If the Coast Guard doesn’t have the money for television time, then it should find another way to get publicity.
The Coast Guard must do a better job of public affairs at the national level. (Anyone who saw Ted Turner’s terribly outdated program on 4 July 1985 entitled “Defense of Freedom,”— which attempted to show the modem Coast Guard and failed miserably—will
agree!) With enough push from a Pu lie affairs champion, the Coast Guar^ could have negotiated itself into D° j advertising campaign, despite the 1 Joint Recruiting Advertising Counc1 decision to shut it out of large-sca e DoD ad campaigns. The Coast Guar should still try to jump on that ban wagon: Its $680,000 public affairs budget obviously can’t compete wi the Air Force’s $17.5 million, the Navy’s $22.2 million, or the Army s $83.3 million budget. The Coast Guard’s lack of identification with other armed services probably p'3}?. more than a minor role in its inabt to get its message across to the ad istration, OMB, and DoT. a
In the Navy, public affairs enj0)'^ position of recognized prominence- Chief of Information oversees the 1e Navy public affairs program. In ™ ’ the Coast Guard’s parent agency, public affairs effort is highly p'aCL and divided into two subdivisions each managed by an Assistant Secre tary! Public affairs at Coast Guard
Headquarters is not accorded the
same
level of prominence: It is placed c3 ously low in the organization (3t 1 division level), under the office
of
Boating, Public, and Consumer
Affair*'
We must increase the visibility
of
as-
public affairs in the organization, signing a flag-rank officer with un vided responsibility for the task- must also revise the public affair*. ual to define public affairs as a ^?lS ny, as well as a responsibility. And ft
talent
into what is now often seen as a end field with no future.
ora1
we must infuse new, dynamic
-not to mention dem0 izing—that in the midst of increase defense spending, the smallest setW^ continues to have the largest survi problem. The erosion of Semp?r vV. Paratus to “Semi-Paratus” is a ing, dangerous public perception [0 requires a new information progr3 overcome it. The executive and le§ £ tive branches of our government
It’s ironic-
niust who
hear the correct message about • ^
and what the Coast Guard is and ^ from the public as well as we Coa to attempt to ward off the budgeta axe-wielders.
134
Proceedings / Sep11’1