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The PHMs had to win some bureaucratic battles to gain their place in the fleet. Now the struggle must continue, to best exploit the offensive punch of these speedy combatants.
The patrol combatant missile (hydrofoil) (PHM) has had a brief but stormy history. The program, first initiated in 1969 as a joint effort to build 30 NATO hydrofoils, eventually produced six U. S. PHMs with the last one commissioned in 1983. Despite being the orphans of the fleet and small in both size and numbers, the PHMs can make significant contributions if we employ them to exploit their full capabilities.
The primary difference between the PHM and other patrol craft is her speed. When foilborne, the PHM can easily attain speeds in excess of 45 knots, and she can maintain those speeds in waves up to 13 feet (sea state six).1 Foilborne propulsion is provided by an LM-2500 gas turbine, identical to the ones in the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) and Spruance (DD-963) classes. Two diesel engines provide hullbome propulsion at speeds up to 13 knots. A combination of the two forms of propulsion is ideal for sprint/drift tactics.
The PHM has a range of about 1,700 nautical miles hullborne, and 700 foilborne.2 She can travel about 14 hours on foils before requiring fuel. Assuming fuel is readily available, the PHM is further restricted in endur ance by the size of her crew, which consists of four ot > cers and 17 enlisted men. The PHM is designed to support a five-day mission, with most of the crew standing watc on/watch-off. After five days, the crew routinely require8 two days’ rest. This cycle can be repeated three time8 before maintenance requirements dictate a two-wee stand-down.3 Therefore, the PHM is best suited for opera tions near a base or a mother ship of some type to provl the necessary crew and maintenance support. .
The PHM’s small crew size requires that most mainte nance and support activities be provided by off-ship PeI^ sonnel. As a result, the PHM program has spawned unique organization, the Mobile Logistic Support Group (MLSG). MLSG personnel augment the ship’s force accomplish all but the most routine preventive and correC, tive maintenance actions. The MLSG also provides a ministrative, clerical, medical, and supply support funC tions for the PHMs. The only drawback to this concept i8 the PHMs’ almost total dependence on the MLSG. They require some type of this support whenever they opera
The History of the PHM
In 1967, small, nimble Egyptian patrol boats employed antiship missiles with success against the Israeli destroyer Eilat. Admiral Horacio Rivero, then-Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, became convinced of the need for an allied countermeasure to this significant threat. In response to Admiral Rivero’s efforts, a NATO “mission needs document” was drafted in 1969 and an exploratory, “pre-feasibility” study group under the NATO Naval Armament Group (NNAG) was formed.
Within the NNAG, the representatives of the NATO navies believed the development of a new class of ships had to fulfill two needs. First, the NNAG suggested an increase in the number of ships based in the Mediterranean “to accommodate the ultimate effects of attrition” from major naval battles. Thus, the new naval platform would have to be relatively inexpensive. As its second goal, the NNAG called for a platform which would be very survivable without much outside support.
These two goals resulted in a description of the new naval platform as a small ship which would be able to defend herself using “speed and maneuverability.” As David Oiling and Richard Merritt state in their history of
PHM design development, “in meeting the requirements of the participating governments, and in particular the U. S. Navy, it was determined that the minimum displacement that could do the job was . . . 228 tons.”1 This relatively small displacement allowed the NNAG to consider hydrofoils and ultimately to determine that a “PHM with fully submerged foils was the answer to the operational requirements of a common, fast patrol boat, capable of carrying surface-to-surface missiles.”2 This program faced two major hurdles. First, NATO had to garner political support for funding the PHM. In addition, NATO had to solve the technical problems associated with developing the equivalent of a “ship supported by an airplane-style wing.”3 As Commander David Patch, a recent PHM program coordinator, stated, “Originally quite a few [NATO] nations were playing with the idea, but they were not willing to commit a vast amount of dollars to the program.”4 By early 1971, many of the previously interested parties had dropped by the wayside. By 1972, only three nations— the United States, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany—remained interested, and they executed a Memorandum Of Understanding for design and development of a NATO PHM.
This agreement established a NATO project office in the United States which consisted of members of the three nations’ navies, who would mo tor the hydrofoil’s research and deve opment. The United States planned finance its share of development and the building of the lead ship, while West Germany and Italy agreed to co tribute their fair shares of the funding required to complete the ship’s deve' opment. In return, West Germany an Italy would receive a “production da package”—a set of blueprints, drawings, and other technical documents which would allow them to build the PHM—and the United States would retain two prototypes. .
The Boeing Corporation received t contract for the development of the * patrol hydrofoil in November 1971- solve the requirements of a small, naval vessel, Boeing borrowed techno ogy from various existing platforms- ^ The company adapted the Harpoon an tiship missile system planned for the
Navy’s P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft. For naval gunfire support, Boeing adapted the lightweight Mk-92 l>r control system from the USS Talbot (DEG-4) and the Mk-75, 76-mm. gUI| from the Italian Swordfish-class patro vessel. Boeing used its experience m building previous hydrofoils and rehe
firep °U^ pHM is a small hull, she is not without gun °W?r' ,^er armament consists of the Mk-75 76-mm. Mk qtV harpoon antiship missiles. She has the face hre C°ntro1 system (FCS) and the AN/SPS-63 sur- chaffy-h radar, along with rapid blooming on-board car^u-,. . ^ and an electronic support measures (E
CaPabilit
•y.H
MLsy°m lheir home base for an extended period. The Well r 0perates from two dozen vans or air-conditioned, boxe hand comforta^le Container Express (CONEX) sea u/h 3re easi'y transportable by truck, plane, or an iyj, y small numbers of PHMs are forward-deployed, temn ^ detachment will go along and operate from a meP°5ary advanced base. This type of advanced deploy- effecti\US ^een conducted several times and has proved
(ESM)
born 6 •^ ^as a drafr °f n*ne feet when foilborne. Hull-
but th' ^°ds l°wered, the draft increases to 23 feet, pHlvi2 aCep ^ods and low silhouette combine to give the vess imacb greater stability than one would expect of a 0 ber size. Hullborne with the foils up, draft is six
feet. This is the normal configuration for entering and leaving port.
The PHM is designed to conduct antiair warfare (AAW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW). As an AAW platform, the PHM is adequate at best. While her primary defense lies in her speed and agility, the Mk-75 gun, when linked with the Mk-92 FCS, is capable of shooting down some expected incoming missiles. In addition, the PHM’s RBOC capability can be used as a passive measure to outwit incoming missiles. Primary detection of threats is from the Mk-92 FCS, followed by a limited ESM suite and the AN/SPS-63 radar. The PHM does not have Link-11, and, therefore, cannot easily share targeting information with other ships. She is definitely not the vessel of choice for protecting the high-value aircraft carrier from an air threat.
The PHM is much better suited for ASUW, primarily because of her potent Harpoon missiles. She is a small, expendable, heavily armed craft capable of destroying much larger and/or more heavily armed ships.5 Although over-the-horizon targeting is preferable in bringing these missiles to bear on a target, the PHM has the speed and
By Ensign Stephen R. Chapin, U. S. Navy
uPon thp *
first arm ame des'Sn f°r foils that had 2). EXpared on the Tucumcari (PGH- Used tf,Crience *n building aircraft was to Powe'T' 'b® LM-2500 gas turbine with th kC Sb'P’ and to couple this Veloped f ydrauh®s that had been de- the spirit °f ^ Poe‘n8 747 aircraft. In aH dime • 3 trufr international vessel, *engths Tk°nS Were measured in rnetric s'§n. whi radar was °f Italian de- tal Con( 1 e ihe gyroscope, environmen- enginesr0 system> and auxiliary diesel CorriPanies"re made by West German
P /* •
MiX: i*°and Procurement Do Not co-prod ■ Ita>y dropped plans for to suppy01'011’ but decided to continue financial 'he devel°Pment program Pr°dUcf ^ ln *be interest of receiving a the dev'?0 des*8n package at the end of time, \y °Pment process. At about this the Unif6^ <3ermany indicated that if duce th 6 u tates did not decide to proNaVy ® shiP for use in the U. S. duction p0ldd be unable to afford pro- f'Hkj p ontmander George Jenkins, estimate','8''3111 Coordinator (1976-78), German *^at by December 1976, West Uted $|t 3nd haly had each contrib-
By i atillion to the project.5 garneretj6.*^b> ^ PHM program had ceivjn th-6 Davy’s support. After rets support, the request for funding had to pass through the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), before being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval. At this time, the PHM met a major funding challenge. This challenge, however, did not center on the
PHM’s ability to perform her mission. Commander Jenkins was convinced that the personalities involved, more than any lack of merit of the platform, threatened the program’s future. The DSARC recommended disapproval of the PHM package to the Secretary of
roc<*di„
The Aquila (PHM-4) shows off the PHM’s dramatic asset— speed. But high-speed operation limits the craft’s endurance. So does the limited size of the crew—here, two of the PHM’s four officers and one of the 17 enlisted men in the combat information center. Still, off-ship personnel operating from easily transportable Container Express (CONEX) boxes, such as these at Key West, Florida, can provide the support the PHMs require.
agility to close on a target rapidly for visual confirmation, fire her weapons, and depart quickly. An inexperienced radar operator could quite possibly mistake the PHM for a low-flying helicopter. Any type of off-ship targeting information naturally increases the PHM’s chances of survival by allowing the Harpoon to be launched at its maximum range.
The mission statement for the PHM is contained in the PHM-1 Class Tactical Manual (NWP 65-1-22):
“In peacetime, to conduct surveillance, screening, and special operations; in wartime, to operate offensively against major surface combatants and other surface craft.”
The PHM is capable of conducting many tactical missions, including the following:
the
nd
importance of inflationary factors, al a reduction in Boeing’s ability to achieve economies of scale.
As Ottis Bullock stated in his repn to the Boeing Company on the deve - opment of a hydrofoil hull, ‘‘Neither the technology of the ship-building m dustry, nor the aircraft industry worke well for a welded-aluminum platform
Defense. PHM program advocates called upon the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) to expound upon the international importance of this shipbuilding program. After listening to ISA arguments, the Deputy Secretary of Defense supported PHM funding over the objections of the DSARC.
In January 1977, there was a change in administrations. Almost immediately upon entering office, President Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, decided to take the PHM program under “advisement.”6 Next, Brown cancelled funding for the PHM squadron support ship, the USS Wood County (LST-1178). And, in April 1977, he decided to cancel the entire program. At this time, true to their promise, the West Germans declared they would be unable to enter into PHM production. Commander Jenkins stated that until the U. S. withdrawal, the West Germans had planned to order “at least eight ships from Boeing.”7 Thus, in April 1977, the hydrofoil’s fate had been decided—or so it seemed.
Adding a further twist to this unorthodox acquisition process, one could make an argument that President Richard Nixon reversed the fortunes of the hydrofoil and saved the PHM program. During his term as President, because he refused to spend the funds that Congress had allocated for certain programs, Congress passed the National Budgeting Impoundment Act of 1974. This law states that if the President does not desire to spend appropriated funds for programs, he must submit a Memorandum of Recision to Congress asking it to abrogate the approved funds. This requires a Bill of Recision, which is essentially an amendment to the appropriated act. If no action is > taken by the House within 45 legislative days, the President must then spend the money for the purpose originally stated in the appropriations act.
Because Congress had already approved funds for the PHM, Secretary Brown, via President Carter, provided the memorandum, and a Bill of Recision was drafted. The future of the Navy’s PHM acquisition looked bleak because the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) was somewhat hostile to the program for earlier cost increases. But, several key personalities helped change this situation. First, Congressman Norman D. Dicks (D- WA), of the district in Washington where Boeing was to build the ships, spoke highly of the vessels and urged the committee to defeat the bill.8 But, it is from one of President Carter’s own appointees that the greatest support for the program came. The fonr>e president of Southern Railroad, then Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr., had sent two detailed memoranda to the Secretary of Deten prior to Brown’s April decision urging him to allow the PHM program to Pr° ceed. Following the April decision, Claytor was bound to support his sen before Congress. However, his mem found their way to the HAC staff an were read into the record before Claytor’s testimony was given. With a vote of nine to one, the committee re jected the Bill of Recision, and the PHM program prevailed against Brown’s attempts to dismantle it- The delays (the production contrae* was not signed until October 1977, eight months after the scheduled awar and three months after the failure or recision) took their toll in increased costs. The vacillations led to an exace bation of the weaknesses of the ’ ^7' before-buy” policy, an increase in
82
Proceedings / September
Of
m the h
■ evel°pment of a first vessel,
'gl.tchPePCCti°ns and technological series S C0ldd be worked out before uhimaM°dUCtion commenced. Although fr°m ae y bus theory did hold true
c°ntract ee^no'°8'cal viewpoint, many “depen(?rS believed that this program the ijfe sfon annual appropriations over to irtsu ° des'gn construction . . . fore rPe,funding °f the PHM, it there-
recluired of the
an inordinate preoccupa-
tion
that flies ft, .
mission !hrou§h the water and fills the the nefS • a Warship”9 Because of PHM m?1VCC* technical risk of the to pUr e defense Department decided This co 3 "f>y'before-buy” program, type l aeePt involves building a protoThus or® Pursuing full production. rather Jr° .ct*on proceeds in a series creasin ai1 ’n parallel, significantly in- builH Atae am°unt of time required to
lieved PePartrnent of the Navy be- i tpe rfpat by using the lessons learned any ergy ,,)0 ® Program managers’ en- Cos( of th n add'b°n> any change in the $2 man™?defense system in excess of Pf°Val 'f11 annually required the ap- tees Tu four congressional commit- cuitie 6 'nberent technological diffi- deveio aSsoc'ated with the hydrofoil’s price ,rcnt C0UW easily cause the fluctuat pSearcb and development to e $2 million beyond initial projections. Thus, the “fly-before-buy” program, which required an extended time span, was particularly affected by political constraints.
The changes in political support also directly affected the hydrofoil’s price tag by forcing the labor costs of the vessel up the “escalation ladder.” The projected cost of the PHM included a provision for “a projected increase in the cost of man hours and material” over the span of the production contract.11 As a result of the delays caused by the defense establishment’s indecisiveness, $15 million was added to the cost of the program, reflecting high inflation rates over the production period. This extra money was not added to the hydrofoil program budget. For this reason, the Gemini (PHM-6) was delivered to the Navy without a weapons suite. She did not receive her Harpoon missile, gun, and fire control system' until about a year after commissioning. Funding for this effort was made available from other defense appropriations. But the increase in the cost of the hydrofoil also influenced Congress (1972-76) to reduce its original goal of 30 PHMs to the current number of six. This reduction impinged upon Boeing’s ability to realize economies of scale to lower the average unit cost. Therefore, paradoxically, Congress’ effort to reduce the overall price tag only added to the average unit cost of the hydrofoils.
‘Gene Meyers and J. Thomas Coates, “Tactical Deployment of Hydrofoils,” Naval Forces (No. 1, Vol. II), p. 3.
2David Oiling and Richard Merritt, “Patrol Combatant Missile Hydrofoil—Design Development and Production—A Brief History,” High Speed Surface Craft (January/February 1981), p. 6. 3Norman Friedman, “Speed in Modem Warships,” Proceedings, May 1979, p. 150. interview with Cdr David Patch, USN, PHM Program Coordinator, 18 April 1985. interview with Cdr George Jenkins, USN (Ret), PHM Program Coordinator, 1976-78, 6 May 1985.
6Alan Zimm, “PHMs: Unique Ships, Unique Problems,” Proceedings, February 1982, p. 91. 7Ibid.
8Jenkins.
9Ottis Bullock and Brian Oldfield, Production PHM Hull Structure Producibility Design (Seattle, WA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1976), p. 2.
10Karl Duff, Henry Schmidt, and Michael Terry, “The NATO Patrol Missile Hydrofoil (PHM) Ship and Weapons Systems Technical Evaluation Programme,” Journal of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 1976, p. 43.
Ensign Chapin graduated from the Naval Academy in 1985. He was assigned to the Political Science Department at the Naval Academy. In December 1985, he received a master of arts degree in National Security Studies at Georgetown University, after which he attended Surface Warfare Officer’s School. Ensign Chapin is currently serving in the USS Doyle (FFG-39).
Some Tactical Considerations
minimal exposure. Seizing the initiative, going on the offensive, and stnK ing unexpectedly are the PHM’s decided advantages in any engagement- The diversification of our naval ca-
In narrow seas, where there is opportunity for rapid deployment and tactical surprise, both the PHM’s underway speed and the extremely brief plant light-off time pose advantages.
For example, the PHM can transit from her home port of Key West to the Windward Passage in little more than half a day, or to Havana Harbor in less than two hours, and have control of the time and place of a potential surface engagement.
Coordinated operations with aircraft can result in over-the-horizon targeting for the PHM—from fixed or rotary wing, land- or sea-based Navy or Air Force assets. This is important to consider, since the range of the Harpoon missile is quite a bit greater than that of the PHM’s active and passive sensors. A light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) Mk-III helicopter, for example, with its 160-nautical-mile radar horizon, operating from an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided
missile frigate, can make the PHM into a formidable force multiplier.
The PHM is a suitable, low-cost vessel for acting as a positive identification waypoint for friendly aircraft returning from airstrikes ashore, capable of self-defense and loitering on station, and adequately equipped electronically, needing only a minor upgrade in air control training. Air superiority is necessary in this scenario.
Based on unclassified reports of some of the Pegasus’s early transits, and more recent movements of all six PHMs throughout the Caribbean, the PHM combat radius is somewhere between 250 and 350 nautical miles, depending on whether the PHM is hull- borne or foilbome, on her activity once on station (engagement, loiter, tattletale), and on the at-sea fueling possibilities. Control of the seas throughout this radius is not envisioned, but certainly denial of such an area to an enemy is likely.
The accompanying map shows areas in the Caribbean where the PHM can conduct denial operations: from U- 6- naval installations (Guantanamo, R°°' sevelt Roads, Key West); from friend) countries where successful naval exercises have recently been conducted; °r from a mobile center of operations wi the participation of a support ship- What is the value of speed in this concept of operations? Speed enhances search and pursuit capabilities and the positioning for antisurface warfare strikes against naval or merchant targets with relatively high cruising speeds in their own right. Speed complicates the enemy’s fire control lem (tracking and classification). Spet enables the PHM to cover large areas and return to base after attack with
the use of an airborne spotter, especially one with capabilities. The advantage lies in the speed and range
of
the
- Geographic area surveillance (coastal, straits, narrow seas)
- Choke point interdiction
- Barrier patrol
- Sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection
- Surveillance of potentially hostile forces (Tattletale)
- Detecting and attacking enemy forces
- Detecting, tracking, and defending against local enemy air attacks
- Screening coastal convoys against surface attacks
- Screening large convoys during arrival/departure
- Special operations
Of these, the PHM can be put to best use in choke point interdiction, SLOC protection, and screening operations.
Choke point interdiction may be the ideal role for the PHM. This mission takes advantage of the PHM’s strengths and minimizes most of her weaknesses. In a typical scenario, a detachment of PHMs (typically one to three) would be assigned to patrol a strait or choke point, protecting friendly forces as they transit, and preventing hostile forces from using it. Depending on the choke point’s size, one or more PHMs might be on station in order to cover all navigable areas. Without other support— airborne spotters, for example—the PHMs would patrol in overlapping sectors, using radar. An alternative that might be used to surprise the enemy would be to patrol under electromagnetic radiation controlled (EmCon) conditions, relying on ESM intercepts. The PHM’s low profile when hullborne favors this tactic by reducing the enemy’s detection range.
When a target is detected, the PHM can either classify it
using ESM or go foilborne for visual confirmation. De, pending on the nature of the intruder, and the rules engagement then in effect, the PHM might respond anything from a warning to a Harpoon salvo. Against belligerent target, she would have to rely on her speed and agility, and her minor antiair warfare assets, \ protection. The emphasis in this scenario is on surpf1!> and speed.
Choke-point operations are significantly enhanced - 5 use of an airborne snotter esneriallv one with E-5 detection. After airborne ESM or radar intercepts, PHMs can close rapidly to the Harpoon’s maximum rall-L_ from their respective sectors. The aircraft could then coOf dinate a multiple-Harpoon time-on-target attack from 1 entire PHM squadron. The PHM’s lack of a Navy tactic^ data system (NTDS) requires that the shots be set up a° coordinated from the aircraft by voice.
Without air cover or larger friendly surface ships in 1 area, the PHM is vulnerable unless she strikes first al1 hard. Even with today’s radar, an adversary can be throv' into confusion by PHM operations at night—much 1 same as our torpedo boats operated during World War .
Depending on the choke point’s location, the PH^ would operate from an advanced base or mother ship- ' .. number of PHMs required to conduct these operations1 related only to the choke point’s width, or area, and 1 PHM crew’s endurance. On-station time would natural be extended by patrolling at the most economical hu borne speed. A ten-knot average would allow fuel t° seven days, which taxes crew endurance. However, actn
siles). Others have not (clandestine insertion of special warfare forces, search and rescue, planting sonobuoys). New developments should focus on those tasks that cannot be accomplished as efficiently by existing platforms. If the PHM cannot accomplish a new mission well, we should not expend efforts just for the sake of versatility.
By Commander Thomas H. Berns, U. S. Navy
The PHM has a solid mission. She is best used in a region which highlights her advantages, and does not stretch her to the limits of her shortcomings.
Commander Bems was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1968 and from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1969. He served in the USS Floyd B. Parks (DD-884) as Main Propulsion Assistant and Engineer Officer prior to attending the Naval Destroyer School. Subsequent sea tours included commanding officer of the USS Excel (MSO-439) and the USS Pegasus (PHM-1). Commander Bems recently completed a tour at the Naval Academy as Chairman of the Department of Leadership and Law. He is currently commanding officer of the USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7).
operatj
ipg a °ns have shown that the crew is capable of conduct- VVartimen~day m'ss*on—probably a more normal length in larger ^ ^Pr‘nt and drift tactics would be used to cover further^atr0^ areas- Use °ftbe advance base or mother ship from b 'ncreases on-station time, by reducing transit time The pTf base t0 tbe patrol sector. l°ng r can also operate in choke point areas as a Speed20^6 sP°tter f°r 3 shore battery of cruise missiles, targe,sand agility enable the PHM to detect and classify clear,. 0r tbe shore battery, and still be fast enough to an ij ? area before the cruise missile arrives on target— The^i SdUat*0n 'n areas where no air support exists. Key ur n*ted States currently bases its PHM squadron in point 6St’ ^0Iada, where it is available to conduct choke- Tassag^31'0118 'n tbe Straits of Florida and the Windward equai| an advance base, these forces would be
the <5/ e^cct've in such strategic areas as the Skagerrak, StraitfaU °* Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits, the Tsugaru bodje’ 3ac* tbc Straits of Malacca—all relatively narrow large 0 Water. The PHM would be less effective in very dom p ra*ts’ such as the Greenland-Iceland-United King- ^hok^’ °r tbe Korean Strait, increa 6 T°'nt °Perations alone build a strong case for The Pu lhe numbers of PHMs. i.e,(C also is well suited for SLOC protection— Close. 3Sta* sea'lanes as opposed to open-ocean sea-lanes. base Th Sea~janes allow the PHM to operate from a home is an 6 Pr'mary method used to protect these sea-lanes t'°narvVer*a^'n® barr*er °f PHMs, which might be sta- convoyv °rer a certain area or move along the SLOC with a y! like a screen. This barrier is in place to protect ships using the SLOC from a surface threat, and to some extent from an air threat coming from outside the barrier. This mission takes advantage of the PHM’s high speed and firepower. The PHM loiters in an assigned area along the SLOC, using her high speed to close on and identify possible hostile contacts. Again, depending on the rules of engagement, the PHM may use her Harpoon or guns to negate the threat.
These types of barrier operations are greatly enhanced by using aircraft as spotters. Since the PHMs are operating in coastal or adjacent waters, the aircraft would be land- based, freeing valuable sea-based assets for open-ocean escort. A squadron of PHMs could provide a moving screen completely along a coastal route or a given section of a SLOC. They could also provide protection while the convoy is entering or leaving port, or waiting in a marshaling area.
Screening of convoys, amphibious task groups, or battle groups is a much more complex mission, but— again—one suitable for the PHM. For this mission, the home base—in this case, a mother ship—is required to travel along with the convoy or battle group. The advantage in using the PHM in this role is that her high speed allows her to cover a large sector—an ideal use for sprint and drift tactics. The PHM can be used to sanitize areas ahead of the convoy, or operate along the axes of suspected surface threats. She offers a long-range probe capability when air assets are not readily available. In addition, her high speed allows her to move quickly to a launch zone for a multiple direction time-on-target Harpoon attack from various platforms of the battle group or screen-
ing element. Repositioning is quickly accomplished. The PHM can also serve as a mobile battery when escorting ships—such as merchant convoys—without long-range cruise missile capabilities.
We are talking primarily about defense against a surface threat. The ability to defend against an air attack has already been discussed, and, at present, the PHM has no antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability.
Other missions are suitable for the PHM. She is ideal for laying a sonobuoy pattern, if other assets are available to monitor the sonobuoys. This can be done in lieu of, or in conjunction with, ASW aircraft. The PHM is available for presence missions close to her home base. This has already been accomplished off Honduras and other Caribbean coastlines.
Using ESM capability and passive plotting techniques, the PHM’s agility allows her to move from one point to another quickly enough to provide her own triangulatlC,n of a contact. It also allows her to launch a weapon mofe accurately when target classification is not a problem-
The PHM can be used as a tattletale in areas cl°se enough to her home base. Diesel engines give her a fa'r' long on-station time. Foilbome, she has enough speed leave the area quickly should the need arise—despite t deterrent effect of the PHM’s Harpoons and guns.
An often-discussed future use for the PHM is that o minesweeper. Her Harpoon tubes could be replaced ) some type of high-speed sweeping gear—or a sled sim1 to the one pulled by minesweeping helicopters. The a vantage in this is the set of very different—even un'Qufwj acoustic, pressure, and magnetic signatures the * leaves when foilborne. Most mines are not set to dete these signatures, which leaves the PHM fairly invulne able to this threat.
86
It took the attack on Pearl Harbor for the U. S. Navy to appreciate the aircraft carriers’ full potential. The process of discovering the PHMs’ full potential need not be as costly.
In amphibious task group operations, the hydr0 . quickness makes her an ideal escort for the new ^ speed air cushion landing craft. In addition, the ^ a squadron is available for reconnaissance in force, °r t long-range sanitation sweep to keep hostile platforms of missile launch range. era-
Recently, the PHM has been conducting special op tions in a mission she was not designed for, but 0 which she has proved very effective. PHMs are rjda called upon for the war on drug smugglers off the r
Proceedings / Septenl*J
other scenarios, the PHMs can be used to lay
!raiIable
oy barriers for the FFG, if the proper receivers are
°bt;
the h' h^£ ‘s one °f the few craft capable of catching com * k Speed “cigarette” boats commonly used to haul and ashore. When linked with aerial spotters, the quick tS VeCtored 10 intercept the high-speed target. Her ment urn’n§ radius and special tactical navigation equip- ing svSUC^ aS hydrofoil collision avoidance and track- tap , em’ al*°w the PHM to use her slight speed advan- °utcl ° °Verta*<e the target, and the 76-mm. gun usually TheSSeS averaSe smuggler’s armament.
PHM/C ls yet another way to take advantage of the attack Strcn8ths while avoiding her weaknesses: the fast- bines SUrfaCe aCtion group (FASAG)- The FAS AG com- warsi? scluadron of PHMs with an antiair warfare-capable supn ta3t Can act as a m°ther ship, providing close-in of SL°rt and targeting information. Although many classes Cus.se(fSfC3n ^ ro^e’ lhe FFG-7 is most often dis- to su ' °r severa* reasons. First, she has adequate room grouPPort a detachment of the mobile logistic support tainin ^ °ne ^er helicopter hangars, while still main- requi g a h^0 capability. Should this helo capability not be the vo herause of other available platforms in the area, ars an G detachment can be expanded to fill both hang- ataoun deck. Second, there is a significant
the LM comrnonality between the two ships, such as aud th "x ^ gas turbine, the Mk-92 fire control system, alreacl° 76-mm. gun. This means that the FFG-7
P°rta ' Carr'es sPares for this equipment, and, more im carries trained technicians. Third, the and a 1 ”aS 3 stronS antiair warfare capability, Link-11, ling t^arge communications suite, useful both in contralto 6 and in operating with a main body.
grou aglae the FASAG operating as part of a carrier battle ASUW "e FASAG can be assigned a large sector for can coverage because of the PHM’s high speed. They tain °VC raptdly to station, then switch to diesels to main- foils °UrSe and sPeed with the battle group, switching to PHlvn^ 3nd dlen t0 Patr°l their sectors aggressively. The teries £C°mes an extension of the FFG’s sensors and bat- cati0 ,^e FFG s fine command, control, and communi- craftnS assets allow her to link with other ships and air- passj 'n the battle group, maintaining the big picture, and that information on to the PHMs. Passively, the generCan Use her AN/SQR-19 tactical towed array sonar to verse,ate surface contacts for the PHM to investigate. Con- infor FFG can use her data link to enter sensor
Base^1'011 from the PHMs into the battle group picture, the pu?n this coordinated information, the FFG can vector CaPab'r-S l° 'nvest'8ate targets or prepare for attack. ESM ti0n 'ltles °f each can be coordinated through triangula- c°m’..0 localize targets. The PHM’s Harpoons can be w‘th the FFG’s for time-on-target attacks. The the K ^ lhus becomes a multiple, long-range battery for ln au|e group.
S°aobu
ajn . The PHMs can become long-range probes to the i Vlsual verification of targets, or to provide over- ^SApZOn tarSeting using their ESM capabilities. The inn r G enjoys long time-on-station by providing refuel- r°m the FFG to the PHMs, and allowing the PHMs’ crew to rest after a five-day mission. The FFG can take one PHM in tow while the others are under way in their sectors.
By maintaining an overall picture during whatever mission the FASAG is assigned, the FFG can best use the PHMs where dictated by the threat or the mission. Thus, the FFG is an ideal platform from which the PHM squadron commander can best coordinate PHM operations.
Tactical employment of the PHM is a new science, which is receiving input from a very small portion of the naval community—but we are learning fast. Every mission, deployment, and exercise involving the PHM adds to our understanding of her capabilities and limitations. We must continue to develop missions for the PHM’s special capabilities.
The Soviets currently have approximately 40 hydrofoil craft, primarily of the Matka and Turya classes, missile ships capable of firing the SSN-2-C. China boasts 140 Huchuan-class hydrofoil torpedo boats. These are extremely capable platforms, and both countries have aggressively sold this type of ship to such Third World countries as Cuba, Albania, Tanzania, and Romania. Therefore, we can expect to see hydrofoils used against us in almost any future conflict. Every time we learn something new about how to use our own PHMs, we learn more about what to expect from the enemy. Every time we confront our own forces with hydrofoil tactics, we learn how to counter the tactics we will surely see from our enemies. Since our enemy outnumbers us in this area, we must exploit our superior use of tactics to counter his threat, and we must learn how to do this now, before it is too late.
In the 1920s and 1930s, our aircraft carriers were used close in to the battle line, strictly to scout for the battleships to provide targeting information. It took Pearl Harbor to change this stodgy thinking and to realize the carrier’s full potential. The PHM is at the same point in her development. Why is our philosophy limited to keeping the PHMs in the Caribbean?
At 75 to 100 million dollars a copy, we must find a way to apply this powerful ship to make the most of her contribution to force strength. The PHM is an offensive weapon—not a floating shore battery.
'LCdr Bruce R. Linder, USN, "Pegasus, Winner or Also-Ran?” Proceedings, September 1981, p. 39.
2LCdr Kendall King, USN, “The Not-So-Odd Couple,” Proceedings, April 1984, p. 126.
3Cdr Miles A. Libbey III, USN, “The Missing Link,” Proceedings, July 1982, p. 40. _
“Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet, 11th ed. (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1978), p. 15L
5Cdr Brent L. Gravett, USN, "Peter Tare and the PHM,” Proceedings, August 1984. p. 129.
Commander Williams graduated from Heidelberg College. He enlisted in the Navy before attending Officer Candidate School. He was commissioned in 1974 and served in the USS England (DLG-22). He graduated from Naval Postgraduate School with an MS in Computer Systems Management. After attending the Surface Warfare School Department Head Course, Commander Williams served in the USS Wadsworth (FFG-9) and was transferred to the USS England (CG-22). He was then stationed at Naval Sea Systems Command. He is currently serving as the Main Propulsion Assistant in the USS Iowa (BB-61).